Telecommunications (Security) Bill

Lord Clement-Jones Excerpts

Report stage
Tuesday 19th October 2021 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Clement-Jones]

2: Clause 2, page 4, line 30, at end insert—
“(7) In making regulations under this section and any code of practice made under section 105E the Secretary of State must take full account of the advice of the Technical Advisory Board established under section 105ZZ1 and of a Judicial Commissioner appointed under section 227 of the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 concerning the proportionality and appropriateness of any measures therein.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would require the Secretary of State to take into account the advice of the Technical Advisory Board, as established in the amendment in the name of Lord Clement-Jones to insert a new Clause after Clause 14, and a Judicial Commissioner.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, in moving Amendment 2 I will speak to Amendment 7. I add my welcome to both the Minister and the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe, in their new roles.

The Minister has now accepted in his Amendment 3 that there needs to be greater parliamentary scrutiny of codes of practice. I welcome that; I am just sad that Amendment 1 did not squeak through. However, he has not accepted the need for greater technical scrutiny of these codes. As the Minister’s predecessor, the noble Baroness, Lady Barran, said in Committee,

“the whole purpose of the regulations was to specify in greater detail what the duties of providers would be.”

Likewise, she said:

“The codes of practice will provide technical guidance to assist public telecoms providers in meeting their legal obligations.”—[Official Report, 13/7/21; cols. GC 488-93.]


However, as the industry has pointed out, there are no clear mechanisms for technical feedback or expertise to be fed into the drafting of the regulations and codes of practice.

The Minister dealt with these amendments himself in Committee. On the Clause 2 regulations, he assured us:

“Advice to the Secretary of State could”—


I emphasise “could”—

“also include relevant representations by public telecoms providers … DCMS continues routinely to engage with telecoms providers about this Bill and telecoms security more widely.”

He also said that

“Clause 3 requires that any codes of practice are finalised only after consultation with affected providers.”—[Official Report, 13/7/21; col. GC 499.]

Again, he gave no assurance of exactly with whom and how the consultation will take place, and he did not explain why he thought that a specific technical advisory board set up under this Bill was not appropriate. For that reason I have no hesitation in retabling these amendments for further consideration on Report.

As the noble Baroness, Lady Merron, pointed out in Committee, there is good precedent in the Investigatory Powers Act 2016, which

“established a Technical Advisory Board to advise the Home Secretary on the reasonableness of obligations imposed on communications providers.”—[Official Report, 13/7/21; col. GC 462.]

The judicial commissioners set up under that Act could be deployed under this Bill.

This is an opportunity for the Minister to demonstrate a much firmer and more inclusive approach to technical consultation. I hope that he will accept this amendment. I beg to move.

[Baroness Merron (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, for tabling Amendments 2 and 7 again on Report. I will not take up much time discussing them, not least because the Labour Front Bench tabled similar amendments in Committee better to understand what advice the Secretary of State will receive and where it will come from when making regulations under Clause 2. As the noble Lord said, we must ensure that the Secretary of State receives advice from the best experts, not just those who support the Government.

As the former Minister, the noble Baroness, Lady Barran, focused only on the incompatibility of a similar board set up by the Investigatory Powers Act, can the Minister today simply answer this question: without such a board, where will the Secretary of State receive advice, and from whom?

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for that very helpful reply. I think he has gone as far as he can, without accepting my amendment, to try to give assurance to the industry about the nature of the consultation. I still believe that something more formal is required but I am not going to quibble about the sharing of ambition. I am sure that is right. The question is whether in practice we are going to get the result we need. The proof of the pudding will be in the eating and we will see how the regulations and the codes of practice turn out in the end. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 2 withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Clement-Jones]

6: Clause 13, leave out Clause 13
Member’s explanatory statement
This would remove Clause 13 (Appeals against security decisions of OFCOM) from the bill.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, a lack of oversight has been a persistent theme through the passage of this Bill. Included within that is judicial oversight and the fact that under Clause 13 any appeal to the Competition Appeal Tribunal cannot take account of the merits of a case against the Secretary of State. The rationale for this, as the Constitution Committee said in its report,

“is unclear and is not justified in the Explanatory Notes.”

It further said:

“The House may wish to ask the Government to justify reducing the powers of the Competition Appeal Tribunal in respect of appeals under clause 13.”


The clause reverses the Competition Appeal Tribunal’s TalkTalk Telecom Group plc and Vodafone Limited v Office of Communications decision, which addresses, inter alia, the standard of review on an appeal to the Competition Appeal Tribunal under Section 192 of the Communications Act.

The Minister’s predecessor, the noble Baroness, Lady Barran, said in Committee in response to the Clause 13 stand part debate:

“It merely changes the standard to which they will be reviewed. Having these cases reviewed on ordinary judicial review principles, rather than taking account of the merits of the case, aims to ensure a smooth regulatory process that focuses on fair decision-making … this should reduce any incentives for providers to litigate solely for the purpose of delaying the regulatory process.”


Note the word “merely”. This is very much for the Government’s convenience. She continued:

“It is particularly important, given that these decisions relate to the security of a provider’s network, that decisions can be addressed swiftly, and providers can get back to the important work of ensuring that their networks are secure.”


This nevertheless tries to give the impression that this is for the benefit of the providers. The noble Baroness then said that:

“Clause 13 applies to appeals only against relevant security decisions … The Government consider this approach to be appropriate to ensure that Ofcom’s regulatory decisions can only be successfully challenged when they are, broadly speaking, unlawful, irrational or procedurally unfair. By reducing providers’ incentives to litigate to delay regulatory action, the provisions in the clause contribute to Ofcom’s effectiveness as a regulator.”—[Official Report, 13/7/21; cols. GC 516-17.]


Surely in these circumstances, particularly on security, the merits of security decisions are particularly important and this is the legislative equivalent of the Government marking their own homework—or perhaps I should say making it much more difficult for it to be marked. I beg to move.

[Baroness Merron (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lords, Lord Clement-Jones and Lord Fox, for tabling this amendment and the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, for his remarks. It certainly is key that Ofcom is able to do the job that it has been entrusted to do. On the matter of providers, I would say that their primary duty has to be to ensure that the networks are secure. We should expect no less from them. I will be very interested to hear how the Minister responds to the points that have been made in respect of this amendment.

[Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay (Con)]

I thank the noble Lords, Lord Clement-Jones and Lord Fox, for tabling this amendment to Clause 13. I know the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, in particular, has taken a keen interest in this area, not just in this Bill but in previous ones as well. I am grateful for the way that he set out the debate again today.

Clause 13 makes provision to ensure that the Competition Appeal Tribunal applies ordinary judicial review principles to appeals against certain security decisions made by Ofcom. Under such principles, those decisions can be successfully challenged only where they are unlawful, irrational or procedurally unfair. In setting the standard of appeal in this legislation, we must find a balance between giving telecoms providers a way to challenge Ofcom’s decisions should they be unfair and ensuring that the regulatory regime is effective and efficient.

Ofcom, as an experienced telecoms regulator, believes that changing the standard of appeal to judicial review principles for certain security decisions has the potential to make the regulatory process quicker and more efficient. The Government agree. We want to avoid either Ofcom or telecoms providers spending months in court.

It was never the intention of Parliament to set the standard of appeal, as it is now, to

“duly take into account the merits of the case”,

as this was dictated by EU law. In 2017 the Government changed the standard of appeal for reviewing decisions by Ofcom from a full merits approach to ordinary judicial review principles via Section 87 of the Digital Economy Act, as the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, will well remember.

However, as EU law continued to apply, the Competition Appeal Tribunal subsequently decided that it had to apply a modified approach to

“duly take into account the merits of the case”.

In essence, this has prevented the provision in the Digital Economy Act, which had been approved by Parliament, taking effect. That rather unhappy outcome would continue to be the case for certain security decisions under the Bill should this clause not stand.

To be clear, Clause 13 applies the judicial review standard only to decisions such as those relating to the issuing of an assessment notice, which should be routine and quickly handled rather than being continuously delayed. It is not being applied to decisions about penalties such as those under Section 105T. Public telecoms providers will still be able to appeal those decisions as they do now, and the tribunal will

“duly take into account the merits of the case”.

Ultimately, we want public telecoms providers to spend their time addressing the security of the network. We do not want them to attempt indefinitely to delay an Ofcom decision by bringing cases against the regulator that do not stack up. We are not breaking new ground by changing to this standard of appeal. Judicial review principles are the normal standard by which most decisions of government and public bodies are legally reviewed.

Parliament has already decided that the standard of appeal for similar decisions under the Network and Information Systems Regulations 2018 should be ordinary judicial review principles. That is consistent with our policy approach in this Bill. Therefore, the Government feel that Clause 13 should stand part of this Bill as it will contribute to the efficiency of the regime and ensure that regulatory decisions are not unduly delayed. It will also ensure legislative consistency. I hope that reassures the noble Lord and that he will be content to withdraw his objection to this clause.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for his response. I am afraid it does not particularly reassure but there will be many other occasions on which we can raise the nature of judicial review, its continual erosion, the Government’s approach to judicial review and their dislike of being challenged. This is fairly thin territory on which to be debating a very large issue in terms of the future of judicial review. I am sure that my other legal colleagues will be more than able to dispute some of those issues. There are many other fish to fry of even greater importance on this Bill so I will withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 6 withdrawn.