Telecommunications (Security) Bill

Lord Clement-Jones Excerpts

2nd reading
Tuesday 29th June 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD) [V]]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for her very fair introduction to the Bill. As a former member of Huawei’s international advisory board, I am somewhat conflicted in a discussion about the principles of the Bill, especially following the various twists and turns in government policy. I very much support the 5G supply chain diversification strategy, but the questions raised by my noble friend Lord Fox and the noble Lord, Lord Young, need to be answered. How it is progressing and where any financial support is going need to be the subjects of regular report by government, given that in the short term we are faced by a stark dual-supplier market.

As my noble friend Lord Fox has indicated, however, I want to focus on, and confine myself to, a debate about the wide-ranging new powers in the Bill for the Secretary of State and Ofcom and the lack of adequate checks and balances, especially in terms of oversight, whether parliamentary, judicial or, indeed, technical, which permeates the Bill. If there are going to be these extensive new powers, we need to make sure that they are exercised properly and with due process and consultation.

The Delegated Powers Committee report referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Young, is just the tip of the iceberg. It draws the attention of the House to the proposed new Section 105E of the Communications Act 2003, which gives the Secretary of State power to issue, revise or withdraw codes of practice about security measures that should be taken by providers in the performance of their duties to prevent security compromises. There is a duty to consult with Ofcom and providers but no oversight or approval role for Parliament.

I am glad to say that the committee, in the light of the importance of the code in assessing compliance and in enforcement by Ofcom, was unconvinced by the department’s claim that this was too detailed and technical, and “not legislative”. As the committee says,

“The Bill provides for codes of practice to play a significant role–both in relation to the exercise of OFCOM’s regulatory functions and in legal proceedings - in supplementing the important duties to take security measures that the Bill imposes on providers.”


It concludes:

“In our view, it is unacceptable for codes of practice that will have the significant statutory effects provided for in this Bill to be subject to no Parliamentary scrutiny procedure.”


I differ from the committee simply in that, in my view, the procedure to be adopted must, at minimum, be the affirmative procedure. As Comms Council UK has pointed out, Section 105E is not the only proposed new section which gives the Secretary of State extensive powers; there are others. Proposed new Section 105Z1, for example, gives power for the Secretary of State to outlaw the use of individual vendors, where there is potentially no parliamentary oversight, if the Secretary of State considers it would be contrary to national security—as has been referred to by other noble Lords. Surely that is exactly where oversight by the Intelligence and Security Committee, as the noble Lord, Lord West, has so cogently said, or by the Investigatory Powers Commissioner, as the Constitution Committee has suggested, would be not only appropriate but essential. The whole area of enforcement of compliance and, under proposed new Section 105Z27, as regards power to require information and the requirement not to disclose, needs similar oversight.

Nor is there any dedicated role for judicial oversight. Unlike similar legislation, such as that under Part 8 of the Investigatory Powers Act 2016, there are no provisions for judicial oversight of the Secretary of State’s powers. This is compounded by the fact that, under Clause 13, in any appeal to the Competition Appeal Tribunal, the tribunal cannot take account of the merits of a case against the Secretary of State, the rationale for which, as the Constitution Committee says,

“is unclear and is not justified in the Explanatory Notes.”

Can the Minister make a better fist of the explanation today?

With regard to Ofcom’s new powers to ensure compliance with security duties, as set out in the proposed new Section 105M, how will these relate to Ofcom’s existing powers under Sections 3 and 6 of the Communications Act 2003? Will this duty and the new powers Ofcom is being given still be subject to good regulatory practice so that, for example, it still must have regard to the principles of transparency, accountability, proportionality and consistency, and not impose unnecessary burdens? How will this fit in with the statement to be made by Ofcom under proposed new Section 105Y? What assurance can the Minister give? Will we see a draft during the passage of the Bill?

Similar considerations apply to the new Ofcom powers to assess compliance under Clause 6 and in regard to inspection notices under Clause 19. As the council has also pointed out, there are no clear mechanisms for technical feedback or expertise to be fed in. It observes that many of the technical requirements that will be placed on its members are not in the text of the Bill but in accompanying documents which are either yet to be published or are receiving very little scrutiny.

Already it is clear that, in the draft Electronic Communications (Security Measures) Regulations, which are to be made by virtue of the proposed new Sections 105B and 105D, giving the Secretary of State power to make regulations to require telecoms companies to take “specified security measures” and “in response to security compromises”, there are real issues with regard to provisions about patches and supply chains and definitions regarding audit and monitoring of foreign network operations centres, and it is not clear that expert technical industry comments are being taken on board. What further consultations are planned? Is this not exactly where a technical advisory board and/or panel, as under the 2016 Act, is needed? Will they even be subject to the affirmative procedure in Parliament?

This lack of clarity and transparency is causing a great deal of uncertainty within the industry. Measures are being proposed that are either technically unworkable or potentially damaging to the strength and health of the UK telecoms industry. Particular concerns arise for providers whose networks are not based purely in the UK and who do not have the relationships with the department, Ofcom and the NCSC that domestic providers may have if there is no structured consultation, oversight and update process when codes are being drawn up. BT itself says:

“we believe greater clarity is needed on OFCOM’s planned approach, with safeguards introduced in the Bill to ensure operator burdens are proportionate.”

It also makes the point that the flexibility in the Bill should not be used to bring forward any deadlines for removal of equipment. What assurance can the Minister give on this?

As well as concerns about the new powers, there is also concern reflected by the Constitution Committee about the width of crucial definitions such as “security compromise” and “connected security compromise” contained in the Bill, and the consequences that flow, particularly as regards planned outages and the need to make a clear distinction between reporting on security compromises and on resilience.

I think that I have gone into enough detail at this Second Reading to amply demonstrate that we have quite an amendment job ahead of us in Committee and on Report.