Lord Clement-Jones
Main Page: Lord Clement-Jones (Liberal Democrat - Life peer)Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Bill
Lord Clement-Jones Excerpts
Lord Clement-Jones
Lord Clement-Jones
My Lords, I will also speak to Amendment 84AEA. We had a very good debate in Grand Committee about orphan works, and the Minister gave some very useful assurances about how the orphan works regime would operate. However, there are one or two loose ends, and I want briefly to raise them.
Amendment 84AE is essentially a retabled amendment designed to establish definitively the nature of diligent search. I was slightly disconcerted by the way the Minister replied to this amendment last time. Surely diligent search must cover each work involved, and I hope the Minister can demonstrate how such search should be undertaken. There is no amendment to this effect, but I should say in passing that many of those who have debated this subject believe that it is very important that orphan works cannot be sublicensed. The argument is clear that to permit sublicensing would risk the distortion of the market through, for example, enterprises that sought orphan works licences and then resold them to all comers, circumventing the safeguards promised in the regulations. I do not know whether that is a loophole or simply a fear that will not be realised.
Amendment 84AEA relates to an objectionable feature of Clause 69, which is found in the new Section 116A(6) of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. This states:
“The regulations may apply to a work although it is not known whether copyright subsists in it, and references to a missing owner … are to be read as including references to a supposed owner and a supposed right or interest”.
The objection to this is that if copyright does not subsist, the work or performance is in fact in the public domain and there is no rights owner who could reappear.
It seems rather unsatisfactory to introduce what I believe is called the domaine public payant in this surreptitious way. If there is going to be an orphan works licensing scheme it should surely be confined to orphans. If it cannot be determined whether a work is still in copyright, surely an orphan licence should not be available. It should be plain in the Bill that this should not extend to works that may be in the public domain. It would be helpful to have a ministerial assurance on this point. I beg to move.
Baroness Buscombe
My Lords, I support my noble friend in relation to diligent search. I think the amendment speaks for itself, and I echo the words of my noble friend Lord Clement-Jones.
Lord Clement-Jones
My Lords, I thank the Minister for that reply. I am reassured by his statement in at least three respects. He made the distinction between the requirement to have an individual search and the requirement to be proportionate in the way the diligent search is carried out. That is the distinction that I would make. I found the statements of the noble Lord, Lord Howarth, rather bloodcurdling in many respects. The proportionality lies not in whether each individual work is looked at but in the nature of the search. I hope that the regulations focus very much on that.
I of course agree that if one is to have an orphan works scheme, it has to be economically viable and has to work for all those taking part in it, but at the same time it must protect genuine rights holders and make sure that searches uncover works that are not orphan but may appear on the face of it to be so. Therefore, I look slightly askance at measures that say “streamline procedures” when individual rights holders, if they exist, are to be ignored. I think that we have common ground on proportionality, but the question is where that lies. It will be useful to refer to the Minister’s words generally when the regulations are drawn up. We may have a chance to debate them in this House in future. I very much welcomed what he had to say on the sublicensing point; that was a very helpful statement. Those who are concerned about Amendment 84AEA will also be reassured. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Clement-Jones
Lord Clement-Jones
In moving Amendment 84AEB, I wish to speak also to Amendments 84AEC to 84AEG and Amendment 84AF.
I will speak first to Amendment 84AF as it falls outside the scope of the other amendments. Clause 69 as drafted does not factor into the opt-out of ECL the situation where the rights holder is not the creator. A firmer commitment from the Government in the Bill is necessary to give more reassurance to rights holders on the ECL provisions in Clause 69 before the legislation completes its passage. This amendment was tabled as Amendment 28X in Grand Committee. An opt-out is available to copyright owners in the Bill as it stands. The amendment would extend this opt-out to exclusive licensees and authorised representatives.
In Grand Committee, the Minister committed the orphan works and extended collective licensing working group to look into this issue as part of its deliberations. While this commitment is welcome, there needs to be certainty that any regulations for extended collective licensing will include such provision. Since ECL has the effect of exercising property rights, potentially against the will of the rights owner, the ability to opt out under subsection (3) of what will be the new Section 116B must be as straightforward and easy to implement as possible. To effectively administer the repertoire they have invested in, music publishers will need to make catalogue-wide arrangements applicable to hundreds, thousands, or potentially, millions of separate works. The grant of rights and arrangements between creators and music publishers are very often not exclusive assignments of copyright; grants can also be made by way of licences, both exclusive and non-exclusive.
It will be unworkable to have an opt-out which is exercisable only by the copyright owner or exclusive licensee. This would require a publisher to go contract by contract, checking the nature of each grant of rights and, where necessary, asking composers to sign opt-out documentation to be sent to the body seeking to operate the scheme. If the opt-out could be operated by the composer’s authorised representative, this would give a publisher or other representative the right to seek the permission from its composers to exercise an opt-out on their behalf, which could then comprise one repertoire-wide opt-out from a rights owner in a manageable way.
Practical experience abroad is that, in the absence of this possibility, ECL provisions can be manipulated by bodies operating schemes to make it impossible for right owners to opt out in any manageable way. I am informed by representatives from music publishing that one example of this is the operation of the extended collective licensing provisions enshrined in Hungarian copyright law in relation to the performing right. In Hungary, one reason for the failure of being able to rely on the opt-out came from the requirement of Artisjus that the rights owner—not any representative—provide due diligence evidencing ownership of each title in question. In relation to a repertoire of many thousands of works, this represents a huge barrier to successfully exercising the opt-out in terms of tracing the title back to its source. It is often via a complicated chain, redacting and copying documents to comply with confidentiality restrictions and then shipping these across to Hungary.
This example of abuse of proprietary rights provides ample evidence that, in the context of ECL, the burden of challenging any opt-out must sit with the entity operating the scheme and not with the individual rights owner. I believe that it is not the intention of this legislation to create such problems but it is important to guard against potential abuse. Can the Minister give assurances on this?
At the end of the day, I cannot see any downside to giving composers a choice in being able to elect to have their trusted authorised representative act on their behalf in this context. I am also not aware of a prevailing view that would be opposed to creating such a modest requirement. Indeed, in Grand Committee, the Minister stated that the Bill does not rule out such a provision.
With the experiences of ECL in other territories in mind, I hope that Report stage is an opportunity for the Minister to clarify responsibility for overseeing due diligence in an opt-out process. I hope that the Government will use this stage of the Bill to clarify that regulations will be clear that the burden of proof for the due diligence in an opt-out will be on the body applying for ECL.
On Amendment 84AEB, copyright licensing bodies are indispensible in many circumstances. For example, no composer could keep track of all the playings of his or her song on television, radio, the internet and in concerts, pubs, hairdressers, department stores and so on; PRS for music does this collectively. However, this kind of licensing is voluntary, meaning that the rights owner gave his or her permission to PRS to license his or her works for use in broadcasts and public performances. Extended collective licensing means that the licensing body can also license works whose authors have not given permission.
Therefore, ECL—and we have debated this in Grand Committee—is potentially dangerous to rights owners. A rights owner may not know about extended collective licensing and find that his or her work has been licensed without their permission. Perhaps they would not have wanted it in that particular publication, or perhaps they had given another publication an exclusive deal. Perhaps they would have charged a different fee; if they had given permission direct, their fee would not have suffered deduction of the licensing body’s commission. Foreign composers in particular may not be aware of the licence at all and may grant conflicting rights or may not collect their fee.
The Government’s explanations always described ECL as “voluntary extended collective licensing”, but the fact is that ECL allows the licensing body to license its rights without their prior authorisation. It is government policy that the author can opt out, but this acknowledges that the licensing body has permission to license his or her rights in the first place. This permission is ultimately given by the Government by authorising the organisation to license rights that it does not in fact hold, not by the author who must withdraw by opting out.
To their credit, the Government have acknowledged the dangers inherent in ECL, and in Grand Committee on 31 January, the Minister explained the Government’s policy regarding safeguards for rights owners. However Clause 69, which enables ECLs to be created by statutory instrument, only very minimally reflects the safeguards as the Minister has now enunciated them. The Government have claimed that the Nordic ECLs provide a strong precedent. However, the safeguards are set out in the Nordic primary legislation. By “Nordic”, I mean Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Finland and Iceland. Setting out the safeguards in primary legislation is clearly an aspect of the Nordic precedent that the UK Government should follow.
My amendments are essentially translations of the Nordic statutory provisions, adapted to the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act. The safeguards usefully include a requirement on licensing bodies to qualify, the need to explain the type of licence being granted, the need for the authorised body to be representative, the adoption of a code of conduct, the ability to refer to the Copyright Tribunal where a claim is being made that the body is not representative or that licences go beyond scope of existing copyright licences, a limitation on the term of authorisation to five years, and clear provisions about the ability to give notice of exclusion of a work.
The Minister has said that there must be flexibility, but he has been fairly detailed in his description of what the secondary legislation will consist of. Flexibility is not therefore necessarily an argument for excluding safeguards for rights holders from the Bill, and there can be no reasonable argument against including those safeguards. I beg to move.
Baroness Buscombe
My Lords, I should like to speak to Amendment 84AF, to which I have added my name. I spoke at some length in Committee on the extended collective licensing measures in Clause 69, and I made it clear then that I do not like the principle of ECL. I cannot see how it materially benefits the UK and it will bring uncertainty by not being truly voluntary.
I believe—and I have said so previously—that such a scheme should be opt-in, rather than opt-out, whereby rights holders who want to license their content through others can do so. However, I welcome the Minister’s assurances thus far that safeguards to such a scheme are vital, but—I echo the words of my noble friend Lord Clement-Jones—the safeguards should be included in the Bill, not left to secondary legislation. If the Government are backing ECL because it works in the Nordic countries, why not follow the Nordic lead and put the necessary safeguards in the primary legislation? Whoever may benefit from such a scheme can then benefit, and whoever feels threatened by it will have some comfort in knowing that the Government have protected the rights of rights holders.
As I said on an amendment on Report last week, China has just announced that it will implement ECL in its copyright law and has said that the details will be in regulations yet to be published. Where have we heard that before? The UK Government will not be in a position to demand appropriate safeguards for licensing of UK copyrights by ECL in China if we do not have them in our own legislation, as the Nordic countries do, nor will UK rights holders or their representative bodies be in a strong position to safeguard UK rights abused by ECLs in foreign countries if the UK’s own statute lacks the necessary safeguards. My noble friend Lord Clement-Jones and I have tabled a series of amendments to this clause which does just that, putting into statute the very safeguards that the Minister himself has articulated.
Again, I urge my noble friend the Minister to accept these amendments, and avoid a situation in which companies can seize the intellectual property of others and license it on their own terms.
Viscount Younger of Leckie
My Lords, this group of amendments is designed to incorporate in legislation a series of safeguards regarding extended collective licensing. The Government have publicly committed to many of these safeguards in some form or other. I thank my noble friend for his continued positive engagement with ensuring ECL is a fair system. The Government share those aims, and I seek to reassure my noble friend that we have met them.
As there are a large number of amendments in this group, I will respond to them by reference to a set of themes. Amendments 84AFA, 84AFB, 84AGA, 84AGB, 84AGC and 84AGD are essentially consequential in nature, and so I will not deal with them directly. Amendments 84AEB, 84AEC, 84AED, 84AEE and 84AEF seek to provide clear safeguards against an unwanted extension of the scope of collective licensing, and to define the characteristics of a body which can be authorised to operate ECL schemes.
The need for safeguards is absolutely beyond dispute. A working group which includes creators of photographic, audiovisual, literary and musical works is helping us to develop these safeguards into draft regulations. I gave commitments during Grand Committee on some of the issues the working group would be asked to consider, such as those raised by Amendment 84AED. The Government will consult on these draft regulations before asking Parliament to approve them. The Government feel that regulations can more easily be adapted to keep safeguards effective in the light of market changes. Such adaptability ensures that the scheme continues to protect creators’ interests. Regulations can also more easily be adapted to emerging best practice; this better prevents abuses. The Government’s approach will still allow for a comparable level of safeguards to those found in primary legislation in other jurisdictions.
My noble friend Lord Clement-Jones raised the issue of the Nordic protections which are in primary legislation, a topic also alluded to by my noble friend Lady Buscombe. The UK proposals include similar safeguards, such as the right to opt out and a test of representation, and a different legislative route that has been used to provide future-proofing. However, not all Nordic ECL provision is for specific uses. For example, the Danish Act includes provision for a “general” ECL. Some vital safeguards are on the face of the Bill: the right to opt out and the requirement that ECL can be authorised only for specific types of works and rights. Applications to operate ECL would be authorised only on the basis of significant, demonstrable support for collective management in relation to the specific licence. This would need to include evidence that the applicant—a significantly representative licensing body—has the consent of its members to apply for the authorisation.
My noble friend Lord Clement-Jones raised the issue of ECL. If I have him correctly, he described ECL as potentially dangerous and questioned the description of it as voluntary. Noble Lords have queried our description of our proposals as voluntary, but they are voluntary because the Government will have no power to impose ECL on a sector. This is not compulsory collective licensing; it will be for a relevant licensing body which will require the explicit consent of its members to choose whether to apply. For non-member rights holders, I accept that ECL, where it applies, shifts collective management from opt-in to opt-out. This is why the Government are committed to a series of safeguards to ensure ECL is authorised only when there is a demonstrable case for it, and to make sure that rights holders have the opportunity to exercise their opt-out.
In relation to the advertisement of ECL schemes prior to authorisation, the Government have proposed that an application should be publicised to allow comments from interested parties before a decision is taken. The Government do not propose that new regulations should be laid in relation to each proposed authorisation. With regard to Amendment 84AEF, I confirm that authorisations will apply specifically and solely to the licensing scheme which was the basis of the application.
In relation to Amendments 84AEE and 84AEG, the Secretary of State will decide whether to grant or reject an application and to set the conditions of any authorisation. We therefore consider it appropriate to provide in the regulations that the Secretary of State should also have the power to revoke an authorisation, should that prove necessary. The Government believe that this may be a more efficient process than a referral to the Copyright Tribunal. Following discussions with the working group, I can confirm that the Government intend to make ECL authorisations subject to renewal.
I turn now to the question of the opt-out, and I hope that my subsequent comments on the subject of exclusive licensees will be helpful to my noble friend Lord Clement-Jones. Amendment 84AF focuses on the right to opt out of ECL schemes. In Grand Committee, I made a commitment that the working group on extended collective licensing would be asked to consider whether the right to opt out should be extended to exclusive licensees and their representatives. The Government take the opt-out protection seriously. If it becomes clear that an extension of the provisions to cover exclusive licensees and representatives is necessary, the Government will act on that basis. However, I do not want to pre-empt the work of the working group, given my Grand Committee commitment.
I know that my noble friend Lord Clement-Jones also has concerns regarding due diligence in relation to opt-out. I can confirm that the Government’s intention is that the burden of proof should favour the party seeking to opt out. That seems to us the right and fair thing to do.
My noble friend Lord Clement-Jones raised his concern that the opt-out would be too burdensome for rights holders. However, the responses to the consultation make it clear that rights holders expect to be able to opt out entire collections of work or individual works quickly and with minimal or no cost. It will be the responsibility of the collecting society to operate opt-out schemes which meet the needs of effective rights holders. They will need to demonstrate how they intend to do this when they apply to operate an ECL scheme.
On Amendment 84AEH, the Government believe that licensing bodies rather than users, who may be individuals or small businesses, should accept and process opt-outs. Licensing bodies will be required to publicise any ECL scheme before it comes into effect, giving rights holders every opportunity to opt out in advance.
Subsection (b) of the amendment presents some practical difficulties. “Reasons to believe”, for example, could prove to be a very subjective judgment. It would seem more practical for licensing bodies to address issues of exploitation that the “author would oppose” on a scheme-by-scheme basis through, for example, licence conditions.
On fair treatment and remuneration for non-members, I reiterate my support for the principle. However, I do not feel that it would be appropriate to give non-members of licensing bodies recourse to the Copyright Tribunal that members do not have. I also feel that it is unlikely to be cost-effective.
Codes of practice will require fair treatment for non-members, and ECL will not be authorised unless a suitable code is shown to be in place. If a dispute fell within the scope of a code, a non-member would be able to use the licensing body’s complaints procedure, with appeals going to an independent ombudsman. The Secretary of State would have the power to revoke an ECL authorisation if a code was not complied with. This is in addition to the proposed wider backstop powers and code review system, which includes the ability to impose other sanctions.
Amendment 84AGE would mandate that the regulations provide for a creator’s moral rights to have been assumed to have been asserted. I am happy to confirm that the orphan works regulations will indeed provide for this.
In relation to ECL, the principle is that the licence conditions applicable to the use of member’s works would also apply to the works of non-members. Amendment 84AGE would, however, also remove references to other safeguards. These include the various rights and obligations once a work ceases to be orphan, and the right to withdraw from an ECL scheme once it is up and running. The fact that these matters are specifically referenced in the Bill is an indication of their importance.
My noble friend Lord Clement-Jones and others have made some valuable points, but I can reassure the House that the Government understand the importance of getting the detail right. Fixing the detail in regulations will allow for expert input from the working group, further consultation and parliamentary scrutiny via the affirmative procedure, and will help the Government to keep safeguards up to date and effective. While I appreciate the intention of these amendments, I am concerned that they would hinder us in getting the detail right now and in the future. I therefore ask my noble friend to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Clement-Jones
My Lords, the Minister has been so forthcoming that I almost do not know where to start in thanking him for the assurances that he has given about the nature and content of the regulations in terms of the safeguards that will be similar to those in most of the Nordic legislation—that is, the way in which licensing bodies will need to demonstrate significant support, the way in which the Secretary of State will set out the requirements, and the powers of the Secretary of State in relation to codes of conduct. These schemes will be subject to renewal, which is extremely important. The way in which the Minister expressed these assurances was extremely important, first, in terms of meeting the expectations of rights holders, which is crucial in meeting some of the concerns. Secondly, even more important is what the Minister said about the onus of proof in terms of the ability of rights holders to withdraw from collective licensing schemes. Above all, that will provide more assurance than almost anything else.
I shudder to think how long some of the regulations following on from Part 6 of this Bill will be, since we are putting huge emphasis on secondary legislation following on from the clauses that we are agreeing. However, the Minister has given a very useful route map of what those regulations relating to extended collective licensing are, and to that extent it is extremely welcome. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Clement-Jones
“Greater protection for authors when assigning or licensing copyright
In paragraph 1(c) of Schedule 1 to the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 (scope of sections 2 to 4 and 7), omit “copyright”.”
Lord Clement-Jones
My Lords, there is currently in many cases an imbalance in economic power between the creator and those with whom they are dealing on copyright. I moved an amendment similar to this in Grand Committee, and at that time the Minister said that the Unfair Contract Terms Act is intended to regulate only business to consumer relations. Of course that is correct. The Minister has, however, agreed to see what can be done by way of review within the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills of this type of issue.
The amendment is designed to elicit from the Minister an assurance that this work will be undertaken. I have sent the Minister a paper suggesting how such a review might take place. It would be an independent review of copyright contracts for creators and would explore how copyright contracts could be made fairer to ensure that creators receive a fair share of the money that consumers pay for copyright content and that the purpose of copyright in stimulating and sustaining creativity is met.
The kinds of contracts that such a review might consider are those with publishers, broadcasters, record labels and film studios; creator’s contracts with, and mandates to, collecting societies; and contracts with internet platforms such as Flickr. Some possible solutions for the review to explore—I am not going to go through them all—might include whether the doctrine of undue influence that applies when a person in a dominant position uses that position to obtain an unfair advantage for himself or herself could be codified in statute law; or whether, for instance, a right to equitable remuneration for creators is a necessary underpinning to fair contracts for creators; and whether model licences and codes of conduct could extend the benefit of collective negotiations through professional bodies to a wider range of creators, particularly new entrants to the entertainment industries and consumers-turned-creators. I very much hope that the Minister can indicate how a review might take place and who would be responsible for it. I beg to move.
Baroness Buscombe
My Lords, I support this amendment, to which I have added my name. I support everything my noble friend Lord Clement-Jones has already said. This amendment would go some way to mitigate risks to the individual creators, without whom there is no creative economy. We have here more risks of unintended consequences of the government proposal for extended collective licensing. Already before the passage of the Bill, there is renewed pressure on individual creators to sign away to publishers all their rights, including rights to income from extended collective licensing. While creators are vulnerable to the take-it-or-leave-it approach in contracts offered by powerful organisations, the likelihood is that creators will thus be deprived of the compensation for the use intended by the drafters. I should add that we have had so much correspondence in this regard that we are looking to my noble friend the Minister for strong reassurance.
Viscount Younger of Leckie
The noble Earl raises an interesting point. This is very much a technical issue. As noble Lords will be able to imagine, a number of lawyers were involved before I was able to stand at the Dispatch Box today. On that point, I ask the noble Earl to allow me to get back to him with a specific reply.
Lord Clement-Jones
My Lords, I thank the Minister for that reply. I also thank the noble Earl, Lord Erroll, for his comments. He rarely supports one of my amendments, and I have learnt more about his ancestors today than on many previous occasions, so I thank him for his support.
The issue is not whether or not to amend this particular Act. As the Minister says, the Unfair Contract Terms Act does not apply to copyright or business-to-business transactions. Therefore, the essence of this is that, where many of these small creators are small businesses, we need to find a mechanism that will create a more level playing field with some of the larger contractors with whom they want to do business, and to find some way in which those transactions can be reviewed in the way that I suggested.
The Minister did not go quite as far as I would have liked and commit to a review. I think he said that he would meet to discuss how a review might take place. I will take that for what it is. I very much hope that I will be able to persuade the Minister, especially with the paper I sent him, which I confess was drawn up by the Creators’ Rights Alliance, which represents smaller creators and feels very strongly about these issues. I am sure that its members will be only too delighted also to meet the Minister. In the mean time, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Clement-Jones
“Diligent search
(1) The Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 is amended as follows.
(2) In section 97(2)(a), after “infringement” insert “, in particular whether in respect of any work or group of works the defendant has carried out a diligent search in accordance with the requirements of inserted section 116A.”
(3) In section 191J(2)(a), after “infringement” insert “, in particular whether in respect of any work or group of works the defendant has carried out a diligent search in accordance with the requirements of paragraph 1A of Schedule 2A.”
Lord Clement-Jones
My Lords, I am afraid that this House will get rather tired of my voice over the next few minutes. I beg to move Amendment 84AHA. This amendment seeks to clarify the matters to be taken into account by a court in exercising its discretion to award additional damages in certain cases of copyright infringement. The power to award such damages for copyright infringement is contained in Section 97 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, and Section 191J covers infringement of performers’ rights. As the provisions are identical in form, I will speak only to copyright infringement.
Additional damages are a form of damages that are intended to have a punitive or deterrent effect on the infringer, and are awarded in exceptional cases, in addition to the compensatory damages based on a reasonable royalty that are the usual remedy for copyright infringement. They are often referred to as “flagrancy damages”. Some kinds of copyright infringement are carried out with such flagrant disregard for the rights of the copyright owner that it is appropriate to have a sanction available to the civil courts that both contains an element of punishment of the infringer and which, more importantly, acts as a deterrent to others who might consider doing something similar. The sanction is not often used, but has been applied, for example, where the defendant has already been found to have infringed and then repeats the infringement.
This amendment will bring the provision up to date to reflect the changes being made by this Bill in relation to orphan works. Your Lordships will recollect that it is proposed that before any work can be declared an orphan it must be subject to a diligent search for its owner. There is considerable disquiet in some parts of the creative community about how conscientious all those who wish to use orphan works will be in carrying out such a search. Of course, we expect that in due course there will be some detail, which the Minister has described in detail, of the requirements set out in the relevant regulations. They will be designed to minimise the possibility that people will take inappropriate advantage of this provision.
None the less, given the enormous potential commercial benefits, it is entirely likely that some organisations will seek to test how little they have to do by way of diligent search. In particular, one of the concerns raised with me is that a potential user may argue that, as they have carried out a search in relation to one item in a group of works, they should be permitted to assume that the result will be the same for the others, and that they are relieved of the need to carry out separate searches. We debated this only a few groups ago.
The protection that this affords to people is that before their work can be declared an orphan and used without their authorisation, there must be a diligent search. This simple amendment deals with the temptation to use the orphan works provisions in a manner that is clearly not intended by the Bill. It spells out that failure to carry out a diligent search will be one of the considerations that the court takes into account when deciding whether or not to award additional damages. It will not be definitive of the question, just one factor to be taken into account.
This would send a clear message that the new freedoms provided by these provisions are not to be abused, especially not at the expense of creative individuals who do not have the resources of large corporations standing behind them to enforce their rights. This is an important aspect and one that is entirely consistent with the policy direction behind these measures. I beg to move.
Viscount Younger of Leckie
My Lords, Amendment 84AHA returns to the subject of diligent search, something that was discussed in one of the earlier groupings. I understand and sympathise with the intention behind this amendment. However, the Government are not convinced that a failure to obtain an orphan works licence legally should be treated as an aggravating factor over and above any other form of copyright infringement. There are already provisions in the 1998 Act for special damages, but the general principle of law at issue is that civil redress is about compensation rather than punishment. The Government feel that the courts should be in the best place to determine damages in the light of the circumstances of each case. I hope that in this light my noble friend will not press his amendment.
Lord Clement-Jones
My Lords, I thank the Minister for that. I will need to consider some of the points that he has made. I am not sure whether I agree that it should be a matter of pure compensation and not damages, but I am sure that his words will be worth looking over again in the light of day. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Clement-Jones
“Right of identification
(1) The Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (the “1988 Act”) is amended as follows.
(2) For section 78 (requirement that right be asserted) substitute—
“78 Moral rights
(1) The rights conferred by this Chapter (moral rights) are—
(a) exercisable without formality in unpublished works,(b) exercisable without formality in works made available to the public after this section comes into force.(2) There shall be no cause of action for omission of attribution in re-publication of a work that was legitimately made available before the commencement of this section, unless the rights conferred by this Chapter were asserted at the time.”
(3) For section 205D (requirement that right be asserted by performers) substitute—
“205D Moral rights
(1) The rights conferred by this Chapter (moral rights) are—
(a) exercisable without formality in unpublished works,(b) exercisable without formality in works made available to the public after this section comes into force.(2) There shall be no cause of action for omission of attribution in re-publication of a work that was legitimately made available before the commencement of this section, unless the rights conferred by this Chapter were asserted at the time.””
Lord Clement-Jones
My Lords, I beg to move Amendment 84AHAZA. The labelling of the amendments gets more and more complicated as time goes on.
The requirement that the moral right be asserted is widely agreed not to be a particularly useful concept. Discovering whether a right has been asserted is in many cases, for practical purposes, impossible. It was noticeable that the Minister confirmed in our previous discussion of orphan works that it would not be necessary in certain circumstances that a right be asserted. In the case of a photograph, for example, it may be necessary to refer to the invoice for payment for the licence for first publication. A consultation held following the debate on the Digital Economy Act could find no reason to retain the requirement to assert the right of identification, and I am aware of no body that is strongly attached to retaining this requirement.
I believe that the Intellectual Property Office has indicated that it is proposed that a right shall be treated as being asserted, and this was confirmed today, in respect of orphan works in the regulations proposed under Clause 69. This amendment therefore makes an important amendment to the Copyright Act and makes the situation uniform. All authors and performers having the right to be identified is an essential precondition for measures to permit licensing of orphan works and to help to prevent the creation of new orphans. More will be required to strengthen this right and to protect the metadata that contains the identification of authors and performers, but this is an important start. It would remove a serious barrier to the ordinary citizen having a right to be identified in the first place, since they are very unlikely to be aware of the requirement to assert. I beg to move.
Lord Jenkin of Roding
My Lords, I very much support this. I believe that it is a very worthwhile amendment. I cannot understand why somebody who is claiming the right to be the copyright owner of an orphan work should have to assert his right from the beginning. He will not know about this, as it is a requirement that will be hidden in the legislation. I cannot for the life of me understand why he has to do this in advance, as it were. It is an unnecessary restriction and requirement to be placed on the shoulders of an individual, perhaps an artist, writer or musician, who says that they are the author and owner of an intellectual property, only to be told that they have not asserted their right from the beginning. I do not believe that that is right.
I hope that my noble friend will look on this amendment sympathetically and, even if he cannot accept the words, undertake to have a good look at the issue and perhaps meet some of the people concerned, with a view to having something put into the Bill at Third Reading. I think that my noble friend Lord Clement-Jones has made a very sound point in moving this amendment.
Viscount Younger of Leckie
My Lords, the noble Lord’s proposed amendment would make automatic the right to be identified as the author of a work. Currently Section 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 provides that moral rights, including the right to be identified or attributed, must be asserted to take effect. The Government appreciate that there is a legitimate debate around the issue of moral rights, particularly the right to attribution. Some stakeholders would like to see the moral rights of creators strengthened further. The Government acknowledge that there are creators who would like to see the right of attribution become automatic and some who would also like it to be unwaivable. We are also aware, however, that other creators take the view that moral rights, such as the right of attribution, can have an economic value. These creators argue that they should be free to decide whether to exploit that value.
As can be seen, this is a complex area on which creators hold strong and often differing views. The economic question of the cost of using works is an important one. Changing the law on moral rights would affect many groups in different ways. It is not an insignificant question and would require a full consultation. I hope that these words help to answer some of the questions raised by my noble friend Lord Jenkin and that, in the light of what I have just said, my noble friend Lord Clement-Jones feels able to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Clement-Jones
My Lords, I thank the Minister for that response, and I thank the noble Lord, Lord Jenkin, for his very valuable support. I appreciate the Minister saying that there is a legitimate debate. There are, of course, a number of aspects of moral rights that are debatable, not only the automatic right stated in this amendment but also the issue of waiver, the question of the economic value of moral rights and so on. This amendment was a way of putting a marker down that this is an area that is somewhat archaic. If we are going to move on, especially when the new exceptions come into play, we must look at further aspects of reform of copyright law, such as the way in which contracts are made with creators, aspects of moral rights and metadata. This is an area that the IPO could very usefully focus on and, in the next round of legislation, look and see whether we can get rid of something that I believe is now not required and is rather out of date and unnecessary. In the mean time, however, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.