Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill

Debate between Lord Clarke of Nottingham and James Brokenshire

Tuesday 9th December 2014 Commons Chamber

[James Brokenshire]

It is a question of the seriousness of the measures. We recognise, because of the changes we are making, that there should be a higher burden placed on the Secretary of State in determining whether one of these measures should be provided. That is why we have moved this up to the “balance of probabilities”. Let us not forget that under the previous control orders regime it was not at that level, but two notches down at “reasonable suspicion”. Under TPIMs, we brought it up to “reasonable belief” and, on the balance of the measures we now have, we judge that moving to the “balance of probabilities” is the right stance to take. I will come on to clause 13 later.

The changes are being introduced in the light of the changing threat picture: the ongoing conflict in Syria and Iraq; the fact that 500 subjects of interest have travelled to that region; the risk that they may pose on their return; and the risk of more people seeking to travel out. It is against that assessment that the threat level has been raised to severe, the second highest threat level, and that has had an impact on our assessment of the measures that need to be available to the police and the Security Service, and it is why we have brought forward the measures in this way.

The measures also follow the recommendations from David Anderson QC, the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, in his most recent annual report on TPIMs. As he has said, however, there is no need to turn back the clock. Control orders were not working and were being struck down by the courts, whereas TPIMs have been consistently upheld and therefore provide a basis in law that is robust and has withstood the scrutiny of the courts. TPIMs have been endorsed by the courts, counter-terrorism reviewers, the police and the Security Service. This change enhances the powers available to manage TPIM subjects by moving them away from harmful associates and making it harder for them to engage in terrorism-related activity. That is why we judge, at this time against the threat picture we see, that it is appropriate to introduce these measures.

It is important, however, that appropriate limits are placed on the use of the powers, and the Bill seeks to do that. We are also acting on David Anderson’s other recommendation to increase the test for imposing a TPIM notice, so that the Secretary of State must be satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, that an individual is, or has been involved, in terrorism-related activity, as well as narrowing the definition of what that activity can entail.

[Mr Kenneth Clarke (Rushcliffe) (Con)]

I intervene on my hon. Friend as someone who supported the original move from control orders to TPIMs and thought the Government had got the balance about right in the original proposals. I am just wondering what the particular reason is for reintroducing the location requirements. What has been revealed to be missing by getting rid of them? They were thought to be a great restriction on freedom. The shadow Minister appears to believe that two people absconded because there was no location requirement. I think it is possible to put on a burqa wherever one is living and that it is quite possible to get into a black cab if someone has let one keep one’s passport. If that is being used as a reason, it strikes me as an excuse for letting two people go.

[Mr Clarke]

I apologise, Mr Hoyle. What exactly has happened to give rise to the need to bring back what I thought were fairly useless relocation orders?

[James Brokenshire]

In large measure, it has been the changing nature of the threat picture. My right hon. and learned Friend will know from his time in government that in the past two years we have seen a very altered threat picture and, as he will no doubt recognise, a rise in the threat level earlier this year. The Government need to consider, in a responsible fashion, that changed threat picture and the advice we received from the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation. The proposals in the Bill are formed with that insight clearly in mind and David Anderson’s specific recommendation on this point. It has been against all those factors that we have judged that the right thing to do is to introduce the measures in this way, subject to the safeguards I have spoken about in respect of the change in the burden of proof and the specific limitation on relocation being limited to 200 miles from the location of the individual. I will come on to speak on that in a more direct fashion, recognising the point the hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull North rightly raised in her amendment.

Justice and Security Bill [Lords]

Debate between Lord Clarke of Nottingham and James Brokenshire

Tuesday 18th December 2012 Commons Chamber

[Mr Clarke]

The balance is indeed difficult to draw. We have debated the balancing test on various occasions and in the past I have rather resisted it because it gives rise to the possibility of the judge saying, “Oh yes, there is a risk to national security. What a pity, never mind. I wish open justice to be done, so let’s take a chance with national security.” That is probably a somewhat broad-brush piece of opposition, and we are reflecting on the issue. The proper response to the right hon. Lady’s entirely sensible and pertinent question is probably best given in Committee, when we will have had more time to decide the position.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department (James Brokenshire)]

indicated assent.

[Mr Clarke]

My hon. Friend is nodding; he will be presenting our reactions.

“Norwich Pharmacal” is the phrase used by lawyers to describe a process that grew up in the sphere of intellectual property law, in which someone is enabled to apply for the disclosure of evidence—documents, usually—relevant to a claim that they are making. It is used to force a third party who is mixed up, however innocently, in suspected wrongdoing, to disclose information that a claimant feels may be relevant to a case that they are bringing in some other jurisdiction, usually abroad.

In 2008, as a result of ingenious arguments, the Norwich Pharmacal principle was extended to national security law. The purpose of proceedings under the principle now is for people involved in a legal process of some kind, usually overseas, seeking to obtain disclosure of intelligence material in the hands of the British Government.

As the purpose of the proceedings is only disclosure—no other judgment is being sought—the Government do not have the option to withdraw from or settle proceedings; if the judge orders disclosure, there is no option but for the Government to release the secret intelligence. That has given rise to understandable fears that if a person shares information with the British Government’s agencies, British judges have the power to order the release of some of it and that person cannot be certain of being able to resist that.

There is no point in my setting out obvious platitudes about the nature of intelligence work. If intelligence agencies are not able to guarantee to their sources, be they friendly overseas Governments or agents, that they can keep secrets, people will not share so much information with them. Lives will literally be at risk in some cases as will international co-operation on such vital issues as torture prevention and human rights.