Illegal Migration Bill

Debate between Lord Carlile of Berriew and Lord Wolfson of Tredegar

Committee stage
Monday 12th June 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

I am grateful for that short intervention. I am now not sure whether I am intervening on the noble Baroness’s speech or she is intervening on mine but she made a couple of points. I do not know whether she has seen my notes because I was going to come to the state practice point in a moment. Frankly, I should not really give this away but that point is probably the best point against the arguments that I am running. I am a little surprised that the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, did not mention it but I shall do so; it is the best point. I am not speaking for the Government so I am not going to divine what is in the mind of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Bellamy, or that of the Minister who will respond; they can speak for themselves and I will speak for myself.

What I was saying is twofold. First, I was not saying that there are no circumstances in which you cannot justify a Rule 39 order. I thought I had made it clear that, if you can justify it properly under Article 34 in the particular circumstances of the case—such as a death penalty case—and there are proper natural justice provisions, it could be justified. That is my first point.

My second point is that the mere fact that states abide by Rule 39 indications will not, I suggest, be enough for state practice as a matter of international law. The fact that a court tells me to do X and I do it does not show that I accept that the court has jurisdiction to tell me to do it. I might choose to do it because I do not want to pick a fight with the court. One has to find a more detailed and forthright statement that is sufficiently unambiguous, and then look at that coupled with everything else.

I have delayed the Committee long enough. On this point, I direct the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, to Policy Exchange, on which she is absolutely right. The point made by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, was picked up and dealt with by Professor Ekins in that report.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

My Lords—

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

Before I give way, may I make one other short point? I respectfully suggest that state practice cannot give a court jurisdiction when it does not have it. All state practice can do is go to the interpretation of a treaty. It does not go to the creation of a power or a jurisdiction; that point may not be one to discuss as the clock strikes midnight, but now is a good time for me to give way to the noble Lord, Lord Carlile.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

I am grateful to the noble Lord. I draw his attention to the current, as of today, UK Visas and Immigration guidance, Judicial Reviews, Injunctions and Applications to the European Court of Human Rights. Where it deals with Rule 39, it says that

“a Rule 39 indication is similar to an Administrative Court … injunction but is”,

to state the obvious, made by the European Court of Human Rights. It goes on:

“Where you have been notified that a rule 39 indication has been made, you must … defer removal immediately”


and,

“where the person is detained, make sure this development is considered in relation to any decision to continue with detention”.

In other words, in their current guidance on the subjects that we are concerned with, the Government regard these Rule 39 rulings as binding. That is what the guidance tells the members of the public who have bothered to look at the Government’s own website this evening, as I have.

Illegal Migration Bill

Debate between Lord Carlile of Berriew and Lord Wolfson of Tredegar

Committee stage
Wednesday 24th May 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

The noble and learned Lord is absolutely right; it has no legal effect. Can I put this another way? The Minister can make a Section 19(1)(b) statement and the court can find that the Act is compatible. The Minister can make Section 19(1)(a) statement and the court can find that it is not.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

Does the noble Lord not agree that the Section 19(1)(b) statement on this Bill is very different from the Section 19(1)(b) statement on the Communications Bill? I am sure that he has looked at it. Secretary of State Tessa Jowell made the following statement:

“I am unable (but only because of Clause 309) to make a statement that, in my view, the provisions of the Communications Bill are compatible with the Convention rights”.


By making that statement, Tessa Jowell made it clear that in a massive Bill there was only one clause that she could not make such a statement about. In effect, she stated that everything apart from Clause 309 was compliant with the Human Rights Act. That is how it was understood; we can all read the debates. Is it not incumbent upon the Government, when they make a statement as vague as that on this Bill, to explain what is and what is not compatible with the Human Rights Act?

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

The noble Lord is making a political point. It may be good politics or bad politics, but whether the Government want to do that or not, my focus is on Section 19 of the Human Rights Act, which is very clear:

“A Minister of the Crown in charge of a Bill in either House of Parliament must, before Second Reading … (a) make a statement to the effect that in his view the provisions of the Bill are compatible with the Convention rights … or (b) make a statement to the effect that although he is unable to make a statement of compatibility the government nevertheless wishes the House to proceed with the Bill”.


We could have a nice debate about whether the statement in the Communications Act 2003 was consistent with Section 19, but that is not my point. My point today is simply that we cannot legitimately criticise the Minister for making precisely the statement that Parliament told him to make in Section (19)(1)(b) if he cannot make a Section 19(1)(a) statement.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

I am reluctant to give the noble Lord a private lecture on this, but I will set out a very short answer. I will be blunt but, I hope, legally accurate. The short answer to the noble Lord’s question is yes; we could do it. International treaties are not part of our domestic law. As far as our domestic courts are concerned—please let me finish and I will give way—if we were to legislate completely contrary to an international treaty, our domestic courts would have to abide by the Act of Parliament, because that is domestic law. Of course, that would put the UK in breach of the international treaty. It is not something I would recommend, but the noble Lord asked me a direct question about how the two interrelate, and that is a necessary consequence of being a dualist state. International treaties are not part of domestic law, unless and until they are incorporated.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

This could develop into a really interesting argument, I am afraid—between lawyers. The noble Lord just referred to the dualist theory, which of course is very important, but, in reality, international treaties are not usually entered into legislation because they are made under the royal prerogative. But that does not make them any less binding.

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

I started my remarks by saying that international treaties are extremely important and that we should always legislate consistently with our international obligations, except in the most unforeseen and unusual circumstances. But that is not the question I was asked by the noble Lord, Lord Hannay. We are a dualist state. That is why we should object to these amendments, which seek to incorporate treaties by the back door.

Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Debate between Lord Carlile of Berriew and Lord Wolfson of Tredegar

Lords Hansard - Part 1 & Report stage
Wednesday 8th December 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

I am grateful to the Minister for giving way. One point he has not dealt with, as I understand it, is why the Sentencing Council and sentencing guidelines are not seen as an adequate and flexible mechanism for dealing with cases of this kind. We need a reasoned explanation for the rejection of that proposition.

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

The reasoned explanation is that the Government believe that this is an offence which should be marked by a life sentence—a mandatory life sentence. The amount of time the person serves can be set by the judge in a tariff.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

The Minister has just given the game away by his slip of the tongue. He said it is a case which should be marked by “a life sentence”, and then he said, “a mandatory life sentence”. He was right before he made the slip of the tongue. That is exactly what judges can do and exactly what the Sentencing Council can deal with. I am afraid that I do not accept that his explanation so far has been reasoned.

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

We are now having precisely the opposite debate to the one we had in Committee. In Committee, when someone said to me—I think it was the noble Baroness, Lady Jones—“this is a mandatory sentence” and I said, “but there are exceptions”, it was said to me, “no, it is mandatory”. Now, when I am trying to point out that it is not mandatory, in the sense that it is a mandatory life sentence but it does not mean you serve life in prison, that is said to be a slip of the tongue. I absolutely meant what I said: this provision sets out a mandatory life sentence, because the Government believe that is the right way to mark society’s horror at the killing of emergency workers, in the same way that we do for murder.

However, with murder, and in this case, the trial judge will have the ability to set an appropriate tariff. Also, unlike with murder, the trial judge can, in exceptional circumstances, depart from the sentence entirely, something which society and Parliament does not enable a trial judge to do in any murder case. With great respect to the noble Lord—

[Lord Carlile of Berriew]

I am sorry to interrupt again, but the Minister has said something completely untenable. He said that under “exceptional circumstances”, the judge has the power to depart from the sentence entirely. That is absolutely not the case. If the sentencing guidelines in front of any judge sitting in a criminal court lead to the conclusion that the starting point for the sentencing process is a life sentence, but there are circumstances at which different levels can be set, they will operate on that basis. This provision is unnecessary if we trust the judges. The Government are telling us, on the basis of belief, as the Minister said—which I do not necessarily regard as reasoned—that they do not trust judges to pass appropriate sentences in these cases, on the basis of one or two instances, when there is a perfectly good living instrument for dealing with this.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar]

I am very happy to be accused of all sorts of things, but I hope that nobody in this House believes that I act either towards it or towards any of its Members with discourtesy. We may have disagreements, but they are always, I hope, courteous. I am not in the least embarrassed about going back to the Ministry of Justice with or without anything. My task, as I see it, is to set out the Government’s position in this House and then the House has to take a view.

With great respect to the noble and learned Lord, I do not accept that this is a question of tweaking the provision or making it better. The points that have been put to me are really points of principle—people do not agree with this at all, while saying, “Of course we agree.” The matter ought to be presented to the House and dealt with by it today.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

Following on from the remarks of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, can the Government agree to the House being adjourned for half an hour or so, so that there can be a discussion between the usual channels and between the groups in the House as to how this should continue? We would be very grateful and it would be seen as a matter of utmost but necessary courtesy.

Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Debate between Lord Carlile of Berriew and Lord Wolfson of Tredegar

Lords Hansard - part one & Committee stage
Wednesday 10th November 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

I hope I can be forgiven for intervening slightly out of order. I have been thinking as I listen to this debate about the very troubling case which the noble Lord, Lord Brooke of Alverthorpe, raised, but I am not sure that what he is looking for is germane to this clause. However, there is an issue of general principle about unrecovered, uninsured losses arising from a serious crime of violence which does not cause considerable personal injury.

If there is an injury that would attract damages of £1,000 or more, some ancillary costs are payable under the criminal injuries compensation scheme. This raises in my mind that perhaps the Government should look at something like the Pool Re reinsurance scheme, which applies to claims which are uninsured as a result of terrorism events. The underinsured or uninsured person can go to this entity, which has been set up jointly by the public and private sectors, and recover the cost of damages for what has occurred outside the insurance scheme. I suggest to the Minister, who is an extremely experienced lawyer, that perhaps the Government should look at the criminal injuries compensation scheme and the Pool Re scheme and try to produce something which would deal with quite a significant number of cases which probably do not involve a massive amount of money, but in which people who are not very well resourced suffer a great deal, and disproportionately, as a result of the kind of offence that the noble Lord described.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord Wolfson of Tredegar) (Con)]

My Lords, this group of amendments, proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Brooke of Alverthorpe, seeks to require that reasonable steps be taken to obtain and take into account details of any financial costs incurred by the victim as a result of the offence when deciding on the conditions to attach to a caution and when deciding on the amount of the financial penalty.

I will begin with the particular instance that the noble Lord set out. Both he and the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, used the word “distressing” and I agree with that entirely. I would go further and say that it was appalling; it is a horrific set of circumstances and I am sure everyone in the Committee would share that approach. I extend deepest sympathies to Mr McAra. I am very pleased to hear that his local MP has been helpful and supportive; I was also pleased to hear that she is a Conservative, although one of the glories of our parliamentary system is that all MPs from all parties extend that sort of support to their constituents. It is very good to hear that the system is working.

I also tend to agree that this would be unlikely to be a caution case. I am hesitant to say any more, because prosecuting decisions are independent and a matter for the CPS. I defer in this regard to the experience of the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, but it sounds to me as though this would be more than a caution case.

The Bill states that both the diversionary and community cautions must have conditions attached to them. Those may include rehabilitation and reparation conditions, financial penalty conditions or conditions related to certain foreign offenders. I assure the noble Lord, Lord Brooke, that I give this amendment and the points that he made a sympathetic hearing, as he wanted, but I will explain why as a matter of principle we cannot accept it. This is not because we disagree with the point that underlies it but for the reasons which I will set out. The starting point is that Clauses 79 and 88 already provide for the authorised person to make reasonable efforts to obtain the views of any victim of the offence and take those views into account when deciding on the conditions to be attached to a caution. This includes obtaining their views on financial costs incurred and any decisions on seeking compensation.

Under the current cautions regime, the code of practice for conditional cautions makes clear provision for this in specifying that financial compensation may be paid to a victim. In addition, where the offending has resulted in damage to community property—I appreciate that in the case we have discussed the damage was to personal property—reparation may also take the form of repairing the damage caused, reparative activity within the community more generally or a payment to a local charitable or community fund, which might be more helpful if an offender does not have the financial means to pay. The current code also states that compensation for the victim should be prioritised ahead of other costs or financial penalties.

As is the case with the current code of practice for conditional cautions, the code of practice for the new diversionary and community cautions is the appropriate place to set out further detail on how the conditions attached to a caution may be decided. Again, that will include obtaining and considering any financial losses and requests for compensation. The code will be drawn up under the delegated powers in the legislation. We will consult widely, as the noble Lord would expect, and it will be laid under the affirmative procedure.

Consulting victims goes beyond just cautions. It is a key principle of the victims’ code, point 6.7 of which says:

“Where the police or the Crown Prosecution Service are considering an out of court disposal you have the Right”—


that is, the victim has the right—

“to be asked for your views and to have these views taken into account when a decision is made.”

As I have sought to explain, that will encompass the financial circumstances as well.

Finally, without wishing to be too particular on the drafting but just for the record, I point out that, although the parts of Amendments 177 and 186 relating to Clauses 81 and 90 share the same underlying intention, those clauses relate to financial penalties paid to a court, which are punitive and are not the same as the rehabilitative or reparative conditions, which I know are really the focus of the noble Lord’s amendment.

Hillsborough: Collapse of Trials

Debate between Lord Carlile of Berriew and Lord Wolfson of Tredegar

Monday 14th June 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

My Lords, we will of course keep this point of law under consideration but not for the reasons the noble Lord gives, if I may say so respectfully. The Prime Minister has already confirmed that the Covid inquiry—if I can call it that—will be established on a statutory basis with full formal powers. That means that Section 35 of the Inquiries Act 2005 will apply. That makes it an offence to commit acts that tend

“to have the effect of … distorting … altering … or preventing … evidence”

from being given to a statutory inquiry.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB) [V]]

Will the Minister confirm that the DPP himself advised on charges brought in the trial and on the surprising decision not to appeal the trial judge’s terminating ruling? Will the DPP follow the practice of publishing his advice in important cases? Will the Minister explain why alternative charges of misconduct in public office were not brought against all three defendants, as they could have been?

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

My Lords, the CPS sought advice from senior Treasury counsel pre-charge. Decisions on appropriate charges were made after consideration of that advice. Those decisions were taken in 2017, predating the current director’s term of office. As far as misconduct in public office is concerned, that charge was not available for Mr Metcalf, the solicitor for South Yorkshire Police’s insurers. The allegations against the two officers were related closely to his conduct. Therefore, it was considered that the same charge against each was appropriate. The CPS did not appeal the decision because, having carefully considered it, it concluded there was not a proper basis to appeal to the Court of Appeal. As for the point about the director publishing advice, he does not sit under the Ministry of Justice, as the noble Lord will be aware, but I will pass that point on to the director, whom I note is appearing before the Justice Select Committee tomorrow.

Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill

Debate between Lord Carlile of Berriew and Lord Wolfson of Tredegar

Report stage & Lords Hansard
Wednesday 3rd March 2021 Lords Chamber

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord Wolfson of Tredegar) (Con)]

My Lords, I understand that the intent of this amendment, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Carlile of Berriew, is to do two things: first, to introduce a role for the Parole Board where, otherwise, the changes in the Bill would make its role superfluous; and, secondly and at the same time, not to reintroduce eligibility for early discretionary release for this cohort.

I will begin by outlining briefly the effect of the amendment in a little more detail. It would replace Clause 27, which restricts early release for offenders convicted of a serious terrorism offence—that is, those listed in Schedule 2 to the Bill—who receive an extended determinate sentence, or EDS, or a new serious terrorism sentence so that they instead serve the full custodial term of their sentence. In its place, the amendment would insert a provision that would change the release provision for all terrorist offenders sentenced to an EDS. Further, and while I understand that this may not be the noble Lord’s intent, this amendment would also apply to those currently serving an EDS for a terrorist offence.

The replacement release provision in the noble Lord’s amendment would continue to restrict early release, but there is an important difference. At the end of the custodial term, the scheme set out in the amendment would instead refer the offender to the Parole Board. The Parole Board would then determine whether the offender represents a grave risk to the public and whether it is necessary for the protection of the public that the offender continues to be imprisoned. Under the scheme in the amendment, this consideration would continue annually until release was granted, or to the end of the extended licence period, when the offender would then be released, unconditionally, into the community. The effect would therefore be that, if release were not granted until the end of the extended licence period, there would be a cliff edge and the offender would at that point be released unconditionally into the community. There would be no period of supervision and reintegration. For the reasons set out by the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, that is a matter of concern.

I have carefully considered the proposed changes, especially as they arise from an amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Carlile. I hope I may be permitted to say that contributions from him on this subject always merit the most careful consideration, and I can assure both him and the House that I have done so in this case. None the less, having undertaken that careful consideration, I must set out the Government’s view that the changes to the release provisions for the EDS, as set out in the amendment, would be contrary to safeguards set out in the European Convention on Human Rights and its case law governing sentencing and release. That case law is usefully summarised in a recent decision of the Supreme Court of this country in Brown v Parole Board for Scotland—we seem to be referring to Scottish cases everywhere today. It is reported at [2017] UKSC 69, in particular the discussions between paragraphs 49 and 55. While every decision of the Supreme Court is obviously a decision of a strong court, that court, for which the noble and learned Lord, Lord Reed, spoke, contained three former and current Presidents of the Supreme Court.

The reason the proposal would be contrary to the case law is that the EDS comprises two distinct parts. The first is a punitive component—namely, the custodial term—imposed for the length a judge considers commensurate with the seriousness of the offending. The second is a separate preventive element—namely, the extended licence—imposed to protect the public from the danger posed by other, future, yet to be determined serious offending. To that extent, we agree with the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, who was right to draw attention to the question of serious risk to the public. That is what the second part of the EDS does.

If the Government were to detain EDS prisoners into their extended licence period for reasons related to their initial offending, that detention would be contrary to the nature and intended purpose of the community supervision component of the sentence, and contrary to the court’s order imposing the EDS. As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Reed, for the Supreme Court, put it in the Brown case,

“the purpose of detention during the extension period is materially different from that of a determinate sentence.”

The noble Lord, Lord Carlile, acknowledged that this amendment would require further development, either in the form of a new sentence or by further alteration to the existing EDS regime. I am grateful for that acceptance. However, I must state that the Government would not support such a proposal, because there is no need for such a new sentence. The EDS and the new serious terrorism sentence are deliberately structured to do two things: to provide punishment and, separately, to aid public protection and reintegration through the licence period. We have no desire to change this overall approach or, to use the metaphor of the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, to change the architecture.

For those who are not dangerous, the sentence for offenders of particular concern sufficiently caters for release with a role for the Parole Board and yet without the risk of an unsupervised cliff edge, which the amendment would introduce. I understand, as the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, noted, that the amendment is born of a desire to introduce a role for the Parole Board. But there is no role for the Parole Board here because it is not necessary. There is no early release and no parole so, accordingly, there is no role for the Parole Board. That is, therefore, my answer to the question put to me by the noble Lord, Lord Marks, who asked why there is no role for the Parole Board. It is for the reasons I have just given. While I suspect that my answer may not leave him persuaded, I hope it means that he is no longer perplexed.

The noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, asked me whether we are saying that the alternative can do a better job than the Parole Board. I accept that, as the premise behind that question would admit, some Peers consider the Parole Board the only qualified body to deal with the specialised nature of setting licence conditions for terrorist offenders. But in answer to the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, I must respectfully reject that approach. The reason the Parole Board is responsible for setting licence conditions when it directs the prisoner’s release is that that is part and parcel of the Parole Board’s decision that the offender can be safely released and managed in the community. The Parole Board decides that the offender can be released and, as part of that, decides the licence conditions that will govern such release.

However, with an EDS for a serious terrorism offence and the serious terrorism sentence, there is no provision for early release before the end of the custodial period. The corollary of that proposition is that release at the end of the custodial period is automatic. Where release is automatic, there is no reason why the Parole Board specifically should consider licence conditions.

Furthermore, offenders will be subject to management under MAPPA—Multi Agency Public Protection Arrangements—through which the police and the probation and prison services work with other agencies to manage the risks posed by offenders living in the community in order to protect the public. In cases under the Terrorism Act 2000—TACT—and TACT-connected cases, that involves the probation service, the releasing prison, counterterrorism police, security services, the Joint Extremism Unit of HMPPS, and social services.

With the creation of the national security division of the National Probation Service, we will see even greater specialism in making such recommendations. That ensures that professionals with a detailed knowledge of the offender are involved in identifying the licence conditions which are necessary and appropriate. The key point is that that happens regardless of whether the final decision-maker on setting the licence is the Parole Board or HMPPS—the governor. While ultimately the board or the governor makes the decision, that decision is always directly informed by those with intelligence of and expertise in managing the offender. I therefore assure the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, that the process is no less rigorous and the outcomes are no different.

The noble Lord, Lord Carlile, asked a specific question about our discussions with the Parole Board. We have shared the Bill with the Parole Board and discussed its implications with it, but there has not been a formal consultation, if that is what the noble Lord was driving at in his question.

For those reasons, which I hope I have explained clearly and fairly, I remain of the view that there is no role for the Parole Board where there is no consideration of early release. That point, combined with the issues I have explained around the legality of this amendment from an ECHR standpoint, leads me to consider this amendment unnecessary. I therefore respectfully urge the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, to withdraw it. Of course, I am happy to continue our conversations with him about this matter, as I am sure we will continue to benefit from an exchange of views about other matters in the Bill also.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB) [V]]

My Lords, I am grateful to all who have spoken in this debate, to the noble Lords, Lord Marks and Lord Ponsonby, for their broad support for what I have suggested, and to the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson of Tredegar, for his detailed response.

When I was at school, I had a teacher who taught us about different forms of argument, one of which is entitled “argumentum ad maiorem”—argument using a greater authority. In those days, I suppose it was something like “Because Sir Winston Churchill said something, it must be right.” The Minister’s argumentum ad maiorem was about the case of Brown v the Parole Board for Scotland, which, it will not surprise your Lordships to know, I have read.

I do not propose to embark on and bore your Lordships with a legal moot about that case. I say simply that I respectfully do not agree with the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson, despite his eminence as a lawyer, about the effect of that case on my proposal. I believe that my proposal, because of the change of the architecture that I suggested, including the fact that the sentencing judge would clearly refer to the potential extension provisions at the time of sentence, would come within the judgment of Brown v the Parole Board for Scotland.