(1 year, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I rise with some trepidation to disagree with these amendments, for reasons that I will try to give briefly. Amendment 8 and, indeed, all the others in the group are concerned with intellectual property. My entry in the register of interests discloses involvement with a strategy consultancy. In that role, we sometimes make ourselves available for the investigation of imposter frauds, for example. Many of those frauds can be connected with the attempted theft of intellectual property, not just by individuals and companies but by nation states. Some of those nation states are extremely big and powerful and have the capacity to make full use of the secrets they steal to become world leaders in the marketing of such goods.
I would suggest, with respect, that Amendment 8 shows a misunderstanding of the issue by the JCHR. Indeed, the reason why the proposed Clause 2(1)(ca)—Amendment 8—is not needed is that the reasons for this provision are well set out, in subsection (2)(b) in particular. This is for the protection of some very important and extraordinarily valuable intellectual property, which is created in, and in the interests of, this country. Indeed, if one looks at the other amendments, in particular those seeking to amend subsection (2), one has to think for only a moment to see the problem, and that these amendments defy that problem.
Let us take the example of a university computer science or physics laboratory where leading-edge research is being done or, to take something extremely topical, a vaccination laboratory where research is being done that could make a huge difference to humankind in general. As it happens, it could also make an enormous amount of profit for those creating the scientific inventions and, given the advantages they gain through taxation, for the Government.
It seems to me that the provisions in the Bill are absolutely needed to protect those scientists and inventors. There is a stage between the idea—which may come to someone in the bath or shower—and the production of a patent or copyright during which that idea is not protected by registration. These provisions precisely protect that intermediate area between the idea coming into the scientist’s head and its being registered and protected under the intellectual property legislation, which can be quite slow, very expensive and very complex.
So I respectfully suggest to those who have tabled these amendments that they are not needed and that, in fact, the Bill gives the right sort of protection precisely where it is needed, in the clause in question.
I respectfully disagree with the noble Lord, Lord Carlile. He may well be able to make a compelling case that there is a mischief that here needs to be addressed, but it is surely nothing whatever to do with national security, which is the subject of the Bill. The noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, is right that it is puzzling that there is no requirement in Clause 2 that it be established that the conduct in question is prejudicial to the safety or interests of the United Kingdom. The desirability of improving intellectual property law is really not an appropriate subject for a Bill of this nature.
Moreover, the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, says that if one looks at Clause 2(2)(b), that paragraph ensures the protection. I remind the Committee that all that Clause 2(2)(b) does is define a “trade secret” as information that
“has actual or potential industrial, economic or commercial value which would be … adversely affected if it became generally known”.
That is the loosest possible definition of a commercial trade secret. It is impossible to understand why matters of that sort should be dealt with in the Bill; indeed, that information may be enjoyed or owned by a foreign individual or company.
Trade secret law is very well developed. It includes remedies for damages and for injunctions. To include Clause 2 in the Bill would attract not just the considerable criminal penalties that the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, referred to, it would invoke Clause 16, on the criminality of preparatory acts—
My Lords, if this is an intervention, could the noble Lord make his point, please?
The noble Lord asked to make an intervention, which is why I allowed him to, and I regret that he used the procedure of the House to make a speech. He will be free to make a speech if he wishes to do so.
No, I am not letting the noble Lord in now. I am sure he will make a speech if he wishes to in a moment.
I will respond to the noble Lord’s intervention, if I may be allowed a moment to do so. His intervention completely misses the point. He seeks to impose upon us his definition of national security. I do not share his definition of national security. If there is theft by a major state overseas of important intellectual property that has yet to be registered and which could make a huge difference to this country, in my view that falls well within the definition of national security. Indeed, that is why the Government have chosen to include economic issues in the broad definition of national security. So I respect my noble friend’s intervention but I disagree with it. I shall listen very carefully to any speech that he makes—after I have sat down.
I am very sorry. I apologise to the noble Lord and the Committee; I thought he had sat down, and I was not the only Member of the House who thought so.
I have made my speech. The only point that I was going to add was that if we retain Clause 2, it includes the preparatory acts under Clause 16 and the powers of search under Clause 21. For all those reasons, I think Clause 2 should not be included in the Bill.
My Lords, the noble Lord obviously did not know that the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, had not sat down, but he perhaps ought reasonably to have known.
This exchange has focused my mind much more on the following question: part of the grey zone that we are dealing with is whether or not economic security is now part of national security. To a considerable extent, it is. I have not yet fully understood the relationship between the Bill and the National Security and Investment Act, passed last year, which deals with, among other things, some aspects of intellectual property. There may well be—but I am not sufficiently expert on it—a degree of overlap between that Act and what is proposed here.
(2 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, Amendment 97CA is in my name and those of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, and the noble Lord, Lord Marks. Unfortunately, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, cannot be in his place this evening because he has been attending a funeral.
Amendment 97CA would remove from the Bill the power in Clause 170 for a court to give a direction that the jury can participate in a criminal trial remotely; that is, in a different location to the judge, counsel and witnesses so long as all members of the jury are in the same place. Jury trial is, of course, one of the cornerstones of our criminal justice system—whether you approve or disapprove of the Bristol jury’s decision to acquit the defendants of criminal damage to the statue of Edward Colston. We need to consider very carefully indeed proposals to amend the way in which the jury performs its functions.
I share the concerns about this proposal that have been expressed by the Bar Council and the Law Society. They say that the success of a jury trial depends in large part on a good working relationship of trust and confidence between judge and jury. The jury needs to be attentive and mindful of its onerous responsibilities; the judge needs to watch the jury to ensure that its interests are protected and it is properly performing its responsibilities. Counsel—both prosecution and defence counsel—need to engage with the jury during the trial. All this is so much harder to achieve through a video screen—indeed, noble Lords will be aware of that from when they have participated in parliamentary proceedings through a video screen over the last two years.
This proposed power requires a strong justification. I listened carefully—I always listen carefully—to what the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson, said in support of this power in Committee and indeed in discussions that I have had with him since, for which I am very grateful. The Minister concedes—indeed, he positively asserts—that this Government have no plan to encourage the use of remote juries. Indeed, they have had no such plans in the nearly two years since Covid-19 began to blight our lives. What the Minister says is that it will be good for Ministers to have this power, just in case it proves useful at some stage in the future. I suggest to noble Lords that it is a very bad legislative practice to confer broad powers on Ministers, particularly powers as controversial as these, just in case they might prove useful at some stage in the future.
The Minister will no doubt give assurances to the House about whether and when these powers might be used. The insuperable difficulty with legislating on such a basis is that the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson, cannot bind his successors in office, who may well have different principles and different policies.
I say to the House that these proposed powers, if ever used, would pose a real threat to the effective administration of justice. There is no current need for them.
My Lords, I strongly support the submissions made by the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, in relation to Amendment 97C. In doing so, perhaps I can give a small insight as someone who has conducted hundreds of jury trials, some of them involving young people—often very naive young people who are in an enormous amount of trouble.
I feel it necessary to say something to the House about the interaction between counsel and the young client. Typically during the course of such a trial, and in my experience this happens more with children on trial than with adults on trial, either, if one is lucky enough to have one there, one asks one’s instructing solicitor to have a word with the client in the dock on some evidence that has just been given, or—if, as is common now, there is no instructing solicitor there—counsel just walks a couple of rows behind to the front of the dock, takes instructions from his or her client about a factual proposition that has just been made and then continues or commences a cross-examination based on the instructions that have just been taken. In other words, there is a dynamic, living, ongoing 24/7 interaction between the advocate and the advocate’s client.
In the last nearly two years we have all been through the process of conducting virtual meetings. In most respects that has worked very well, but, since we have had the experience of going back into real meetings—on and off, admittedly—we have rediscovered the importance of interaction on the details that occur during a discourse. In my view, it could prove very damaging and delaying in trials to have to have that sort of discourse with a client by asking the judge to turn off the devices so that a private consultation can take place. That could look very odd to a jury, as compared to a quick word two rows behind. I therefore ask the Minister to reflect upon the dynamics of a real trial. I should add that not only have I conducted a lot of trials but for 28 years I was a part-time judge. As a judge I have conducted a lot of jury trials, and the same points arise from the judge’s position.
So far as the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, is concerned, I agree with him for a similar but different reason. It is based on a relationship, the relationship between the judge and the jury. It is absolutely commonplace—it happens every hour of every day—for the judge to make some kind of contact with the jury. It may be eye contact; it may be an aside; it may be a little joke. You would not believe how much juries laugh at judges’ jokes; judges make jokes and get far greater laughs than any comedian I have ever seen. All this is part of the process of creating a living instrument through a trial that really works on a human basis. If there are to be any jury trials conducted with the jury in a different place from the judge, that must be most exceptional. If the judge and jury were in the same place, it may be that—and this would still have to be exceptional—the judge might come to a factual decision that a fair trial could be held, but it would be a very rare instance where that would work.
If I may put it as high as this, I advise the Government not to go down this road. In my view, it has the danger of disruption, increasing appeals and actually destroying the very essence of the holy grail, as it were, that is part of our criminal justice system: the jury trial. Part of that essence is the relationship between the judge and the jury, and that really cannot be conducted remotely.