Civil Legal Aid (Remuneration) (Amendment) (No. 3) Regulations 2014
Lord Carlile of Berriew Excerpts(10 years, 7 months ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)
My Lords, I very much support the excellent speech made by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. I hasten to say that I do not have any expertise in judicial review or in the work of the administrative court, save that I sat on the Court of Appeal, but the legal aid amendments raise constitutional issues of some importance.
I wish to say something about the position of the Lord Chancellor, following on from what was said by the noble Lord, Lord Lester. The Lord Chancellor is head of the Ministry of Justice and, more importantly, has for centuries been the conscience of the monarch and continues to be so. I wonder whether this Lord Chancellor has ever heard of that. Successive Lord Chancellors have had to juggle two positions, as a member of the Cabinet of the Prime Minister of the day and as head of the administration of justice. These two positions inevitably create a conflict of interest, which successive Lord Chancellors have generally managed well.
We now have for the first time a Lord Chancellor who is not a lawyer, who appears not to understand the importance of the judicial and legal systems, and who is either unaware or chooses to be unaware that the administration of justice is one of the pillars of the constitution. He appears not to recognise his special responsibility as Lord Chancellor. He has not listened to the judiciary, particularly the senior judiciary, or to the legal profession, and he has not given sufficient consideration to the implications of these regulations. I have had a great admiration for successive Lord Chancellors—and I suppose I must declare an interest as the sister of Lord Havers—and it saddens me to have to say this. Rather like the noble Lord, Lord Lester, I now regret the clause in the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 that permitted a non-lawyer to become Lord Chancellor.
The administrative court has an increasingly important role in society. It is a crucial part of the checks and balances between the Government of the day and members of the public who have not had a fair deal from a government department or local government. The court holds the Government or local government to account for misuse of powers, and ensures access to justice, accountability and good administration. The effect of these regulations is to reduce dramatically the opportunity of a member of the public to challenge a decision of government, even when that decision is patently unfair. I am talking not about pressure groups, but about individuals. If no legal aid is paid until permission is given then most of the work will have already been done, and in many cases the problem will have been sorted by the lawyers acting for the applicant.
In some of the lobbying information that I have received I was told of two cases where a lawyer sorted it long before it had to go to the judge, by giving the particular government department relevant information that the government officials had failed to look at or had not received from people who are unable properly to put their own cases forward. The absence of legal aid until the moment of the grant of permission will exclude all the cases settled and the management of many problems before the case comes to the judge. It will be a lottery, where many lawyers will not accept to do the work with the hope but not the expectation of payment, especially when the outcome may not require taking the case to the permission stage. The making of the application may itself be sufficient. This is manifestly unfair to the ordinary member of the public. In the year before we celebrate Magna Carta, we might just remember Clause 40:
“To none will we sell, to none will we deny, to none will we delay right or justice”.
That is a hollow phrase today, as many will be denied the right to have an injustice corrected by the courts.
It is very convenient for the Government to reduce the opportunity to challenge decisions made by their departments, which in itself will create a greater and greater inequality for members of the public. It makes many government decisions immune to scrutiny. That cannot be right. I recognise, of course, the efforts of this Government to cut expenditure and I applaud them for the many ways in which they have done so. But this attack on access to the administrative court is a step far too far. There must be some other way to deal with inappropriate applications. The suggestion of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, that it should be left to the judiciary seems to be a sensible compromise. I hope that the Government will think again.
Lord Carlile of Berriew (LD)
I support the Motion of Regret brought by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. In my view, the Government have brought a large blunt instrument down on a subtle and fragile part of legal tissue.
I received a briefing this afternoon from a government source in this part of the coalition who told me that it was estimated there would be a saving of between £1 million and £3 million through the provisions that we are debating. That is just about the least robust financial assessment we have ever heard in this House. If the Opposition had put it forward, I can imagine the Government’s excoriation of it.
In saying what I say, I hope that I will be forgiven for not dwelling on the interesting subject of the epidemiology of the role of Lord Chancellor. I intend to concentrate on more practical things concerning legal aid. I do so from the position of someone who still sits for a few days a year as a part-time judge in the Administrative Court dealing with exactly these cases. I thought it might inform the debate if I told your Lordships something about that role.
On a typical non-court sitting day—that is, a sitting day but in chambers—the Administrative Court judge receives a trolley containing about 12 judicial review cases. Some but by no means all—now, at least—are asylum and immigration cases. Others are on a much broader range of issues across the field of judicial review of administrative action by central and local government, the Parole Board and other public bodies. If we take those dozen cases, some—on a bad day, a majority—are wholly without merit. That phrase was adverted to by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. I agree with the Government that legal aid should not be available or recoverable for cases that are wholly without merit. The Bar Council has taken that realistic view, too.
Some claims are most certainly brought with very little thought, no understanding of the law and just as a delaying tactic. However, some of those dozen cases, on every single sitting day, have merit. The trick for the judge is spotting them. The question here is whether the filter should be the Government, either by statutory interdiction or via the Legal Aid Agency, or the judge. I support the view of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, that the “wholly without merit” test, applied by the judge, is by far the fairest way of dealing with these cases. It is also transparently fair. It is fair in the minds of the public. It is free of the accusation that government or politicians have taken hold of judicial review for illegitimate, political purposes.
Assisted Suicide
Lord Carlile of Berriew Excerpts(10 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
Lord Carlile of Berriew (LD)
My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Jay, for instigating this debate and for the way in which she introduced it. I am going to say something that I did not intend to say, because I have been so shocked by what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, has just said. He has demonstrated a scant and incomplete understanding of what the Director of Public Prosecutions does in these cases. What actually happened here is that the then Director of Public Prosecutions, Sir Keir Starmer, as I understand it determined these guidelines personally and with enormous care as a result of more than 5,000 representations. There is no case that shows that the guidelines have not worked well. The idea that they are not led by compassion is completely unrealistic. The Crown Prosecution Service considers every case on the basis of all the evidence placed before it. Everybody who is interviewed under caution in relation to such a case has the opportunity to tell their story in full, and is able to make extraneous representations—for example, through their solicitors. As a result, the former DPP and the present DPP consider every case on its facts, and apply the guidelines one by one. If there is an issue of compassion, then it is applied to that case.
The noble and learned Lord should not forget—indeed, the House should not forget—that there is a very important constitutional protection here, and that is the power of the Attorney-General or the DPP, as is appropriate in any given case, not to prosecute. That is exactly what is applied here compassionately in an interpretation of the law that works well and should not be changed.
Criminal Legal Aid (General) (Amendment) Regulations 2013
Lord Carlile of Berriew Excerpts(10 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
Lord Carlile of Berriew (LD)
My Lords, given the current clamour for repentance in some quarters, it is a real pleasure to follow a sinner who hath repented. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown, makes an extremely powerful point in reminding us that these are cases in which the merits test has been passed. Therefore, the Government are deliberately excluding from access to litigation people who have been advised that they have merit in their case. That is a matter of real concern.
I, too, applaud the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, for moving this Motion of Regret—the third Motion of Regret, or similar, in a run of these legal aid regulations. This fact, in my view, should cause Ministers and the Government Front Bench real concern. There is more or less united opposition to these regulations among the informed. I would have thought that that evidence was as good as one could wish for.
I also want to pick up a point on mental health made by the noble and learned Baroness, with all her experience of the judiciary. It is often a matter of pure chance whether a child or adult with a serious multiple mental health history ends up in prison or in hospital. It may depend on where they were standing when a florid episode took place, whether there was a sympathetic or an unsympathetic police officer present or whether or not their family was there to protect them. It is purely because of a small event that one person may now be in a hospital, with all the care that a hospital provides, and the capacity to obtain legal aid for important litigation that may establish the course of the rest of their lives, and another may be in prison, where, apparently, they are to be deprived of access to that litigation. That seems to me profoundly unjust.
The third and final point I will mention—trying not to take up too much of your Lordships’ time this evening—relates to children and young people and the work of the Howard League for Penal Reform, of which I was president but am no longer. On 13 December last, the Joint Committee on Human Rights stated that it was “disappointed” that the Government had pursued the removal of matters from legal aid relating to young people and, in particular, resettlement cases. The committee said:
“The issues concerning young people may involve matters of housing law, social care law and public law of such complexity that they require access to legal advice and assistance in order to investigate and formulate their case”.
There are, of course, some very good lawyers in this House, but there is not a lawyer in this House who would not be challenged by some of these cases. The Howard League has a legal team that has helped literally hundreds of children make fresh starts and secure long-term support on statutory funding. The result has often been to allow them to be released safely, having served the shortest appropriate time in prison. They have often been able to move on not just to lives which are free of crime but to lives which are positive in a much broader sense.
In turn, this has led not only to justice on their part but has saved the taxpayer a huge amount of money. It is extremely expensive keeping young people locked up. Therefore, I say to my noble friend the Minister that I doubt very much that any robust cost-benefit analysis has been done on removing legal aid from children in custody rather than allowing them the legal aid which the expert legal team at the Howard League—and, of course, elsewhere—has utilised to bring benefit to those children’s lives.
Lord Goldsmith (Lab)
My Lords, it is a privilege to follow the statements that have been made by so many of your Lordships universally condemning these regulations and identifying the specifics of why they are wrong in principle and wrong in fact.
I have not been someone who has objected to any legal aid cut. I have been concerned about some but, as a member of a Government who themselves had to look at legal aid issues, that was not the concern. However, what particularly concerns me about these regulations is the point that the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, made early in his contribution when he referred to the reasons given by the Secretary of State, the Lord Chancellor, for making this change—said to be ideological.
While there may be that ideology so far as the Lord Chancellor is concerned, noble and learned Lords have already made it plain why it is legally wrong: because prisoners have rights. Therefore, if the justification is that, ideologically, they should not have rights, he is saying that they should be in the same position as the people in the black holes of Guantanamo.
I am still shocked by the piece that the Lord Chancellor wrote in the Daily Mail on 11 September 2013, in which he described judicial review, not once but twice, as,
“a promotional tool for countless Left-wing campaigners”.
That is completely untrue, of course. I do not think that the Daily Mail would be regarded as a left-wing campaigner, yet it used judicial review to challenge the Leveson inquiry. Much as I admire it, I do not think that the Countryside Alliance, when it brought a judicial review against hunting, would have regarded itself as a left-wing campaigner.
It is deeply worrying that that is the ideology that underlies these changes. It would be deeply worrying if it came from anybody, but coming from a Lord Chancellor—a Secretary of State for Justice—it is a matter of the gravest regret, which is why I am very happy to support the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. It is wrong for these reasons. It is wrong because legal aid is about justice, not about ideology. It should be about ensuring that people can vindicate their rights where properly those rights deserve to be vindicated. Therefore, the Lord Chancellor—the Secretary of State—is ideologically unsound and also legally wrong.
This measure is, I regret to say, shabby, and a political and populist move which does no credit at all to a Government. Equally, it does no good, as noble and learned Lords and noble Lords have pointed out, in terms of cutting the budget. I very much hope that the noble Lord—and I, for one, welcome him to his place on the ministerial Bench—will do his best to make sure that that point is driven home within the Ministry of Justice and that the Secretary of State recognises eventually that this sort of move, which he regards as ideological, is in fact utterly to be regretted.
Costs in Criminal Cases (Legal Costs) (Exceptions) Regulations 2013
Lord Carlile of Berriew Excerpts(10 years, 11 months ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
Lord Pannick (CB)
My Lords, I add my welcome to the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, to the government team. He brings to this role expert legal knowledge, very considerable practical experience, excellent judgment and a concern to promote the values of the legal system, qualities that have not noticeably been displayed over the past three and half years by those responsible for making decisions in the Ministry of Justice. I hope that the Secretary of State will listen to the noble Lord’s advice and take advantage of the expert legal advice and assistance that he will be providing—indeed will be providing, as I understand it, in the best traditions of the Bar, on a pro bono basis.
I am very grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Bach, for promoting this debate. I share his concerns about the exclusion of borderline cases from the scope of legal aid. The concern I have is that many of the leading cases in which the law has been developed in the public interest over the past few years have involved claims which, because of the disputed legal principles, could not have been said to have a 50% chance of success. The noble Lord, Lord Bach, mentioned examples of such legal aid cases, including one in which I acted for the claimants. That was the case of Debbie Purdy, which was the subject of the last judgment of the Appellate Committee of your Lordships’ House before the creation of the Supreme Court in 2009. This was a case in which judgments were delivered by two noble and learned Lords in their places today: the noble and learned Lords, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood and Lord Hope of Craighead,
The Appellate Committee held that that the DPP had a duty to publish guidelines about the circumstances in which he would prosecute for assisting a suicide. Those guidelines have made a valuable contribution to justice in a difficult area of the law. It could not have sensibly been said that the claim brought by Debbie Purdy was other than borderline. Legal aid was accordingly granted under the law at the time. When these regulations are implemented, as I think they now are, legal aid will simply be unavailable for such a case.
For legal aid to be able to fund such cases serves the public interest. The Minister told the House today that the removal of borderline cases from the scope of legal aid will save £1 million a year. Such a modest saving cannot begin to justify the damage that this change will do to the ability to develop the common law. The Minister’s other point was that taxpayers’ money should not be spent on cases that a private-paying citizen of reasonable means would not wish to pursue. The defect in that reasoning is that a private-paying citizen may well wish to pursue a case that has only a 30% or 40% chance of success if it raises an issue of enormous importance to them.
There is a further point in answer to this defence of this change. It is a point that was made by Richard Drabble QC in his excellent response to the consultation on this issue. He pointed out that when the Government respond to judicial reviews in cases such as that of Debbie Purdy they do not simply ask themselves whether they have a 50% chance of success and, if not, decline to be represented in the court proceedings; the Government very properly take account of the importance and complexity of the case and often fund a defence even though their legal advisers cannot say that there is a 50% chance of success. These are not the cases mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, where further investigation may provide an answer; they are cases where it is inherent in the nature of the case that they are borderline and you cannot say that there is a 50% chance of success.
Why should the legal aid scheme adopt a different and narrower approach to legal aid for claimants than the Government adopt for themselves in deciding when and how to resist judicial review claims? The Government’s reasoning leaves entirely out of account the nature of the cases that will now be excluded from legal aid and the public interest in ensuring that the law is determined and applied only after proper legal argument on both sides. For these reasons, I very much regret these amendment regulations and I hope that the Minister, if he is unable to say so today, will be able to advise the Secretary of State that further thought needs to be given to this important matter.
Lord Carlile of Berriew (LD)
My Lords, I join the noble Lords, Lord Bach and Lord Pannick, on two grounds. The first is the generous but completely justified welcome that has been given to the arrival of my noble friend Lord Faulks on the government Front Bench. Indeed, I am encouraged that he has a record of questioning the reduction of legal aid, particularly in criminal cases. I urge him to do another piece of pro bono work, a tutorial for his ministerial colleague in another place, Mr Shailesh Vara, on understanding simple statistics and understanding something about legal aid.
The second ground on which I agree entirely with those who have already spoken is in my support of the regret Motion introduced very clearly by the noble Lord, Lord Bach, and illustrated with customary cogency by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. However, I want to turn to the criminal regulation. I do not support a criminal regulation that means that somebody who has perfectly reasonably obtained the advice of a good solicitor and senior counsel can only, without exception, recover costs at legal aid rates if he wins the case. It may be best if I give a real illustration.
A retired butcher of about 70 years old was charged with some very serious sexual offences, including rape, against a young girl of about 12 years old who was the daughter or granddaughter of a neighbour. He instructed a good solicitor. The good solicitor said to him that he could instruct counsel on legal aid but his preference would be to instruct more senior counsel, leading counsel, but that would not be covered by legal aid. Not surprisingly, the 70 year-old retired butcher asked for advice as to his prospects if he took either part of the respective advice. He was advised by the solicitor, perfectly reasonably, that his best prospects were to have the more experienced counsel from the very beginning, so leading counsel was instructed.
As it turned out, in the event, there were a number of complex legal points and some factual issues. After the matter was dealt with with a good deal of care by the solicitor and leading counsel, the case went to the Crown Court where it was dropped at the courtroom door. One of the reasons why it was dropped was that it transpired that he could not have committed one of the most important offences alleged against him because he was out of the country at the time, an issue which involved very complicated inquiry, including issues of the admissibility of evidence obtained from abroad. Thus, he avoided a trial and a potential sentence of upward of 10 years’ imprisonment and he was able to return to his family and home. He had paid for the advice by borrowing money from his grown-up children and by mortgaging his home.
Before your Lordships think about six-figure sums for the fees involved, they were nothing like so high. It was well understood by the solicitor, who drove a hard bargain, and by counsel, who knew perfectly well that their fees were subject to assessment if they were too high, that reasonable fees would have to be charged, and they were. Total costs in the case amounted to a middling five-figure sum. He applied for his costs before the Crown Court judge, before whom the case was dropped—accepting an acquittal, by the way—and the judge thought it entirely reasonable that he had obtained the advice of leading counsel and a good solicitor and he was awarded his costs out of central funds. What is unreasonable or unjust about that? He acted on legal advice, what he did was perfectly reasonable, a good result was obtained and the costs of a trial were avoided, which would probably have been higher than what was paid out of central funds to the solicitor and leading counsel.
What is proposed in criminal cases now is that someone in that position will be able to recover at best only a half, probably a third, of those costs. The retired butcher, therefore, having been acquitted in a prosecution brought unjustly, would have been some tens of thousands out of pocket. Do we really want to countenance a criminal justice system like that? I do not.
Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)
My Lords, as a member of the Joint Committee on Human Rights and, I suspect, the only non-lawyer to take part in this debate, I thank my noble friend for moving the Motion of Regret. I shall make a couple of points based on the JCHR’s report—with which the Minister, as a former colleague on that committee, will of course be very familiar,. The Government’s gain is the JCHR’s loss. I shall spare him any further blushes. As has already been said, the Government estimate that about £1 million will be saved as a result of these changes. Such a small, or as the Minister called it, modest sum in public expenditure terms comes well within the margin of error, and indeed the JCHR questions the accuracy of this estimate. My noble friend suggests that there could be no saving at all.
Whatever the savings actually are, clearly they are very modest and we have to ask whether it is proportionate to put at risk the rights of access to the courts where human rights issues may well be at stake, as underlined by the Bar Council in its evidence to the JCHR. It said that of all the legal aid measures,
“this one is … likely to have the most immediate and adverse effect on human rights”.
It gave as examples the prospect of loss of one’s home or of one’s children being taken into the care system. These are very fundamental issues for ordinary citizens. ILPA has also raised its concerns to your Lordships, particularly with regard to asylum and immigration cases. It raised particular concerns about separated refugee children, and I would welcome an assurance from the Minister that that group will be protected.
Criminal Defence Service (Very High Cost Cases) (Funding) Order 2013
Lord Carlile of Berriew Excerpts(11 years ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
Lord Carlile of Berriew
That a Humble Address be presented to Her Majesty praying that the order, laid before the House on 1 November, be annulled. (SI 2013/2804)
Relevant document: 18th Report from the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee.
Lord Carlile of Berriew (LD)
My Lords, in speaking to the two Motions standing in my name on the Order Paper, I should start by saying that I do so with sadness and regret. The fact that we are having this debate on annulment Motions at all is a symptom of the breakdown in trust between barristers in criminal practice and the Lord Chancellor’s Department. I have been at the Bar for 43 years now, with 42 years in practice. Over that period there have been pinch points, there have been negotiations about costs, but they have always been resolved by constructive engagement. We are now in a situation in which, for the first time in my time at the Bar, barristers are intent on withdrawing their labour, and they are at loggerheads with a Government who a great many of them have supported over the years. That is a sad state of affairs.
I declare my interest at the outset. I am a barrister who has conducted several very high cost cases, the category on which I will focus. I was but am no longer involved in a still current case which is not affected by the changes. I am very grateful to my noble friend the Minister for meeting me, with two officials present, on 26 November. I thought the meeting was useful and possibly constructive for the future. I hope he shares that view.
What are VHCCs? They are called “very high cost cases” but that is somewhat pejorative. In truth, the letters could also stand for “very high complexity cases”. They are few in number and among the most complex cases that come before any court, criminal or civil, in terms of the law that is involved and the facts that they engage. All, by definition, have to be expected to last more than 60 court days—they are massive cases. Substantial prison sentences may ensue for the people convicted, and usually those convicted in this class of case are not career criminals but people of previous good character.
A current case of which I am aware involves nine parties, including the prosecution; 20 counsel, including nine QCs; and between 5 million and 8 million pages of documents disclosed. One might ask, “What all those lawyers are doing, trying to read between 5 million and 8 million pages for the defence. Are they just making work for themselves?”. No, not at all. “Disclosed” in this context means that the documents have been described by the prosecution as either materially undermining the prosecution case or materially assisting the defence case; there is a clear obligation on the defence to examine those documents as best as it can.
These cases are every bit as complex as some of the legendary civil cases involving Russian oligarchs and the like about which we read, and the huge commercial disputes that some of the distinguished noble and learned Lords now sitting in the Chamber were involved in in practice and as judges. They demand the same legal and analytical skills as the most difficult civil cases. There is an added element. All these cases are heard by juries; so the hugely complex material has to be translated, as it were—transposed—into a situation where it can be understood by a jury.
Some defendants are wealthy and would like to pay for their own defences, but they are not allowed to by the state. For the most part they cannot use their assets to pay for their defences because they have been seized by the state. They are the unwilling people who have been thrown on to legal aid and basically obliged to take it or defend themselves. We have had arguments in this House in the past about whether these assets should be unfrozen under careful scrutiny and management to allow them to be used to pay for their defences, but for a completely strange reason the Government are not prepared to allow this to happen. I suggest to your Lordships that that is a stubborn, unreasonable and unrealistic approach.
As I have said, these defendants are thrown unwillingly on to legal aid representation, like it or not, and the public pay. Theoretically, if they are convicted some of the costs can be recovered, but I would like to hear from my noble friend what proportion of the defence costs have been recovered in these cases. Defence costs are notoriously difficult to recover. There are a legion of anecdotes, mostly true, about how the families of those convicted can sit quietly on the assets that have been frozen and live, for example, in expensive family homes for years. Recovery is very unsuccessful.
There seems to be an implication that the Bar is being greedy, setting fees that are totally unrealistic, but I remind your Lordships and particularly my noble friend that these fees have never been set by the Bar or by any other advocate. They have always been set by the Government of the time, and, until now, after consultation, discussion and negotiation, which is a process founded on reason.
Unfortunately VHCCs have developed a substantial bureaucracy which is extremely frustrating to those of us who have had to conduct them. They involve case managers who are civil servants. I have occasionally suggested to these case managers that they are “valued members of the defence team”, a phrase that I have repeated on a few occasions in messages to them. Even that flattery has failed to secure a single attendance by a case manager at a conference in the case, or a single attendance at court when there was a critical incident occurring in a preparatory hearing or the trial. This is mere bureaucracy, which adds totally unnecessarily to the cost of these cases, the fees for which could be assessed by the very people who are sitting in the court—as used to be the case—the associates or court clerks, who saw what was going on and were able to see how much work each advocate had done in the case. The lazy got less than the assiduous.
Lord McNally
It is very late and noble Lords have all had a very good time.
Lord Carlile of Berriew
It is very late, but this is an important debate, as has been made clear. I have one question to ask. If my noble friend thought it right that there should be an extensive consultation on the generality of legal aid, why was there no consultation on VHCC cases?
Lord McNally
This is the first time that VHCC cases have been cut by this Government. I do not think that they were cut by the previous Government. Were they? I stand corrected.
There was a consultation and this has not come out of the blue. I have been talking to the Bar for three and a half years about these cuts.
I hope we do not get an interruption from my noble friend Lord Phillips. He came in very late.
Lord Carlile of Berriew
My Lords, it is now 11 pm so I shall be very brief but I do want to reply to the debate. Twelve out of the 13 Members of your Lordships’ House who have spoken in this debate have spoken consistently with the same thread, criticising the Government for the introduction of these statutory instruments. As I listened to those contributions, I reminded myself of what a privilege it is to be a Member of your Lordships’ House. There were magnificent speeches, many of them from the Cross Benches, three from noble and learned Lords who have held very senior positions in the judiciary, and two from noble and learned Members of this House who have been Attorney-General on opposite sides, with very different types of practice in their experience.
I believe that your Lordships have provided my noble friend the Minster with the finest debating tutorial he could ever have had and that the Lord Chancellor could ever have had in how wrong the Government’s decision to introduce these statutory instruments has been.
Lord McNally
My noble friend interrupted me and I shall interrupt him just once. It is only for this reflection: yes, we have had a good debate and I do not doubt the eminence of those who contributed to it, but I have said it before: the legal profession must not exist in a bubble and congratulate or commiserate with itself. I sometimes wish that this House was full to the gunwales so that we could have a proper debate on these matters and see whether this unanimity of view about the sufferings of the legal profession was quite so evenly spread as a debate like this might sometimes indicate.
Lord Carlile of Berriew
My noble friend is a much liked, popular and witty Member of this House and I will not rise to the uncharacteristic and unjustified provocation of that intervention. I was about to say that I hope that the Lord Chancellor himself will read every word of this debate and will take note of what I think I described earlier as the finest debating tutorial one could have. If my noble friend is saying that all that has happened in this House in the past couple of hours has been a demonstration of self-interest by lawyers, one or two non-lawyers, judges and others who are acting in concert to defy the Government then, in my view, that demeans what has been a magnificent debate. I thank all those who have taken part for giving me the privilege that I described earlier.
I have some sympathy for my noble friend the Minister who sought to respond to the debate. He read out a familiar litany, but it was a litany without a message save the message of mistake. He allowed himself to stray into the suggestion that there had been consultation about the VHCC changes. He sought to elide into the VHCC changes consultation that had taken place on completely different legal issues. It is important to emphasise at the end of this debate that there was no—zero, zilch—consultation on these VHCC changes, and that is fundamental to the complaint that the Bar makes about the high-handed way in which this unilateral breach of contract has occurred.
My noble friend said that the Government were “under responsibilities to make these cuts”—those were his very words; I noted them as he said them. However, with great respect to my noble friend, that phrase is meaningless. The Government have the responsibility to get it right, not just to make cuts for the sake of making them. He said in relation to what is going to happen to these VHCC cases, in which there are now no advocates, that “we will just have to see how this works out”. That took my breath away. It is an acceptance that there are now cases with no advocates, that there is no plan B for these cases and that the promises that the Government made to everyone that it would all be all right on the day have simply been shown to be wrong. I would never accuse my noble friend of being incoherent but the brief that he had was full of incoherence, and we saw it displayed this evening.
At this late hour, I do not propose to divide the House but I believe that I do not need to do so. This debate has been well worth having because of its overwhelming effect of showing that the Government are wrong in what they have done with these cases and that the explanation which my noble friend sought to give just did not hold water at all. With the permission of the House, I beg leave to withdraw the Motion.
Legal Aid
Lord Carlile of Berriew Excerpts(11 years, 5 months ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
Lord Carlile of Berriew
My Lords, I join in congratulating the noble Baroness, Lady Deech, on securing this debate on this very important subject. I also declare my interest. It is set out in the register, but for relevant purposes, I have practised criminal law for 42 years, of which I have spent 28 in one or other of these Houses of Parliament observing the rather tense relationship between politics and law.
This debate is about something fundamental: the quality of the society in which we live. It is about the clarity of the political conscience, which must be sure that our legal institutions are properly implemented and are to be trusted. One of my great mentors was the much-lamented Emlyn Hooson, a colleague of ours on these Benches and one of my predecessors as Member of Parliament for Montgomeryshire. Emlyn Hooson represented Ian Brady on legal aid at his celebrated trial—the Moors murders trial. One of the reasons why we have been able to be confident that what has happened to Ian Brady has been just is because he had the advantage of a proper legal aid defence of the highest quality. We should let go of that at our peril.
The avoidance and the remedying of injustice are dependent on a quality criminal legal aid system, which needs in appropriate cases the best advocates and the best solicitors. Without that, our consciences will be failed. We have heard some criticism of the Bar Council today. I do not hear the same criticism when the doctors in your Lordships’ House stand up and rely on the representation of the British Medical Council or, at least until recent days, when a trade union such as Unite stands up and speaks for workers in this country who find it difficult to negotiate on their own behalf. I applaud the Bar Council, the Criminal Bar Association and the Law Society because they have had the courage to say firmly what needs to be said strongly to protect our legal system in this country.
The reality is that young barristers and young advocates who are solicitors are working for smaller amounts of money than they would earn in almost any other profession. Even without these suggested legal aid reforms, Queen’s Counsel—silks—are being priced out of the market by restrictions on their appearance and by the diminishing amount of work. There is now developing a divided legal profession in which some are still earning large amounts of money—why should they not because they are in the private market? Those of us who choose to remain in the public market are in an almost entirely different profession. That is not good for the health of our society or for the law.
May I specifically say a word about very high-cost cases? These are the small number of extremely complex fraud cases that come before the criminal courts. VHCC could equally stand for very highly challenging cases. They involve huge sums and massive complexity; they are every bit as complicated as any commercial arbitration. Yet it is the legal aid system that is targeted by an entirely arbitrary cut of 30% which, outrageously, is intended to be applied to cases that have already started. People who are involved—I am involved in one such case—will have to take, if they do not return their briefs in outrage, a 30% cut as they continue that case if these proposals come into force. Yet the Ministry of Justice has failed to engage with other issues about such cases. VHCCs are overadministered and, outrageously, restrained assets—the assets, until they are restrained, of defendants—cannot be used to pay for their defences. That seems to be wholly anomalous and unacceptable. The VHCC proposals are quite simply outrageous.
Let us not forget that the Serious Fraud Office sometimes gets things wrong. It took the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, who incidentally was not being briefed at legal aid rates as far as I know, to sort out the misbehaviour of the Serious Fraud Office under its previous leadership to ensure that two brothers, Robert and Vincent Tchenguiz did not face wrongful prosecution for alleged crimes that they had not committed. It sometimes takes the best to sort out bad decisions by public authorities.
Finally, I just want to say a word about prison law because I used to be the president of the Howard League for Penal Reform. I have now been succeeded by the noble Lord, Lord Myners. The changes in prison law will not save money and will increase costs. They will undermine the principle of rehabilitation. More prisoners will become stuck in jail. They will result particularly in specialist lawyers being replaced by less experienced lawyers for the same price. There is not time to develop this, but I urge the Minister to attend closely to the submissions made by the Howard League and particularly by Laura Janes, the acting legal director, who is the great expert in these matters.
The Minister of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord McNally)
My Lords, it is important that I put on the record the Government’s point of view in this important debate, so I will not be able to follow the usual courtesy of a detailed response to the many individual points and questions raised. However, I will treat the Hansard of this debate as an input into the consultation under way, and I will see whether I can cover some of the specific points raised in an omnibus letter that we will circulate to noble Lords.
First, I, too, congratulate the noble Baroness, Lady Deech, on securing a debate on this important subject. It has attracted a speakers list of great experience and expertise, and the debate as a whole has been a major contribution to what I emphasise is a consultation still in progress. This debate and the consultation that has initiated it take place against a background of two inescapable realities. The first was stated by the noble Baroness, Lady Deech, herself when she spoke in the debate on the gracious Speech on 9 May. She was also quoted today by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope. She said:
“It is self-evident that there cannot be a bottomless fund for legal aid”.—[Official Report, 9/3/13; col. 101.]
The second reality was made clear by the noble Lord, Lord Carter, in his review of the procurement of legal aid conducted in 2006. He said:
“A healthy legal services market should be driven by best value competition based on quality, capacity and price. All three of these factors should lead to the restructuring of the supply market”.
Of his own proposals, he said:
“The emphasis of the proposals has been upon providing incentives for firms to structure their businesses in such a way that legal aid services can be procured more effectively, and that the service is delivered more efficiently”.
It is therefore no surprise that previous Governments wrestled with this issue.
The establishment of the Legal Services Commission in 1999 reformed the part of the system which funds legal aid services but not the part which delivers them. Costs continued to increase, giving rise to several series of fee cuts. The case for reform was certainly enough to persuade the Opposition to include a commitment to find greater savings from the legal aid scheme in their 2010 manifesto. Their consultation document, Restructuring the Delivery of Criminal Defence Services, published earlier that year—this was quoted by the noble Lord, Lord Faulks—said:
“Currently the criminal defence service is highly fragmented, with a large number of small suppliers and relatively few large suppliers”.
The need for reform of legal aid-funded services in order to deliver a cost-effective, sustainable legal aid scheme is well established, but it is not the only driver for reform of the legal professions. Changes in technology and its increasingly fundamental role in the functioning of the criminal justice system demand the kinds of changes to working practices and business models seen throughout the public and private sectors. The introduction of alternative business structures, Jackson reforms and an increasingly well informed customer base are all examples of changes which present their own challenges that the legal professions must meet. Those changes are accompanied by the brutal fact that the number of businesses providing criminal legal aid services now vastly outstrips demand for such services.
The realities have been gathering force and relevance for decades, so it is absurd for the professions to claim that they have been bounced by a short and ill considered consultation. When I first came into this office in 2010, the Bar Council was starting to consider ways to restructure the way that it delivers its services. It was looking at what it called procure co-type organisations. I had a very interesting discussion with the then chair of the Bar Council about its vision for the future of the Bar. I understand that work to explore such arrangements ceased at the request of senior members of the Bar due to concerns that it would aid the Government in introducing competitive tendering. We want the Law Society and the Bar Council to engage with changes which are in many cases inevitable.
The Government recognise that the services the professions deliver are a vital component of our legal system and ensure access to justice and equality before the law. We recognise that the independent judiciary—perhaps the most critical element of our justice system—could not survive without drawing from the pool of talent that the professions create.
However, alongside the need to ensure access to justice and a healthy, sustainable legal sector, the professions must also recognise that the Government are entitled to seek the best possible value for money from the legal aid budget. The coalition’s programme for government made a commitment to review the legal aid scheme with the aim of finding savings, culminating in the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012. This will have removed around £320 million from the legal aid budget by 2014-15—largely, as has been explained, from the civil legal aid budget—as well as strengthening accountability and introducing a more rigorous approach to financial management by creating the Legal Aid Agency.
However, the current financial climate means that it is necessary to look again at everything that the Ministry of Justice is doing, including in relation to legal aid, in order to make further savings, particularly in respect of criminal legal aid. This was the focus of the consultation, which has recently concluded, and the aim is to further reduce the legal aid spend by around £220 million by 2018-19.
The consultation, published in April, included a proposal to move to a model of price-competitive tendering in the criminal legal aid market. Conscious of the professions’ objections to the principle of “one case, one fee”, we proposed to exclude criminal advocacy from the competition model, instead proposing to restructure the Crown Court advocacy scheme. Being mindful of the great disparity in the level of fee income received by advocates for Crown Court work, our proposals would rebalance fee income so that those at the top end took the greatest reduction and the lower earners the least. Indeed, some lower earners may see a small increase in their fee income.
Alongside this, we sought to further increase efficiency by proposing a sensible reduction in the use of multiple counsel. To ensure public confidence in the level of expenditure on the longest and most expensive cases, as well as delivering the necessary savings for the legal aid scheme, we propose to reduce the rates paid for criminal, very high-cost cases by 30%. We have also included some small but important reforms to civil legal aid and expert fees to ensure that these, too, are fair and proportionate, and consistent with those paid for similar work elsewhere.
Our proposals also seek to address a number of issues where the savings may be small but we believe that the impact on public confidence in the legal aid scheme is significant. We propose to reduce the scope of prison law cases funded through legal aid, directing less serious matters to the internal prisoner complaints process. The prisoner complaints system was updated in 2012 and has recently been audited with a review of the adequacy, effectiveness and reliability of controls over prisoner complaints, with no significant concerns identified. Criminal legal aid will remain for a significant number of cases where liberty is at stake, such as parole hearings, or where there is a risk of extra days being added, such as in disciplinary cases.
By proposing a Crown Court eligibility threshold, we are ensuring that those who have the means to pay for their own defence do so. By setting it at twice the average household disposable income, we have ensured that it is fair.
In introducing a residence test, we seek to ensure that civil legal aid expenditure is targeted at those who have a strong connection to the UK. As with other public services, legal aid is paid for by UK taxpayers and we do not believe that it should be provided to those who have never set foot in this country or whose connection is tenuous.
We have already proposed an exception for asylum seekers in recognition of their particular vulnerability—
Lord McNally
No, I am not giving way. I am sorry. I have five minutes left. It is a time-limited debate and the noble Lord has had his time.
Lord McNally
I am answering the debate.
We have already proposed an exception for asylum seekers, in recognition of their particular vulnerability, and made clear that persons who did not meet the test would be entitled to apply for exceptional funding. We have heard the concerns raised during the consultation and in today’s debate in respect of the impact of the test on other groups of people or types of cases. We will reflect carefully on these points before making any further decisions.
We recognise judicial review as an important tool of redress which balances the power of the state. We continue to believe that it is important to make legal aid available for most judicial review cases. Under this proposal, legal aid for the earlier stages of a case would not be affected. Payment would continue as now for work to investigate the strength of a claim or to engage in correspondence as required by the pre-action protocol. This is important as many cases will settle or conclude at this point without issuing an application, avoiding further costs to the legal aid scheme, the courts and public authorities. However, we are concerned that legal aid is sometimes treated as a resource to further pursue weak cases that have little effect other than to waste taxpayers’ money. We do not think it is fair for taxpayers to pay the bills for weak cases that have little effect other than to incur costs for public authorities and the legal aid scheme. We set out our initial assessment of the impact of the proposals along with the consultation paper and invited consultees to comment on the extent and range of those impacts and set out any concerns that they had in this regard. We are now carefully considering all responses and the issues that they raised.
Much of what has been said about our proposals on price competition has quite simply been false. The debate has been dogged by a baffling conflation of the Government’s intention to manage the criminal legal aid scheme, through around a quarter of the current number of contracts, with a mythical intention to see only around a quarter of the present number of firms. Some of the rhetoric has risked misleading the public that legal aid would no longer be available. However, the professions have made clear their views on the importance of client choice both for the benefit of clients themselves and for the health of the market more generally. As the Justice Secretary told the Justice Select Committee last week, we have listened and will put forward revised proposals in the autumn. We have also listened on the proposed residence test and will consider the issues raised as well as the comments made across the proposals from nearly16,000 responses.
This House has much collective wisdom and experience about the issues that we have been discussing today. I want to make it clear that this is a real consultation and we are listening. The decision that Ministers have to take will be in the context of the economic realities from which the legal aid fund cannot escape. There will be cuts that will mean some tough choices. However, when the cuts have been made we will still be left with one of the most generous legal aid schemes in the world. I would make the point that although I have never compared it with continental legal aid schemes, I have compared it with common law legal aid schemes in Australia, Canada, New Zealand and elsewhere—and noble Lords will find that it is one of the most generous in the world. I am proud of that fact. I want us to have a generous legal aid scheme. Access to justice is important. I want us to work on ways and ideas, some of which have been thrown up by the consultation, which will give long-term sustainability to legal aid.
However, long-term sustainability means the legal professions facing up to some hard facts. There continues to be oversupply in both parts of the profession, with too many lawyers chasing a limited amount of publicly funded work. Lawyers themselves have to address the further issues of quality and consolidation which will remain long after this present argument has been settled. Alternative business structures, the Jackson reforms, no-win no-fee, damage-based agreements and conditional fee agreements, will all impact on the organisation and structure of the profession. There are wider issues, such as a lack of social mobility and diversity which cannot be solved simply by tweaking the legal aid scheme.
In some ways, I have been disappointed at the way in which those who have responsibilities in these areas have refused to engage with these fundamental issues. I agree with my noble friend Lord Marks that we have to seek a new settlement in this matter. There is still time to do so. Our legal system, our respect for the rule of law and the eminence and integrity of our judiciary are precious gifts passed down from one generation to another. We all have a duty to protect what is best while managing the change that is inevitable. That is the task before us now, and I again call on all those who care about the system of justice to join us in that task.
Crime and Courts Bill [HL]
Lord Carlile of Berriew Excerpts(12 years, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
Lord Elystan-Morgan
My Lords, alongside those who have already spoken, I humbly subscribe my support for this amendment. If ever there was an argument on the part of government that has been shot through and shattered, this is it. If ever there was a piece of legislation where there was an overwhelming and unanswerable case against it, this, in my respectful submission, is it. I appreciate the argument put forward on 30 October by the noble Lord, Lord McNally, when he mildly, with considerable charm, chastised me. He said that it is wrong to argue that a Government should take a view which is different from the policy that has been established by judges over a long period of time. I think I do him fairness in summarising it in that way. He must be right. Parliament is sovereign and supreme. Judges do their best within the limits set down by law, but they can—and should, on occasion—be overruled by Parliament. That is what Parliament is about.
However, I believe that there should be a qualification to that rule: Parliament should never do that, and certainly should never circumscribe the discretion of judges, properly and justly used, unless a case had been made for that, and that case would rest on facts. In my submission, this case does not rest on facts at all. It rests much more on some form of political prejudice. The noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, on 30 October, quoted a speech made by the Prime Minister on 22 October dealing with this particular matter. These were the words used by the Prime Minister on that occasion:
“‘At every single level of sentence this Government is getting tougher ... we are toughening up community sentences too. If you are on a community sentence you will be supervised-you will be properly punished-you will be forced to complete that sentence’.”.—[Official Report, 30/10/12; col. 523.]
It seems to me—and I made the point in a general way on the previous occasion—that essentially the Prime Minister was talking about including some element of hurt in a sentence. That is not the same thing as punishment.
The noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, has already made the point that the fact that a person, with the sanction of the law, is enjoined to do something that he may not wish to do, is of itself a punishment. He is subjected to the sovereignty of the court in that respect. I would argue further that the very fact that a person is convicted of a criminal offence, and that stain will be on his escutcheon for ever, even with all the ameliorations of the 1974 Act, is of itself a punishment. However, what is asked for here is something that society regards as hurting the offender. The rationale behind it seems to be that society in some way, through the courts, has failed to recognise that essential element of hurt. In other words, it is saying, “You are namby-pamby. You are soft. You are far too liberal in your attitude in this matter. You are not tough enough”. There is no evidence whatever to support that contention.
As far as the probation service is concerned, the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, has shown quite clearly that it is tough, it is not soft and it is succeeding. The vast majority of cases are dealt with satisfactorily up to level 3; indeed, some of them up to level 4. No professional body could be expected to do better than that. Where is the evidence of the failure to exercise the element of harshness and pain—for that is what the Prime Minister was talking about?
It is entirely proper for a Government, where they are justified in doing so, to circumscribe the discretion that lies with any judge. I think that both Governments have been doing it a little too liberally over the past 20 years. Be that as it may, where they genuinely believe that there is such a case, they are entitled and indeed, one might say, obliged to do so. The case has not been made. If the Government cannot come forward with any hard evidence at all, they will, in effect, be relying on what the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, described really as a cosmetic and rather vulgar attitude, where they will be seeking a populist commendation for something that is utterly unworthy.
Lord Carlile of Berriew
My Lords, I support entirely the sentiments behind the amendment moved so ably by the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham. I support verbatim the comments that were made by the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, and share the concerns expressed by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, about the use of the word “exceptional” in these provisions.
These proposals ignore what happens every day of the week in court rooms up and down the country. There is a substantial class of cases—or there are classes of cases—which are not particularly common but fall far short of being exceptional. I am the last person here who should attempt to explain to this House in the presence of members of the judiciary who have already spoken what the term “exceptional” means, but usually it means roughly what the dictionary definition says that it means. These are not the common class of cases; they are truly exceptional.
I mention one group of cases that I have experienced as a practitioner and sitting as a recorder and that causes me real concern in the context of this part of the schedule. It is a group of cases in which the defendants are usually women who have been subjected to often very severe domestic violence and sometimes sexual violence. They have done something fairly serious in terms of criminal law and have usually pleaded guilty. They have to be sentenced by the court, but punishment is somewhere low down the list of the priorities that the judge passing sentence has in mind. The sentence can serve a useful service; there are elements in community sentences that are restorative or retributive and can help to resolve the situation that has given rise to the appearance in court. The requirement of punishment in all but exceptional cases seems to ignore the reality of a class like the one that I have mentioned. For that reason, I invite my noble friend the Minister to hearken very closely to this debate, which has had some very authoritative voices speaking in it, and think again.
Baroness Linklater of Butterstone
My Lords, I add my voice to the chorus of consent as to what this amendment is all about. It seems to arise from the Government’s wish to include specifically punitive requirements in order to, as the Minister for Justice has said, put punishment back into sentencing. The goal is to appear to be tough. This move is simply crude, inappropriate, and very unlikely to realise outcomes that are positive or helpful in any way in the long run. It raises the fundamental issue of what the ultimate goal of sentencing is, or should be, and where the balance should lie with punishment for its own sake. Here I agree completely with the noble Lord, Lord Elystan-Morgan, that when the Government talk about punishment in this context it implies something painful, distasteful and unpleasant. I am clear in my own mind that the reduction of reoffending should be the prime purpose of sentencing, when sentencers make their choices from the available options.
If punishment has its place, we know from the Government’s own research that punitive options on their own achieve nothing in terms of reducing reoffending, and only when allied with other constructive sanctions have they any impact. There is a real risk that requiring sentencers to add this extra element will restrict their freedom to set appropriate sentences based on the facts and circumstances of individual cases. Invariably, there will be a range of support needs at issue. We know, as we have already heard, that the majority of those coming before the courts have significant mental health and learning difficulties, as well as substance misuse, real social deprivation, and so on.
What constitutes exceptional circumstances when what may be exceptional in the general population is more like the norm in the offending population? Their needs are indeed exceptional, so what are the courts to do when the exceptional is the norm? I have put my name to Amendment 6, which seeks to,
“leave out ‘exceptional’ and insert ‘special’”,
to try to make a meaningful distinction, but in the end the courts must be free to decide this issue, as has been commonly agreed. They have to be trusted to find the right balance between punishment and rehabilitation in the decisions they have to make based on individual circumstances and need. Punishment can be used but emphatically not for its own sake and should always be combined with rehabilitative requirements if the ultimate goal of reducing reoffending is to be achieved. It follows, therefore, that the various elements of a disposal must be compatible with each other. I echo what has already been said and remind my noble friend the Minister that all requirements do indeed represent a punishment where freedom is being curtailed. It is true that we have a long way to go before all community sentences are as effective as we would like them to be, but punishment for its own sake is not the answer.
Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill
Lord Carlile of Berriew Excerpts(12 years, 7 months ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
Lord Thomas of Gresford
Why should one run that risk? Why should one have applications for judicial review being made based on the amendment as currently drafted? This adds nothing to the Bill. All it does is open an avenue for satellite litigation which should not be permitted.
Lord Carlile of Berriew
My Lords, it would be a great disappointment to your Lordships’ House if you were to find that there was unanimity on these Benches. I am not going to disappoint your Lordships: there is not.
I agree entirely with the noble Lord, Lord Pannick—particularly in relation to the second and third parts of his speech—and also with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf. In answer to my noble friend Lord Thomas of Gresford, I would say that Clause 1(1) contains absolutely no statement of principle whatever, whereas Amendment 1B does contain a statement of principle, albeit within the financial limits set by the Bill.
What I really wanted to do is say a few words about financial privilege. I suspect that there will be other noble Lords who were once Members of another place who, like me, have sat on the Reasons Committee. It is the Reasons Committee that drafts the reasons why the Commons do disagree with your Lordships' House. It sits in a room just behind the Speaker’s Chair. That room is known as the Reasons Room. Behind that Alice-in-Wonderland title lies an Alice-in-Wonderland process. In the Reasons Room, the Reasons Committee—which does not produce a Hansard record, or certainly did not do so in my time—produces reasons that, by and large, are presented on a piece of paper and nodded through. That seems to me to be what has happened here. The reason that is given is that,
“it would alter the financial arrangements made by the Commons”.
That is a statement of predictive certainty. What we have heard from my noble friend the Minister suggests that there might be a possibility at some stage in the future that some kind of judicial review action might, not would, have some effect on, not alter, the financial arrangements made by the Commons.
I echo the words of the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, about the process of judicial review. Every judicial review application goes in the first instance, on an entirely paper procedure, before a judge of the administrative court. As it happens, most applications—about 80 to 90 per cent—are refused on the papers and there is practically no expenditure upon them at all. I cannot see any circumstances in which it is more likely that judicial review proceedings would continue as a result of including this amendment in the Bill as compared with the Bill as it stands. As my noble friend Lord Thomas said, the Bill as it stands contains the potential for applications being made for judicial review against the exceptionality provisions and against a ruling that legal aid should not be given. What is proposed here hardly increases that risk.
Lord Carlile of Berriew
I will give way in a moment; I shall just finish the sentence.
If the other place has got its reasons wrong then surely we are entitled to question those reasons in this House, and if the burden of the debate justifies it, to ask the other place to reconsider, on the basis that it has got its reasons wrong. I will give way to my noble friend now—but he does not want me to. I am glad that I have answered his question. I have nothing further to add.
Lord Morris of Aberavon
My Lords, I rise in support of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. I am concerned about the reasons given in the Marshalled List, and perhaps the Minister can help the House. What are the financial implications if this amendment were accepted? The reason given is:
“Because it would alter the financial arrangements made by the Commons, and the Commons do not offer any further Reason, trusting that this reason may be deemed sufficient”.
If that is the sole basis for rejecting the amendment—or if there is any other reason, any other sinister matter, that the Minister is concerned about—perhaps he will tell us.
The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, has told the House that there are no financial implications to his amendment. The amendment states that the Lord Chancellor shall exercise his powers under this provision in order to ensure that individuals have access to legal services, and that it is entirely within his discretion,
“and subject to the provisions of this Part”.
This is a very carefully drafted amendment. It secures the Government’s financial position. The ultimate discretion is the Lord Chancellor’s, and I find it very difficult to foresee, in reality, any other financial implication.
Lord Carlile of Berriew
My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Alton of Liverpool, has made a very persuasive case for those who suffer from mesothelioma. Part of that case is that he believes—and he has much support for this—that there will be sufferers from mesothelioma who will not be able to recover damages unless the amendment that was previously passed remains in the Bill. We have just heard from an expert on personal injury cases—my noble friend Lord Faulks—who has expressed the contrary view. He said that lawyers will be prepared to take these cases because they are not very difficult to prove and that there will be no deficit for potential claimants if the amendment is not restored to the Bill. That leaves those of us who are genuinely interested in knowing the truth about these claims on the horns of a dilemma. Given that there is no claim of financial privilege in relation to this amendment, the answer to that dilemma is extremely important.
Therefore, I, for one—and I am sure that other noble Lords around the House share this view—would be grateful if in replying to this debate or at some point during the debate the Minister could tell us whether the department has made an assessment of this problem. What is the department’s view? Does it accept that cases will not be brought if the amendment is not restored to the Bill? If so, there is a very powerful case for an exception, as otherwise people will be denied justice for an extremely serious illness by reason of what I think the noble Lord, Lord Howarth, called dogmatic consistency. I share his view that dogmatic consistency is not a necessity for any Act of Parliament. Indeed, one has only to examine half a dozen at random to see how little dogmatic consistency there is in Acts of Parliament. Therefore, I hope that the Minister will give us that information during this debate so that we can make an informed judgment in deciding whether to vote and, if so, how.
Lord Wills
My Lords, the case for this amendment was powerfully made in this House last month and in the other place last week, and I rise now briefly to add another voice in urging Ministers to think again, even at this late stage, and to try to find a constructive solution to this issue.
Before coming to your Lordships’ House, I was an MP in Swindon. Because of that town’s industrial history and particularly because of the large railway works, which employed many thousands of people over many years, this illness was known locally as the Swindon cancer. I, too, thank the noble Lord, Lord Alton, for his sterling efforts on behalf of all my former constituents who have suffered from this terrible disease and, I am afraid, will suffer from it in years ahead.
Ministers have claimed that it would be wrong for various reasons—I understand and completely accept what the noble Lord, Lord McNally, has said about this—to make a special case for this one disease. The fact, however, of this disease’s particular virulence, that it is inevitably fatal, that it progresses with terrifying speed, that it is hard even to find palliative care for it once it has taken hold, all argue powerfully for it being just such a special case.
It is unconscionable to force sufferers from this terrible disease, and their families, at a time when every hour is precious to them, to go through the processes required by this Bill to secure the compensation to which they are entitled. Those are fundamental points for me—whether they can secure lawyers and whether success fees are to be secured for the lawyers. Every hour is precious. The people who are diagnosed with this illness have months and sometimes only weeks to live. We should not force them to go through the processes required by this Bill.
As my noble friend Lord Howarth has already said, accepting this amendment would do no damage to the fundamental principles behind the Government’s reforms of the legal aid system. It is the only decent thing to do.
Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill
Lord Carlile of Berriew Excerpts(12 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
Lord Newton of Braintree
My Lords, my name is to the amendment, along with those of the noble Lords, Lord Pannick and Lord Bach. I intervene at this early stage partly for that reason and partly to support many of the points that my noble friend made without reiterating them.
We need to bear in mind that this proposed change to legal aid does not take place in a vacuum. It takes place at a time of great actual or potential turbulence—or at least change—in the benefits system, arising to some small extent in respect of housing from the Localism Act, and to a much greater extent from the Welfare Reform Bill. I do not want anyone to think that I am opposed to the Welfare Reform Bill. I had some reservations about parts of it but, like every other group in the House, I support its basic thrust. However, we ought to be absolutely clear that you cannot have change on that scale in the social security system without a lot of gainers, a lot of losers and a lot of people who will want to test, question and seek advice on the changes that affect them if they feel aggrieved.
There are many such changes. There is the housing benefit cap. There is the benefit cap, which is probably less serious in this context because fewer people are supposed to be affected. A huge number of disabled people and carers will be affected. In the area of housing benefit, many tenants will be affected by what is known as the spare-bedroom tax. These are not trivial numbers. The DWP’s estimate, given to me by the Minister, of the number of people affected by the housing benefit cap—the bedroom tax, if I may use a tendentious phrase—is 670,000. The number of people potentially affected by changes to the disability and carer allowances in the Welfare Reform Bill is of the same order if the figures I remember being given in Committee are right. Therefore, we are talking about potentially well over a million people.
If I was still an MP, I would be a bit worried. That is an average of around 2,000 people per constituency. They will all have relatives, some of whom will be affected and many others of whom will be upset by what is happening or could happen to their relatives. They will not all have a great grievance but there will enough of them who do. They will be bewildered and in some cases frightened, as we know from the e-mails we all received over the Welfare Reform Bill. They will not know where to turn but they will know that they need advice and help from somewhere. Let us not underestimate the scale of the impact of this change.
My second point, in what I hope will not be too long a speech, is: does it matter? There has been something of a flavour to Ministers’ comments that the only things that matter enough in this area to warrant a continuation of legal aid are those that threaten life or liberty—for example, orders under the Mental Health Act—or highly specialised areas such as children’s special educational needs and several other children’s issues. I pay tribute to the Government for the fact that they have recognised some of those points. However, there has been a slight flavour that welfare rights and welfare benefits generally did not quite rank in this league. There has been a sort of flavour that it is only a bit of money after all, although I do not think that anybody has actually said it. However, no one who has been Secretary of State for Social Security would harbour the illusion that the £10 or £20 a week that people could lose—for example, under the housing benefit cap if they have a spare room and do not move—is a trivial sum. It may not be a great amount to all of us in this House, but there are a lot of people in this country to whom £10 or £20 a week makes a great difference to whether they can heat or whether they can eat. I do not want to exaggerate this matter or get emotional about it, but some people will be frightened at being hit by some aspects of these changes and they will need somewhere to turn to.
I wish to quote a couple of points from the letter that the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, wrote on behalf of all four of us. I stress that the letter was written on behalf of all four of us. I had agreed it; I just was not present to sign it. It states:
“81% of all cases heard in the First Tier Tribunals relating to benefits are for benefits relating to disability … in 2009/10 an appellant at the First Tier Tribunal that received advice before going to the Tribunal was 78% more likely to win their appeal than an unadvised appellant”.
Then there is another point to which I may come back in a moment: namely, that nobody believes that the savings the Government have claimed for these proposals will actually be realised. The CABs, the Law Society and the report produced by King’s College all reckon that a lot of theses savings are illusory and that the knock-on effects on other government departments will be substantial but have so far been completely unquantified.
My third main point is about the effect of all this on the places where people can and do turn for both direct and indirect help: namely, the citizens advice bureaux, which are universally admired and supported, and are valued in this House and the other place, and a whole variety of law centres and other big society advisory services throughout the country. The CABs have just published a report which I hope everyone will read. I do not wish to quote the whole of it, just a bit from the introduction and the conclusion. In between there are a lot of case studies. The introduction states:
“Specialist advice has become a core part of the CAB service. Our frontline caseworkers and managers have told us that the impact of the proposed changes to legal aid on specialist services will be devastating. The overwhelming majority say that it will be impossible to provide a specialist service, whilst over half say that it may be impossible to continue providing any advice service at all … And it's not just the Citizens Advice service that will be affected - law centres, independent advice agencies and some solicitors' firms will find it difficult to continue to operate”.
After mentioning various cases, the conclusion states that if these cases,
“could be empowered to help themselves without specialist advice, casework and support from legal aid, then every CAB would rejoice, but that is not the reality. It will be a massive failure in the justice system if they are abandoned”.
I shall conclude quickly, but I should like to make just one other point. The Government have, in a way, acknowledged that there may be a need to support other advice services, but we still have no real idea how that is to be done. We have had a promise of a one-off £20 million, which is not a lot in this context. A review is going on which has not yet been completed and whose results we do not know. We have no serious commitment from the Government as to what they will do when they have the results. The nearest we have to that is a comment on the King’s College study to which I referred, which states:
“We are committed to the not for profit sector and have committed £20m this year to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of advice services, but this does not mean that the Government will meet all demand in the future”.
I would not want to back off from supporting the amendment on the basis of a vague promise that something along those lines might be done. It is a classic case where we are entitled to ask another place to take another look, and that is what I hope we will do.
Lord Carlile of Berriew
My Lords, in the background to the undoubted need to cut legal aid for economic reasons, it is undoubtedly fair to take as a starting point the Government’s realistic decision to continue to fund judicial review for welfare benefit decisions. In their 2010 Green Paper, the Government gave examples of where judicial review would be used, and is used, for benefit cases. I quote:
“As with other areas of law, funding for judicial review will continue to be available for benefits cases. Such cases are likely to occur where there are delays in making decisions on applications for benefits, or delays in making payments, or whether there has been suspension of benefits by authorities pending investigation”.
None of those examples of judicial review is based on the merits of the case in question; and the problem with judicial review is just that. Where legal aid is available for judicial review in benefits cases, it will not avail a single potential litigant when the decision taken is simply wrong, the evidence has been mis-analysed and misapplied, and the factual decision is unsustainable. That is not what judicial review is for.
Bearing that in mind, I have had to think hard about the balance between wishing to help the Government to fulfil their aims to cut legal aid in a realistic way and those determinations of principle and conscience that some of us have held to for quite a long time. I applaud the measured and economical way in which my noble friend Lady Doocey moved the amendment. She has great experience in dealing with these issues and enormous knowledge of them. Over decades, she and I, and a number of others on these Benches, have attended debate after debate within our party in which the sort of principles that she espoused have been affirmed, reaffirmed and re-reaffirmed.
Lord Carlile of Berriew
My Lords, I want to give my noble and learned friend the Advocate-General a brief moment of ministerial bliss during this debate—there have not been many so far. I speak to government Amendment 68. My noble friend Lord Faulks and I and others have argued that clinical negligence should be available for severely disabled infants—at least for those who suffered neurological damage, which may of course result in physical damage, and often does, either before birth, at birth or shortly after. It is a great pleasure to see Amendment 68. It has been the result of some negotiation, but I should say that the Government have been very willing negotiators at all times on this issue.
I recognise that there will be understandable disappointment if legal aid is not extended in the same way to all clinical negligence relating to infants, even that which does not involve neurological damage, and disappointment that legal aid is not being automatically scoped into all clinical negligence. Like the noble Lord, Lord Clinton-Davis, I am old enough to have been involved in clinical negligence cases and seen the advantage of legal aid, particularly for those of poor means.
I raise one issue with my noble and learned friend on which I would be very grateful for a specific response. It is about other clinical negligence and exceptionality. Many of us have pored over Clause 9, entitled “Exceptional cases”, although if one reads the text of Clause 9, it is ambiguous whether it applies only to exceptional cases or, potentially, to a largish cohort of cases that fall within Clause 9(3)(b)—that it is appropriate to grant legal aid,
“in the particular circumstances of the case, having regard to any risk that failure to do so would be”,
a breach of convention or enforceable EU rights. I have in mind where there may be a number of claims of a similar nature—for example, a group of 100 claims arising from the negligent use of a particular drug. One has only to say the word thalidomide to understand how that can arise. I believe that a similar situation could arise in our age, just as it did then.
I would be grateful if the Minister would confirm that, were such a cohort of cases to exist, it would not be excluded from exceptionality by reason of being a cohort or group. If one looks at the decided cases in which the word exceptional or exceptionality has been interpreted by the senior courts, it is generally understood to refer to singular cases. We can envisage a plurality of cases of the kind I described, which may give rise to a risk of a breach of convention or other EU rights.
Lord Howarth of Newport
My Lords, I, too, welcome the concession that the Government propose in Amendment 68, in so far as it goes, to allow legal aid to be available in cases where infants have suffered perinatal injury. As the parent of a child who suffered perinatal injury, I can only welcome it. I simply ask the Minister on what argument of principle he extends legal aid to that group of people but not to others whose lives may be ruined through the experience of clinical negligence.
Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill
Lord Carlile of Berriew Excerpts(12 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
Lord Hart of Chilton
My Lords, my name is on this amendment. I support it for the reasons so admirably given by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. Like him, I am a member of your Lordships’ Select Committee on the Constitution, which identified the importance of a statement of constitutional principle relating to access to justice.
As the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, has pointed out, the wording of the amendment is closely based on Section 4(1) of the Access to Justice Act 1999. Throughout the nine years that I saw those provisions in operation, budgetary restraint urged by the Treasury was always present because in those days, health and education were regarded as of higher priority. Nevertheless, legal aid was regarded as an essential element to access to justice and that principle constantly focused and concentrated the mind. The amendment seeks to do the same. It recognises budgetary restraint. It does not require a blank cheque much as some would wish it. It is moderate in tone and therefore realistic, but it enshrines an important constitutional principle that will overarch and permeate the whole of Part 1 of the Bill.
The Minister said in Committee and will probably say again that the amendment is unnecessary. That is not so. It is of fundamental importance to all of us and is absolutely essential.
Lord Carlile of Berriew
My Lords, like other noble Lords who have spoken, I remain in support of the principle behind this amendment. We are discussing the question of fairness in the distribution of legal aid and the availability of justice to members of the public. Like the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, I have campaigned in relation to clinical negligence—particularly perinatal negligence. Like him, I am grateful for the very realistic approach taken by Ministers and the clear indication and undertaking to make a concession on that matter.
However, one issue that concerns me greatly is the matters that will be debated under Amendments 8, 9 and 10—the question of scoping in and scoping out. I would be perfectly willing to see this amendment go by had we a commitment from the Government that scoping in would be added to the Bill. Had that commitment been made, I would have seen some evidence of overall fairness in the approach to legal aid being placed clearly in the Bill.
Like the issue we are currently debating, the issue of scoping in has been trailed in debate time and time again over a period of months. Frankly, I am shocked, particularly as a Liberal Democrat, that we have not yet heard from the Secretary of State that he is prepared to accept scoping in—a cost-free act of fairness, far away from attracting any issues of financial privilege. In the absence of such an indication, I feel constrained to support the amendment so ably moved by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick.
The Lord Bishop of Exeter
My Lords, last week I was asked to give a lecture on perspectives on social justice from the Old Testament. We found ourselves deep in the prophet Amos. If your Lordships are looking for some edifying and deeply challenging Lenten reading, I commend this ancient Hebrew text to you. At the heart of Amos is the same concern with access to justice. He constantly attacks a system whereby the rich can buy justice and the poor are denied it. We find him thundering against those who would turn aside the needy at the gates of justice. Access to social justice runs, like lettering through a rock, through not only Amos but the whole of the Old Testament. I suggest that it is also at the heart of any civilised society. I would not expect the Government in general or the Minister to dissent from that principle, but without this amendment or something like it that principle is in danger of being fundamentally undermined and flawed.
Among the many privileges of my life is to be the president of the local Exeter CAB. I know how much CABs and others working with the poorest of the poor fear the consequences of the removal of access to legal aid and justice for those who are very poor. I heard the Minister earlier this afternoon stand at the Dispatch Box and say, “Well, the danger here is that we begin to think about worst-case scenarios”. If I have learnt one thing from my time in this Chamber, it is that one of the functions of the law—and of this House—is to look forward precisely to worst-case scenarios. My fear is that the Bill as it stands is cast around a best-case scenario. In its desire to tackle, properly, abuses within the system and deal with the unnecessary, escalating costs associated with, for example, the no-win no-fee industry, there is a danger that huge swathes of activity hitherto amenable to legal aid are being removed from those who need that access.
As I say, the aim of the law and of a House like this is to foresee worst-case scenarios and see ahead to the elephant traps. Without such an assurance as is contained in this amendment, I fear that such elephant traps could include not only the denial of justice to the poor but, for example, people acting as plaintiffs on their own account in a court of law, inefficiently taking up more time, leading to more appeals and adding to further legal costs. Is there not a danger that those denied access to justice might even begin to take the law into their own hands?
This amendment is a very simple one. It does not undermine the heart of the Bill at all. It ensures that individuals, rich and poor alike, have access to legal services that effectively meet their real needs.