(3 years, 7 months ago)
Lords ChamberIt is no problem at all; this is Committee, where we clarify these issues. But I think it is fair to say that the trigger for the SVRO, essentially, is the conviction.
An interesting criminal law debate is developing and I cannot resist joining in. I very respectfully suggest to the Minister that this is a situation in which the use of examples, if they are worked up, is very important and would be extremely useful. My view is that she is right about some of this but possibly not all of it, and that the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, is possibly right about quite a lot of it but wrong about some of it—for example, the relevance of previous convictions, which may be used far more these days than he imagines. Previous convictions are available as evidence of propensity and are frequently used in criminal trials. I respectfully suggest to the Minister that a series of indicative examples should be worked up and put in the Library in advance of Report, because it would make these questions much easier to answer.
I thank my noble friend—and he is my noble friend because he has come to my rescue time and again. I am not a lawyer and even less of an expert in criminal law.
(3 years, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, it is a genuine privilege to follow that eloquent introduction to this group of amendments by the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti. I make it absolutely clear from the outset that, for me, this is no competition between amendments: we are absolutely on the same page, in the same chapter and in the same book. In my view, it would be inexcusable for any Minister to reject these amendments on the grounds that they are not sufficiently well drafted.
The noble Baroness and I are both Back-Bench Members of your Lordships’ House; neither of us is a parliamentary draftsman. Yes, we are perfectly capable of drawing up a basic amendment or new clause and of obtaining advice elsewhere, as I am sure we both have. What we both trying to say, however, is that there needs to be a solution to the fear that now exists among young women about lone male police officers. It is a solution that the Government have to produce and that parliamentary counsel has to draft and put in a form that will be clear both to women and to the police.
Our feelings of sympathy for the family and friends of Sarah Everard are in no way diminished by the passage of time. Indeed, it is vital that we should keep this story running until we reach a satisfactory ending. If I may be forgiven for putting a personal slant on this, we are fortunate enough to have five daughters. One is a young professional woman, single, living with friends in a shared flat in Clapham, just like Sarah. She goes out with her friends or on her own and walks across the common, just like Sarah. She walks home when she feels like it and is obviously responsible in the way that she approaches her journey, just like Sarah. And she was brought up absolutely to trust the police, just like Sarah.
All those assumptions have been smashed on the ground as a result of this case. I am sure that we are not the only family who, for obvious reasons, sit up at night looking on Find My Friends, worried about the whereabouts of our children—although they tell us now that they are worried about our whereabouts and use Find My Friends for that purpose. We are genuinely concerned as they go about their lawful lives day and night. We have taught them the basic conventions of good self-protection and safety but, of course, one of the basic tenets of that domestic advice was that you can always trust a police officer: if something goes wrong and you can see a police man or woman, turn to them; they will see you right. We and they are now shocked to the core by the number of cases of police sexual misconduct that have come to light. This case is the very worst of the very worst, but it does not sit in a category all of its own. More than 70 incidents of police sexual misconduct, almost all by male police officers, have now come to light and been investigated to a greater or lesser extent.
Sarah Everard should, of course, still be alive and free to come and go as she wishes. In her death, she should not have to be remembered for the unspeakable things that happened to her, to which the noble Baroness referred—for the abuse of her person when alive and the desecration of her body in death. She must not be seen to have died in vain. It is our duty, in both Houses of Parliament, to take the appropriate steps to demonstrate to the world at large that Sarah Everard did not die in vain and that other young women—other women—will be protected from such events so far as is possible. That is our responsibility.
(3 years, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberI am grateful to the noble Baroness. Does she agree that the passing of her amendment, or something like it, would send out a clear message to the Crown Prosecution Service that its policy change-based failure to prosecute significant numbers of rape offences and other serious sexual offences should be reviewed as soon as possible?
I thank the noble Lord for his intervention and absolutely agree. Of course, it would not solve the entire issue, but it would set us on the right path in sending that signal to the CPS, as well as to the police.
The multiagency, public health preventive approach is so important. Education plans, health plans and a more standardised perpetrator scheme would all be part of what this change could look like. It is important to note that the HMIC report that the Home Secretary commissioned warned that this duty, as it stands, would not go far enough in that regard.
The noble Lord, Lord Polak, mentioned in his speech at Second Reading that we need to make sure that such landmark legislation, the Domestic Abuse Act and this Bill, does not stand in isolation. We need to sustain the momentum of this ambition. Let us once and for all try to buck the trend of silo policy-making and bring together this work in a meaningful way.
As others have discussed in previous debates, it is right that the burden should not fall entirely on the police. I think we spoke about “broadening the base”, and that is why it is crucial that we get this duty right. Nevertheless, the specific policing response and the CPS response deserve a lot of attention. One-third of all violence reported to the police is domestic abuse related. This is not a small slice of their work. While their response to this crime has certainly improved over the past decade, and there are pockets of excellence and dedication, which we must acknowledge, there are still inconsistencies at every level in how the police respond to victims of domestic abuse and sexual offences, and shocking variations in how frequently—perhaps infrequently would be more appropriate—different forces use the protective powers available to them. I am sure that the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, will speak at length on stalking; some forces around the country seem entirely unaware that stalking protection orders are available to them, and this has to change.
Another statistic that shocks me is that three-quarters of all domestic abuse cases are stamped with “no further action”. We know from the rape review that was launched this year, and as the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, has pointed out, that that happens with so many incidents of sexual offences. It cannot continue. The lottery of standards among the 43 police forces in this country, and within individual forces, means it very often boils down to who picks up the phone or who responds to the call as to how victims are dealt with.
I will make one further point before I finish. As with other high-harm crimes, such as terrorism and organised crime, I believe strongly that violence against women and girls should be marked with a clearer focus, better funding, minimum standards and far more national co-ordination. This amendment is only part of the answer—of course it is—but it could be instrumental in starting that journey to greater consistency. Small actions taken together can make a big difference. While this amendment is relatively simple, its effects could ripple out.
Finally, you do not wake up one morning and become a murderer or a rapist; you work up to it. The horrific chain of events leading to Sarah Everard’s terrible murder laid this bare in the starkest of terms. We have to act to do all we can to stop this kind of behaviour in its tracks before it escalates and takes lives. There is an opportunity in this Bill, and we must take it.
My Lords, I support Amendments 55 and 56, principally because, apart from their justice, it is naturally the right thing to do. As importantly, the amendments move the police into the preventive area more than they are now. I keep urging the Government and the Home Office in particular to make statutory the preventive duties. I am afraid that that is not yet taking shape, and this is a way in which it could do so.
There is a consequence of this. People have talked about the inconsistent approach around the country. That will generally tend to happen: with 43 organisations, we will always end up with an inconsistent approach. For me, 43 is at least 42 too many. That is my view; others will have different views but having so many organisations will lead to inconsistency.
More importantly, we are asking for officers to be more specialist in their investigative capacity. If it is left to the front-line officers, often they do not always have the time, or, frankly, the skills, to investigate these serious types of crime. The natural consequence of that is that more people will be moved out of uniform and into specialist areas. We all need to keep in mind that although part of the public will urge being able to see officers more often, officers are more effective when they are more specialist. How we get that balance right is difficult. This is not a plea for another 20,000 cops; it is about getting the balance right between the specialist who can be more effective and the uniformed officer who is more visible. That debate continues, and the amendments support that.
I rose to talk in particular about Amendments 57 and 58, which I support. Professor Shepherd has achieved some incredible things from his base in Cardiff. There are two big reasons why I support those amendments. The first is the constant bid for consistency. They provide a further test on the definition of serious violence, such as the requirement for hospital attendance, particularly at A&E. There is a danger, of course, that some people will attend A&E who do not really deserve to go there—they believe that they are seriously ill, when in fact they are not—but that risk is fairly low. Most importantly, as the noble Lord, Lord Brooke, said, the amendments will urge the health service to share the data it has to better inform the police and the Home Office on the strategies for the future. I am afraid that if the police can be inconsistent, so can the health service in sharing data that is vital to understanding the nature of serous violence around the country. Without that information, neither the Government nor the police, nor others, can take action.
For those reasons, I support these amendments, which are sensible conclusions.
My Lords, I have already made a comment about serious sexual offences but there is something else that I want to raise, into which I have been provoked by my noble friend Lord Hogan-Howe. The point I want to make is about consistency. I do not agree with my noble friend that we should have a single national police force, but I do believe that 43 territorial police forces is a real recipe for inconsistency. I regret very much that successive Home Secretaries, from all political parties, have failed to take on this issue. What actually happens—Charles Clarke did it when he was Home Secretary—is this: when a Home Secretary has the courage to say they are going to reorganise police forces to bring policy consistency on issues such as this, immediately that Home Secretary is told by Members of another place that the world will fall apart if the Loamshire police force is abolished, because how could the world continue without it?
I was a Welsh MP for 14 years. There are still four police forces in Wales; there should not be. The Dyfed-Powys Police, the force in my constituency, operated generally well, but I could not possibly argue that more than one police force is needed, in Wales, at any rate. I therefore ask the Government to take consistency as a major theme in this matter and reflect—
We are going into a wider debate. My personal view is that we should never have abolished the Oxford City Police force in the 1960s, because we never recovered when it became part of Thames Valley Police, and we had our own watch committee. But there is an issue here, is there not, between what might be regarded as operational efficiency and overpoliticisation? Frankly, the experience in Scotland is not a good example of the risks of too direct a relationship between a national Government and a police force. That would surely be the risk in Wales.
I realised when I started on this that there were one or two noble Lords around the House—I saw one agreeing with me, I think—who are, or have been, police and crime commissioners, who might disagree. I respect the noble Lord enormously, as he knows, but I say to him that the experience in Scotland was not good to begin with but is much, much better now.
I will cite just one piece of evidence. The small number of counterterrorism units operate very well as a group. They have a very good collegiate function and there is real consistency between their operations. In my view, the way that CTUs have developed is a paradigm for the reorganisation of the police. I do not want to prolong this part of the debate, but I urge the Minister to consider whether the best route towards consistency is to reorganise the police, reluctant though many will be.
(3 years, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I support the amendments in this group in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, to which I have added my name. The provisions in the Bill relating to serious violence introduce a new legal duty of disclosure that seriously threatens the doctor-patient relationship, especially in relation to patient confidentiality.
The Bill explicitly sets aside the common-law duty of confidentiality that I as a doctor owe to my patients. Doctors regard patient confidentiality as a fundamental ethical duty, upholding the trust that lies at the heart of the doctor-patient relationship. The Bill’s proposals that relate to disclosure of patient information threaten the common-law provision of confidentiality, the requirements of data protection laws and doctors’ ethical standards.
The General Medical Council, in guidance on professional standards, makes it clear to all doctors when and in what circumstances a doctor can release confidential patient information without a patient’s consent. This, in my view, covers the requirement for disclosure in situations of serious violence. The police having the ability to gain identifiable—I stress “identifiable”—patient information from health bodies without setting out clear reasons, which should be limited by statute, is fundamentally wrong. The Bill does not provide clear statutory arrangements that have the confidence of the medical profession, as highlighted by its regulator—the GMC—the BMA and some other health professionals, and, importantly, the data protection guardians. These bodies have raised serious concerns.
The noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, spoke eloquently and in detail on all the issues in moving her amendment, so I do not need to enlarge on that, but I support her comments. The Minister needs to set out more clearly the Government’s intention, scope and implementation of the powers in the Bill relating to access to patient data. The noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, asked some key questions that also cover some of my concerns. The issues are important. Might the Minister agree to meet the GMC, the BMA and representatives of other health professionals? I look forward to her response.
My Lords, I apologise for not having taken part in the Second Reading debate, when I was unavoidably abroad for professional reasons, or in the first Committee day, when unfortunately I was recovering from coronavirus—an experience I would not recommend to any of your Lordships given my experience of it. I rise to speak having very much enjoyed the speech by my noble friend Lord Patel, because I thought he introduced an element of balance that had not quite reached the debate in the earlier moments, eloquent as the introduction from the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, was.
I will cite two pieces of my own experience as evidence. I spent 10 years as a lay member of the General Medical Council and, during those 10 years, sat successively on the health committee and the conduct committee. The health committee is a form of conduct committee, but with an obvious emphasis, as its name indicates. We spent a great deal of our time discussing whether doctors can be fully relied upon at all times, and in particular at critical moments, to understand the limits of the duty of confidentiality. Because it is not an absolute duty; there is a balance between the private rights of the patient and the general duty of the doctor not to disclose information, and the public duty of the doctor to disclose information if there is, for example, serious danger of violence to the public. I fear that more work will be needed on the amendments being proposed at the moment if that balance is to be sustained.
My second piece of evidence relates to an inquiry I conducted in 2012 for the then Secretary of State for Education, which related to something called the Edlington case. The brief story was that two small and neglected boys, who were fractionally over the age of criminal responsibility, nearly killed another child in a wood. Fortunately, that child and their companion survived—one of them only just. In my inquiry, I looked at the sharing of information by a host of organisations—schools, general practitioners, social workers and so on. It was a clear conclusion of my report that, if key information had been shared, the child who nearly died would not have been assaulted, the two very unfortunate little brothers who committed the assault would not have spent the succeeding years of their lives in a custodial institution and the schools would have been able to create a situation in which the dreadful problems for everybody concerned did not arise. One of the key issues in that case was that the general practitioners did not fully understand the balance between their duty to the public and the rights of their patient—and near-disaster ensued.
To noble Lords moving these amendments and to the Minister, who I know listens to these debates extremely carefully, I say that this is not the time for people to take up closed positions on these matters. There is a lot of work to be done. I think my noble friend Lord Patel probably agrees with this, but I speak with great trepidation, because right in front of me are two of the most distinguished doctors in the whole country. We must ensure that, where it is necessary as a public duty, they and others need to be consulted to ensure that the balance is right and is therefore not the subject of the controversy we have been hearing about already this afternoon.
My Lords, I do not disagree with the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, but I none the less think that the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, and her colleagues are on to something. There is no question but that the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, is right that, under common law, doctor-patient confidentiality is not and has never been absolute. The question is when it is trumped by other considerations, and who decides.
It is always dangerous to suspect what the Minister will say in her eventual reply, but I suspect that she will say reassuring things, and her colleagues will have given her reassuring things to say, about the intention. I am sure that the intention is not for the wholesale trumping of doctor-patient confidentiality. There is no public interest in that and the Government would not want people to take that as the case, because it would be completely counterproductive not just to the effective functioning of public health but to law and order. To give an obvious example, if everyone involved in knife crime feels that there will be no confidentiality whatever in the emergency room or elsewhere, one runs the danger of people not going to get the vital help and emergency care that they need. I know that the Minister will understand that.
Going back to the detail—as this is Committee—when should there be a trumping and who decides? That is a worthwhile, detailed conversation to be explored between organisations such as the General Medical Council and the Minister and her team. Because, while it may not be the Government’s intention to trump common-law principles of ethics and confidentiality en masse, we have to remember of course that statute displaces the common law. If the statute is unclear and people think or perceive that the common law has been trumped and that the decision has been taken completely out of the hands of an individual practitioner on the advice of ethical bodies or ultimately taken out of the hands of a judge and that the principles of confidentially have been totally trumped, we have a problem—and that means the Government have a problem as well.
So I hope that, when the Minister eventually replies to this debate, she will not reject these concerns out of hand and will take on board the possibility of a bit more detailed discussion about when the duties to collaborate and so on should trump confidentiality, when not and, crucially, who is to decide. For my part, I would favour practitioners, properly advised, perhaps by more and further guidance from their professional bodies, and, if necessary in individual cases, by the order of a judge, possibly sought on an ex parte basis, as opposed to anything too wholesale or administrative. That is just my suggestion. I am sure that the Minister and her team will be able to come back with something that meets the concerns of the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, and her colleagues before the next scrutiny stage of the Bill.
My Lords, I am sorry to intervene again, but it may help the debate if I address some of the issues raised. I should have mentioned in my speech—but I deliberately did not—my personal experiences when I was approached on four occasions by the police to give some information about patients. I refused, because I followed the guidance of the General Medical Council, and at no time did that threaten or harm the health of the patient nor anyone else—relatives or any members of the public. On one occasion, I voluntarily informed the police about a patient who had approached me for completely different reasons, but I had noticed that harm was being done to her and, on subsequent occasions, it became quite clear that it was becoming a serious issue. Therefore, I disclosed information to the police; again, following the GMC guidelines.
The common law may have soft edges, but if a doctor follows the common law and the guidance the GMC issues, it works. On what happens when a doctor refuses to give information, despite the fact that the patient is being harmed or that the patient may cause harm to other people, then the doctor will be wrong in his or her duty, and therefore can be overridden. That is the only point I would make.
My Lords, I hesitate to be disorderly, but I was asked a direct question by the noble Baroness opposite. I think in fact it has been pretty fully answered by my noble friend Lord Patel, but the noble Baroness phrased her question in the language of judicial review, and I would just point out to her that in the real world the possibility of the judicial review of a single medical practitioner in these circumstances is not realistic in the slightest, so it would not happen. If I may say so, it is a good question but the wrong good question.
My Lords, I support the amendments introduced so ably by the noble Lord, Lord Young, and the noble Baroness, Lady Blake. This has been an example of how good this House is at certain things, with two noble Lords with huge experience in the policy area under consideration—and I understand, in the noble Baroness’s case, a deep understanding of the housing situation in one of our major metropolitan cities, Leeds. We should listen to them with great care; I am sure the Minister will.
Other examples can be given of evidence showing that housing really needs to be included right at the core of all these considerations. A recent initiative by a very experienced retired criminal Queen’s Counsel, Bruce Houlder QC, focused on knife crime. The work that Mr Houlder—a very good friend of mine—is now doing, to some acclaim, demonstrates, among other things, that knife crime becomes a cultural issue in certain housing areas. It requires attention in a Bill such as this.
I want to add something about the Edlington case, which I mentioned earlier. One of the issues that arose in that case, which I included in my report to the Secretary of State, was that housing was not included in the consultative group trying to resolve the florid problems of the two children who became serious offenders. Had it been included, they would have been moved and would not have been allowed to stay in the housing where they were. It was absolutely fundamental as a mistake, and we are now nearly 10 years on.
I hope that the Minister responding to this debate will take on board what has been said and ensure that further consideration is given to these amendments.
My Lords, I rise to speak briefly to this group of important amendments, and declare my interest as a vice-president of the LGA.
The noble Lord, Lord Young of Cookham, and the noble Baroness, Lady Blake of Leeds, set out the reasons for these amendments, and I fully support them. Those responsible for providing housing have changed over the years, from the time when it was solely the purview of local authorities to now, when it is a mix of elected councils that hold housing stock themselves through to housing associations and registered social landlords providing a mix of accommodation for couples, families and, less frequently, single people living alone.
Whatever their circumstances, tenants all deserve to feel safe in their home and free from violent attack. Women and young people are often the target of violence, sometimes with catastrophic consequences. Some of this will be domestic violence; in other cases it will be gang related. Whatever the cause or outcome, it is essential that the housing providers have a robust strategy in place—first, to prevent violence in the first place and, secondly, to deal with the aftermath once it has occurred.
Housing provider co-operation with the police is essential in dealing with violent abuse. Relying on GDPR protection to avoid releasing information is unhelpful at best and, at the other end of the spectrum, borders on ignoring the violent act itself. Of course, this release of information on behalf of the housing providers does not extend to medical professionals, the subject of the previous group of amendments.
Violence is abhorrent and prevents people enjoying the safety they should feel in their home, whether that is a bedsit or a three-bedroom family home. Local authorities will receive complaints about the behaviour of their tenants from neighbours. This might be about noise or anti-social behaviour. In more serious cases, the complaints will be about violence suffered by children and women, and sometimes men, living in a nearby home. It is difficult for local authority housing departments and RSLs to take action on what might be a malicious complaint, but I believe that where a robust serious violence reduction strategy is in place, officers will have the confidence to act before the violence ends in a tragedy, as in the case study the noble Baroness, Lady Blake of Leeds, mentioned.
I have only one caveat: the Government should ensure that local authorities, whose budgets have been slashed over recent years, have sufficient funding to be able to produce and implement a violence reduction strategy and not be expected to fund additional work on their already overstretched budgets.
Society is becoming immune to the level of violence experienced by some communities. This has to be reversed. A serious violence reduction strategy for each community living in social housing, whoever the provider may be, is a step in the right direction towards raising the profile of the damage that such violence causes and beginning to tackle its reduction. I fully support this group of amendments.
(4 years, 5 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I have bled your Lordships’ ears over this Bill long enough, so I can be short. I thank the Minister for her patience and fortitude but my profound fears about this legislation will continue for a very long time, until it is amended or repealed. My concerns are about the signal that it sends but, even more, about the serious human rights abuses that it will herald. It is, quite simply, the most constitutionally dangerous legislation that I have seen presented in this country in my working life.
I am rather ashamed not to have been able to persuade more of your Lordships of the profound dangers of allowing the Executive to grant advance immunity for criminal actions to a whole raft of their agents—not just the brave security services or the hard-pressed police but many other government agencies and quangos, and the members of our communities who inform for or work for them, including even children. It will not even be with prior judicial warrant. This legislation does not put current arrangements on a statutory footing, so it does not merely respond to the litigation mentioned by the previous speaker. As for that litigation, there may be a lesson here for those of us who at times have dabbled in test-case legislation: to be careful what we wish for when provoking the might of the state in this fashion.
Just as our cousins on the other side of the Atlantic are beginning to rebuild their own bedrock of the rule of law, it will take a little longer in our own jurisdiction. A lot is said of patriotism these days. My patriotism is not the love of a flag but, in a nutshell, a love of the NHS and the rule of law. This Bill abrogates the vital principle of equality before the law, which I think all people well understand. It is a very sad day for me. For the moment, like the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, I can only bear witness for the record—but that I must do. I cannot in good conscience support the Bill being passed off as law.
My Lords, the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, always expresses herself firmly and persuasively. That said, I am afraid I could not agree with her less about this legislation. I support the passage of the Bill and want to thank the Minister, the noble Baroness, Lady Williams, who has been both consultative and a very good listener. She has also shown that she is prepared to move on important issues. Far from what the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, said, the Bill puts CHIS on a solid, statutory footing.
It has improved the way in which CHIS are to be dealt with by creating a clear process, all of which is legally enforceable and accountable. The code of practice has been mentioned less frequently in our debates than it deserved. It is absolutely required reading for all who are involved, or perhaps even interested, in how CHIS are handled in this country. One thing to be emphasised about the code of practice is that because it is a code rather than an Act of Parliament, although it has the force of law, it is a living instrument which can be changed as needs must.
The Bill will make a beneficial difference for the authorities, for the CHIS themselves and for public safety. With the changes that have been made, which have been difficult and creative at times, I commend it to the House.
My Lords, it is my particular pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, although it is a particular discomfort to me to disagree with him on this occasion. The Bill proposes that the state should have the power to grant immunity for crimes committed in the future by agents on its behalf. I believe that the grant of such immunity is contrary to the rule of law, which prescribes that all are bound equally to observe the law, not least the criminal law. The fact that such immunity will derive from legislation if the Bill becomes law does not alter my belief.
Giving the state the power to exempt prospectively its agents from criminal law is the antithesis of this fundamental principle. A decision to prosecute or not should be granted only retrospectively, when all the facts and circumstances of the conduct at issue are known, including the nature of any authorisation and, above all, whether it is in the public interest to prosecute. The CPS makes such decisions all the time; that is compatible with the rule of law and equality before the law. This arrangement, as far as is known, has worked perfectly satisfactorily for the last 200 years. Instead, the Bill overturns this status quo, challenges the rule of law and gives the state unparalleled powers. I regret that on this occasion I cannot follow the advice of my noble friends on my party’s Front Bench and, as a matter of conscience, I am obliged to vote against the Bill.
(4 years, 5 months ago)
Lords ChamberBy chance, I heard the noble Lord, Lord Ricketts, outlining some of his concerns on the radio. I bow to his expertise but there is probably some difference in our interpretation of what he outlined, particularly on access to databases and the sharing of information.
My Lords, together with our departure from the Schengen Information System, there appears to be no replacement for the respective instruments on joint investigative teams, the enforcement of fines, the enforcement of non-custodial measures and prisoner transfer. Please will the Minister tell the House how these gaps will be filled?
The noble Lord will know that the EU maintained that it was legally impossible to offer SIS II to a non-Schengen third country so we have reverted to Interpol, which is a tried and tested mechanism of co-operation. Regarding the joint investigative teams, the UK will be able to continue running and participating in those with EU member states and third countries on a non-EU legal basis. Prisoner transfers are a Ministry of Justice lead. The EU did not want to include arrangements on them in the agreement but we will continue to transfer foreign offenders back to their home states using the existing Council of Europe convention, as well as accepting the repatriation of any British citizen imprisoned by an EU member state who is eligible and wants to return to the UK to serve their sentence.
(4 years, 5 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, it is a real privilege to follow the noble Lord, Lord McCrea of Magherafelt and Cookstown. With his immense experience of events in Northern Ireland, he has brought a real reality dose to this debate, and I commend every word that he said to be considered carefully.
The noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, opened this debate with her customary clarity, consistency and commitment. However, it was noticeable that on her side of your Lordships’ House very cogent speeches to the contrary were notably made by the noble Lords, Lord West and Lord Rooker, and I agree with both of them.
There are two issues that have not featured very much so far in this debate. One is that, far from dodging the rule of law, Her Majesty’s Government have chosen, remarkably, to put CHIS on a fully statutory footing, which makes it more part of the rule of law than outside it. I say particularly to the highly respected lawyer, the noble Lord, Lord Hendy, that there is nothing about the rule of law that prevents something like CHIS being part of the rule of law. Indeed, it is right that the use of CHIS should be carefully circumscribed in that way.
The other issue that I particularly want to mention which I do not think has featured at all so far in this debate is the draft code of practice concerning the authorisation and use of CHIS, which says in paragraph 3.2:
“The 2000 Act stipulates that the authorising officer must believe that an authorisation for the use or conduct of a CHIS is necessary in the circumstances of the particular case for one or more of the statutory grounds listed in section 29(3) of the 2000 Act.”
Indeed, if one looks at the paragraphs that follow paragraph 3.2, one sees that the code of practice makes it absolutely clear how careful authorising officers must be in the authorisation of a CHIS, whether just to be a CHIS or to commit a criminal act. Indeed, that code is not merely for guidance; in this instance, at least, it has the force of law.
To take an example other than those mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord McCrea, let us suppose, and I suspect I am not too far from reality in this, that a CHIS is asked and authorised to participate in acts forming part of a serious robbery in order to bring a major robbery gang to justice, maybe the robbery of a bank or a robbery at an airport. The CHIS has to determine whether to do that.
It is worth adding at this point, and I have some recollection of the way this is done from my time as the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, that CHIS are not merely chosen randomly in a pub to become covert sources; they are considered with great care. In many cases, behavioural analysis is carried out to ascertain whether the CHIS is going to be reliable and will adhere to the authority that they are given. So someone becomes a CHIS not only if they are willing but if they have been assessed as suitable and it is necessary in the circumstances of the particular case.
So how is the CHIS going to react? These are not normally random people whom one bumps into on the high street; they are people who are usually already involved in crime or are in relationships with criminals; they are certainly involved in a criminal fraternity. What is their first reaction going to be? It is going to be, “If I do this, will I be immune from prosecution or do I run the risk of being prosecuted?” When someone takes the potentially huge personal risk, even to their life, of becoming a CHIS, provided that they are told that they must strictly adhere to their permission and not commit any other criminal offences, otherwise they may well be prosecuted, surely it is reasonable within the rule of law, and in the interests of society, not least in detecting and removing serious crime, for an assurance to be given that they will not be prosecuted.
Indeed, what is the reality of what happens without these clear new proposed laws? A CHIS is asked and authorised to commit a criminal offence. If they are prosecuted, they will naturally be horrified that they are being prosecuted because the public authority asked them to commit the act that they have committed. In the real world, the assurances that they have been given by officers will be certain protection against prosecution and the material of abuse of process applications before the court. However, going through that process is far from clear and far from providing the confidence that CHIS need, so I suggest to your Lordships, and respectfully to those who, with completely honourable arguments, have proposed Amendments 1 and 2, that in fact what is proposed is fairer, clearer and in the public interest.
I now turn briefly to Amendments 21 and 22, moved with great clarity by my noble friend Lord Anderson of Ipswich. Like him, I will be very interested in the Minister’s response to this debate. The principle in Amendment 21 is sound: if there is public—I use the word in its broadest sense—corruption in the way in which the CHIS has been authorised to commit the crime, then that public misbehaviour should be capable of prosecution under the broad offence of misconduct in public office. This offence has proved flexible to deal with all kinds of circumstances in which serious and very reprehensible errors have been made by public officers. Indeed, on one occasion, in the Bishop Ball case, it was used to prosecute where some of the indecency offences were out of time—a bishop being in a public office. Amendment 21 seems an entirely sound principle, and I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response.
Amendment 22 seems to provide the balance, which has been discussed by many noble Lords, as to how compensation should be given—for it should be given—if people suffer injury as a result of criminal offences committed by CHIS. The Minister may say that these circumstances are provided for under the existing law, but I urge her to the view—she always listens very carefully to what is said—that it would be of benefit to put the principles of Amendments 21 and 22, possibly amended, into the Bill.
Overall, I respectfully suggest that Amendments 1 and 2 should be rejected, and Amendments 21 and 22 accepted in principle.
My Lords, the level of responses throughout the debates on the Bill indicates the level of concerns across your Lordships’ House, including concern for the rule of law. But there is widespread acknowledgement that it is desirable to put these matters in statute; I do not think that is being denied.
The preservation of the status quo as regards the place of the Crown Prosecution Service in the criminal justice system is because the status quo—the CPS—has our confidence, and we support Amendments 1 and 2. There is a reason why we are so often advised to leave alone what is working. The DPP is able to consider, and is accustomed to considering, the detail of each case, including whether the individual concerned is an untrained member of the public. I agree that agents are not generally naive young things met in a supermarket queue, or wherever; they are not random choices. Like the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy of The Shaws, I regret that such a range of CHIS, and thus of criminal conduct authorisations, is combined for the purposes of this debate.
In Amendment 2, the proposed new subsection (3B) sets out a clear sequence. It addresses the principle of whether a CCA can sidestep the detailed considerations to be applied, rather than rewriting those considerations—or rather, writing them differently—as Amendment 3 does. Most importantly, it applies the well-established principles underlying the decision to prosecute. I am very pleased that the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, is pursuing the issues of practicality and ethics.
My Lords, I very much agree with the detail and the general sentiment in the excellent contribution of the noble Lord, Lord Rooker. The word “practical”, which he used several times, is a vital word, to which I would add “mundane”, which I think he used once, referring to the mundanity of many of the orders, and the potential volume of those mundane orders. I speak not as any legal expert, but as someone who was on the receiving end of precisely this. I was on the Economic League blacklist, undoubtedly because of the infiltration of the anti-apartheid movement by an agent of the state.
My concern is about the competence of the state. A book was written at the time by an extremist, a Stalinist and supporter of the Soviet Union called Denver Walker. The book is called Quite Right, Mr Trotsky! and it was released in the same year that I was having those problems. In it, he starts by saying that this could be Special Branch or MI5 in terms of what he is doing. He exposes every Trotskyist organisation in the country, naming names, citing examples and explaining ideology in minute detail. At the same time all the organisations he named, bar two, were infiltrated. That is now on the public record. The state was spending resources and putting a priority on infiltrating irrelevant, tiny organisations. The Revolutionary Communist Group, one of the two not infiltrated, is described in the book as being presumed by everyone on the ultra-left to be run by Special Branch. That is actually in his book.
Competence is critical. If we are trying to intervene in, for example, terrorist organisations or organised crime, competence is absolute and fundamental. Yet we have this history, in the 1970s and 1980s, of the most appalling incompetence. We had the targeting of irrelevant people, creating consequences for people who were on the side of the state in precisely the terms on which the state was infiltrating these organisations. What conclusions would I draw from that?
I draw the conclusion that the noble Lord, Lord Blunkett, whom I normally agree with, is fundamentally wrong to suggest that the judiciary has the wrong skill set for assessing and authorising such decisions in advance. I would say exactly the opposite. The judiciary has exactly the right skill set, not to know anything about extremist organisations or extremists but to hear and evaluate a coherent case—or an incoherent case, and turn that down if it is—when put forward by one of the agencies to or for which we are giving, clarifying or maintaining powers with the Bill.
If you are incapable, as intelligence services, the police or one of the other agencies, of putting a coherent case together for why you need authorisation, it would seem that the authorisation you need has a rather weak case. If that had happened in the 1970s and 1980s, a lot of that nonsense and wrong priorities would never have got past stage 1. They were based not even on a hunch, but on an irrelevance. If we are to have efficiency in getting into terrorist groups and organised crime, having a system that forces those who wish to do so to explain their rationale for what they plan to do, and why, and having someone able to assess whether that rationale is coherent, seems the right approach. The last people who should do it, therefore, are politicians.
The practicalities and mundanity are what we should be determining these decisions on. Of course there will be cases that are far from mundane in their application, but that does not mean that the same principles are not required in getting an agreement. It therefore seems to me that those amendments which push the Government in that direction should be welcomed by the Government, and those that do not should be rejected—not just by the Government, of course, but by the House.
My Lords, the interesting lesson from the noble Lord, Lord Mann, on the history of the left—it is a pleasure to follow him—has shown exactly why the Government are right to make a root-and-branch reform, and introduce a structure based on statute for the handling of covert human intelligence sources. We have heard a lot about what happened in the past, but an awful lot has changed since the 1970s, the 1980s and the 1990s. The major changes in this kind of policing started after 9/11, which was like a massive electric shock to the whole system of detecting various serious crimes, because of the arrival of large-scale terrorism on the streets of Europe and in many other countries. An awful lot has happened, too, since 9/11. The methodology has been sophisticated quite enormously, hence the large amount of legislation since the events of 9/11.
I listened with particular interest, because I agreed with what they said, to my noble friends Lord Anderson and Lord Butler and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay. I am a great believer in the theory of Occam’s razor, that entities should not be multiplied unnecessarily or, as it is sometimes put, “Keep it as simple as you can”. To start with, this is an operational issue. In the decision to make someone a CHIS, there is usually a very long period of assessment, a decision by management in consultation with the proposed CHIS handler and sometimes, as I said in an earlier debate, some behavioural analysis. This is an operational matter.
My Lords, on the narrow point just made very clearly by the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, I would question the way in which she diminishes the importance of codes of practice, which have the force of law. One example of a code of practice that has had the most incredible effect on the fairness of trials is Code C under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, which in many ways has been the formidable weapon in the hands of the defence advocate, and sometimes in the hands of the prosecution advocate too, to ensure that justice is done.
That said, I have no objection whatever to what is intended by Amendments 6 and 36. I suspect that the Minister would want to refer to the code, at least generally, which is peppered with words such as “reasonable”, “proportionate”, et cetera, and would say that reasonableness is imported in any event. However, I agree with the view that in a Bill of this kind, adding the word “reasonable” into the statute as suggested may be comforting and safe, and will make it a better statute.
I disagree with Amendment 18, which is in this group, and a time limit of four months. Running a CHIS is often very arduous and complicated, and many CHIS are run for much, much longer than four months. The noble Lord, Lord McCrea, in an earlier part of this evening’s debate, referred to the information that was obtained concerning the Real IRA, as it was called, which led to the conviction of a number of its operatives. I do not know anything about the facts of that case, but I suspect that in an operation of that kind, many CHIS were run for long periods, and for very good reasons. As the noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller, said very eloquently, those who are running the CHIS are, in any event, these days, doing an extremely good job in great difficulty, and we do not want to add to their bureaucratic burden; they and their CHIS have great difficulties to face. They do not want to be faced with the necessity of reapplying every four months; it is just far too short a period.
My Lords, I have little to add to what has gone before. I often wonder whether the Government are concerned about judicial review when they resist placing the test of a decision on a reasonable basis in any legislation. If the test in any case is simply the subjective belief of the official—the government agent involved—it might be hoped that a trip to the divisional court and an application for judicial review would be avoided. The noble Lord, Lord Anderson, did indeed refer to public law tests. The Wednesbury test of reasonableness is now more than 70 years old and it is sometimes forgotten that it was the local picture house that took the town’s corporation to court because the licence it gave prevented children under 15 attending the cinema on a Sunday, whether accompanied by an adult or not—one’s mind flips back to the dim and distant past. That was the factual basis of a very important principle of law.
When considering reasonableness in this context, there are two limbs. In the context the House is discussing, the question would be whether the authoriser had taken into account all the wider implications of the authorisation, including its effect on prospective victims of the crime being committed. He would obviously have to follow the code, which, as the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, has just said, is peppered with instructions, having the force of law, to act reasonably. If the authorisers get beyond the first limb of the test, the second limb is whether the decision they have taken is so outrageous and irrational that, as Lord Diplock put it in a later case, it is
“so outrageous in its defiance of logic or of accepted moral standards that no sensible person who had applied his mind to the question to be decided could have arrived at it.”
Needless to say, cases challenging a decision tend to succeed on the first limb, but I do not see why we have to go to that position. I have been trying to check Hansard, but I think that the Minister referred, in reply to the first group of amendments today, to the decision being reasonable. I cannot see any reason why it would not be reasonable to put “reasonable” on the face of the Bill. I support these amendments.
My Lords, I add my thoughts for James Brokenshire, who was a member of the Justice Committee when I chaired it; I respect him and hold him in the highest regard, and I wish him well, as others have.
It is pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord West; I recall taking evidence from him when I was a member of the Intelligence and Security Committee. Now that he has gone from poacher to gamekeeper, I hope he is applying similar zeal to the scrutiny and examination of these very issues. I hope that the ISC will take a continuing interest in this legislation when it is on the statute book.
During my time on the Intelligence and Security Committee, I was concerned about the unspecific and broad nature of the “economic well-being” justification as a basis for approving various forms of action. Of course, that was in relation to intrusive surveillance powers, not the sanctioning of criminal acts, which we are discussing today; indeed, since that time, the economic well-being justification has been qualified in the same terms as those which Amendment 9 uses.
I raised my concerns in Committee on 3 December, and they echo the concerns expressed by the Constitution Committee, of which I am a member, in its report on the Bill. It was disappointing that, on 3 December, the Minister’s reply did not answer or even refer to the concerns I had raised. She had had a long day, and she has had an even longer one today, but I hope that I can provoke her to make some things clearer.
In that debate, I said that there are obviously threats to the economic well-being of the United Kingdom that are as serious as physical threats to that security. I included
“action by a hostile state or a terrorist ... group to destroy or disrupt key elements of our critical national infrastructure, energy supply, transport or banking and financial transaction systems”—[Official Report, 3/12/20; col. 870.]
as well as government communications and many forms of cyberattack.
I will suggest three other areas which might involve action by hostile states or extremists and might be candidates for authorisation. I do this simply to illustrate how broad the concept of economic well-being is. The current pandemic is, undoubtedly, a threat to the economic well-being of the United Kingdom. Could there be a future pandemic situation in which we believed that the reckless behaviour of other countries or deliberate action by extremists was making the spread of the pandemic significantly more dangerous? Would that qualify if some form of participation by an agent or human intelligence source seemed likely to help us fight the threat? I think it probably would.
I will give another example. The way the Brexit future relationship agreement is implemented could certainly affect the economic well-being of the United Kingdom. Could that justify deploying intelligence resources, including covert human intelligence, involving themselves in criminal acts? That is not quite so clear.
I offer a third example—that of a major overseas defence and civil engineering contract, affecting perhaps as many as 10,000 jobs in Britain, where there are fears of bribery, corruption and money-laundering, and of those distorting the outcome. What if a different British company is involved in the rival bid for this contract—these bids normally come from consortia involving companies from several countries—and that company considers that it would be very adversely affected by action which might have been begun by someone qualified through this legislation? The economic well-being justification is clearly not a simple matter in such a situation.
I am not asking the Minister to comment on those three hypothetical examples individually. What I want her to consider is, first, whether the economic well-being justification should be so broad. Secondly, if it is not to be qualified by reference to national security, as Amendment 9 in the name of my noble friend Lord Paddick requires, how else can we be confident that it is not inappropriately used? The use of this justification for serious criminal action has not really been the subject of much ministerial comment, and its scope will depend heavily on how future CCAs will be viewed in retrospect by the Investigatory Powers Tribunal and by the commissioners. This approach does not give us much confidence that applications to authorise criminal conduct in relation to economic well-being issues will be considered by authorising officers against a well-understood test of what is justifiable. We have to bear in mind that these authorising officers are in a wide variety of organisations, some of which have long experience of intelligence work and some a great deal less.
The Constitution Committee said in its report:
“While we recognise that threats to the ‘economic well-being of the United Kingdom’ may justify a security response, we are concerned about the use of such a broad concept to authorise serious criminal conduct. The House may wish to consider whether the authorisation of criminal conduct should require more specific justification than a general invocation of the need to protect economic well-being.”
That is what we are doing in this short debate tonight. I would like to hear a clear statement from the Minister on how we might establish clear principles against which to test whether authorising criminal action under so broad and vague a headline as “economic well-being” will, in any future instance, be proportionate and justifiable. Would it need to be a threat to economic well-being of a kind that would, in effect, be a threat to the security of the United Kingdom? That is really what the amendment suggests.
My Lords, I join in the good wishes to James Brokenshire. He has been a superb Minister over many years and never appears to be partisan, whatever he feels inside. He is one of the best listeners among Ministers I have ever seen. He has played a very important part in some significant policy areas, so we hope that he will be much better soon and back in a very senior position.
It is always an enormous personal pleasure for me to follow the noble Lord, Lord Beith. I have admired him in politics for decades. He is one of the best parliamentary debaters that we have, as he has illustrated in the last few minutes.
I want to speak on Amendments 9 and 11. Like the noble Lord, Lord Beith, I was looking for examples and thought I would ask myself whether I had done any cases as a QC that involved serious economic crime that did not fall within the realms of national security, or clearly so. I was immediately able to think of two examples. One was a money-counterfeiting case in which a ring of forgers was forging very substantial quantities of notes, many of which passed into currency circulation. The other was a fraud relating to the activities of the London Metal Exchange in which over £1 billion-worth of fraud was committed by the simple task of forging bills of lading that referred to metals passing around the world, when the only ones that were really passing around the world were a few containers of pig iron—not the much more valuable metals referred to on the forged bills of lading.
Neither of those cases, obviously, would have any direct relevance to or interest in national security, but they are undoubtedly very serious crimes. I do not know, for I was the defence counsel in both those cases, whether any CHIS were involved in those cases, but it would not surprise me if they were, because there were obvious parts that they could have played. It seems to me that the use of CHIS in those circumstances of economic crime is entirely legitimate and that Amendment 9 is therefore inappropriate and too limiting.
(4 years, 7 months ago)
Lords ChamberI wish I had spotted my noble friend when I answered the previous question. He will know that, during the Covid period, the issue of homelessness was paramount, in terms of protecting people. Of course, that will not stop after we have got through the pandemic. I am very aware of the various factors that might lead LGBT people to become homeless and subsequently be unable to get back on their feet, so I totally take his points on board.
Can the Minister assure the House that not only the rights, but also the interests of trans victims of domestic abuse will now be recognised, as they are potentially the most vulnerable, and worthy of a speedy and strong response from the police, including the 999 service, which is sometimes less than helpful to them?
I am glad that the noble Lord has brought this up. I recognise the particular problems that trans victims face in terms of credibility, for want of a better word, from our services. The fact that we now train front-line police officers to be not only sensitive but cognisant of the different types of domestic set-ups and to respond appropriately and sensitively is incredibly important. The noble Lord talked about trans victims. I am also minded of some lesbian victims of domestic abuse whom I have met who feel that, perhaps because some of them look more masculine, they will not be treated as victims and are more likely to be assumed to be perpetrators.
(4 years, 7 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, for his thought-provoking speech. I welcome the noble and learned Lord, Lord Stewart of Dirleton, and look forward to many contributions from him in the future. I particularly welcome a fellow criminal lawyer to a senior role here. His maiden speech was both elegant and bucolic.
The proportionate use of CHIS is a necessary component of the fight against terrorism and other serious crimes, including people trafficking and modern slavery. A group of operational case studies has been tabled by the Home Office to accompany this Bill. I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Williams, for the part that she has played in ensuring that those case studies appeared and for providing as much openness as possible for our debates on the Bill, consistent with legitimate national security considerations.
As we heard, a major inquiry is currently investigating undercover policing. It enjoys the wise leadership of Sir John Mitting. Under examination of the activities of individual police officers and professional managers, this Bill provides a framework—a rulebook—that makes it clear that participating informants of and in crime, including those committing some crime, must be subject to full and rigorous control in the future, and that the use of CHIS is controlled in all circumstances.
No more can there be room for sometimes extraordinarily casual and inexcusably pragmatic decisions which allow vulnerable people to continue to be involved in, and at the same time be victims of, serious crime. The CHIS draft revised code of practice, published in September, is a model of its kind, and I hope your Lordships have read it. It is essential reading for this debate.
Subject to two reservations, the Bill, the code and the Investigatory Powers Commissioner’s Office should provide a clear foundation for the proper use of CHIS in the future. I urge your Lordships not to be confused about IPCO’s role. It should be a prompt and rigorous regulator. It should not be transposed to a real-time, operational approval agency. That is not its intended role and, frankly, not its expertise. The Bar Council says that, in respect of criminal contact with the security and intelligence services,
“this Bill is a welcome regularisation of activity which was previously lawful but for which the power and mode of authorisation was opaque and outside the system of quasi-judicial scrutiny which otherwise oversees all intelligence and surveillance activities of agents of the state. It serves to reinforce the rule of law.”
I agree.
I have two reservations, which Her Majesty’s Government must address. First, amendments to the Bill can ensure that IPCO’s scrutiny role will be accelerated, so that any breaches of the Act and code are negated within the minimum practical full-time period, and it certainly does not have to wait for an annual report. Secondly, in relation to CHIS aged under 18, of which there have been very few, the youngest being 15 years old, I agree with the organisation Justice that authority to commit criminal conduct should be limited to truly exceptional and necessary circumstances, with clear and proactive measures to protect the child’s welfare. All that must be achieved within the provisions and correct interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights.
I look forward to Committee, which promises improvement of an already very welcome Bill.
(4 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, first, I thank the Minister for the clarity of his opening to this debate. I too pay tribute to the two memorable and entertaining maiden speeches which we heard. I look forward to hearing from both noble Lords frequently in future.
I think people have been trying to tempt me into saying something about Prevent. I will not, save this: I hope my successor as independent reviewer of Prevent will be given access to the very large body of evidence which I was able to collect, and will make his or her mind up quite independently, without any attempt at influence from me.
This Bill’s focus is the protection of the public, and we should not for one moment lose sight of that primacy. I support aspects of the Bill strongly, but at the outset I will refer to one briefly which I do not support: the relegation of the Parole Board. I agree completely with my noble friend Lord Anderson, the noble and learned Lords, Lord Garnier and Lord Falconer, the noble Baroness, Lady Prashar, and others who have spoken about that.
However, I agree with the strengthening of sentences for terrorism-related offences, which are a very specific and unusual group of crimes. What is more important than the protection of the public from those who are released from prison at the end of terrorism offences, or from those who are radicalised in prison and released? In considering that, we should reflect on this: surely, if the release of a terrorist puts the public at risk, the crucial balance between rights and duties must justify properly regulated and proportionately extended detention.
I support the strengthening of TPIMs covered in Part 3. As a former independent reviewer, I had the scrutiny of the full period of control orders. They worked well; they were supported by the courts; the standard of proof was adequate; they were justiciable. For all the years since control orders were replaced with TPIMs by the coalition Government, I have called for their return. In effect, that has now been done, and I think it is correct. As I said, I believe the standard of proof is fair, tested and justiciable.
It is right that the evidential basis for release of terrorist prisoners should be as complete as possible, including psychiatric and neurological assessment. Polygraphs are not magic; they determine little on their own, but in various other areas they have been demonstrably useful as part of the toolkit used in the determination of truth. I see no strong argument against their use in that way in this context.
In the time left to me—in this speech—I want to be clear about the nature of the challenge we are dealing with, by reference to the Fishmongers’ Hall incident, which is very instructive. The perpetrator terrorist, Usman Khan, had been assessed as reformed and deradicalised by external experts, some of whom were present at Fishmongers’ Hall. However, evidence from the prison from which he was released—in my possession and provided to the Home Office some months ago—shows the following. First, almost none of the day-to-day custodial staff who knew him and dealt with him on a daily basis believed he was anything other than extremely dangerous at the time of his release—they were proved right. Also, unknown to the outside experts, in that prison radicalisation was not just in existence but rampant. For example, it included Friday prayers where there was a division into two groups, radical and non-radical, which a perfectly decent imam could not control; and within the prison, sharia courts meted out punishments that included floggings—inside the prison and known to the prison staff. Those are facts.
Before we can be comfortable with advice about release and release decisions, there must be far better management and verification of desistance and disengagement programmes, and of the prisoners who are part of those programmes. This is too important an issue for anything less.