(1 week ago)
Lords ChamberAs an amendment to the amendment in the name of Lord Forsyth of Drumlean, to leave out “and to provide full support at ministerial and official level to the peer in charge of the bill for its remaining stages in the House of Lords”.
My Lords, I should make it clear at the outset that I am opposed to this Bill in principle but, above all, I am opposed to it because it is not an adequate Bill to deal with all the issues raised and does not provide anything like sufficient protection for those vulnerable people who might be persuaded, against their real will, to accept assisted suicide.
I agree with the words in the amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth, apart from his bold bid that, in effect, this Private Member’s Bill should be treated as a government Bill. That was not what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, said was happening; I am sure that he would confirm that civil servants are insisting on their neutrality being maintained, even when they are looking at the feasibility of the Bill—I see him nodding in agreement. The noble Lord, Lord Forsyth, asks for
“full support at ministerial and official level to the peer in charge of the bill”.
That would put the noble and learned Lord in the position of a Minister. Such support is inappropriate for a Private Member’s Bill of this kind. It does not pretend for one second to be neutral or even-handed.
If the last 27 words of the amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth, were removed, I would agree with it completely, but he seeks to take the steps that I have just described. Indeed, despite the large resources supporting the purposes of this Bill and the involvement of many experts, including the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, one of our most respected and knowledgeable legislators, this Bill earns a D-minus for its draftsmanship, even after all those committee meetings in the other place. It needs to be dismantled if it is to be an effective and proper Bill, to give it what I would, as a shortcut, call legislative legitimacy.
What evidence is there for the propositions that I make? I will cite two pieces of evidence that emerged from your Lordships in the last two days. First, the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, chaired by the noble Baroness, Lady Ramsey of Wall Heath, produced a report a couple of days ago which there is no time to read out. I will simply summarise that, by the calm standards of that committee, its criticism is excoriating. I was on that committee for a considerable period, and I never saw any Bill criticised to that extent. It says that the Bill is simply not fit for purpose, breaking several standard rules of draftsmanship. It is incompetently drafted, after all the time that has been spent on it, with the steersmanship of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer. Then yesterday, the Constitution Committee reported and endorsed the views expressed by the other committee, saying, in effect, that the Bill was not fit for purpose.
We must remember that this Bill would allow a citizen deliberately to perform acts which are intended to cause the death of another citizen. Since the end of capital punishment, no such act is allowed in our law to any citizen other than in war. That is the weight of the change which this Bill seeks to make. We must be given time, the space and the methods to amend the Bill if that can possibly be done, hence my support in due course for the amendment tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Berger, which would allow a Select Committee to hear evidence which the Commons committee chose not to hear and would have been very persuasive. I beg to move.
My Lords, I will focus on the content of existing law relating to end-of-life issues. I do so to make the point that the current law recognises the fundamental importance of autonomy. It rejects the absolute sanctity of life, about which we have heard much from the Bishops’ Benches and noble Lords, and the Bill will introduce greater dignity and greater safeguards than currently exist.
There are two basic legal principles. The first is that you have a legal right to end your life. Since the enactment of the Suicide Act 1961, attempted suicide is no longer a crime. You do not need to satisfy a panel of doctors or psychiatrists. There is no special protection against your relatives. If you are a competent adult, the doctors cannot require you to eat, to have a blood transfusion or chemotherapy, and they cannot stop you going to Dignitas. Why is that? Because the law recognises that it is your life, and so it is your decision, and because the law rejects the absolute sanctity of life.
There is a second legal principle that follows from this, and it is that the health system has a legal duty in some circumstances to take positive steps to implement your wish to end your life. I will give noble Lords an example: the case of Re B (Adult, refusal of medical treatment) [2002] 2 All ER 449. This was an adult woman who was paralysed from the neck down. She was dependent on an artificial ventilation machine to breathe. She wanted the machine turned off: she wanted to die because of the poor quality of her life. Her doctors declined to do so, so she applied to the courts for an order that they do so. The noble and learned Baroness, Lady Baroness Butler-Sloss, then the president of the Family Division, granted that order. She said the woman was an adult; she was of sound mind; it was her decision whether to live or die.
Parliament has intervened in this area. We made provision by the Mental Capacity Act 2005, Sections 24 to 26, to allow an adult of sound mind to make an “advance decision” refusing treatment to prolong their life, should the occasion ever arise, and should the person at that time lack the capacity to indicate their wishes.
I have one other example. When Tony Bland, a victim of the 1989 Hillsborough football stadium tragedy, was in a persistent vegetative state with no prospect of recovery and could not express a view about whether to live or die, the Appellate Committee of this House decided in 1993 that because he had no quality of life, there was a legal duty on the health authority to end his life support—to pull the plug. That is what the doctors did, and there have sadly been many similar tragic cases since.
For this Bill to authorise doctors to assist a person to end their life by providing a drug so they can die with dignity is entirely consistent with well-established legal principles which respect autonomy on end-of-life decisions. The Bill contains many more safeguards than already exist. It enables terminally ill people to end their life in a less painful and more humane manner than starving themselves to death or otherwise committing suicide, or travelling to Switzerland.
Because we are restricted to four minutes.
I support the Bill. I look forward to debate—including debate with the noble Lord, Lord Carlile—in Committee. Thank you.
(1 week, 3 days ago)
Lords ChamberI am grateful to my noble friend for her question. She will know that the Government have accepted—certainly from the Home Office’s perspective—the recommendations of the report on child sexual abuse from IICSA. Some recommendations have been mirrored by the recent report on grooming gangs by the noble Baroness, Lady Casey. One recommendation is that we do exactly what my noble friend has said. As part of our response, we are including an ambitious proposal for therapeutic support, and we are going to work across government to look at how we can future-fund support services to enable victims and survivors to access and receive better care and support. In doing so, we have in this year doubled the support funding for adult victims and survivors of child sexual abuse to a total of £2.59 million.
I welcome the Minister’s excellent Answer to the Question from the noble Baroness, but will he go a step further and tell us that the Home Office will use the Lighthouse project as the template around the country, given that it is cheaper than existing less specialist sexual abuse services, helps children recover more quickly from terrible trauma and enables quality court decisions to be made when necessary?
I am grateful to the noble Lord for that point. As I said in my initial Answer to the Question, we have recognised the great importance and success rate of the Lighthouse model. As part of the response to the recommendations from IICSA, we are looking at how we can roll that out. That is a cross-government issue with other government departments as well as the Home Office, but we are intent on ensuring that we have an ambitious proposal for therapeutic support, and that model is certainly one we are looking to roll out still further.
(1 week, 4 days ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I support this amendment, to which I am a signatory. It has been admirably moved by the noble Lord, Lord Bach. He has set out in detail the rationale for the amendment, so I will not repeat his arguments. However, I would like to highlight the human impact of lack of legal aid for those in immigration detention.
Look at the scenario. Those in detention may have faced trauma such as persecution, threats to life and inhumane treatment by callous human traffickers. Following this trauma, they face a very complicated, confusing and bureaucratic system which they have to navigate. It is, in fact, extremely difficult to navigate the system without competent legal advice, and if they get anything wrong, the consequences are very detrimental to them, as this can endanger their safety in the long term.
Concerns have been expressed by His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Prisons about the detained duty service, which all the evidence shows is not easily accessible and is of doubtful quality. It gives only 30 minutes of advice, which is not enough to explain the circumstances. Furthermore, at the end of the 30 minutes, it is not clear whether they will be supported. If appeal deadlines are missed, and because of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022, this lateness is held as evidence of lack of credibility. All this is happening when those detained are locked up in prison-like conditions, potentially indefinitely.
This scenario is not exceptional; all the evidence shows that it is quite common. In short, the system of providing legal assistance and representation in detention is broken. Action is urgently needed—not least for the reasons described by the noble Lord, Lord Bach—such as the piloting of the UK-France migration deal. We need practical action to improve access to high-quality legal advice within 48 hours. This will not only be humane, but, as has been described, will increase the effectiveness and efficiency of the immigration and asylum system. I therefore commend this amendment to the Committee.
My Lords, I too have put my name to this amendment, and I am very grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Bach, for how he opened the debate and explained the amendment.
About 42 years ago, my first task in the other place was to be a member of the Standing Committee on the Police and Criminal Evidence Bill, which was probably the most important criminal law statute enacted in my time in either House of Parliament. Paragraph 6 of the Home Office’s online summary of the Act’s provisions, which is shared with the Legal Aid Agency and the Law Society website, says:
“The police must tell you … why you have been arrested and are being detained”.
There is an analogy between what we are discussing today and what happens in cases where people are arrested in accordance with the Police and Criminal Evidence Act. Those of us who have been MPs or have worked with the police—I was once the chair of the London Policing Ethics Panel—and spent the night with police officers on duty have seen the following happen in real time in the real world. If somebody is taken into a police station under arrest, they wait to be interviewed and then a duty solicitor is found for them if they do not have a solicitor of their own. The job of that duty solicitor is to explain to them—in terms they understand, and, I hope, in a language they understand—why they have been detained.
People who are arrested for criminal offences in the ordinary course of things on a noisy Saturday night in north London do not expect to be kept in custody for a very long time. If somebody is detained under immigration detention, it must be even more alarming, because the consequences they see panning out before them are being put by force on to an airplane and returned to a country they have not been to for a very long time. It may be a very deserved return, but it must still be alarming.
For the kind of police situation I have described, it is worth looking at the statistics. Some 25% of those arrested—one in four—are not charged with any offence whatever. Mistakes are made and, sometimes, they are glaring mistakes: the wrong person is arrested, either due to mistaken identity or because they happen to be a youngster carrying the identity card of somebody who may look rather like them but is a bit older. They may be arrested mistakenly because their age has been misunderstood. There may just be a terrible mistake, which can be ironed out only if somebody is there to help them, because complete misunderstandings occur. It is very important in all cases that there should be an early intervention, which may be very brief, in which a lawyer can be made available to advise a person whether what has happened to them is legitimate—not whether it is right; that is not the question—as part of the process.
For the sort of immigration detention we are discussing, it may be that the figure of mistakes is much lower than 25%—I accept that. However, I do not accept for one moment that there will be no mistakes. Indeed, the provision of legal aid is a key component in upholding the constitutional right of access to the courts, which is itself inherent in the rule of law. The courts have repeatedly upheld the principle that a failure to provide legal aid in what are regarded proportionately as proper circumstances can amount to a breach of fundamental rights. I cite, for example, the judgment of Lord Reed in the UK Supreme Court case, R (on the application of UNISON) v Lord Chancellor [2017], at page 51, paragraph 66. It is an undeniable right.
I congratulate the Government on some steps that they are taking to deal with immigration cases. They are speeding up the process dramatically. I hope that those cases—for example, the Afghan and Hong Kong cases—in which almost everybody is given asylum anyway will be speeded up so that they can be dealt with more or less summarily. I hope that the Government will fulfil their promise to appoint more adjudicators, judges of one kind or another, for as long as is needed to deal with the backlog. I hope they will use these adjudicators in a creative way by sending them out to where the people they are adjudicating on are situated, so that cases can be dealt with in bulk, possibly by hiring a local school or village hall or by simply setting up a room wherever those people are held, so that the cases can be dealt with quickly.
I am listening very carefully to what the Minister says, but does he not agree that the very high percentage of these cases that reach an appellate level in which the litigants are not represented by lawyers is alarming evidence that if legal aid is available at an early stage, it is not having much effect?
I am grateful to the noble Lord for that intervention. I do not have before me, although I perhaps should, the figures to which he refers, but Ministers can certainly examine, and look at how we improve, that. It is in the interests of the Government—never mind of the individuals who are seeking asylum—to ensure that we have speedy, correct asylum decisions that get to the heart of the person’s asylum claim as a matter of urgency, rather than going through tortuous numbers of appeals and other legal matters. We must get to a position whereby the Government can determine whether someone has a legitimate asylum claim and, if so, can act upon it or, if not, can take action to deny that asylum claim and put in place the consequential action to be taken.
(2 months, 2 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberI am not suggesting that it is. I completely agree with the noble Lord, but there is a difference between that kind of action and the action generally taken by young supporters of Palestine Action. Whether or not I agree with it—I have never supported its activity—there is a great difference between that and terrorism. If you start labelling people as terrorists willy-nilly right across the board, you go down a very dangerous route.
I have great regard for the noble Lord, but will he answer a simple question in a simple way? Does he accept that the actions of Palestine Action as described by the Minister are criminal actions that fall within the definition of terrorism and therefore are available, if the Director of Public Prosecutions so decides, to be prosecuted as terrorist offences?
My Lords, I would like to make a point about why so many people across the UK, particularly young people, have joined Palestine Action. It is important that we recognise their frustrations at the current time. Direct action at military bases is nothing new, as many noble Lords have pointed out. Welsh women marched from Cardiff to Greenham Common and were joined by thousands more women along the way. They did not just march. They used a range of direct action tactics, including blockading the base and cutting the fence, to protest against nuclear weapons being held at that base. There is a long history of direct action across the UK that is perhaps not comfortable. The actions of Palestine Action are the direct actions of a civil disobedience group, not a terrorist group. That is why I support this regret amendment.
My Lords, the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, was brave in moving this regret amendment, and she should have been heard with more respect. I was one of those who suggested that she should give way, but I know it can seem like bullying in this House, and I think we should reflect on that. It is not a very good thing to gang up on someone who has a difficult job to do.
I would also like to mention two others who have contributed and for whom I have great respect. The noble Lord, Lord Hain, joined the Cabinet in 2002, as I remember, as Secretary of State for Wales. He was a successful Secretary of State for Wales and then Secretary of State for Northern Ireland. The Terrorism Act 2000 was in existence in 2002. Offences were added and other legislation was introduced while he was in the Cabinet, and I do not recall any occasion on which, publicly at least, the noble Lord protested, objected or resigned as a result of the creation of the body of terrorism law that now we have—he is confirming that—so I think that what he has said today is perhaps a little inconsistent with his history. Forgive me for saying so.
I also commend the Minister strongly. I thought he gave a very balanced description, which in factual terms nobody has contradicted. He said that three bodies are being proscribed now. It is interesting that objections have not been made in relation to two of those bodies—probably because noble Lords do not really like what they do very much, because they are extreme right-wing terrorists—but exactly the same process has been gone through with them as with Palestine Action. What is that process? To examine intelligence that no doubt exists, but that we have not heard about. In this House, we have to be responsible and take it that there is an intelligence case behind what is proposed. Material evidence has been brought together that shows that this organisation, Palestine Action, like the other two, has carried out activities that fall within the definition of crime that can, and I emphasise “can”, be treated as terrorist.
The context is that what has happened since the Terrorism Act 2000—since 9/11, in fact—is quite different from the world in which the suffragettes, the Greenham women and all the other examples that have been mentioned, including very successful anti-apartheid demonstrators such as the noble Lord, Lord Hain, lived. It is a given. That has not been objected to. Even the noble Baroness has not said that Palestine Action does not commit crimes that qualify as terrorist crimes, if they are prosecuted as such.
Noble Lords should not assume that every time a crime is committed that could be prosecuted as such, it is. The Crown Prosecution Service and the Director of Public Prosecutions have to make a decision. One of the most important protections in our constitution, which we talk about all too rarely, is the discretion of the DPP not to prosecute in the public interest or for other reasons covered by the two-stage code test. It may well be that if silly supporters of the criminal acts of Palestine Action or these other two bodies are interviewed by the police, they will not be prosecuted under the Terrorism Act. We have to trust juries, and magistrates in summary cases, to ensure that the prosecution system is run fairly. In this House, and particularly in the other place, there is a huge amount of control available over the prosecution system.
Let us be clear. If we do not like the definition of terrorism we have in our law, it is our duty as legislators to change it—and we have all decided not to change it. When it suits us, we encourage it to be used: something has to be done. When it is a bit inconvenient, we say that it is the most terrible thing on earth. The truth is the middle road, which has been given to us by the Minister. I urge your Lordships to act responsibly today, listening carefully to what has been said, taking into account what we can do in future, but accepting this instrument.
My Lords, I have a few short points. I entirely agree with what the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, has just said.
First, I hope that when we vote, if we vote, we will entirely put out of our minds whether we sympathise with the Palestinian cause, as most of us do, and whether we regret what Israel has done in various respects. We are concerned with a violent group. It really does not matter whether the cause it articulates and supports is justified. The law in a civilised country simply cannot accept people using violence against people and property in support of a cause they believe to be right. No such law can survive in a civilised society.
Secondly, if I understood him correctly, the Minister has explained why it is not sufficient for the law simply to prosecute people who commit criminal acts of the sort that are alleged—I agree that we have to be very careful here, for sub judice reasons—against members of Palestine Action. The point, if I have understood the Minister correctly—and he will say if I have not—is that there is a vital public need to prevent these people organising and recruiting, and the only way in which the law can do that is to take the action that the Minister is proposing today, which I strongly support.
It is proportionality that I am concerned about. Proscription, as the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, rightly pointed out, would mean that merely expressing approval for Palestine Action, even via an ill-judged retweet, could carry a 14-year prison sentence. I was not particularly convinced by the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, although he is a very long-standing friend, because if the CPS will not prosecute because it is clearly not the right thing to do, why is it there?
I am sorry but I cannot let that pass. Every day the police prosecute people for theft. The maximum sentence for theft was seven years—I am not sure whether it still is. Practically nobody gets seven years; most people get a non-custodial sentence. The assumption that everybody prosecuted will be locked up for years and years is a misleading premise for this debate.
I am not trying to mislead anyone; the noble Lord knows better than that. If it can happen, I do not think it is right. It is as simple as that.
That brings me to the security breach. Barely three weeks after the Strategic Defence Review urged stronger protection for RAF logistics bases, an activist group breached the security at Brize Norton. Can the Minister say in winding up what consequences there have been for those in charge of security at the base? Was site security managed by the RAF or contracted out? Can he give the House a categorical assurance that whatever mistakes enabled this breach will not be repeated?
There is also the question of workability. Hundreds of thousands of our fellow citizens have marched peacefully for a ceasefire and an arms export ban on Israel, a position that opinion polls say now commands majority support. Since this position is shared by Palestine Action, a member of the public promoting these views could be interpreted under this law as supporting the group. I would welcome clarity from the Minister on this, as it has understandably left many concerned and a bit confused.
We should be concerned that, while we debate the order, innocent Palestinians continue to die in their hundreds. The Government’s principal diplomatic energy should be directed at securing a durable peace: a plan for Gaza which excludes Hamas, pressure on Prime Minister Netanyahu to halt the de facto annexation of the West Bank and, without further delay, formal recognition of a Palestinian state by the United Kingdom. That is the Liberal Democrat position. For the sake of our security, credibility and liberties, I ask the Minister to focus on pursuing these aims instead.
(2 months, 2 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberI hope that I can again reassure the noble Lord. Legislation is in place, and his Government previously and this Government now want to see that legislation implemented when the police judge that criminal thresholds have been crossed. It is not for Ministers to determine whether a criminal threshold has been crossed; it is for the police to present a case to the Crown Prosecution Service, for the Crown Prosecution Service to put that to the courts and for a jury to convict or otherwise on the basis of evidence supplied. But I am supportive of his general aim. It is important that harassment, intimidation, threats and calls for death are seen as the serious criminal events that they potentially are. Therefore, it is right and proper that in this case Avon and Somerset Police follow that through, and it is right and proper that in any event, be it at a music festival, a football ground, a street protest or anything else, people have the right to protest but not the right to threaten, harass, intimidate or call for death.
I suggest to the Minister that it would be a sensible, practical measure for he and Ministers at DCMS to get together to produce a bespoke website aimed at festival organisers, performers and audiences, so that they understand what hate crimes are, what is and is not acceptable, and what will be the consequences if they choose to break criminal laws that have been created by all Governments in the last 15 years.
That is a helpful suggestion. The noble Lord will know that this is a fluid discussion both with the BBC and internally within DCMS and the Home Office. I am repeating myself, but I reiterate that it is for the police to determine criminal action, but it is certainly for the Government, be it DCMS, the Home Office, jointly or both, in conjunction with other agencies, such as the BBC, to make sure that there is wide dissemination and understanding of where that criminal line is drawn. I am grateful for the noble Lord’s suggestion, which I will reflect on outside the Chamber today.
(3 months, 1 week ago)
Lords ChamberI am grateful to my noble friend, who has done an excellent job in the report the Police Federation commissioned her to produce on its governance structure and future direction. I was pleased to meet my noble friend to discuss the recommendations of that report. I know that the Government are giving the Police Federation, because that is its responsibility, time to reflect on those recommendations and, I hope, to act upon them. I will certainly, as will my right honourable friend in the Commons, Diana Johnson, take a keen interest in how the Police Federation responds to those recommendations. My noble friend is right to say that the effectiveness of the Police Federation is an important part of the police family.
Does the Minister agree that the efficiency of, for example, police regional counterterrorism units provides evidence that the 43 territorial police offices should be reformed, and that no more than 12 forces would be likely, by economies of scale, to provide greater efficiency and better service to the public? Is it not time to reform the police structure?
The noble Lord tempts me to examine issues that are potentially being addressed as part of our discussions on the police reform White Paper, which will be produced shortly. The White Paper is looking at governance and efficiency and how best we can promote resources, so that the ambition of the noble Lord, Lord Dobbs, can be met during this Parliament. I cannot comment on those issues directly, but the noble Lord needs to reflect on the fact that in the police reform White Paper we will discuss a range of measures, of which governance and responsibilities will be one.
(5 months, 2 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberThe Government take privacy extremely seriously. We have a strong international reputation for privacy, and we continue to work with companies to ensure that privacy is respected, but I cannot comment on the issue the noble Lord has mentioned concerning any ongoing issues or operational matters. I cannot confirm or deny any notices, and I will, I am afraid, have to repeat that again for the House today.
On a non-operational matter, can the Minister confirm that all decisions of the kind that have been mentioned will routinely be referred to the Investigatory Powers Tribunal so that it can decide whether government decisions were proportionate or disproportionate?
All proceedings will be referred to the Investigatory Powers Tribunal, and the decision whether to hold the discussion in public or private is for the tribunal. Those matters will be examined and any judgments on any issue at any time will be made by the tribunal. I hope that is a non-controversial matter for the noble Lord.
(7 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I declare an interest in that I conducted the first Prevent review in 2011 and started what became the Shawcross review, which I strongly support. I thank the Government for the remedial steps that have been taken, as described in the Statement, following the loss of a valued colleague with whom I too was in the House of Commons and had many happy exchanges. Can we now be a little bit more positive about the future? Does the Minister agree not only that there have been successes, as he just described, but that some of them have been quite remarkable in turning young men and women from becoming potential terrorists, and that we should not let up in enhancing the effectiveness of Prevent in what is an extremely challenging and difficult area of work, which is sometimes underestimated?
I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Carlile of Berriew, for both his previous work on helping to support to development of the counterterrorism strategy and his comments. As I said to the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, there have been around 5,000 successful Prevent referrals since 2015, and there are people now living productive, constructive lives who may have gone down the radicalisation route had Prevent intervention not taken place.
I add that I was in the Home Office from 2009 to 2010, and in the Ministry of Justice from 2007 to 2009, and when we dealt with Prevent then it was an entirely different world. There was no Twitter or Facebook; the internet was relatively in its infancy. In the 14 to 15 years between then and my return to the Home Office, there has been the dark web, radicalisation, fake news—a whole range of things. One of the key issues for the future is asking the tech companies to step up to the plate on what they need to do to help support the Prevent strategy and deradicalisation. That is why my right honourable friend the Home Secretary has written to tech companies, following both the Southport and Sir David Amess reviews, to ensure that we can examine, with them, their responsibilities once the Online Safety Act comes into effect on 17 March.
I am grateful for the noble Lord’s support. He is right that Prevent can be a success and we should not throw it out on the basis of failings that are self-evident but which are not the full story of how the Prevent strategy has worked.
(7 months, 1 week ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, Amendment 37A is in my name and that of the noble Lord, Lord Carlile of Berriew. Clause 31 of the Bill provides that,
“Except so far as this Part or regulations under this Part provide, nothing … confers a right of action in any civil proceedings in respect of a contravention of a requirement imposed by … this Part”.
It then goes on to say that that subsection
“does not affect any right of action which exists apart from the provisions of this Part”.
I was quite confused by that clause, and relieved that the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, also sought clarity. Our amendment would provide that:
“Nothing in this Act or regulations made under it affects any right of action in civil proceedings”.
If we have interpreted the provision correctly, that is a rather more straightforward way of saying it.
When the point was raised at Second Reading, the Minister said that the lack of time meant that we did not have the opportunity then to discuss the clause in detail. He said there would be opportunities in due course, so I am taking this opportunity. My question is, quite straightforwardly: does the amendment express what the Government are seeking to say, particularly with regard to breach of statutory duty? If it is not as the amendment sets out, why not? I beg to move.
My Lords, it is a pleasure to act as junior counsel to the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee. I listened carefully to some comments that the Minister made on Monday, which alluded to this clause, and I thought about them carefully, but they were brief and I, too, wish to test what is really intended by the Government. My feeling is that the Government have made an inadvertent mistake in Clause 31 which they can easily rectify.
This Bill is designed to protect citizens by imposing clear statutory duties. When clear statutory duties are imposed and there is a breach of those duties, it is very common for a citizen who is a victim of that breach to be able to bring a civil action. The purpose of the civil action is often to recover damages, though it may involve other declaratory judgments too.
I want to give a few examples, because I think we are going to have one substantive debate on this clause and then a decision will be reached. I am going to mention a number of instances in which breach of statutory duty gives rise to a civil action to obtain judgments of the kind I mentioned. First, driving a vehicle in an unsafe condition gives rise to a statutory duty which can result in a judgment for damages. In this Bill we are talking about something much bigger in scale than driving a vehicle in an unsafe condition, but it may have exactly the same consequences.
There are other examples. If there are unsafe systems or means of work in any workspace, there can be an action for breach of statutory duty without it being necessary to prove negligence, nuisance or any other tort —civil wrong—that requires specific proof of certain aspects. Allowing a vehicle to be driven by an uninsured person allows a claim for breach of statutory duty. The failure to arrange compulsory insurance for employees allows such a claim. If a landlord fails to provide habitable standards, equally, there can be such a claim. If a company fails to disclose required financial information to investors, there can be such a claim for breach of statutory duty.
If a shop sells faulty electrical equipment whereby a fire is caused in the home for which it has been bought, for example, one does not have to prove negligence. One may have an action under the Sale of Goods Acts or their equivalent, but there is an opportunity to obtain damages for breach of statutory duty. At a construction site, the failure to provide safety barriers gives rise to such an action. If we go to a restaurant and suffer food poisoning because it has failed to reach the statutory hygiene standards, we can make a claim for damages for breach of statutory duty. If one fails as an employer to provide proper training to employees on handling hazardous chemicals, that too gives rise to a potential claim for breach of statutory duty. I have chosen just a few examples—and there are others—where one does not have to prove negligence and the components of negligence.
Such provisions are all designed to secure protection for individuals without the need to prove those other elements of common-law civil wrongs. I do not understand why those rights are removed by Clause 31(1). I invite the Government to reflect on what is, as I have suggested, probably an inadvertent failure.
My Lords, I beg to differ with the noble Lord, but not because I do not want deserving people to recover compensation. My reading of the Bill as it stands is to the effect that, as drafted, Clause 31 achieves two things. First, it puts beyond doubt any question whether the breaches of requirements under the Bill can of themselves be a ground for a civil claim. It says plainly that such breaches will not in themselves be a ground. However, it is important to be aware that the fact that a breach of duty under the Bill or regulations has occurred will still be evidence that will be admissible in a civil claim which alleges negligence or other breach of common-law duty. The important point is that there may have been a breach that was without negligence.
If there has been a breach then it will be strong evidence that something has gone wrong that should be compensated for, but it may be capable of explanation and justification in the civil courts, which does not excuse criminal liability. Put simply, the Bill as drafted makes plain that a breach of statutory duty will not of itself alone give rise to an actionable breach of duty sounding in damages.
Secondly, as it stands, the Bill makes it clear that what is said in Clause 31(1) does not affect—that is, detract from—any right of action that exists in common law. In other words, a claim of negligence, in particular, or any other common-law right will remain; so this provision takes nothing away. Where, in a civil action, the claim establishes that as a matter of fact there has been a breach of such statutory duty, that will be evidence in the case and it is likely to be strong evidence. It will be a matter for the court to determine whether it is evidence of negligence or other evidence that might give rise to a justifiable claim for damages, and what weight to give it. I hope that is clear.
The amendment proffered to us would delete the whole of the existing clause, and would simply say:
“Nothing … affects any right of action”.
With respect, I suggest that that would be less clear and less helpful to the courts, because it will leave open a possible argument that breaches of statutory duty are themselves grounds for action, even where no want of care has been established. That would be getting closer, in effect, to strict liability for civil damages, however blameless the body or person concerned. That is why it is a step too far. It is unnecessary and potentially damaging, when we look at the vast range of bodies and people who will be affected.
I am very grateful to the noble Lord, who I respect very much as a lawyer. To say that this applies strict liability is, with respect, completely wrong, is it not? All strict liability requires is proof that damage has taken place. Breach of statutory duty involves at least a failure to act on the part of the person sued. To elide this into strict liability is just not correct.
(7 months, 1 week ago)
Lords ChamberI am grateful to the noble Baroness. I can give some figures, but not off the top of my head. I will certainly write to her about that.
The key question is illegal migration. The guidance we are talking about is on revising procedures for those who have entered the United Kingdom illegally and currently could apply for British citizenship after a period of 10 years. We have lifted that 10-year procedure, so no one can have British citizenship approved, as a presumption, if they have entered the country illegally. They can still apply for British citizenship and have mitigating circumstances brought forward, should they so wish. A range of measures has been issued in the guidance published this week.
Can the Minister assure those of us who stood shoulder to shoulder with the Labour Party in opposing the previous Government’s completely discredited Rwanda proposals that people who come within asylum criteria are not affected by the announcement made today?
People entering the United Kingdom or applying for asylum using a viable and legal route are not affected. Individuals who come here through illegal routes will be subject to the criteria in the guidance, which are that they can apply for British citizenship, but the presumption is that it will be refused unless they bring forward mitigating circumstances, which can be considered.
The noble Lord will know that the Bill introduced in another place on Monday repeals the Rwanda Act, on which we have already spent a wasteful £700 million. We will come to this House in due course to say that it was not a deterrent for illegal migration, and we should be looking at legal, safe routes, which I know the noble Lord supports.