Anonymity (Arrested Persons) Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Campbell-Savours and Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames

2nd reading (Hansard): House of Lords
Friday 1st March 2019 Lords Chamber

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, I start by congratulating my noble friend Lord Paddick on the excellent way he opened the debate on the Bill so lucidly and eloquently. He has, of course, campaigned for this change for some time. Indeed, we tabled an amendment to the Policing and Crime Bill in 2016, seeking pre-charge anonymity. On that occasion we withdrew it, but I am very pleased to see that my noble friend is taking it forward to legislation.

I am supposed to be winding up this debate on behalf of the Liberal Democrats. Since my noble friend Lord Paddick was to be the only one speaking before me, I was pleased that the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, spoke in the gap, so that I would have some winding-up to do, as well as supporting my noble friend.

I welcome the Bill. It is right that it does not stop with sexual offences but talks about criminal offences in general, because a wide injustice occurs as a result of unfair exposure to publicity of people who are innocent. We all know the high-profile cases—my noble friend mentioned Lord Brittan, Paul Gambaccini and Sir Cliff Richard—and we know of many others. Some are not exactly high-profile and are just pursuing anonymous lives, but there are many who are half way up the system, who cannot afford to take proceedings, who do not have the influence to complain, but who are exposed, if they are arrested falsely then released, to damage to their reputation in their communities that can be long-lasting.

My noble friend, and the briefing, reminded us of the couple who were arrested for flying drones at Gatwick. They were, I suggest, mercilessly and falsely hounded by the press in a, frankly, unforgivable way, but the press thought it made a good story and there was the background that many people had lost their holidays and been caused severe disruption by what had happened. The result, when they were photographed, their names and pictures were published, their house was searched and they were held in custody for some time, was that they felt completely violated. It is also possible they were exposed to danger from the less scrupulous of those who had been seriously affected. The problem for their reputation is that people do not follow the details as closely as they might. They will be forever known by the question: “Oh, weren’t they the ones who had the drones at Gatwick?”. That kind of innuendo and misinformed spread of rumour trashes reputations unjustly.

My noble friend rightly talked about balance, and it is a question of balance. It is balancing the right of the public to be informed—the so-called right to know—against the right to personal and family privacy. He was also fundamentally right to mention the presumption of innocence. That is a presumption in our law that is at the root of our liberties, and yet the exposure to our reputations being trashed by the media strikes at the heart of the value of the presumption of innocence. Too many are convicted and have their lives ruined not by processes of law but by gross and intrusive publicity, often to be released without charge or simply not charged, but to find that they are nevertheless convicted at the bar of public opinion.

The internet and social media make the position far worse. It has been a few years now, but many of your Lordships will remember the film “Notting Hill”, and Hugh Grant tries to reassure Julia Roberts when his house is surrounded by press photographers and television cameramen. He says to her, “Don’t worry: today’s newspapers are tomorrow’s fish-and-chip wrappings”, and she says, “No, everything I do, every time I am seen in public in future, the pictures they’ve taken today will be taken out, hauled out, and put in the newspapers”. That effect may be dramatic for film stars, and her character was a successful film star, but it is also dramatic for anybody who takes any part in public life. I suggest there is a danger that people are avoiding public life because of the danger of too much publicity. The Bill is a small step on the way to combating that evil.

I echo the point made by my noble friend that this is about arrest rather than charge. Anonymity is to be extended by the Bill not to those who have been charged but to those who have been arrested. He made the very valid point about the difference between the test that the police have to apply when they arrest somebody, which is no real proof of guilt, nothing that gives rise to major suspicion, and the test that the Crown Prosecution Service or the police have to meet before somebody is charged.

What are the arguments against? They are twofold. First, there is the argument that people will not come forward. My noble friend mentioned the Warboys case, but it is often used in cases of domestic and sexual violence, in particular. I wonder whether that is true. Unlike the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, perhaps, I believe that the exceptions to reporting restrictions contained in Clause 2 provide that balance. I do not see difficulty about the interests of justice or the public interest: those are the general principles that would be applied by a judge in the Crown Court hearing such an application. Reasons given for lifting restrictions include that,

“it may lead to additional complainants coming forward … it may lead to information that assists the investigation of the offence … it may lead to information that assists the arrested person; or … the conduct of the arrested person’s defence at trial is likely to be substantially prejudiced if the direction is not given”.

Those are reasons that may well, in particular cases, justify the lifting of the anonymity restriction.

We have to trust the judges. They know the principles they are supposed to apply and they are given a key, in what is not an exhaustive list, to the circumstances that might justify this. In my view, those factors strike a reasonable balance between the interests of publicity and of justice.

[Lord Campbell-Savours]

I am sorry to press the noble Lord, who is an eminent lawyer, but I go back to,

“it may lead to additional complainants coming forward”.

Is that not the case in almost all rape cases?

Health and Social Care Bill

Debate between Lord Campbell-Savours and Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames

Thursday 8th March 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

My Lords, on these Benches we take the view that it was sensible to include this provision. The advice that we have is that the risk of the application of competition law is reduced by ensuring that the majority of income for NHS foundation trust hospitals will always be for the purpose of treating NHS patients. It is not an absolute guarantee but it is a sensible risk-reduction exercise and it was put in for that purpose. There is no point in taking a risk unnecessarily. The communication problem has frankly been the result of the efforts of opponents of the Bill, partly in the party of the noble Baroness, in stressing the 49 per cent and suggesting that it is the purpose of the Bill, which, as I say, it is not.

That is not to say that private income in NHS foundation trusts is bad. The Labour Government recognised that throughout. In her speech, the noble Baroness herself very properly recognised it. Private income represents an opportunity for foundation trusts to attract innovation, to buy new and expensive equipment and to develop world-class centres of excellence. We recognise and applaud those features of private income. However, when tabling Amendment 220B, we were concerned that there should also be an individual arrangement for foundation trusts by which individual limits would be subject to agreement with Monitor.

[Lord Campbell-Savours]

Will the noble Lord explain, in very simple language that people outside can understand, what is to prevent a central London teaching hospital with an international reputation ending up taking almost half its business from overseas patients who pay by private means?

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

I take the noble Lord’s question to mean: why should a proportion not exceed 50 per cent? As I have explained, the reason is that we regard that as having a risk. If the question is why should a central London hospital not take nearly half its income from private patients, the maximum taken at the moment is, I believe, some 39 per cent. There is a limit of 5 per cent on any increase to be proposed, more than which the governors would have to agree to by a majority. It could not just be a simple majority; a majority of the governors must vote to approve the change. It may well be that some hospitals will wish to go nearer to 50 per cent, which is why there is a reference to 49 per cent.

[Lord Campbell-Savours]

So that we can have it absolutely on the record, is the noble Lord saying that a teaching hospital in central London—