Reconciliation: Role of British Foreign, Defence and International Development Policy

Lord Campbell of Pittenweem Excerpts

Friday 14th December 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Campbell of Pittenweem (LD)]

My Lords, it is always a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Jay, who today was once again authoritative and perceptive. Those are qualities which necessarily apply to the most reverend Primate who opened the debate. I was interested to understand that he had addressed the United Nations Security Council on some of the issues we have been discussing. Perhaps on a more private occasion he might be willing to give us a personal report on just how well he thought his remarks were received, because I can think of some current members of the Security Council who might find some of the things he said a little uncomfortable.

Let me begin by saying how much I associate myself with the remarks made by the noble Lord, Lord Boateng, about the fact that soft power and hard power are mutually reinforcing. That is set out in a report produced by your Lordships’ House in 2014, Persuasion and Power in the Modern World. That rather lines me up with the noble Lord and against the analysis provided by the noble Baroness who is no longer in her place.

I want to suggest, perhaps not on the same theme as the noble Lord, Lord Jay, some considerations with regard to the exercise of hard power. It might be thought that if soft power is successful, as it sometimes is initially, there will be no need for hard power—but if reconciliation were to break down, it may well need hard power in order to create an environment for a return to reconciliation. It is also the case that if reconciliation is proving impossible, hard power may be needed to create an environment for the discussion of reconciliation. One possible consequence is that the introduction of hard power may essentially have the effect of freezing events, so that what began as a ceasefire may well turn into a de facto long-term settlement. I have in mind the position in Cyprus, of which the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, has much more experience than I have and probably than almost all noble Lords in the House.

It is also worth reminding ourselves that hard power is not necessarily provided by coercion; the threat of coercion may be of considerable impact in considering the extent to which hard power makes a contribution. Even after successful reconciliation, parties who had previously been in disagreement may take some comfort from the regulating presence of hard power: for example, the continuing presence of a military mission of one kind or another.

In all these scenarios it seems to me that there are a number of principles that have to be applied, and I shall give some examples to suggest where that has not been the case. The hard power that is to be deployed must both be proportionate and have integrity. Reference has already been made in this debate to United Nations peacekeeping. The hard fact is that when it comes to peacekeeping missions, the United Nations has to take who or what it can get. The behaviour of some peacekeeping missions—I think particularly of the mission in which soldiers from Ukraine were involved—proved to be, to put it mildly, nothing less than catastrophic, involving abuse and worse. It is also the case that often when a request is made and an invitation given to offer troops for United Nations peacekeeping missions, impoverished countries apply, not necessarily those with a high degree of military acumen or ability. Often, those countries use the United Nations deployment to help to meet the cost of their military, sometimes to ensure that they obtain equipment which they would not otherwise possess and sometimes to pay their soldiers whom they would otherwise be unable to pay.

Of course, whenever a peacekeeping mission is commenced, the United Nations is entitled to expect that any countries which join will stay the course. Most of us may be aware of the rather dramatic events portrayed in the film “Black Hawk Down”. It portrays an event in Somalia which, not surprisingly, obtained a huge amount of publicity in the United States, and afterwards the United States mission was withdrawn, with what were inevitably damaging consequences. That argues very strongly for the fact that, if you are going to deploy your forces in circumstances where there is real risk, you need to be satisfied that you have public opinion firmly and courageously behind you.

Reference has also been made to Rwanda and, in a slightly different context, to the contribution of Kofi Annan, but it is generally recognised that his decision that the small United Nations force should be withdrawn may have contributed to subsequent events. I join the noble Lord, Lord Jay, in saying that I think it was a failure of what we rather broadly call the international community not to take steps to intervene in Rwanda, difficult though that might have been.

It is also said in this context that we have to pay due regard to the responsibility to protect. It began as the right of humanitarian intervention, as noble Lords will remember, contained in the speech made by Prime Minister Blair in Chicago. It is said—and I myself have enunciated this principle here, rather as the noble Lord, Lord Jay, did—that intervention should always be the last resort. However, I have to tell him, and remind myself, that the very distinguished civil servant the Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Defence, Sir Michael Quinlan, took a rather different view, which was that often early military intervention may have a very beneficial effect by, as it were, squeezing off something that may develop to a much greater extent, whereupon military intervention becomes more difficult.

I think too of the credibility of intervention. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, which is not all that long ago in our recollection, it was only the deployment of NATO, with the United States of America in the forefront, that eventually created the circumstances for what we might call reconciliation, although current events hardly suggest that the position is by any means fixed. It was only because of good-quality, highly motivated and well-equipped intervention that there was a benevolent outcome.

As for Sierra Leone, it is interesting that the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Richards, who subsequently became Chief of the Defence Staff, was a brigadier at that time, and it is generally accepted, not least by himself, that he took his orders in perhaps a rather more elastic way than the Ministry of Defence had originally conceived. However, if he had not exercised that degree of individual judgment, events in that part of the world would have been very much less favourable than they turned out.

These are not necessarily all joined-up illustrations, but I think they allow me to reach the conclusion that hard power cannot be an end in itself. There is no more dangerous proposition in the discussion of foreign affairs than the sentence, “Something must be done”. There must always be clear political goals, both tactical and strategic—and, once it has been decided to exercise hard power, there must always be the political will to carry the hard power through to the achievement of those goals. Without these principles, hard power might become an obstacle to reconciliation.

Shipbuilding: Appledore Shipyard

Lord Campbell of Pittenweem Excerpts

Monday 26th November 2018 Lords Chamber

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, I do not accept that. We are committed to maintaining a fleet of 19 frigates and destroyers. That is what we have at the moment. The Type 26 frigates will replace some of the Type 23s and the Type 31s the rest of the Type 23s. I do not accept that the fleet is somehow dwindling because of the aircraft carriers.

[Lord Campbell of Pittenweem (LD)]

My Lords, I cannot restrain myself from the observation that if the Royal Navy had as many ships as we have Questions about ships, we would be in a pretty good position altogether. The last time that this issue was discussed, the Minister told the House and myself that, notwithstanding the worst-case deficit in the Ministry of Defence equipment budget of £14.8 billion, the MoD would still be able to balance the books. Will that include cancellation or creative accounting, as has happened in the past?

[Earl Howe]

Not at all, my Lords. We are committed to our capital programme. If there has been any creative accounting in the past, we want to put that behind us because we want to be absolutely transparent about what our spending plans consist of. With regard to shipbuilding, as I said in my initial Answer, part of the trick will be to make the British shipbuilding industry more productive, innovative and competitive, and that is what we are seeking to do through the strategy.

Shipbuilding: Warships

Lord Campbell of Pittenweem Excerpts

Wednesday 14th November 2018 Lords Chamber

[Earl Howe]

Yes, we want the first ship in 2023, with five ships delivered by the end of 2028 to replace the five Type 23 general purpose frigates.

[Lord Campbell of Pittenweem (LD)]

My Lords, given that the National Audit Office report of 5 November concluded that the Ministry of Defence equipment budget remains unaffordable by as much as £14.8 billion, where will the money come from to build complex warships?

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, that worst-case prediction is a forecast over 10 years. We have plenty of time to manage the budget, as we always do, to make sure that we can deliver our very ambitious equipment programme. Work is in hand to do just that.

Offshore Patrol Vessels

Lord Campbell of Pittenweem Excerpts

Monday 22nd October 2018 Lords Chamber

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, they have been decommissioned. In congratulating my noble friend on the foresight that he showed in commissioning those vessels, I hope he will be reassured by my initial Answer—that we are maintaining flexibility to cope with unforeseen contingencies.

[Lord Campbell of Pittenweem (LD)]

Is this issue part of the defence modernisation programme, which is of course a defence review by another name? The results of that review were promised in June this year. So far, no results have been published. What is the reason for the delay, and when will the results be announced?

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, the Defence Secretary published a Written Ministerial Statement on 19 July, as the noble Lord will be aware. It set out the headline conclusions of the modernising defence programme. I know that noble Lords were slightly disappointed with that Statement. We had hoped that it would be informative and reassuring—we had certainly intended it to be so. It confirmed the direction of travel; it described the work done to date; it set out some headline conclusions. Strictly speaking, the matter of the offshore patrol vessels is not part of that but, as I have explained, it is important to prepare now for the contingencies that may ensue from Brexit.

Royal Navy: Type 31e Frigate

Lord Campbell of Pittenweem Excerpts

Thursday 6th September 2018 Lords Chamber

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, the Type 26 programme is proceeding at pace, on time and on budget so far. The point that the noble Lord makes, about ordering all Type 26 ships in one go, might not be the right way to get value for money. If we had done that in the first instance, it is arguable that we would have overpriced the contract, because Australia has since come in with a firm order for Type 26 frigates. We are sure that this will play very favourably into the price of our next order for the Type 26.

[Lord Campbell of Pittenweem (LD)]

My Lords, the noble Earl’s reply to the noble Lord a few moments ago was, to say the least, concise. He failed, however, to point out that the contract for the Type 31 has been restarted. Part of the problem, as the Government have indicated in their reason for restarting, is that the bids that were received were “not compliant”. I understand that to mean that the capability that the Government seek is not deliverable at the price of £250 million per ship. On that basis, the Government have a choice to make: either to reduce the capability or to increase the price. Unless they do one of those things, the exports on which the Government have set great store will not be achieved.

[Earl Howe]

I hope to reassure the noble Lord on those points. The contracts that were being competed for, and which have now been recommenced, were to pay for a series of design deliverables to support the main procurement contract; they were not the main assessment of industry’s ability to deliver the manufacture programme. We still believe that industry will be able to meet that challenge, and the procurement process, despite having been recommenced, is now proceeding at pace.

National Security Situation

Lord Campbell of Pittenweem Excerpts

Thursday 19th April 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Campbell of Pittenweem (LD)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Ahmad, and the shadow Leader of the House, with both of whom I am in substantial agreement. I go back to the issue of Syria, which was the catalyst for bringing forward this important debate. With the benefit of hindsight, I am able to rehearse a number of propositions perhaps beyond those that have already been discussed that establish the lawfulness of what took place.

First, Assad used chemical weapons on Douma but he had done so before. This was a breach of the Chemical Weapons Convention, to which Syria was a signatory in 2013. The Assad regime ignored the warning available in September 2013, although the prospect of action was aborted. The use of chemical weapons is a breach of the law of conflict and humanitarian law. As a signatory to the convention, the United Kingdom has a legitimate interest in its enforcement. Of course, as had already been said, the Security Council, for reasons of Russian policy, has been effectively emasculated.

In the course of Monday’s discussion, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Morris of Aberavon, raised the issue of responsibility to protect. That doctrine was first enunciated by Prime Minister Blair in his Chicago speech; it was refined thereafter, particularly by the Canadian Government. It was successful in Kosovo—as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Morris, indicated—and Sierra Leone. Although it may not be universally accepted, in the circumstances we are describing, I believe it can legitimately be described as “persuasive”.

A combination of these circumstances has been extremely unusual. My question, which may not be susceptible to an answer today, is this: what is the position if, in the next six weeks, the Assad regime once again mobilises helicopters and drops barrel bombs filled with high explosive that kill and maim more people and cause more damage than anything that occurred in Douma? If these circumstances arise, they will pose a challenge not only to the Government but to those of us who have supported the action taken by them.

Let me turn to some of the broader issues. This debate is an extremely broad canvas, to put it mildly, and in the time available, I am not sure that I can colour it all in. I must therefore be selective. Looking at the number of noble Lords with experience and qualifications who will follow me, I have no doubt that any omissions I make will be more than made up for by their contributions.

The national security capability review was published on 28 March, on the eve of the recess. It got very little national coverage. Things are usually published on the eve of a recess because they contain bad news. I can give the Government some relief, because it contained no bad news. In fact, it contained not very much at all. When examined, the document is heavy on ambition but light on substance. It tells us a great deal of what we already knew or could have reasonably predicted. The approach of the review has already been criticised by the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy, of which I have the honour of being a member. That criticism centres on how we can make judgments about the overall issue of national security while the defence component is absent. We know why that is so, but it seems to argue strongly for the view that we will be able best to understand the content and effectiveness of the capability review once defence issues have been properly resolved.

I appreciate that security depends on more than defence—including soft power, intelligence and counter-terrorism—but I would argue that defence is unique because it is the public demonstration of will, capability and deterrence. If all three services are short of personnel, as the review suggests, part of what we are expecting to be told at the end of June by the Secretary of State for Defence must include some effort to deal with those shortages.

But one issue raised by the noble Lord, Lord Ahmad, that causes me considerable concern is the changing nature of the nuclear environment and the weakening, as he said, of arms control. But it is not just Russia. In the United States, the comprehensive test-ban treaty has not yet been ratified. There is considerable doubt whether the Trump Administration will be willing to sign a follow-on strategic arms reduction treaty. As has been pointed out, the Russians have effectively given up on the INF Treaty—that rather improbable product of the meeting between Gorbachev and Reagan. Indeed, it is not just nuclear, because Russia has effectively given up the CFE—the conventional forces in Europe treaty.

But there is one more pernicious doctrine abroad in the whole question of arms control and nuclear weapons. It is called de-escalation, but it is not what it seems. It amounts to reduced nuclear payloads being put on existing missiles, such as those nuclear-capable missiles that have now been deployed in Kaliningrad. It therefore embraces, if not directly at least by inference, the use of nuclear weapons as battlefield weapons—nuclear war fighting. Noble Lords will remember that that was one of the threats of the Cold War. The United States of America hinted that there would be a more general application of the deterrence of nuclear weapons in its own security review. In Russia, military generals have been willing to accept, if I might put it that way, the possibility of the same.

That naturally leads me to the United States. We have not an exclusive relationship but a particular one, just as Macron and Trump have a particular relationship. The features of our relationship are well known: intelligence sharing and access to the Trident missile pool; we are each other’s ally of first choice; a senior partnership in NATO. But we are beholden to an occasionally incoherent and often volatile President. There is not much mention these days of the pivot to the East, which caused so much anxiety in Europe when it was first pronounced by Secretary of State Clinton, but America now sees China as a competitor. The President is embarked on a rather improbable initiative relating to North Korea. It can reasonably be argued that, so far as the United States is concerned, its interests may continue to be focused more often in the East than they are in Europe.

Every President leaves a mark on the presidency. I believe that it is wrong to assume that President Trump’s successor, from either party, will be drawn by or be willing to embrace the Atlanticist tradition. Given the state of politics in United States, it is more likely that such a successor will owe a great deal towards populism. That is why we must do more for ourselves and along with our European allies, whether in NATO or the European Union. PESCO, as noble Lords will know, seeks to improve the effectiveness of the European collective contribution to NATO. The United Kingdom should lead that initiative by the nature of the budget we are prepared to pay for defence. To do so would provide a commitment not just to trade but to the security relationship with the European Union, which has not yet been determined but on which the capability review places great stress. We need more capability for the United Kingdom, Europe and for NATO. If we do that we will allay the issue of burden sharing, which is alive in Washington in the Senate, the House and the White House.

I believe that 2% is not enough for the United Kingdom’s defence budget. That has been so particularly since the cost of the nuclear deterrent became part of the defence budget rather than being separately financed.

Having begun my speech with Syria, perhaps I can finish with Syria. I find myself in the position of being like a sinner who is about to repent but who cannot quite bring himself to do so. The reason why I take this position is that it is now beyond doubt that Assad will win this civil war. It is beyond doubt that he did not and does not need to use chemical weapons. It is beyond doubt that he will continue to enjoy unequivocal support from Russia because of Russia’s anxiety to maintain the influence it has garnered from the vacuum left by what one might describe as the West and because of its bases at Latakia and Tartus, which give it direct access to the Mediterranean. As part of the forward thinking that must surely be provoked by these discussions, Syria is—one might argue—an essential component of our foreign policy in the future. We will have to reshape our policy in relation to Syria and to Assad and we should not shrink from that either.

Armed Forces Act (Continuation) Order 2018

Lord Campbell of Pittenweem Excerpts

Tuesday 20th March 2018 Grand Committee

[Lord Campbell of Pittenweem (LD)]

My Lords, I am also lost in admiration for the quality and character of the Armed Forces, who serve this country so well. Since the noble Earl introduced the debate with characteristic clarity there is no need for me to rehearse the statutory position. I also welcome the detail of the Explanatory Memorandum, but I draw the noble Earl’s attention to page 2, paragraph 7.3, the second line of which says that the Bill of Rights is of 1688. All my schooldays were based on the proposition that it was 1689. Along with the Act of Settlement of 1701, it forms a part, at least, of the constitution of the United Kingdom. It does not really matter whether it was 1688 or 1689—at least it shows that I have read the Explanatory Memorandum.

Although this is a regular event, we should not allow ourselves to ignore its constitutional and political significance. The commander-in-chief of our Armed Forces remains the sovereign by law, but now the Government exercise the royal prerogative. That has assumed a political dimension, because Governments of both parties have accepted the need for parliamentary approval, whereas if the prerogative were simply exercised in purity, as it were, that would not be so. I think of the approval sought by Prime Minister Blair for the military action against Saddam Hussein and that sought by Prime Minister Cameron in relation to Libya. In both instances, the Government were successful, but when it came to the question of Syria in 2013, the Government discovered that there was no majority for the action proposed, which the then Prime Minister accepted almost immediately.

The Bill of Rights of 1689 arose out of the civil war that had so disfigured England. It was a particularly torrid time in the history of England, with Oliver Cromwell and the execution of Charles I. Given that Cromwell went to Edinburgh, where he stabled his horses in the basement of the Court of Session, Scotland was to a certain extent involved as well. There has been no civil war on this island since then, with the possible exception of the last convulsions of Jacobitism in 1715 and 1745.

I want to make three points, if I may, although the noble Earl has anticipated me to an extent. We do not always keep in mind the fact that the service of our Armed Forces takes place around the world in a whole variety of roles. I wonder how many citizens know that members of our Armed Forces are embedded in the Pentagon as part of the defence relationship between the United Kingdom and the United States or understand the extent to which our training commitments in Afghanistan are important. Although these are not the forgotten army of the Second World War, it is important on such an occasion to acknowledge the contribution that they make. One further contribution has some resonance with the events of the last 10 days: what I would call NATO’s forward deployment in the Baltics but what is known by NATO as its enhanced forward presence. That is being done to make it clear to Russia and Mr Putin that NATO accepts and undertakes the obligations under Article 5 in relation to its members Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.

My second point, which has also been foreshadowed, is assistance to the civil power. As the noble Earl pointed out, this takes a variety of roles. In Edinburgh, military transport took medical staff to hospitals to perform necessary and urgent operations. As we have heard most recently, a particular skill set has been brought to the Salisbury investigation. It was reported in some newspapers that there was formerly a battalion with those particular skills but that it had been disbanded. Perhaps the noble Earl could tell us a little about the history of that, because if there was any watering down of that capability, that is obviously a matter of some importance.

--- Later in debate ---

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, not for the first time, we can be grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Campbell of Pittenweem, for drawing our attention to what may seem an anomaly in the date I read out from the Bill of Rights. I hope that I can convince him that I was correct—and that he too was correct. The Bill of Rights, a copy of which I have in my hand, is indeed dated 1688. However, the noble Lord may be interested to know that in the preamble of the Bill, the following words appear:

“Whereas the late King James the Second by the Assistance of diverse evill Councellors Judges and Ministers imployed by him did endeavour to subvert and extirpate the Protestant Religion and the Lawes and Liberties of this Kingdome”,


and so on. It is apparent from the notes attached to the Bill that:

“The Bill of Rights is assigned to the year 1688 on legislation.gov.uk … although the Act received Royal Assent on 16th December 1689. This follows the practice adopted in The Statutes of the Realm, Vol. VI (1819), in the Chronological Table in that volume and all subsequent Chronological Tables of the Statutes, which attach all the Acts in”,


the first year of William and Mary’s reign,

“to the year 1688. The first Parliament of William and Mary (the Convention Parliament) convened on 13th February 1689 (1688 in the old style calendar—until 1st Jan 1752 the calendar year began on March 25th)”.

So I am afraid that we are at the mercy here of a historical quirk which has, quite rightly, prompted the noble Lord, Lord Campbell, to question the accuracy of what I said.

[Lord Campbell of Pittenweem]

I am grateful to the noble Earl for his extensive investigations into these matters. I can say only that I would not have dared to correct the First World War veteran who taught me history to tell him that it was 1688 and not 1689.

[Earl Howe]

I think that in modern parlance we can safely say that it was both, but as a working basis, 1689 will do very well.

The noble and gallant Lord, Lord Craig, returned us to the issue of human rights, as he has done in the past. I understand entirely the concerns that he outlined. Clearly, we need to address what many people see as a flaw in the way that the law has come down upon certain events and situations experienced by the Armed Forces in the course of combat and in conflict zones.

For the future, and I make it clear that we cannot do anything about the past, the Government have already announced that they would consider on a case-by-case basis a derogation from the European Convention on Human Rights, where that is appropriate in the context of a future operation overseas. That could help to ensure that our troops can confidently take difficult decisions on the battlefield, and enable us to focus on the defence budget rather than on lawyers. Some would say that lawyers have had too big a slice of the cake in recent years when it comes to the cross-questioning of our Armed Forces personnel in various contexts. I am the first to agree that it has been very burdensome and difficult for many individuals.

Royal Navy: Warships

Lord Campbell of Pittenweem Excerpts

Thursday 1st February 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Campbell of Pittenweem (LD)]

My Lords, perhaps I might press the Minister on the points raised by the noble Lord, Lord West. If the integrity of the modernisation is to be preserved, no decisions can be taken that will affect capability between now and the conclusions of that review. Should not the principle of “nothing is decided until everything is decided” rule the Government’s position here?

[Earl Howe]

No, my Lords. The Ministry of Defence will continue to take decisions in parallel with the programme that is now in train. Where significant decisions need to be taken, their impact on the modernising defence programme and their relationship with it will of course be considered.

Defence Modernisation Programme

Lord Campbell of Pittenweem Excerpts

Monday 29th January 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for repeating the Statement, and perhaps I may be the first to congratulate him on his birthday. That is the charming bit over.

We welcome the decision to separate out the modernising defence programme from the national security capability review. That, frankly, is not much of a statement because anything has to be better than a Cabinet Office-led NSCR which is financially neutral. But this Statement reads as though one has had access to a whole series of other Statements, so I will confine myself to trying to understand the detail of what it sets out. Early on in the Statement it says:

“Following agreement of the high-level findings of the national security capability review”.


Are the high-level findings of that review already in the public domain? If not, can the noble Earl tell us what the other high-level findings of the review are? Have they been published, and if they have not, will he explain why we have heard about just one finding and not the whole suite?

Later in the Statement we are promised that the national security capability review will be published later in the spring. Seasons of the year can be variable in this place, so can I ask for an assurance from the Minister that we will have a precise definition of “spring”? This morning I took the trouble to google the word and you have two choices: meteorological spring ends on 31 May while astronomical spring ends on 21 June. I will settle for either date provided that we have a commitment that the review is going to be published. The reason I am looking for that assurance is that I think I have been told—I may be misquoting the noble Earl—in one of our many debates on defence that there would be the second annual report on SDR 2015 by the end of 2017. The end of 2017 was last month. Is there to be a second annual report on SDR 2015? If so, when?

Later in the Statement there is slipped in—“slipped in” is unfair, but it is towards the end of a long paragraph—the commitment:

“However, we must do more to ensure that we use our resources effectively and deliver the efficiencies that the department has committed to”.


What are those efficiencies? Are they the ones committed to in SDSR 2015? The noble Earl will know from our debates about defence, of which we have had several in recent months, that virtually nobody believes that such efficiencies are achievable. Indeed, in the areas that one has been able to measure, the reduction in resource has clearly stalled. What does the noble Earl mean by “efficiencies”? Having been in the efficiency business in my professional career, I define “efficiencies” as achieving the same with less resource or achieving more with the same resource. All too often in defence, “efficiencies” has meant cuts. Could we have a categorical assurance that these efficiencies genuinely will be about achieving more with less? If it really is about more with less, why, in the last seven years, have the Government not achieved those efficiencies anyway?

Later in the Statement, we are told that the “programme”—that is, the defence modernisation programme—

“will involve four strands of work”,

but it then goes on to define only one. What are the other three strands? It sounds very precise and as though there is a very clear plan behind the Statement. If there is, could it be revealed to us? The fourth strand is to look at what is required to contribute to the “three national security objectives”. I am sure that in the tons of paper that the MoD produces I could find what the three national security objectives are, but could the Minister enlighten us as to what the three national security objectives are that the fourth strand pursues?

Following the Statement in the other place there was a debate. Somewhere in that debate there was a commitment by the Government to deliver the report on the defence modernisation programme by the Summer Recess. Will the Minister restate that it will be delivered by the Summer Recess? Could he give us some feel as to the certainty of that, particularly given the failure to deliver previous reports by their due date?

I do not think that the Statement says anything about “financially neutral”, but in the debate that followed the Secretary of State for Defence said on at least four occasions that the defence modernisation review would not be financially neutral. I think he said it four times, but perhaps it was more often. Does “not financially neutral” mean that the Government have decided to provide more money for defence? Presumably “not financially neutral” does not mean that there will be even less money. I hope that is what it means, but could we have a straightforward yes or no answer: is more money to be found for defence? Whatever the answer to all these questions is, I have real trouble in my own mind understanding how a fiscally neutral NSCR will work with a not fiscally neutral defence modernisation review.

[Lord Campbell of Pittenweem (LD)]

My Lords, I join in the congratulations to the noble Earl on his birthday and thank him for repeating the Statement. He must feel, to some extent, that today is a rerun of the discussion we had last Monday. On these occasions tribute is often paid to the Armed Forces, but I have a question on that. What evidence is there of any impact on recruitment and retention as a result of the uncertainty that has surrounded these issues? I also remind the noble Earl that, as some of us in the House will remember, a lot of the language in the Statement is very similar to what we saw and heard in Options for Change and Frontline First. We know that the outcome of both exercises was a substantial reduction in defence expenditure and hence in capability as well.

There are only two passing references to NATO. I press the noble Earl on how far, and to what extent, interoperability with NATO and our other allies will lie at the very heart of the exercise it is now proposed to carry out. As has been said on a number of occasions in response to questions in the other place, the Secretary of State asserted that the exercise would not be fiscal-neutral. Last Monday the noble Earl rather adroitly avoided answering my question as to whether he agreed with the Secretary of State, and indeed the head of the Army, that more money needs to be spent on defence. I offer him another opportunity to answer that question and I hope he will forgive me if I ask: yes or no?

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, I thank both noble Lords for their good wishes. I will do my best to answer the questions that have been put to me. The noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, asked about the findings of the NSCR. We are not making an announcement on those findings today. The NSCR is the report referred to that will be published in the spring. It will not be the early spring; I hope the noble Lord will allow me to leave the Government some flexibility on that matter, but our ambition is to publish the findings of the NSCR before what most people would regard as the summer. As for the annual report on the 2015 SDSR, which was indeed due at the end of last year, the noble Lord is right: publication has been slightly delayed. I hope it will be delayed for not too much longer but we remain committed to publishing the second annual report.

The noble Lord asked about efficiencies, as a number of noble and noble and gallant Lords have done in the past. In taking this work forward we will take all existing efficiencies into account and our targets for achieving further efficiencies. We will also look for opportunities to identify new efficiencies by understanding how the MoD can reduce duplication and adopt new approaches to delivering a more modern organisation. I am well aware that there is a great deal of scepticism around efficiencies. I endorse the noble Lord’s interpretation of the word: this is about finding savings that do not adversely affect defence outputs. We are very strict about that and if any noble Lord would like to quiz me further, I will be happy to answer.

He asked about the work strands of the MDP. I hope the timetable and detail of the work will emerge very soon. In essence, we are looking at a work strand that focuses on the MoD operating model and will deliver plans for a stronger and more capable head office.

Secondly, there is the efficiency programme and business modernisation. This consists of obtaining independent assurance over the existing efficiency plan, identifying any new savings deliverable through up-front investment and understanding how the MoD can reduce duplication and adopt new approaches to delivering a more modern organisation.

Thirdly, there is the work relating to our commercial and industrial partners: assessing how the MoD can improve on strategic supplier management, improve its commercial capability, and build on improvements to the performance of Defence Equipment and Support—DE&S. Those three work strands are already under way. There will be a continuation of those work programmes.

The fourth strand is, I am sure, the one that interests noble Lords the most. It is about defence policy, our outputs and our military capability. It is about analysing the global security context and implications for defence policy, understanding the relative priority of defence roles and tasks, and identifying opportunities—and, indeed, imperatives—for modernising capability, the workforce and force generation. I hope that gives a flavour of the four strands of work.

The noble Lord asked me to enlighten the House on the three national security objectives. To refresh the memories of noble Lords, as described in SDSR 2015, the first is,

“to protect our people—at home, in our Overseas Territories and abroad, and to protect our territory, economic security, infrastructure and way of life”.

The second is,

“to project our global influence—reducing the likelihood of threats materialising and affecting the UK, our interests, and those of our allies and partners”,

and the third is,

“to promote our prosperity—seizing opportunities, working innovatively and supporting UK industry”.

What confidence do the Government have that the MDP will be completed by the Summer Recess? We intend the MDP to be substantially complete by the Summer Recess. Our aim is to be in a position to share headline conclusions by that time and we are confident that we can achieve that. That means sharing as much as we possibly can with Parliament and with Heads of State and Ministers at the NATO summit.

I was asked by both noble Lords about the prospect of defence receiving more money. It is only fair that noble Lords do not press me too hard on this at this point but I will say that my right honourable friend the Secretary of State has been speaking regularly to the Chancellor since arriving at the Ministry of Defence. He will continue to do so as the MDP progresses, but let us put this question into its context. Against the backdrop of the increasing threats that the Statement refers to, this work is about ensuring that the Armed Forces have the capabilities they need to keep our nation safe. That is the objective. Given that, it is important that we maintain the dialogue that is already in train with the Chancellor. I will not pre-empt the results of the dialogue by plucking extra funding figures out of the air, but if we conclude that defence needs more money, we will have a very alive conversation with both my right honourable friend the Prime Minister and my right honourable friend the Chancellor.

The noble Lord, Lord Campbell, asked me a number of further questions. The first was about the effect on recruitment and retention. As I have said, any prolonged uncertainty is damaging and we have to acknowledge that. The recruitment and retention climate is difficult. It is difficult, however, to pinpoint a single reason for that. I think there are multiple reasons for it. What we will see over the next few months, however, is a much more inclusive dialogue about the programme as it goes forward. I hope that that effort in the direction of transparency will dispel a lot of the uncertainty that perhaps exists at the moment. My right honourable friend the Secretary of State is very clear about the outcome: he does not wish to do anything that will damage defence. It is important to restate that with regularity.

Interoperability with our NATO allies is certainly an important strand of our work, as it has been since 2015, when we articulated one of our overarching aims, which was to be “international by design”. That means not only working with our allies on training, strategy and doctrine but having equipment that is interoperable.

I hope I have answered noble Lords’ questions but I am happy to answer further questions.

Armed Forces: Investment

Lord Campbell of Pittenweem Excerpts

Monday 22nd January 2018 Lords Chamber

Asked by

[Lord Campbell of Pittenweem]

To ask Her Majesty’s Government what assessment they have made of the levels of investment in the British Armed Forces, in the light of recent reports of potential cuts in defence spending.

[Lord Campbell of Pittenweem (LD)]

My Lords, I beg leave to ask a Question of which I have given private notice.

[The Minister of State, Ministry of Defence (Earl Howe) (Con)]

My Lords, defence spending is rising, not falling. This year the budget is £36 billion, and it will increase by at least 0.5% above inflation every year of this Parliament to almost £40 billion by 2020-21. The UK is proud to be the second-largest defence spender in NATO and the fifth-largest in the world. Recent press speculation about changes to the UK’s force structure, and cuts to the budget, has been misleading and unhelpful.

[Lord Campbell of Pittenweem]

My Lords, is it not unprecedented for the head of one of the armed services to intervene in a debate of this kind? It is made all the more remarkable by the fact that he has been endorsed by the Secretary of State for Defence. Does the Minister agree with the Secretary of State for Defence—whom of course he serves as a Minister of State? If the head of the Army and the Secretary of State have now reached the view that there is insufficient investment in defence, is it not high time that the Government did so as well?

[Earl Howe]

It is difficult for me to comment on a speech that has not yet been given, but I recognise the sentiment that the noble Lord articulated. The National Security Capability Review is about maintaining agility in this country’s security and defence, and staying ahead of the curve in terms of the resources we deploy. We must remain agile in a world that is ever changing, and that is why the Government are conducting this review: it is about ensuring that our defence and security policies and plans are as joined-up, efficient and effective as possible.