Scotland Bill

Lord Cameron of Lochbroom Excerpts

Wednesday 28th March 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Forsyth of Drumlean]

My Lords, we have been singularly unsuccessful in getting my noble and learned friend to accept any amendments so far in the long consideration of the Bill, but here is one that he cannot possibly refuse to accept. He is surely not going to argue on the basis of syntax that he could not accept the noble Lady’s very sensible common-sense amendment, which I have great pleasure in supporting.

[Lord Cameron of Lochbroom]

My Lords, it is not merely a matter of syntax—it is what the Crown Estate Commissioners represent. They represent a single body with jurisdiction over the Crown Estate in each of the four constituents of the United Kingdom. It is clear that the amendment would cure the problem and recognise that responsibility. I therefore have no hesitation in supporting it.

[Lord Browne of Ladyton]

My Lords, noble Lords will remember that in Committee I spoke to an amendment in my name and in the names of my noble and learned friends proposing the amendment of the title in the Bill to the simple title of “Crown Estate Commissioner for Scotland”. That did not find favour with the Government—particularly, as I recollect, with the Advocate-General for Scotland—but in the course of the debate it became clear that the Committee was of one view: the least attractive title for the Crown Estate Commissioner was the one that was in the Bill.

The noble Lady, as she has told the House, spontaneously came up with this proposal in the course of the debate, and it appeared to find favour with the government Benches—at least, they were more inclined to respond positively to it than they were to the proposal that had emanated from the opposition Benches. My own view is that there is a distinction between the proposal that I put forward and the one that the noble Lady put forward, but it is in the category of a distinction with little difference. But I understand why the Government may be more inclined to respond positively to something that comes from the Cross Benches. In those circumstances, as Members of the House will see, my noble and learned friends and I have appended our names to the noble Lady’s amendment. I support it for all the reasons that she articulated then and which have been debated at some length. Therefore, I do not think that we need to go into them again.

I was not convinced by the noble and learned Lord’s defence of the title “Scottish Crown Estate Commissioner” but I was convinced by his defence of the process of selection that I had also sought to amend. I have repeated that amendment by laying Amendment 11, but for the purposes of forward planning I advise that when it comes to the appropriate time I will not be moving it.

Scotland Bill

Lord Cameron of Lochbroom Excerpts

Tuesday 28th February 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sewel]

I do not think the real issue in respect of penalties is about proportionality but to do with the type of case we have heard about from the noble Lord, Lord Steel, and my noble friend Lord Maxton, of the person living one side of the border who finds himself on the other side and commits what is an offence on that side but not on the other side. The imposition of the penalty then affects him where he is resident—he would lose his licence for the whole of the United Kingdom although he has committed no crime in England. That sort of situation will not enjoy public confidence.

[Lord Cameron of Lochbroom]

As the debate continues, it seems we are missing something. If I think back to my days in the law, we had a book called Road Traffic Offences, which dealt with the whole substance of road traffic law, which included regulations in respect of licensing and also of course the issue of penalties. Here, we are, in part, trying to add on to a United Kingdom Act—the Road Traffic Act 1988 in one case, and the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984 in another—little bits that will apply only to Scotland and which devolve power to make certain changes in the whole structure of road traffic law in that way. As an individual who has to obey the law, I would find it very difficult to find where to go to in order to understand what my obligations are in driving. Leaving aside the issue about licensing and the like raised by the noble Lord, Lord Sewel, the United Kingdom licence is a licence to drive anywhere—yet we are asking individuals throughout the United Kingdom to have regard to regulations made by two separate bodies, each with their own responsibilities, which are giving rise to a whole series of different and very difficult questions that have already been brought to mind in this debate. I wonder whether—

[Lord O'Neill of Clackmannan]

Before the noble and learned Lord leaves that point about two different jurisdictions, can he perhaps clear up for me the difference in relation to corroboration between Scotland and England? As I understand it, at the moment, because we have UK traffic legislation, only one policeman is required to provide evidence in an arrest. However, were Scottish legislation to apply and there was a different alcohol or speed limit, would that be subject to a different form of corroboration, since it came from Scots law rather than UK law?

[Lord Cameron of Lochbroom]

The noble Lord raises an interesting point. I would not wish to give any definitive opinion as it is a long time since I have had to deal with these matters. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Boyd, is probably better able to do so, as he has a more modern understanding of road traffic law as a recent Lord Advocate in Scotland. However, these questions arise over a whole series of issues apart from road traffic. We are getting into an area where I wonder whether the kind of devolving of powers that is being sought here is in fact creating more problems that it would do if the whole issue of road traffic legislation—instead of being under the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984 or the Road Traffic Act 1988—were left as a separate Act that applies within the jurisdiction of the Scottish Parliament. That would be much clearer for members of the United Kingdom.

[Lord Boyd of Duncansby]

The noble and learned Lord threw me that one and I will just take it up. It is true that there are a whole range of United Kingdom statutes that nevertheless require different evidential standards on both sides of the border. There is the Misuse of Drugs Act, for example, where corroboration would be required in relation to those offences that were prosecuted in Scotland but not—I think I am right in saying—in England and Wales. The same, of course, is true of the Road Traffic Act. If I may say so, that possibly just reinforces the point that different jurisdictions will have different rules of evidence and in theory, or at least in principle, there is nothing to stop them having different penalties and limits for particular offences.

Scotland Bill

Lord Cameron of Lochbroom Excerpts

Thursday 2nd February 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Boyd of Duncansby]

My Lords, may I ask a question? They are on the Marshalled List in this group; that is the point. We are all here ready to debate these issues. It would be very unfortunate if we now moved on to other business and came back to this issue; these all form part of a group.

[Lord Cameron of Lochbroom]

I am in some difficulty because in listening to what the noble and learned Lord has already said about Clause 17 stand part, he justified his arguments by reference to later amendments in his name—namely, Amendments 71 and 72. It seems to me perfectly plain that these are before the Committee for discussion even though we may for the moment have swept Clause 17 out of the way—firmly batted it out of court. I ask your Lordships to reconsider the matter which has already been introduced because it would cause intense confusion if we passed over what the noble and learned Lord has already said in support of the amendments which will come in place of the displaced section at a later date.

[Baroness Rawlings]

My Lords, we have put the Question on Clause 17 prematurely. I suggest that we continue the debate.

--- Later in debate ---

If one supposes that a certificate is to be mandatory for a right of appeal to the Supreme Court, it raises a difficulty. It seems doubtful that an appeal court which had not determined the compatibility issue would find itself in a good position to decide whether to grant this supposed certificate. It is not impossible that it might do so, but it seems highly improbable, because, as far as it was concerned, there would be no compatibility issue to be addressed—and, of course, the Supreme Court is entirely for compatibility issues. This is perhaps just one for example of what may happen. All I say is that, in viewing this proposal, one should be very wary about approving it.

[Lord Cameron of Lochbroom]

I shall speak briefly because I look at the matter not in particular detail but, like the noble and learned Lord, Lord Boyd, from a philosophical view. Scottish criminal law and procedure has developed in an entirely different way from that in the other jurisdictions in the United Kingdom, but it has now had placed above it a Supreme Court with a particular mandate. It seems to me that that is the court which at the end of the day can determine whether what is being brought before it, whether with leave or without it, is a matter with which it should be concerned, looking to its universal jurisdiction in order to provide consistency in a very special area of law.

That being so, notwithstanding my having no reason to doubt that in general the court below will be capable of determining whether a point of public law importance arises, there are special cases where that might not be perceived by the court below and no harm is done by leaving out the certification procedure which is available in a different form in the way of leave, and by adopting the path in these matters suggested by the noble and learned Lord the Advocate-General.

I do not intend to deal with any of the other matters, because this seems to me the real nub point in the relationship between the High Court of Justiciary and the Supreme Court which arises out of the other amendments which have been proposed.

[Lord McCluskey]

I hope that this will be the last time that I rise to my feet in this part of the debate. I shall endeavour by Report to formulate one amendment on matters relating to certification so that we can address this topic more fully than we have been able to do today.

Perhaps I may turn in the mean time to Amendment 72C and, linked with it, Amendment 72H. After “only”, Amendment 72C would insert,

“after the final determination of the proceedings, except with the permission of the High Court under subsection (5C)”.

That subsection relates to proposed new Section 288AB and references before the finality of the proceedings. In the normal case, the judgment that is required to be made under Article 6, which is the most important article bearing upon these issues, is whether the appellant— the accused or convicted person—has been deprived of a fair trial. The courts in Strasbourg, England and Edinburgh have repeatedly said that you judge the question of the fairness of the trial in the light of the whole circumstances. That is why I suggest that normally the appeal should take place at the end of the proceedings in the High Court and not before. That has the advantage that it avoids delay in the middle of proceedings of an unnecessary kind.

There have to be exceptions. The most obvious example is an issue such as the temporary sheriffs case, where it is independent of the facts of the case. It is an issue as to whether or not the court is an independent tribunal. There have been other cases of that general character. The court could make an exception there and we can surely trust it to do so. But the idea is that no appeal goes before the proceedings have been finalised in the High Court.

Amendment 72H deals with an issue related to that but also related more to the fact that the court can send it away ex proprio motu if it decides that that would further the interests of justice. The amendment relates to the fact that the Lord Advocate or Advocate-General may require the High Court to refer a compatibility issue to the Supreme Court for determination. That appears to be again on a par with the court deciding that the interests of justice require this issue to be decided if it can be decided without reference to the facts of the case. The Lord Advocate in particular—I am sure that others in the Committee could confirm this—may well have knowledge of the consequences of a particular decision going a particular way. He may be anxious to get these consequences ventilated and the decision made because there may be hundreds or even thousands of cases pending the decision. I very much want to see that the Lord Advocate has this power.

I am sure that it would be exercised responsibly. There is no reason to suppose that the Lord Advocate would exercise it irresponsibly and I am sure that it will be confined to those cases where it is clear that the matter is independent of the fairness of the trial on the facts or the conduct of the trial itself. Rather, it is dependent on an issue that lies outside the trial.

Amendments 72F and 72G relate to the possible extension of the 28-day period. In my submission, once a case has been through the High Court before a judge and jury or before the Sheriff Court and then it goes to the High Court of Justiciary sitting as an Appeal Court, one would have thought that by that stage all the issues had been properly identified. Therefore, 28 days is long enough to allow an appellant to formulate his grounds of appeal. That is why I do not see the need for a longer period for the High Court, having regard to all the circumstances. That is contained in the amendment of the Advocate-General. I wanted to delete that proposed new subsection and also the one relating to a similar power in the Supreme Court.

It is important to bear in mind that under the European Convention on Human Rights and the Human Rights Act the victim is usually the accused person, whereas the injured person or the relatives of the deceased person are not victims at all. But in truth and public understanding, the real victims of crime are those who have suffered from the crime. They want to see cases finished as quickly as possible. Therefore the possibility that the Supreme Court or the High Court may take weeks or months to decide a matter and then allow an appeal is abhorrent to the general public. I submit that the Government should consider very carefully accepting my amendments to the new clause proposed in Amendment 72 and restrict the period to 28 days.