Lord Sewel
Main Page: Lord Sewel (Non-affiliated - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Sewel's debates with the Wales Office
(12 years, 6 months ago)
Lords ChamberBecause I have been asked to answer to your Lordships' House on matters relating to the Wales Office, as indeed I am asked to answer on matters relating to the Scotland Office, although I am not a Scotland Office Minister, and on matters relating to the Attorney-General’s Office as well. It would be unfortunate if it were suggested that the Crown Estate commissioner for Scotland was only for Scotland and did not have responsibilities. To answer the noble Lord’s point, I do not exercise any functions as Advocate-General for England because it does not have an Advocate-General.
Would a way out be to change it to the “Crown Estate Commissioner from Scotland”?
For the reasons given by my noble friend Lord Maclennan of Rogart, the Duke of Atholl may not actually have come from Scotland but may have had a lot to contribute. If someone has a bright idea that squares all these circles, I would be interested to hear from them.
The noble and learned Lord is making one point. We have heard a great deal about the limits and the penalties. My noble friend Lord Caithness was driving in Europe and went through three countries. In many countries across the Channel, the limit may be 50 milligrams or thereabouts, but often the penalty is either what I would call a light rap over the knuckles or three months. But if the level is 80 or 100 milligrams, which is what we have, quite often it will be one year or even more. Ever since, I think, 1967, the level has been 80 milligrams and 12 months. If we are going to have lower limits as there are in some Scandinavian countries—in Finland, but not Sweden or Norway so far as I am aware, it is zero; I do not know what the penalties are, whether they fluctuate or vary—would my noble and learned friend the Minister put that into the frame when he comes to respond to this?
I do not think the real issue in respect of penalties is about proportionality but to do with the type of case we have heard about from the noble Lord, Lord Steel, and my noble friend Lord Maxton, of the person living one side of the border who finds himself on the other side and commits what is an offence on that side but not on the other side. The imposition of the penalty then affects him where he is resident—he would lose his licence for the whole of the United Kingdom although he has committed no crime in England. That sort of situation will not enjoy public confidence.
As the debate continues, it seems we are missing something. If I think back to my days in the law, we had a book called Road Traffic Offences, which dealt with the whole substance of road traffic law, which included regulations in respect of licensing and also of course the issue of penalties. Here, we are, in part, trying to add on to a United Kingdom Act—the Road Traffic Act 1988 in one case, and the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984 in another—little bits that will apply only to Scotland and which devolve power to make certain changes in the whole structure of road traffic law in that way. As an individual who has to obey the law, I would find it very difficult to find where to go to in order to understand what my obligations are in driving. Leaving aside the issue about licensing and the like raised by the noble Lord, Lord Sewel, the United Kingdom licence is a licence to drive anywhere—yet we are asking individuals throughout the United Kingdom to have regard to regulations made by two separate bodies, each with their own responsibilities, which are giving rise to a whole series of different and very difficult questions that have already been brought to mind in this debate. I wonder whether—
My Lords, my noble friend is building a mountain out of a molehill. These matters are not exactly going to be slipped under the carpet. As I have indicated, Scottish Ministers were fully consulted in the most recent consultation on the revision of the Highway Code, and there is no reason to suggest that that would not happen again. Indeed, there might be even better reasons why that should happen if these powers are devolved. In the course of these debates my noble friend has put his finger on a number of important points, but I sometimes think that he is trying to make difficulties where in practice none would exist. A young person, or indeed an older person, who has not passed their driving test has to learn the Highway Code to take the theory test, and there are a whole host of questions to learn. Reserved matters change, and that is reflected subsequently in the Highway Code, but people are expected to be prepared for the test that they are about to sit.
I pick up my noble friend Lord Steel’s point on people crossing borders. My noble friend Lord Caithness said that he had driven through three countries in Europe where the speed limits changed. I recall driving through different states in the United States where speed limits changed. It was picked up that we are talking not about main roads—the M6 or the M74—but about country roads that could cross borders. I suspect that the same applies to boundaries in some other countries as well. There is certainly a boundary between the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland, and matters are resolved there, just as when you have local speed limits.
I can think of one particular local speed limit on the west side of Shetland. I never understood why there was a 40 mile an hour limit there, in the middle of what was otherwise a 60 mile an hour limit, but you observed it, or tried to, and then when you passed the de-restriction sign you went back up to 60. It did not actually cause any practical difficulties. You can have such a variety of speed limits in local areas and around schools in built-up areas. The limit could be 20 miles an hour, and it does not seem to cause any difficulties. People see what the speed limit is—there have to be signs—and they obey it.
There is a fundamental difference between comparing the Scotland/England situation with that of Northern Ireland and the Republic. They are different states; that is the important issue. I am still concerned about someone crossing the border committing an offence on one side that is not an offence on the other side but losing their licence on a UK basis.
My Lords, I give the example of the United States, which is one country where there are different speed limits in different states as you cross them. The noble Lord also mentioned licences. However, the point is that certain things are crimes in Scotland but not necessarily crimes in England. Just because you commit and are found guilty of a crime in Scotland, it is not a defence to say, “Ah, but in England I wouldn’t have committed a crime and, therefore, wouldn’t have been fined or gone to prison”. You must accept the law in the place where you are. If you go out to drink and drive, you should have regard to what the limits are. For the sake of argument, if the limit in Scotland was lower and you knew that you would be driving in Scotland, you should have proper regard to what the law is there.
As someone who was brought up some eight miles from the English border, when I was 18 we certainly knew the difference between the licensing hours in Gretna on the Scottish side and Longtown on the English side. In fact, there was a pub much closer, just across the border on the other side of the A74 from Gretna Green. Local people know what the different laws are on both sides of the border. As I say, if you are drinking and driving you should have proper regard to what the law is in the country in which you are driving.
Is the Minister’s position that if, as in the case that I cited, a person drives across the border and commits a crime in Scotland that is not a crime in England, it is perfectly understandable that, if the situation allowed, he should lose his licence in Scotland but not in England, where he has done nothing wrong?
My Lords, at the moment you could be in a position in which you gain penalty points, which could cumulatively lead to you losing your licence, because you have breached a 20 miles per hour speed limit set by a local authority. Just because a local authority in Hampshire would not necessarily have designated a 20 miles per hour limit for a similar area, that in no way means that the penalty points that you have accumulated for speeding—perhaps outside a school in Lanarkshire—should somehow be discounted. The point is that if the decision made by the Scottish Parliament was that the law should reflect the problem of alcohol abuse in Scotland, it follows that people are aware of the penalties.
I draw a distinction between the situation with a degree of devolved authority—maybe a little more if this Scotland Bill becomes law—and the position of an independent Scotland. That is a totally different question. I would think it extremely unlikely that a delegation consisting of representatives of the London Government and the Edinburgh Government negotiating in Brussels in a situation of devolution but not independence for Scotland could not work out in advance and in private what was the best line and who would make which point. I do not think it very likely that the representatives from Edinburgh would see it as their task to undercut the United Kingdom interest because that would—while devolution persists—also undercut the Scottish interest.
One of the difficulties in relation to Europe and getting a common view—almost parity between UK Ministers and Scottish Ministers—would be around fisheries policy. The position of the SNP Administration in Scotland is that—and God knows how it can be done; I do not think it can—Scotland would leave the common fisheries policy. That creates a totally different negotiating framework in that policy area from a Government who say, “We are staying in but we have to reform and modify the common fisheries policy”.
My Lords, as I attended 108 meetings of the Agriculture and Fisheries Council I must just very briefly intervene. Of course, it was very common in the council that a Minister from the Scottish Office—a Scottish member of the UK Government—led for the United Kingdom. This was quite right, because of the huge fishing interest of Scotland. That was perfectly reasonable. I do not remember any case where there was anything complicated about that.
I should add that some other member states did something quite different. For example, a representative of the regional government in Belgium spoke for Belgium on a number of occasions, and I think on one or two occasions a representative from a German Länd spoke for the German delegation in the council. That was not the British position but the position of two other member states.
I advise the Committee that if Amendment 51A in this group is agreed to, I cannot call Amendment 51B due to pre-emption
My Lords, I rise to speak to Amendment 51A, which is in my name. The noble Lord, Lord Forsyth of Drumlean, is absolutely right when he draws our attention to the central constitutional importance of the clause. We are dealing with a fundamental constitutional issue—the power to create taxes, which is a defining characteristic of a sovereign parliament. At the moment, the new Section 80B proposed for the 1998 Act reads:
“Her Majesty may by Order in Council amend this Part so as to … specify, as an additional devolved tax, a tax of any description”.
Through this amendment, I want to ensure that any change in the tax powers of the Scottish Parliament will be subject to the scrutiny that you have with the primary legislative process rather than that which applies to secondary legislation. The Order in Council route is totally inadequate to secure the degree of political scrutiny that is appropriate and necessary. The granting of a power to enhance the taxing powers of a devolved parliament is not something that should be done lightly, casually or trivially. It should be done only through the process of primary legislation to ensure the absolute, measured, considered and examined scrutiny of any proposal. The order route is inadequate because we do not amend Orders in Council—this House is, rightly, reluctant to vote down orders and they see a very abbreviated form of parliamentary scrutiny.
Is it not an oddity that this House is not meant to consider taxation at all and yet the Bill provides for this House to approve the order?
Yes, and also, if we look at the way in which this has developed, I do not know how we come to this order solution. If you go back to 1997, the tax-varying powers then were subject to a separate question in a referendum and were incorporated in the Scotland Act as primary legislation. The Government today are bringing forward a whole series of tax-raising powers to be given to the Scottish Parliament in primary legislation. Why is it suddenly decided that any new taxes that are not specified in the Bill are going not to be subject to primary legislation but only to what I consider to be the absolutely unacceptable method of secondary legislation and Orders in Council?
I mentioned the 1997 referendum, and we know there are amendments standing in the name of some colleagues dealing with the referendum on taxing powers. I am not in favour of a referendum on taxing powers—although I took a referendum Bill through this House, I am not awfully in favour of referendums. My concern is that taxation and the power to create new taxes are of such fundamental constitutional importance that we run a very grave danger if we devalue the standing of that power and use a way of obtaining them that may be convenient for the Government but is wrong. It must be the job of the United Kingdom Parliament to be able to scrutinise any proposals for new or additional taxes in any part of the United Kingdom, through the proper parliamentary process.
I have a great deal of sympathy with the argument that the noble Lord, Lord Steel, has just expressed. I cannot see the fundamental point of principle that the noble Lord, Lord Sewel, can see. He spoke of this procedure proposed in the Bill as not providing the necessary and appropriate degree of scrutiny. The people who would be taxed are the people of Scotland who elect the Scottish Government. I cannot see any particular point of principle in saying that they may not determine the form of their taxation. States in the United States of America have a considerable degree of freedom. Local taxes are different all over the United States. In many cases, they have a balanced budget requirement. The people of Scotland, speaking through their representatives in Scotland, cannot determine the level of the Scottish deficit.
The argument that the Scottish Executive should have control over the level of taxation is one thing, but the creation of new taxes is a totally different thing.
I cannot really see that distinction. I would be more worried about the level if the level affected the balance of the deficit of the United Kingdom. The levels would have to be adjusted so that the tax take in Scotland remained the same proportionate to expenditure in Scotland. But as for the creation of a new tax, going by a different form, if the Scots chose to lower taxes in form A and raise them in form Y, provided that they came to the same amount and had the same effect on the United Kingdom Exchequer, that seems to me entirely up to them. I cannot see a point of principle there.
The problem of the deficit is really a red herring, because the deficit would be controlled by borrowing powers.
If the deficit is not important to the argument made by the noble Lord, Lord Sewel, what is the answer to mine? It is perfectly possible for the Scots, and reasonable, to decide the form in which they should be taxed.
I agree that the Bill proposes a very eccentric procedure. I was going to go on to say that, first, on practical grounds, I would hope that no one would set up differential tax systems inside the United Kingdom. Secondly, I would not disagree with the argument of the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth, against the particular procedure for vestigial approval which is laid down here. My argument is on the point of principle of the noble Lord, Lord Sewel. Those who should be in the lead on the forms of taxation in Scotland should be the Scots; that seems to me to be clear.
I am disappointed with this bit of the Bill—
The noble Lord has challenged me on a point of principle. The argument surely must be that macroeconomic policy under the devolution settlement is reserved and, within that, it is absolutely right and proper that the United Kingdom Parliament examines any proposals for new taxation on the basis of how it impinges upon macroeconomic policy, and whether it is fair and would inflict great harm on any part of the economy of the whole United Kingdom.
Yes, that is reasonable. We certainly agree on the macro point. We disagree on whether there is a point of principle about forms of taxation. I would like to pick up on the other point made by the noble Lord, Lord Steel, about the Prime Minister's speech in Edinburgh. Here, I disagree with the noble Lord, who says that we should proceed to have the referendum as soon as possible, which would give us a couple of years to work out what devo-max means. I do not know why we do not put into this Bill what we think devo-max means, with a sunset clause. I follow the argument that the referendum should have only one question but there is a genuine problem in that the Sir Alec point made by the noble Lord, Lord Steel, certainly applies in Scotland. People up there do not really believe that the London Government intend, once one has had the referendum and if its answer is no to independence, to confer a further substantial degree of devolution.
When we get to the Minister’s reply, I think we will find that it is not already in the Bill in the form that I would like. We need to work out exactly how much is needed to fund the planned expenditure of the Scottish Parliament and to look at ways in which that can be funded through taxes raised by the Scottish Parliament. Some people in Scotland, MSPs and others, including Peter Duncan of the Conservative Party, have come out with a scheme that they call devo-plus. I do not agree with it fully but it deserves looking at. It is one of a number of options that should be looked at for funding Scottish expenditure with income from within Scotland.
Way back in the mists of time, I used to construct a series of social surveys. One of them was a series of questions on the powers of local government. We asked people two sets of questions: the first on which powers were at which tier of local government; and the second on whether local government should have more powers. The initial answer to the latter question was always yes. Then we asked what powers they wanted to see local government have, and about 90 per cent of them were powers that local government already had. That is the problem with the “more powers” argument: it assumes that people are fully aware of the powers that the Parliament already has. I simply do not think that that is the case.
I wish I had not given way; that intervention was not all that helpful to my argument. If the noble Lord, Lord Steel, David Cameron and I can agree on a way forward, there must be some hope that this rainbow coalition will find out what is best for Scotland and for Britain, and will avoid the dangers of separation and of breaking up the United Kingdom. That is the way forward. I have spoken for quite long enough now.
Someone had to create the sales tax in the first place. I might be wrong but I do not think that in the United States the creation of a sales tax is a federal function that is then devolved to the states.
May I just answer this point first, if noble Lords will allow me? I am perfectly willing to try to dredge up examples as I stand here, but it would be pointless. I fundamentally disagree, as does the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, that the difference between creating new taxes and raising taxes is as fundamental as the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth, says it is. There is very little meeting of minds between us in this, but there is no meeting of minds even in relation to that.
I am grateful to my noble friend for giving way. The comparison to the United States is very ill judged. The United States is a federal system. The United Kingdom is a unitary state with devolved Administrations, which is fundamentally different when you talk about sovereignty.
We have already had the benefit of a very interesting contribution from my noble friend Lord Morgan, which I will read with care, about the Protean nature of sovereignty. I merely responded to the point that I understood my noble friend Lord Sewel to make—that the defining characteristic of sovereignty relates to taxation. He seems to be conceding the point that it does not. I am sure that if we all read what the noble Lord, Lord Morgan, said this afternoon and perhaps read more extensively what he has probably written on the subject, we will conclude that it does not. I make the point in passing that I do not think taxation is the defining issue of sovereignty.
On the genesis of the power, the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth, asked whether it was recommended by Calman. The true answer to that is that it was not, but the power has its roots in the recommendation of the Calman commission, which concluded:
“The Scottish Parliament should be given a power to legislate with the agreement of the UK Parliament to introduce specified new taxes that apply across Scotland”.
I am not entirely sure whether that statement has a sufficient shock effect for the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth, as I think he indicated that he would be surprised if Calman recommended that. However, there can be no doubt that the Bill goes further than this. As I said, the power was not recommended by Calman but it has its roots in the recommendation of the Calman commission.
The Bill goes further than the recommendation, not only prescribing a much wider power for the creation of new Scottish taxes, which is the concern of the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth, but allowing for the future devolution of existing UK taxes, as Scottish Financial Enterprise and the Scottish Affairs Select Committee, to which I have previously referred, have pointed out. However, there is also no doubt that the breadth of this provision answers a specific call for the further flexible development of the devolution settlement. That is why it is so important to the Bill and of such great significance and cannot be dismissed as a small step. I say that with all due respect to the noble Lord, Lord Steel. It is a very significant step in the devolution settlement. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth, that it is a pity that this measure has not been accorded due significance in public debates by those who should have known about it.
The significance of the Calman commission’s recommendations as a whole lies in providing a framework for the continued development of devolution in a legitimate and managed way. I support that. However, I argue that if we agree with the principle of greater financial accountability for the Scottish Government—we on these Benches broadly agree with that; I do not think there is much discontent about that on our Benches—the decision over whether additional taxes should be devolved in the future comes down to a decision about the practical impact of such a devolution for Scotland and for the United Kingdom as a whole. To that extent I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Kerr.
Thus, this is not in my view an issue of constitutional principle. The issue of constitutional principle is whether we agree to the devolution of taxes, which is what the Bill is specifically about. Thereafter, it is a matter of the practical requirements of such a power. I hope that noble Lords who think they disagree with me will bear with me as I think that I will answer the point that is milling round in their heads about why this argument is deficient. It is for this reason that we have tabled Amendment 51B, which would place a duty on the Secretary of State to seek parliamentary approval for draft regulations on the conditions that must be met by any proposed tax for it to be devolved and the specific consultative procedure that must be followed by the Scottish and UK Governments. It has become a habit in this Committee for noble Lords to say that the drafting of measures may be deficient. The drafting of the relevant amendment may indeed be deficient, but this is the best that I could do. If the Committee and the Government are inclined to support it, we can make it much better between now and Report.
I believe that much of the concern expressed by my noble friend Lord Sewel and others about the wide-ranging nature of the power in new Section 80A could be allayed if the Government set out in more specific detail the criteria that will be expected of any new candidate for devolution and a clear process by which those criteria will be applied. I regret that we have got this far without that becoming apparent for the reasons that I am about to go into. The big problem is that Parliament is being asked to approve the allocation of a significant and wide-ranging power to the Executive with practically no information about how this will be used in practice and the safeguards that will exist to constrain it.
Indeed, the Select Committee, to which I have already referred, understood this well. It concluded in its report that it was,
“disappointed that, when pressed, the Secretary of State could not give us examples of the type of tax which could potentially be acceptable … We are also concerned by the absence of any clear process or mechanism by which the criteria will be applied”.
In his evidence, the Secretary of State for Scotland, Michael Moore, set out extensive and broad criteria that he said would need to be applied to any tax for it to overcome the hurdles necessary for devolution.
The Select Committee went on to ask the Government,
“to provide a more thorough and detailed explanation of how this process would work, during the passage of the Bill through this House”.
We should bear in mind that the committee is talking about the other place. I commend the report of the Scottish Affairs Select Committee more generally to noble Lords. I do not know how many of them have had the opportunity to read it, but I commend it. I particularly commend paragraphs 92 to 96, although I do not intend to read them out at this time of night, and the evidence of the Secretary of State, Michael Moore, because it reveals significantly the basis of a mechanism for dealing with this issue.
Noble Lords should not underestimate the importance of the power provided by Clause 28, and I do not think that they will do so after this debate. It provides a real and tangible mechanism for the continued strengthening of the devolution settlement and the devolution of further powers. In many ways it is the antithesis of the further undefined devolution that has been alluded to by the Prime Minister of late and, indeed, by the First Minister in his flirtation with the concept of devo-max, whatever that might be.
My Lords, again, I will get there in the logical flow of the argument, if my noble friend will permit me. He does not make new points; I have them on board; I will try to address them, but I think we should go through the logical steps of exactly what the construct will be, because this is a critical question. I do not dismiss it.
Why is it so important? The power will enable the whole of an existing tax to be devolved and allows for the creation of a completely new devolved tax. That is clear. It is a power recommended by Calman but which the Government are not in a position to devolve at this time so, to that extent, it is necessary to implement Calman.
Does the noble Lord accept that there are fundamental differences between using orders and using primary legislation? One of those fundamental differences is that an order cannot be amended. I should have thought that, on the creation of new taxes, it is likely that Parliament might wish to amend such an order when it comes before it.
Again, perhaps I may be permitted to go through the complete steps needed to introduce any new tax.
The Government believe that we have a proportionate and appropriate package. We need to take all the measures in the round. In this case, to address the specific question of the role of your Lordships' House—I will not be drawn into taking all the points out of order, but the question of the role of the House of Lords is important—it is because the power addresses the constitutional question of who should be able to set a tax, not the rate of the tax nor the structure. The question of the introduction of the new tax is indeed one in which this House should have a role, which is included in the Bill and the clause.
If the Scottish Government came forward with new tax proposals, they would have to meet the criteria that I laid out, which would include provisions on the macroeconomic effect. Clear criteria are set out and it would not be sensible for the Scottish Government to come forward with tax proposals that did not meet the criteria. The noble Lord, Lord Browne, asked whether the criteria should be enshrined in some way. It strikes an appropriate balance to have them clearly set out in the Command Paper.
I will give way in a moment. Perhaps I may try to answer some other questions first. The criteria are clearly set out and it is appropriate—
On this point, the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth, mentioned on a number of occasions the real politics of the Bill. Following my noble friend Lord McFall, perhaps I may ask the Minister whether he is aware of the phrase, “It’s Scotland’s oil”, and of how potent that would be in any debate if the Scottish Government brought forward an oil tax.
My Lords, I am not sure that it is profitable to speculate about what, at some time in the future, a Scottish Government might come forward with. I have set out that there are clear criteria that the UK Government will use to screen proposals. It is very important that the criteria are clear to the Scottish Government—and they are. Secondly—I will give way in a moment to the noble Lord, Lord McFall—it is also appropriate that they are set out, as they are, in a Command Paper, which will give flexibility as circumstances change. The criteria are fundamental and clear.
My Lords, while I am not steeped in as many years of Scottish politics, maybe the benefit of being a bit of an outsider and coming at this with fresh eyes means that I am able to observe a little of the history of this. Notwithstanding the attempt to say that tax proposals have not been brought forward in any way that has had discussion and consensus to date, including the ones that are the subject of this Bill, the history gives me confidence that this is a construct that will work. This is based on what we have seen in the devolution of powers to Scotland to date, and in the process that has led up to where we are with this Bill—which is not perfect and so other critical steps must be gone through. I do not see this obstacle that my noble friend is putting up. However, we will have to agree to differ on that.
I am grateful to the Minister. In citing the creation of the Scottish variable rate for income tax in the Scotland Act 1998, is not the Minister actually supporting my argument that the creation of new taxes and new powers ought to be through primary legislation?
No; the point I made was that it went through this House, as would an order as envisaged here. Any number of points can be made. The principal point I addressed was the question of whether this House would be circumvented in some way by the introduction of a proposal for new taxes for Scotland. The answer is: unequivocally not, whether by an order or by primary legislation.
I would like to move on, because I have now laid out the full process here. It is important to register again the question of accountability, and the importance of the new accountability for the Scottish Government that is given here in the proposal that, for the first time, the Scottish Parliament will have the facility—with the approval of this Parliament—to set new taxes. It means that the Scottish Government will be able to find ways to deliver their desired policy outcomes and potentially raise additional revenue. As well as assisting policy-making in Scotland, the ability to propose tax solutions will itself increase the accountability of the Scottish Government and the Scottish Parliament, which is of course the main purpose of the Bill.
The measures in Clause 28 will correct an anomalous situation whereby the Scottish Parliament can implement tax policy changes through only what Calman described as the backdoor of local authority taxation. At the moment, only local taxation is devolved to Scotland. Calman noted that the current situation incentivises the Scottish Parliament to achieve its policy aims through local taxes even though they might be more effectively achieved through devolving taxes which are reserved. Again, it is important that we reflect on that point.
Not only that, but introducing makeshift local taxes in lieu of the power to raise them nationally would mean that the UK Government and this Parliament would have no power to intervene even if there were implications for the wider UK tax system. The powers granted here would at least allow for a discussion of new taxes between Holyrood and Westminster that in many cases could result in better outcomes for both Scotland and the wider United Kingdom.
Although I suspect that we may come back to this matter in more detail in later clauses, I want to address in headline terms the question of my noble friend Lord Lang of Monkton on whether Scotland will be better off or not. I know that there are questions about what the evidence from the past shows and how much credence should be given to that past analysis. But in simple terms, Scotland will be better off under the proposed arrangement if tax receipts grow faster than public spending than they would under the current block grant system and vice versa. It is not possible to say exactly what the impact will be but the key point is that this Bill delivers accountability to the Scottish Parliament and not a guaranteed financial settlement.