(1 year, 4 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I committed to tabling an amendment at Third Reading in response to widespread concerns raised by the House over the 2020 Supreme Court ruling concerning the validity of interim custody orders made under Troubles-era internment legislation. We debated these issues at length during the amending stages, and I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, and my noble friend Lord Godson for raising these matters and for the constructive manner in which they engaged on the amendments that I tabled late last week.
To be clear, it has always been the Government’s understanding that interim custody orders, made by Ministers of the Crown under powers conferred on the Secretary of State, were perfectly valid. To restore clarity around the legal position and ensure that no one is inappropriately advantaged by a different interpretation of the law on a technicality, I have tabled amendments that retrospectively validate all interim custody orders made under Article 4 of the Detention of Terrorists (Northern Ireland) Order 1972, as well as paragraph 11 of Schedule 1 to the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1973. This has the effect of confirming that a person’s detention under an interim custody order was not unlawful simply because it had been made by a junior Minister rather than by the Secretary of State personally, as was always the understanding of successive Governments.
The amendments would also prohibit certain types of legal proceedings, including civil cases, applications for compensation as a result of miscarriages of justice, and appeals against conviction which rely on the 2020 ruling from being brought or continued. To align with other prohibitions in the Bill, the continuation of pending claims and appeals in scope would be prohibited immediately from commencement.
There is a specific exemption in the Bill for certain types of ongoing criminal appeals, where leave to appeal has already been granted or where there has been a referral by the Criminal Cases Review Commission by the time of the Bill’s commencement. Importantly, this exception would not allow for the payment of compensation flowing from the reversal of such convictions. I make it clear that this amendment would not lead to convictions already reversed being reinstated. I hope the House will join me in welcoming the legal clarity that these amendments bring. I beg to move.
My Lords, I thank the Minister for tabling these amendments in response to amendments tabled by me and the noble Lord, Lord Godson, which were supported by the noble Baroness, Lady Hoey. I thank the Minister and his officials very much for the constructive way in which they engaged with us to produce this complex amendment in response to our simpler but plainly inadequate amendment. I also thank the noble Lord, Lord Butler, who is not in his place. He supported the amendment on the basis of the well-understood Carltona doctrine.
I have also been asked to mention the noble Lord, Lord Howell, who is in the interesting position of being the only living Minister who was in Northern Ireland at the time and directly involved with this and a number of other ICOs. I thank him and many other noble Lords for their help with these amendments. They will do a great deal to restore the Carltona principle to its proper place and it will put right a decision of the Supreme Court which was no doubt reached in good faith but which was, in retrospect, wrongly decided.
I have a couple of questions for the Minister, of which I have given him notice. The first is in relation to the commencement date for the two new clauses. They are described as coming into force two months after Royal Assent. I understand what he says about those extant criminal appeals. It seems that delaying this for two months risks there being some further appeals which will go forward on the rather unfortunate premise that the relevant ICOs were unlawfully entered into. Can he clarify that?
Secondly, the second proposed new clause contains an order-making power, for regulations under Section 55(2), which is consequential on the section and allows a Minister to amend this Act. They are subject to the affirmative procedure, but I am concerned, as the House always is, by powers of this scale. I seek an assurance from the Minister: although I know that the current Secretary of State will not be amending the Act to, in any way, take away with the left hand what it has given with the right, it would be useful to have on record the assurance that the Bill does not intend to amend its provisions in any substantial way, particularly those that are the subject of these amendments.
I welcome these amendments and thank the Government very much for their co-operation.
(1 year, 5 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I am very grateful, as always, to noble Lords who have spoken in this short but very important debate led by the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, to whom I am very grateful for the constructive engagement and discussions we have had over the past few days. This has been an excellent debate. I join in the tributes to Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, whose contribution to this House over many years has been immense.
The Government are extremely sympathetic to the aims of this amendment. It aligns with our desired policy aim to reduce pressure on the civil courts in Northern Ireland, which currently have a considerable case load. In our view, it would not be appropriate for the Government to give an opinion on the judgment of the Supreme Court in R v Adams, but we are of the view that this judgment, which was unexpected, has led to a degree of confusion in our law that merits clarification in some way. If I may go slightly further than my brief, when the judgment appeared some of us were—to put it mildly—somewhat baffled by its content.
On the numbers of cases in scope, we are aware of around 300 to 400 civil claims being brought on a similar basis to the Adams case, including those at pre-action stage, with 40 writs filed before First Reading of this Bill. It is therefore likely that a number of Adams-type cases will be allowed to continue in spite of the prohibition on civil claims in Clause 39 of the Bill. We are aware that this amendment has a wider application than just civil damages claims, which are otherwise within the scope of Clause 39, but the numbers of other types of cases in scope are limited.
The Government also understand that the amendment covers applications for compensation for miscarriages of justice under the statutory scheme established by Section 133 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988, following the reversal, as a result of the Adams judgment, of convictions for escaping or attempting to escape from internment facilities. The Government anticipate that it is unlikely that many more cases could in theory be brought along these lines; based on the numbers of escapees, this is unlikely to be more than around 30 and could be substantially less.
Claims brought as a result of the Supreme Court judgment in Adams are claims for compensation that are not based on any allegation against the state of mistreatment or misfeasance in public office, as other claims in this area are, but on a technical point regarding the signing of interim custody orders, as the noble Lord, Lord Butler of Brockwell, made absolutely clear. At the time of their detention and conviction for escape-related offences, and for decades afterwards, these individuals could not have expected the Supreme Court to find as it did.
The Government have always acted on the understanding that those interim custody orders made by Ministers of the Crown, under powers conferred on the Secretary of State, were perfectly valid on the basis of the well-established and understood Carltona principle. This is a clarification that needs to be made, in our view, to restore legal certainty around this crucially important element of the way in which government works in this country.
I listened with great interest to my noble friend Lord Howell of Guildford, who is the surviving member of the Northern Ireland Office from 1972 as Minister of State. He gave a very vivid and accurate description of just how difficult life was at the time, and how dangerous and fast-moving the situation was.
I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Murphy of Torfaen, in his description of how the warrant system works in Northern Ireland. As many Members know, I have worked for a number of Secretaries of State, and the signing of warrants is something all of them have taken a huge amount of care over to ensure that they are done properly and within the law.
In response to the noble Baroness, we are not far away from Third Reading, as she will be aware, but I will endeavour to consult with interested parties between now and then.
On this basis, as the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, indicated, I will commit to bringing forward an amendment at Third Reading next week, following consideration by officials and lawyers, that addresses these matters. In return, I ask that the noble Lord and my noble friend Lord Godson withdraw their amendment, subject to the caveat that the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, made in his remarks.
My Lords, I am very grateful to all those who have taken part in this debate, and I am grateful to the Minister for his remarks. I am sure the House is grateful for all those who associated themselves with the comments I made about the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood.
The Minister said with his usual understatement that many were somewhat baffled by the decision of the Supreme Court. The bafflement was widespread, I can assure the House, and the notion that we should wait until another case comes along was never a convincing argument in favour of Parliament not acting to put right this injustice. As the Minister rightly said, Clause 39 of the Bill will not deal with this essential unsatisfactory aspect of the judgment, and there could be many cases arising out of the error made by the Supreme Court.
Of course courts make mistakes from time to time; the whole basis of an appeal from one judgment to another is predicated on the fact that they do. The Supreme Court rarely makes mistakes, but Parliament puts them right when it does. Parliament also makes mistakes, and would then reverse those mistakes. There is nothing in this amendment which shows a lack of respect for the Supreme Court or its decisions in any way.
I look forward very much to meeting the Minister and his officials, to help, I hope, provide an amendment which reflects what is in our amendment—government amendments are always better than amendments put forward by Back-Benchers. Provided it does what this amendment was intended to do, that would be satisfactory.
I need not weary the House any longer at this stage. I have repeated that we will bring back the matter at Third Reading if, sadly, we are unable to find a satisfactory way through. In the meantime, I thank all noble Lords and beg leave to withdraw the amendment.