Northern Ireland Troubles (Legacy and Reconciliation) Bill

3rd reading
Tuesday 4th July 2023 Lords Chamber

Third Reading

Scottish legislative consent withheld, Northern Ireland legislative consent sought.

16:48

Motion

Moved by

[Lord Caine]

That the Bill be now read a third time.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Northern Ireland Office (Lord Caine) (Con)]

My Lords, before we begin Third Reading, I will make a statement on legislative consent.

The Government remain committed to delivering better outcomes for those most affected by the Troubles by providing more information in a more timely manner to more people than is possible under current mechanisms. We have, however, been unable to secure legislative consent from the Northern Ireland Assembly, which is of course not sitting currently. It is important to note that the Government are working tirelessly to see the return of effective, locally elected and accountable devolved government, which is the best way for Northern Ireland to be governed. However, I also acknowledge the possibility —if I can put it that way—that, even if an Assembly were sitting, it may have chosen not to provide legislative consent in this case.

The Government have also not secured legislative consent from the Scottish Government. We are therefore, regrettably, proceeding without consent, as this legislation requires a UK-wide approach. As the Government, we must make difficult and realistic decisions about how we can best deliver for families in Northern Ireland. I reassure noble Lords across the House that the Government will continue to engage with all Northern Ireland parties and the Scottish Government on this matter.

Clause 42: Tort, delict and fatal accident actions

Amendment 1

Moved by

[Lord Caine]

1: Clause 42, page 36, line 4, at end insert—
“(8A) This section does not apply to a relevant Troubles-related civil action if, or to the extent that, section (Interim custody orders: prohibition of proceedings and compensation)(1) applies to the action (prohibition of civil claims alleging invalidity of interim custody orders).”Member’s explanatory statement
This provides that Clause 42 does not apply to proceedings to which subsection (1) of Clause (Interim custody orders: prohibition of proceedings and compensation) applies.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Northern Ireland Office (Lord Caine) (Con)]

My Lords, I committed to tabling an amendment at Third Reading in response to widespread concerns raised by the House over the 2020 Supreme Court ruling concerning the validity of interim custody orders made under Troubles-era internment legislation. We debated these issues at length during the amending stages, and I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, and my noble friend Lord Godson for raising these matters and for the constructive manner in which they engaged on the amendments that I tabled late last week.

To be clear, it has always been the Government’s understanding that interim custody orders, made by Ministers of the Crown under powers conferred on the Secretary of State, were perfectly valid. To restore clarity around the legal position and ensure that no one is inappropriately advantaged by a different interpretation of the law on a technicality, I have tabled amendments that retrospectively validate all interim custody orders made under Article 4 of the Detention of Terrorists (Northern Ireland) Order 1972, as well as paragraph 11 of Schedule 1 to the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1973. This has the effect of confirming that a person’s detention under an interim custody order was not unlawful simply because it had been made by a junior Minister rather than by the Secretary of State personally, as was always the understanding of successive Governments.

The amendments would also prohibit certain types of legal proceedings, including civil cases, applications for compensation as a result of miscarriages of justice, and appeals against conviction which rely on the 2020 ruling from being brought or continued. To align with other prohibitions in the Bill, the continuation of pending claims and appeals in scope would be prohibited immediately from commencement.

There is a specific exemption in the Bill for certain types of ongoing criminal appeals, where leave to appeal has already been granted or where there has been a referral by the Criminal Cases Review Commission by the time of the Bill’s commencement. Importantly, this exception would not allow for the payment of compensation flowing from the reversal of such convictions. I make it clear that this amendment would not lead to convictions already reversed being reinstated. I hope the House will join me in welcoming the legal clarity that these amendments bring. I beg to move.

[Lord Faulks (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for tabling these amendments in response to amendments tabled by me and the noble Lord, Lord Godson, which were supported by the noble Baroness, Lady Hoey. I thank the Minister and his officials very much for the constructive way in which they engaged with us to produce this complex amendment in response to our simpler but plainly inadequate amendment. I also thank the noble Lord, Lord Butler, who is not in his place. He supported the amendment on the basis of the well-understood Carltona doctrine.

I have also been asked to mention the noble Lord, Lord Howell, who is in the interesting position of being the only living Minister who was in Northern Ireland at the time and directly involved with this and a number of other ICOs. I thank him and many other noble Lords for their help with these amendments. They will do a great deal to restore the Carltona principle to its proper place and it will put right a decision of the Supreme Court which was no doubt reached in good faith but which was, in retrospect, wrongly decided.

I have a couple of questions for the Minister, of which I have given him notice. The first is in relation to the commencement date for the two new clauses. They are described as coming into force two months after Royal Assent. I understand what he says about those extant criminal appeals. It seems that delaying this for two months risks there being some further appeals which will go forward on the rather unfortunate premise that the relevant ICOs were unlawfully entered into. Can he clarify that?

Secondly, the second proposed new clause contains an order-making power, for regulations under Section 55(2), which is consequential on the section and allows a Minister to amend this Act. They are subject to the affirmative procedure, but I am concerned, as the House always is, by powers of this scale. I seek an assurance from the Minister: although I know that the current Secretary of State will not be amending the Act to, in any way, take away with the left hand what it has given with the right, it would be useful to have on record the assurance that the Bill does not intend to amend its provisions in any substantial way, particularly those that are the subject of these amendments.

I welcome these amendments and thank the Government very much for their co-operation.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, I support the amendments, but mention has been made of the Supreme Court judgment in R v Adams [2020] UKSC 19, which caused the difficulties that these amendments are designed to address.

On 26 June, on Report, my noble friend Lord Faulks referred to Policy Exchange as having

“consistently and cogently argued that the decision flew in the face of the well-established Carltona doctrine”.

That has been explained as the doctrine that the powers of the Secretary of State may be exercised on their behalf by junior Ministers or officials. My noble friend Lord Butler of Brockwell expressed concern that the Carltona judgment

“has been thrown into doubt by this judgment”,

which he described as “this very extraordinary ruling”. The noble Lord, Lord Howell of Guildford, said that he was

“astonished, frankly, that such a legal error could have been made”.—[Official Report, 26/6/23; cols. 502-6.]

The judgment of the five judges of the Supreme Court was given by the late Lord Kerr of Tonaghmore, a distinguished and much-respected jurist. In his judgment, Lord Kerr recognised the role and importance of the Carltona principle. His reasoning was that the principle did not apply in the Gerry Adams case, because of the specific wording of the relevant statutory provision, which expressly distinguished between the making of the detention order and the signing of the order. The statutory provision said that the order could be signed by the Secretary of State, a Minister of State or an Under-Secretary of State. Lord Kerr’s conclusion was that the distinction expressly drawn in the statutory provision between the making and the signing of the order necessarily meant that only the Secretary of State could make the order.

My point is that it is simply wrong to accuse Lord Kerr of ignoring the Carltona principle or throwing it into doubt. The judgment, whether or not you agree with it—different views are, of course, permissible—was based on an analysis of the express terms of the relevant statutory provision. I am concerned that this House should not unfairly impugn the reputation—the well-deserved, high reputation—of the late Lord Kerr.

If I understood the Minister’s opening remarks correctly, he said that the amendment restores the legal position, as it had been widely understood by Ministers, prior to the Supreme Court judgment. With respect, that is not quite right, because Lord Kerr’s judgment refers to the legal advice that was given to the Attorney-General in July 1974 by JBE Hutton QC, later Lord Hutton of Bresagh. Mr Hutton, as he then was, advised Ministers through the Attorney-General. I quote from paragraph 6 of the judgment of Lord Kerr that

“a court would probably hold that it would be a condition precedent to the making of an ICO that the Secretary of State should have considered the matter personally”.

I repeat: I support the amendment, but I hope it is appropriate to put those matters on record.

17:00

[Lord Godson (Con)]

My Lords, I join the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, in welcoming the amendment put forward by my noble friend the Minister that reverses the effects of R v Adams, thus restoring the Carltona principle and stopping compensation wrongly being paid for what was an entirely lawful action by my noble friend Lord Howell of Guildford. I also join in the tributes paid earlier to Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, who retired from this House a fortnight ago and was one of the most formidable critics of the Supreme Court’s judgment in that case, thus showing his own remarkable independence of mind, which was characteristic of his career here and on the Bench.

There has been much objection in this House to the Bill’s immunity provisions, as if they were somehow unique and unprecedented. However, immunity has already been widely granted to terrorists, such as the early release for prisoners, which was a key element of the Belfast/Good Friday agreement, implemented by the Northern Ireland (Sentences) Act 1998. There were also 187 comfort letters issued to those on-the-runs between 2000 and 2014. The issuing of these letters was further pressed on Tony Blair as Prime Minister by Bertie Ahern as Taoiseach in December 1999, along with the cessation of extradition requests.

There has also been widespread use of royal pardons: 418 were issued in Northern Ireland between 1979 and 2002, including many for convicted terrorists. The Northern Ireland (Offences) Bill of November 2005 further sought to fulfil commitments made by the British and Irish Governments in 2003, with its offer of judicially based immunity for offences committed before 10 April 1998—that is, the Belfast/Good Friday agreement.

These are all extraordinary departures from the normal rules of law. Privately, Tony Blair admitted to Members of this House that they had ripped up the criminal justice system in Northern Ireland. This was not just for terrorists but for security force personnel as well, which is why the investigation into Bloody Sunday was an inquiry led by a judge, not a criminal investigation led by the police.

This Bill seeks to implement a legacy programme that is even-handed and counters the relentless tide of anti-state revisionists and revisionism. That is why I believe it deserves our support.

[Lord Dodds of Duncairn (DUP)]

My Lords, I welcome the Minister’s amendments and I will confine my remarks to them. First, I observe that this shows how quickly the Government can move when they decide to legislate in respect of Northern Ireland to remedy an obvious injustice. Therefore, I hope that, on future occasions when we raise issues of concern that have support in Northern Ireland, the Government will be loath to use the argument that parliamentary time does not permit.

Secondly, people from right across all communities and all parties in Northern Ireland—except Sinn Féin, of course—will breathe a sigh of relief at the prospect that the godfather of terrorism over many decades, Gerry Adams, will not, on a technicality, be able to benefit from the largesse of the British taxpayer, when so many widows and the thousands of families that he and his organisation caused such suffering to, have struggled with very little compensation or recompense for many years. That injustice will be put right in this House and this Parliament. That will be warmly welcomed by those who really believe in true justice.

[Baroness O’Loan (CB)]

My Lords, Clause 42, to which this amendment applies, deprives those who suffered loss or damage as a consequence of the Troubles of the ability to bring or continue any civil action after 17 May 2022—some 14 months ago. A relatively small group of UK citizens from every part of these islands is to be deprived of their rights not only to bring a civil action but to inquests and to full human rights-compliant criminal investigations by virtue of the restrictions still placed on the investigative powers of the ICRIR by this Bill.

The long title of the Bill is amended by one of the amendments. It describes the purposes of the Bill as being to

“promote reconciliation by establishing an Independent Commission for Reconciliation and Information Recovery, limiting criminal investigations, legal proceedings, inquests and police complaints”.

The purpose of the Bill is clearly stated, but at no stage has the Minister explained how it is expected that limiting criminal investigations, legal proceedings, inquests and the investigation of police complaints will promote reconciliation. I am unaware of anyone who thinks it will.

The real purpose of the Bill is to protect the Government from having to pay damages for those occasions on which investigation reveals that the state acted in breach of its duties to protect life. At its simplest, if somebody was murdered, and the state had prior knowledge and did not intervene or prevented proper investigation—and we know that these things happened right across our communities—a cause of action is disclosed. Now, in addition to the provisions of these amendments, there will be no right of action for bereaved and grieving families. That is the first purpose: to stop civil actions. The second purpose is to control access to information so that some people will never be able to prove what happened in cases involving state actors. The third purpose is to protect those veterans—they are few—both police and military, who may have committed the greatest crime, that of murder, from being subjected to due process. This Bill, as everyone has said, has been roundly and consistently condemned in the UK, by the Council of Europe, by the European High Commissioner for Human Rights, by the UN and by many others. It is a terrible breach of our international legal obligations.

Internment without trial was introduced on 9 August 1971 and continued until 5 December 1975. About 340 people were detained initially, often just scooped up by the Army because of their age and where they lived. About 100 were released within 48 hours; 17 people died in the rioting which followed and an estimated 7,000 Catholics had to flee their homes when they were attacked by loyalists. Initially, internment was carried out under regulations made under the special powers Act. All those detained were from the Catholic community. The interpretation of the Detention of Terrorists (Northern Ireland) Order 1972—introduced that November—by the Supreme Court is the subject of today’s government amendment. Overall, 1,981 people were detained without trial, 1,874 from the Catholic/nationalist/republican community and 107 from the Protestant/unionist/loyalist community. That began in 1973. It is generally accepted that internment without trial was a major recruiting agent for the IRA, and the Government said decades ago that they would never introduce it again.

It is also generally accepted in Northern Ireland and elsewhere that Gerry Adams was in the IRA and that he served on the IRA army council. As one who, as a young woman, lost my baby when I was caught in an IRA bomb explosion, I fully understand the revulsion at the idea that he and others who were involved in violence might now be able to recover even more money as a consequence of the Supreme Court decision in this case. A briefing on the Supreme Court judgment by Richard Ekins KC and Sir Stephen Laws is helpful in defining the justification for and the parameters of the amendment. Ekins and Laws describe how the process worked. Detention began with the making of an interim custody order, which was an exercise of a power conferred by the 1972 order on the Secretary of State. The order specified that only the Secretary of State, a Minister of State or an Under-Secretary of State could sign an interim custody order.

They went on to say that

“detention under the 1972 Order only began with the making of an interim custody order. Detention was only able to continue for more than 28 days when the Chief Constable had referred the matter to the Commissioner (a former judge or senior lawyer) who would consider the matter afresh. If the Commissioner was satisfied that the person in question was involved in terrorism, the Commissioner would make a detention order. When Mr Adams escaped from custody, his continuing detention, beyond the period of the interim custody order, had been authorised by a Commissioner who had made a fresh decision”.

This amendment seeks only to address the consequences of the Supreme Court’s decision. It is not about the merits of detention without trial. It is about whether the Carltona principles should have applied to prevent the Secretary of State having to consider each application personally. It is also about stopping the significant number of civil actions lodged after the Supreme Court judgment.

Internment without trial should never have happened, but this amendment is not about that. For that reason, while I will not oppose these amendments, I look forward to the Minister giving the assurance sought by the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, as to the extent of the exercise of powers anticipated to make secondary legislation under the powers conferred by the Bill.

[Baroness Suttie (LD)]

My Lords, I broadly welcome these government amendments. This is a complex matter, as the interventions this afternoon have illustrated, but I am glad that the Minister has managed to find a solution that is, broadly speaking, acceptable to all, subject to the comments made for the record by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick.

I have only one question for the Minister regarding these Third Reading amendments. I assume that the Northern Ireland Department of Justice was also consulted and that it is happy with these proposals. Could the Minister perhaps confirm that that is the case?

[Lord Murphy of Torfaen (Lab)]

My Lords, this is the third occasion on which your Lordships have had the opportunity to discuss what has become an increasingly complex issue. I am delighted that it is probably the last as, should there be any more, it would get even more complicated.

I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, that Lord Kerr was a very eminent judge. Many of us remember him and the great work that he did. However, there has clearly been a problem with this particular judgment, and the principle of junior Ministers signing orders on behalf of the Secretary of State, even if it applied all those years ago, must be sustained. So I very much look forward to what the Minister has to say in response to this short debate. We will not be opposing this amendment.

[Lord Caine (Con)]

My Lords, I am as always very grateful to those who have contributed. In direct response to the noble Baroness, Lady Suttie, I can assure her that the DoJ in Northern Ireland was consulted on these amendments.

I am grateful again to the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, for the very constructive way in which he has engaged on these matters. With respect to commencement, it is the Government’s intention that this should commence at the same time as the Clause 42 prohibition in the Bill relating to the ending of civil proceedings: that is, two months after Royal Assent, which is the normal commencement date. We believe that a consistent approach is important, particularly when bringing forward an amendment that is about ensuring legal clarity.

The Government believe that there is little or no prospect of compensation claims being hurried through in the two months between Royal Assent and commencement. To give an illustrative example of the pace of such claims, there has to date, to our knowledge, been no payment of compensation to anyone bringing a claim as a direct result of the Supreme Court judgment in 2020; nor are the Government aware of any of these cases being close to awarding compensation. This includes the significant cohort of civil claims in this area, which remain at a relatively early stage.

On the issue of consequential powers raised by the noble Lord and by the noble Baroness, Lady O’Loan, in her remarks, the power exists for the new provisions. I assure the House that this is solely for the purpose of consequential amendments and not to be used to alter fundamentally the policy intent of the provisions within the amendments, or their scope in bringing relevant proceedings to an end. It is intended to be very limited indeed.

17:15

I am very grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, for his contribution. He raised a number of points but did not direct any questions. I am quite relieved at that, given his great legal experience and expertise, whereas I am a humble history graduate standing at the Dispatch Box. His comments brought out that there is a need for greater clarity in the law in this area, and that is indeed what the Government are seeking to provide with these amendments.

Finally, I should say that we are undertaking a full analysis, which will inform the Government’s view of the defensibility of the new provisions in the event of any legal challenge on convention rights grounds. However, the Government believe that the clauses created by these amendments are consistent with convention rights and that any interference with the rights of those involved can be justified.

Amendment 1 agreed.

Amendments 2 and 3

Moved by

[Lord Caine]

2: After Clause 44, insert the following new Clause—
“Interim custody orders: validity
(1) This section applies in relation to the functions conferred by—(a) Article 4(1) of the 1972 Order, and (b) paragraph 11(1) of Schedule 1 to the 1973 Act,(which enabled interim custody orders to be made, and which are referred to in this section as the “order-making functions”).(2) The order-making functions are to be treated as having always been exercisable by authorised Ministers of the Crown (as well as by the Secretary of State).(3) An interim custody order is not to be regarded as having ever been unlawful just because an authorised Minister of the Crown exercised any of the order-making functions in relation to the order.(4) The detention of a person under the authority of an interim custody order is not to be regarded as having ever been unlawful just because an authorised Minister of the Crown exercised any of the order-making functions in relation to the order.(5) Subsections (3) and (4) do not limit the effect of subsection (2).(6) This section and section (Interim custody orders: prohibition of proceedings and compensation) apply only in relation to an exercise of any of the order-making functions which was conduct forming part of the Troubles (see, in particular, section 1(2)); and for this purpose any exercise of any of the order-making functions must be assumed to have been conduct forming part of the Troubles unless the contrary is shown.(7) In this section and section (Interim custody orders: prohibition of proceedings and compensation)—“1972 Order” means the Detention of Terrorists (Northern Ireland) Order 1972 (S.I. 1972/1632 (N.I. 15));“1973 Act” means the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1973;“authorised Minister of the Crown” means a Minister of the Crown authorised to sign interim custody orders—(a) by Article 4(2) of the 1972 Order (in the case of such orders under that Article), or(b) by paragraph 11(2) of Schedule 1 to the 1973 Act (in the case of such orders under that paragraph);“interim custody order” means an interim custody order under—(a) Article 4 of the 1972 Order, or(b) paragraph 11 of Schedule 1 to the 1973 Act;“order-making functions” has the meaning given in subsection (1).”Member’s explanatory statement
This provides for Article 4 of the Detention of Terrorists (Northern Ireland) Order 1972 and the corresponding provision in the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1973 to be read as having allowed junior Ministers to make interim custody orders (which was understood to be their effect at the time when the powers were in force).

3: After Clause 44, insert the following new Clause—
“Interim custody orders: prohibition of proceedings and compensation
(1) On or after the commencement day, a civil action may not be continued or brought if, or to the extent that, the claim that is to be determined in the action involves an allegation that—(a) the person bringing the action, or another person, was detained under the authority of an interim custody order, and(b) that interim custody order was unlawful because an authorised Minister of the Crown exercised any of the order-making functions in relation to the order.(2) On or after the commencement day, criminal proceedings relating to the quashing of a conviction may not be continued or brought if, or to the extent that, the grounds for seeking to have the conviction quashed involve an allegation that— (a) the person bringing the proceedings, or another person, was detained under the authority of an interim custody order, and(b) that interim custody order was unlawful because an authorised Minister of the Crown exercised any of the order-making functions in relation to the order.(3) If criminal proceedings relating to the quashing of a conviction are pre-commencement proceedings—(a) subsection (2) does not apply to the criminal proceedings;(b) section (Interim custody orders: validity) does not prevent the court from quashing the conviction on the ground that an interim custody order was unlawful because an authorised Minister of the Crown exercised any of the order-making functions.(4) On or after the commencement day, no compensation for a miscarriage of justice is to be paid in respect of a conviction that has been reversed solely on the ground that an interim custody order was unlawful because an authorised Minister of the Crown exercised any of the order-making functions.(5) Regulations under section 55(2) which make provision that is consequential on section (Interim custody orders: validity) or this section—(a) may amend this Act (including this section);(b) (whether or not they make such amendments) are subject to made affirmative procedure, unless they are instead made in accordance with section 55(5) (the affirmative procedure) or 55(6) (the negative procedure).(6) In this section—“commencement day” means the day on which this section comes into force;“compensation for a miscarriage of justice” means compensation under section 133 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988;“pre-commencement proceedings” means proceedings—(a) for which leave was given before the commencement day, or(b) which follow from a referral made by the Criminal Cases Review Commission before the commencement day.”Member’s explanatory statement
This prohibits civil and criminal proceedings and payment of compensation for miscarriages of justice which are based on interim custody orders made by junior Ministers having been unlawful.

Amendments 2 and 3 agreed.

Clause 56: Regulations

Amendment 4

Moved by

[Lord Caine]

4: Clause 56, page 48, line 16, at end insert—
“(4A) Where regulations under this Act are subject to made affirmative procedure, the statutory instrument containing them must be laid before Parliament after being made.(4B) Regulations contained in a statutory instrument laid before Parliament under subsection (4A) cease to have effect at the end of the period of 28 days beginning with the day on which the instrument is made unless, during that period, the instrument is approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament.(4C) In calculating the period of 28 days, no account is to be taken of any whole days that fall within a period during which—(a) Parliament is dissolved or prorogued, or(b) either House of Parliament is adjourned for more than four days.(4D) If regulations cease to have effect as a result of subsection (4B), that does not— (a) affect the validity of anything previously done under the regulations, or(b) prevent the making of new regulations.”Member’s explanatory statement
This sets out the made affirmative procedure for Parliamentary scrutiny of regulations under Clause 55 which make provision in consequence of Clause (Interim custody orders: validity) or (Interim custody orders: prohibition of proceedings and compensation).

Amendment 4 agreed.

Clause 59: Extent

Amendment 5

Moved by

[Lord Caine]

5: Clause 59, page 53, line 25, at end insert—
“(3A) Sections (Interim custody orders: validity) and (Interim custody orders: prohibition of proceedings and compensation) extend to Northern Ireland only.”Member’s explanatory statement
This provides for the two new Clauses in Lord Caine’s name to extend only to Northern Ireland (like the 1972 Order and 1973 Act, to which the new Clauses relate).

Amendment 5 agreed.

Clause 60: Commencement

Amendments 6 to 8

Moved by

[Lord Caine]

6: Clause 60, page 53, line 31, at end insert—
“(aa) section (Interim custody orders: prohibition of proceedings and compensation)(5);”Member’s explanatory statement
This provides for subsection (5) of Clause (Interim custody orders: prohibition of proceedings and compensation) to come into force on royal assent (as it relates to the power to make consequential provision which comes into force then).

7: Clause 60, page 53, line 35, after “42” insert “, (Interim custody orders: validity) and (Interim custody orders: prohibition of proceedings and compensation)(except for subsection (5))”
Member’s explanatory statement
This provides for the two new Clauses in Lord Caine’s name to come into force two months after royal assent (except for subsection (5) of Clause (Interim custody orders: prohibition of proceedings and compensation) which is dealt with by the amendment of Clause 60(1) in Lord Caine’s name).

8: Clause 60, page 54, line 1, after “42” insert “, (Interim custody orders: validity) and (Interim custody orders: prohibition of proceedings and compensation)”
Member’s explanatory statement
This is consequential on the other amendments of Clause 60 in Lord Caine’s name.

Amendments 6 to 8 agreed.

In the Title

Amendment 9

Moved by

[Lord Caine]

9: In the Title, line 6, at end insert “, and to provide for the validity of interim custody orders.”
Member’s explanatory statement
This is consequential on Clauses (Interim custody orders: validity) and (Interim custody orders: prohibition of proceedings and compensation).

Amendment 9 agreed.

17:17

Motion

Moved by

[Lord Caine]

That the Bill do now pass.

Bill passed.