Budget Responsibility and National Audit Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Burns and Lord Eatwell

Thursday 9th December 2010 Grand Committee

[Lord Eatwell]

My Lords, I hope we can have a fairly brief Committee today, not least because the annual contest between the universities of Oxford and Cambridge at Twickenham has just kicked off. This, however, is not a contest but an attempt to improve the Bill. In moving Amendment 40 and speaking to Amendment 43, I believe we can significantly improve it.

We have already discussed whether the OBR should write its own school report, as the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, referred to it. There was general agreement around the House that that was a bad idea. In proposing this amendment I have, as I am sure Ministers and officials have, examined procedures in equivalent organisations in other jurisdictions. The most relevant of these is the US Congressional Budget Office, although there are significant differences between the two organisations. The CBO is answerable to Congress, whereas the OBR is a creature of the Executive. This has been the source of many of our difficulties in constructing a framework of independence. None the less, we have something valuable to learn from the CBO, which uses clear and extensive peer review. As I am sure the Minister is aware, the CBO is scrutinised by a large and very distinguished peer review committee of, I think, about 20 people. Nothing so large is necessary for the rather more limited activities of the OBR. None the less, independent peer review will undoubtedly be valuable. It will not only add to the intellectual input to the activities of the OBR—undoubtedly a positive factor—but act as a further buttress to independence. The peer review committee of the Congressional Budget Office publishes its findings on the CBO website, enhancing the transparency of the entire process.

We have already discussed the need for the past forecasts of the OBR to be assessed by some independent authority. That independent authority could be the peer review committee proposed in Amendment 40 to the Bill and Amendment 43 to the schedule, although there could be other ways of doing it. Amendment 40 provides the peer review committee with clear and unambiguous terms of reference. It must report on,

“the accuracy of fiscal and economic forecasts prepared by the Office, including the appropriateness of the methods employed”.

This is a clear technical remit; the committee would not be allowed to stray into the realms of policy.

Amendment 43 provides some detail on the appointment of the peer review committee. Again, I have looked at the practice of the Congressional Budget Office, where many of the members of the peer review committee are nominated by the council of the American Economic Association. I have suggested that the ideal body to recommend to the Chancellor persons of appropriate technical expertise would be the equivalent professional body here in the UK—the council of the Royal Economic Society. Otherwise, appointment will be by the Chancellor, with the approval of the Treasury Select Committee of another place.

It might be argued that the process of peer review will take place anyway in the context of vigorous debate among economists and econometricians over forecasting and policy. However, I submit that without a dedicated peer review committee this debate, which will take place anyway, will tend to be unfocused. The particular value of the peer review committee is to have a group of very well qualified professionals who see it as their responsibility to examine the results and the methods of the OBR. As I suggested, there may be other ways of achieving this objective, but I believe that an independent review of the OBR’s record and methodology will add tremendous value to the process and help to buttress the independence of the OBR, which is something that we all seek. I beg to move.

[Lord Burns]

My Lords, I have a lot of sympathy with the idea of having independent reviews of forecasts and the methods employed at some intervals during the process. My concern is whether the amendment makes too much of a meal of the issue. It is important to have an appropriate way of appointing an independent person or persons to undertake this work. My preference would be to give this job to the non-executive directors of the OBR. That seems a perfectly respectable way to do this. It is common practice in companies that the independent directors should appoint auditors and should look after other forms of oversight.

I cannot believe that a group of five people is needed to undertake this task, which, as the amendment says, is to evaluate forecasts and to look at the methods used. If we are not careful, we will have the same problem as we have had with the MPC—quite soon, one runs out of qualified people to fill a committee.

I also have concerns about whether an independent review is needed every year. Not a lot will change each year. We will have one year’s figures in the forecasts and we will be able to look at the outturns. When one is looking at issues relating to bias and variables, one typically needs a run of years to be able to see the pattern of the forecasting record. The Bill suggests that there should be an annual review, but to me the issue is how often one needs independent input into this process. I would be cautious about that. It is a task that one could leave to the non-executive directors, who would decide whether, for example, an independent review was needed every year or whether internal and independent reviews should be held in alternate years. I would leave it to the independent directors, or members of the office, to determine the number of people needed for these investigations, who to recruit and whether to recruit the same people on successive occasions.

I support the idea of independent input, but let us not make a meal of it. The task is on a different scale from that in the US example that the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, cited. We need something of a size that is appropriate to the task in hand.

Budget Responsibility and National Audit Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Burns and Lord Eatwell

Wednesday 1st December 2010 Grand Committee

[Lord Burns]

I support my noble friend Lord Turnbull and the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes. This amendment is totally unrealistic. To imagine that one should bar secondees from this kind of activity is extraordinary. There can be no real career structure within the OBR. There are specific sets of jobs and there will be little potential for advancement. It is bound to provide activities that people will take on for a certain period, after which they will move on to do something else. Inevitably, they will wish to hold on to their employment in a department which actually offers them the possibility of a career structure.

I think that the noble Lord hugely underestimates the independent-mindedness of many civil servants. During my time in the Treasury, and I am sure subsequent to that, we had many secondees from other departments who would work in our expenditure divisions. They would work effectively in support of the Treasury by running, very often, the expenditure policies relating to the departments from which they had been seconded. I had no difficulty with this. Indeed, when I first joined the Treasury, my noble friend Lord Kerr was on secondment from the Foreign Office to the Treasury in order to carry out the expenditure work of the MoD. These are everyday, bread-and-butter activities for civil servants, and I am confident that they can work very effectively.

Clearly there would be a problem if the executive members of the OBR were on secondment from the Treasury, but I assume that that is not what is in mind and that the mechanisms which have been put in place in terms of their appointments will safeguard against that. However, we must be realistic about these arrangements. As long as the senior people in the OBR are appointed under the correct processes so that they are independent, it should be for them to recruit the people who they think can carry out the tasks most effectively. To surround that with lots of restrictions is not only unrealistic but, as my noble friend Lord Turnbull said, very damaging.

[Lord Eatwell]

This is a tricky issue but the balance has been struck by a combination of the noble Lord, Lord Turnbull, and my noble friend Lord Myners. If the staff of the OBR is simply a rotating group of Treasury officials, the appearance of independence, which is so important to the OBR, will be endangered. We should remember especially the crucial independence of method set out in Clause 6(2). If it is a rotating group, it will carry with it the method that it brought from the Treasury. On the other hand, I recognise that we do not want to limit the career prospects of staff or the quality of staff; we want to get the best people we possibly can.

The Government cannot be complacent about this. The OBR will undoubtedly be under close scrutiny and it will not do for it to allow employment to be a revolving door connected to the Treasury. It is up to the Government to come up with an answer. If they want the OBR to have independence, they will have to find a solution to the staffing problem. I am afraid I do not have it; if I did I would offer it. Given its independent role under Clause 6(2), it is clearly a problem. However, I entirely agree that we should not in any way endanger the career prospects or the quality of the staff of the OBR.