Employment Rights Bill

Lord Burns Excerpts

Consideration of Commons amendments and / or reasons
Tuesday 28th October 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Collins of Highbury (Lab)]

My Lords, Clause 59 restores the long-standing practice that existed for 70 years—even during the Conservative Governments of Margaret Thatcher and John Major—before the passage of the Trade Union Act 2016, whereby new members are automatically included as contributors to a political fund unless they choose to opt out. The Government believe, as I said earlier, that the 2016 Act placed unnecessary red tape on trade union activity that works against trade unions’ core role of negotiation, dispute resolution and giving a voice to working people. We have a clear manifesto commitment to repeal it.

We seek to redress this balance and remove burdensome requirements on how unions manage their political funds. We are not—and I make this absolutely clear—removing choice. At the point of joining, every new member will be clearly informed on their application form that they have the right to opt out. This same form will make it plain that opting out has no bearing whatever on any other aspect of their union membership. Most union membership forms are now online and most of these details are contained in a highly accessible form. So we are not removing choice; people will be very aware of what they are doing.

It is important to stress that trade unions are not groups that conscript or compel members to join them; they are democratic organisations whose political funds are ultimately controlled by their members through the democratic structures of the union. All members are free to participate in these democratic structures and thereby to decide how their political fund is used. Members who object to a union’s political fund can use the union’s democratic structures to close the fund, get involved in the union to be part of the decisions about how the fund is spent, and opt out of political fund contributions on an individual basis. These are all important elements of choice.

Political funds are one mechanism that union members can utilise to represent their collective interests. Political funds are not just about affiliations to certain political parties. Indeed, some unions do not contribute to any political party at all. Political funds can allow unions to participate in campaigns on a range of issues in their members’ interests. Examples include lobbying MPs, broader public campaigns, research to develop policy ideas, and paying travel expenses for workers to attend Parliament to give evidence about the issues they face at work. Indeed, as I have repeatedly said, UNISON operates two separate political funds, or two parts of one political fund, related to affiliation and to wider campaigning.

I also remind noble Lords that establishing a political fund is not a requirement for trade unions and that the majority of unions do not operate one. Political funds are set up through democratic structures of a union and must have sufficient support from its membership to do so. These structures make unions accountable to their members, who are free to participate in the democratic process to shape how political funds are utilised. What we propose today returns us to a system that is both workable and proportionate. We do not wish to saddle unions with excessive paperwork when the principle of choice is already safeguarded.

I hope this reassures noble Lords that automatic opt-ins will reduce the administrative burden on unions while retaining members’ capacity to make an active choice not to contribute to the political fund if they so wish. Once again, I hope we can move on in relation to this issue and respect what the Labour Party committed to in its manifesto, restoring the rights for unions that have existed for over 70 years. I beg to move.

Motion L1 (as an amendment to Motion L)

[Lord Burns]

Moved by

Leave out from “House” to end and insert “do insist on its Amendments 61 and 72.”

[Lord Burns (CB)]

My Lords, in July, this House agreed my amendment on trade union political funds with a large majority. The amendment would maintain a position where new members have to opt in to make a contribution to a union’s political fund. This was debated in the House of Commons and rejected. I have had a conversation with the Minister and the Deputy Leader of the House about this, for which I am grateful— I welcome the Minister to her new responsibilities.

In the Commons, three reasons were given for rejecting my amendment; we have heard the noble Lord, Lord Collins of Highbury, make similar points. The first reason given was that it was necessary to lift the “burden” of the 2016 Act. I am sorry that giving members more autonomy and an active choice in the decision whether to contribute to a political fund is seen as a burden. If there is an administrative cost, surely the correct response should be to examine the procedures and methods within the unions that create this burden. My understanding is that today—we heard it repeated this evening—members generally communicate online with their union. This should be much more efficient than in the days of pen, forms and postage, and surely cannot be a decisive factor.

The second reason given was the familiar argument that the Government’s proposal simply returns to the long-standing precedent that has worked for 70 years. However, as I argued last time, using an arrangement whereby members are automatically opted in unless they take on the additional burden of opting out is no longer acceptable in most walks of life. In that case, members are not exercising an active choice; it is using passive inertia to reduce the likelihood that members will exercise their right to opt out.

The third reason given was that accepting the amendment would break a clear government commitment. I can find no reference to trade union party funds in the Government’s election manifesto—maybe I have missed something. I can find no mention of political funds in the paper Labour’s Plan to Make Work Pay. That paper charges the previous Government with having “attacked rights at work” and says that Labour “will repeal” those measures, but in which universe is giving people the right to make a transparent and active choice about paying into a political fund attacking rights at work?

I recognise that since the 2016 Act came into force, the proportion of trade union members paying the political contribution has fallen. However, to examine the change and compare it with 2016, we have to omit the figures for Unite the Union, because it has not submitted figures for the past three years. Taking it out and making the comparison with the other unions with political funds, we see that 86% of members contributed in 2016-17 while in the most recent year for which we have numbers, that has fallen to 68%. I can understand the concern, but the real question is: what does this tell us?

For me, the most plausible explanation is that it tells us something about the decisions that members wish to make when faced with a clear choice. It is interesting that reduction in participation is not the same across all unions with political funds. I suggest that unions should ask themselves why they have failed to persuade those members to contribute to those funds, rather than relying on inertia and hoping that members will make their contribution without really considering the issue.

I want to address one further argument. Several times it has been suggested that trade unions are subject to constraints and regulations that do not apply to other organisations; for example, the National Trust. Some even question why they should be required to have a separate political fund. But to me, this overlooks a significant difference: trade unions are regulated bodies. They are protected against being sued for damages and have legal immunity for their funds in trade disputes and their core services. However, the law does not allow them to impose compulsory levies on all members to fund political representation. They are allowed to have a separate political fund but must have safeguards to protect individual members’ freedom of choice. Of course, the crux of the matter is: what do we mean by freedom of choice?

I would like to find a solution that provides genuine freedom of choice and avoids going through these arguments—rather bitter arguments, sometimes—with each change of Government. In my view, this means giving members a clear and equal choice when they join a union, or when that union votes to establish a new political fund. They should be required to choose between two options: do you wish to pay the fee to the political fund, or do you not wish to do so? This seems the only fair way to provide people with an equal choice.

I emphasise that I do not have a position on whether members should pay the political contribution. I am not trying to discourage them from contributing. All I am asking is that members be given a clear and equal choice that meets the transparent standards we expect today. I beg to move.

[Lord Leigh of Hurley (Con)]

My Lords, I support the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Burns, and of course I welcome the new team to the Front Bench. The noble Lord, Lord Collins of Highbury, will recall that we had pretty much the same debate in 2016, albeit that we were facing in different directions.

The noble Lord, Lord Burns, referenced the debate on 23 July, which was day 4 of Report, about disclosure of payments made from a political fund. This is key, because if union members are going to have, in effect, an opt-in/opt-out arrangement changed, they need to know what the political fund is used for. When I pushed the Government on it, the then Minister, the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Whitchurch, said:

“My understanding is that the political funds will be required to continue to spell out how they are spending the money, but not for sums under £2,000”.


I challenged her, and said:

“I am sure the Minister would not like to have on record something that does not seem to be correct. I think she means that amounts under £2,000 need not be disclosed”.—[Official Report, 23/7/25; col. 281.]


The noble Baroness ignored my comment, and we carried on to a vote on whether payments made by the political fund should be disclosed to the certification officer and members of the union in respect of their own money, as has previously been the case.

On 29 August, over a month later, the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, wrote to me with what was described as a corrections letter, which, while lacking in my opinion an appropriate apology, confirmed my assertion that this Bill removes the duty of unions to disclose the detail of expenditure from their members or anyone else. Accordingly, it allows the union bosses to spend their members’ money from the political fund exactly how they like, with no one able to see where the money is spent. The noble Lord, Lord Collins of Highbury, just said that political funds are controlled by their members; he then said that those funds are accountable to members. I take issue with that.

My concern is that the vote on this issue took place on the basis of information and assurances given to your Lordships’ House at the Dispatch Box which the then Minister—not the current Minister, I emphasise—has now admitted were factually incorrect. It may well have swayed some noble Peers. This seems a very unsatisfactory situation, as it allows a vote to have taken place on incorrect information and assurances.

In the end, my amendment was defeated by 18 votes out of 360 Peers’ votes cast. I ask the Minister to explain this situation from the Dispatch Box so that we have a clear record of what has happened and so that legislation may be revisited at a later date. I ask noble Peers to bear this in mind when considering whether to support the noble Lord, Lord Burns.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Collins of Highbury (Lab)]

I thank my noble friend for that. I apologise to the noble Lord, Lord Leigh, as I got carried away with the points I was making about contracting out and forgot to address his specific issue, which he raised with me previously. I have the letter that my noble friend Lady Jones wrote to him, and I am quite happy to be absolutely clear that we are removing the additional reporting requirement introduced by the 2016 Act for unions to provide additional information about their political expenditure in their annual returns to the certification officer. We are simply returning to the reporting requirements that existed pre 2016, with unions’ annual returns available for public inspection—an additional point my noble friend made—and they will continue to include information relating to governance and finance of the trade union, including management of their political funds, as they have done for many years. Repealing the 2016 Act is of course a manifesto commitment. But my noble friend is right that accountability on expenditure is very much through access to information that is provided for already in legislation.

[Lord Burns (CB)]

I thank the Minister for his response. I am disappointed but not entirely surprised. I can assure the Minister that I have no objection to how political funds are used. When the whole notion of political funds was established, it was clearly for the support of political parties—that was what the debate was back in 1910 and 1920 and that is not the issue at heart.

The issue is how people express their decision on whether they wish to join the political fund or not. I continue to hope I can persuade the Government there is merit in trying to find a settled resolution to this issue which all parties can support. I believe it can be done. The Minister already outlined the procedures that will be required under the Government’s proposals in terms of telling people what the political fund is for and explaining to them that they have the ability to opt out. I think all we require is to move that along so that people are presented at the time they join with a clear choice. They should know exactly what is in front of them and what the options are. That is the way in which we can move this issue on; it has gone on, as we discussed when we met, since 1921. It has gone backwards and forwards. I would like to test the opinion of the House.

House of Lords (Hereditary Peers) Bill

Lord Burns Excerpts

Report stage
Wednesday 9th July 2025 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Burns]

23: After Clause 1, insert the following new Clause—
“Restriction on nominating new life peers(1) In the period between the commencement of this Act and the first General Election thereafter, the number of recommendations made to His Majesty for the granting of new life peerages under section 1 of the Life Peerages Act 1958 (power to confer life peerages) must not exceed one new peer for every life peer who leaves the House through retirement or death. (2) Following the first General Election after the commencement of this Act, and for as long as the membership of the House of Lords exceeds the membership of the House of Commons, the number of recommendations made to His Majesty for the granting of new life peerages under section 1 of the Life Peerages Act 1958 must not exceed one new peer for every two life peers who leave the House through retirement or death.(3) Once the membership of the House of Lords is equal to or less than the membership of the House of Commons, recommendations made to His Majesty for the granting of new life peerages under section 1 of that Act must not be such that they would cause the membership of the House of Lords to exceed the membership of the House of Commons.”

[Lord Burns (CB)]

My Lords, I welcomed the statement from the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, at the beginning of Report and her proposal to establish a dedicated Select Committee to undertake future work once the Bill becomes law. She highlighted two specific proposals in the Government’s manifesto—on retirement and participation—on which she would like to make progress in the Select Committee. She suggested that there seemed to be consensus in the House on these issues and I think many of us would agree.

However, in response to a question from the noble Baroness, Lady Hayman, the Leader did not include controlling the size of the House as one of the topics that might be considered by this Select Committee. She suggested that it could possibly be covered by a subsequent committee. To me, this was surprising, as the manifesto also stated that the House of Lords is “too big”, which could, at a bit of a stretch, be interpreted as a commitment. I am grateful to the Leader for several useful conversations on this matter in recent weeks.

As the House knows, my view is that if we are to address the issue of the size of the House, we must address appointments as well as departures, either in this Bill or subsequently. Both matters are important. However, during the debate on the Bill, considerably more attention has been given to measures that would increase the number of Peers leaving than to the number of appointments. The cross-party committee which I chair for the Lord Speaker concluded that these measures to increase the numbers leaving may be in vain if no action is taken also to constrain the number of appointments.

The manifesto states that the reason the House is too big is that “appointments are for life”. However, an additional and more important reason for the present size of the House is the Prime Minister’s power of patronage in the appointment of Members. With rare exceptions, there has been a persistent tendency for the number of appointments to exceed the number of leavers, on occasions by very large amounts. There are no guardrails on appointments, as we seem to call them these days. Prime Ministers can make more appointments than Members who leave, and often do. To make matters worse, they can appoint disproportionately to their own party when in office, and often do. As the saying goes, you do not have to gaze into a crystal ball when you can read an open book—or even a Select Committee report.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Smith of Basildon (Lab)]

I am afraid that my use of the word “shenanigans” has been copied by many others since, and it was not original on my part. To go down a bit of a rabbit hole, we have seen a lot of raw degrouping of amendments in this Session of Parliament. That aside, we are all looking for the House to do its best work, and to be treated responsibly, listened to and engaged in legislation.

The only time I recall a threat of introducing so many new Peers—we have talked about in the past—was when Jacob Rees-Mogg was Leader of the House of Commons. I had just become Leader of the Opposition, and we were threatened with 1,000 new Peers on the Brexit issue, but it never materialised. It was recognised then that the best way of dealing with things is in the way that the House normally does.

The noble Lord, Lord Butler, made a very good point about quality. Appointments should consider quality and commitment. We are not just a House of the great and the good; we are people who are committed to the work that we do, and we bring judgment to the issues we debate. The noble Lord is right to look at that. The comments of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, on Front-Bench appointments in particular is one of the issues that deserves further consideration. This is an issue that the Select Committee would look at more broadly to ensure that we do not just create vacancies to go back to a larger House.

I understand the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Burns, and I completely accept the purpose of putting it forward. I would say that one flaw in it is that his proposals—and I think this might have been the point that the noble Lord, Lord Newby, was making—do not take into account the relative strength of political parties. Under this proposal, when a Peer departs, the party of government could always appoint a member of their party and not look at the balance of the House overall, and we do need to look at the balance of the House overall. Therefore, I understand the sentiment and I think the noble Lord is right to say that this needs further consideration, but I would ask that he withdraw his amendment. This is something that merits further discussion.

[Lord Burns (CB)]

My Lords, I am very grateful to all those who have taken part in this debate, and indeed for the degree of support for the principle of constraints on appointments and the need for guard-rails. I appreciate the remarks of the Leader of the House, who I think indicated, as I hoped, that we would be in a position with the Select Committee to discuss the issue of the relative size of appointments and those who are leaving. I do not want to press this to a Division today, as it is not the right vehicle for such a change. The amendment also needs to be considered in the context of other proposals to encourage departures and allocate appointments, as the Leader of the House has said.

Although I did refer to it in my remarks, at this stage I have not tried to deal with the issue of the allocation of vacancies to the different parties. That was set out in the Lord Speaker’s committee report, which said that the allocation between the parties should be made according to the number of votes and seats that they achieved at the previous general election. I still believe that that is a very effective mechanism. It is one that stabilises the numbers and allows for a shift in the proportions depending upon the political success of the parties during an election, so you get movement.

House of Lords (Hereditary Peers) Bill

Lord Burns Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 25th March 2025 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Burns]

82: After Clause 1, insert the following new Clause—
“Restriction on nominating new life peers (1) During any period in which the membership of the House of Lords exceeds the membership of the House of Commons, the number of recommendations made to His Majesty for the granting of new life peerages under section 1 of the Life Peerages Act 1958 (power to confer life peerages) must not exceed one new peer for every two who leave the House through retirement or death.(2) Once the membership of the House of Lords is equal to or less than the membership of the House of Commons, recommendations made to His Majesty for the granting of new life peerages under section 1 of that Act must not be such that they would cause the membership of the House of Lords to exceed the membership of the House of Commons.”

[Lord Burns (CB)]

My Lords, we have spent many hours examining individual proposals for reform, including term limits, age limits, participation limits and the strengthening of HOLAC. I will bring together these threads and argue that none can be entirely effective in the long run unless we can establish a ceiling on the size of the House of Lords. For me, this is the keystone around which we can build the other elements of reform we have discussed. Without it, it will be difficult to stabilise the number of Members, and we will likely encounter the problem of increasing size again. I am less committed to the precise number for this ceiling and more to the principle of a ceiling.

My amendment proposes a limit on the size of the House of Lords, specifying that it shall not exceed the size of the House of Commons. Until we reach this limit, there would be only one appointment for every two leavers. I emphasise that this amendment is not intended to delay the passage of the Bill, which I support. I apologise to the noble Lord, Lord Grocott, for joining in this seminar on the future reform of the House—possibly the longest seminar I have ever participated in.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Smith of Basildon (Lab)]

It continues.

There have been some interesting discussions. The noble Lord, Lord Burns, used his amendment to refer back to the Lord Speaker’s Committee, when he looked at the size of the House and how related issues might be addressed. His amendment focuses on the idea of two out, one in, although he spoke more widely on the report, which was very helpful. I will come to that in a moment.

The noble Lord, Lord Northbrook, wants to delay the commencement of the Bill, which is why he tabled his amendment. He seemed to think we should have a draft Bill first to implement the Burns committee’s report. I looked into his interest in the Burns committee, and I was surprised, given that he thought it so important to delay this Bill until there is a draft Bill on the Burns committee, that he did not speak on the Burns committee when it was debated in your Lordships’ House. I think he referred to it in debate on my noble friend Lord Grocott’s Bill. It is an interesting point but not one that we would be able to accept, because it would just delay this Bill.

The noble Lord, Lord Burns, raised some interesting issues. When we debated the Burns committee report there was widespread support around the House for it. Looking back, I was not sure during the debate that every Member was fully signed up to every part of the report, but there was a real view that something had to be done and that this was going in the right direction of how we might address the issue.

The noble Baroness made a point about size and how we are not a full-time House. We are very much a full-time House. We sit longer and later than the other place, but we do not expect every Member of your Lordships’ House to be full-time. Members have outside interests, and we do not expect everybody to be here all day, every day—and neither should we. It would be unhelpful to the House if every Member was always here and we were all full-time politicians. We bring different experiences and different issues to the House.

I think we agree that the size of the House should come down. This is a bit about perception. We regularly read about the size and the bloat of the House, and how we are the second-largest assembly in the world, but we are not. If we look at the active membership—Members who attend reasonably regularly—then the House is not that size; it is much smaller. The two measures we are looking at, on retirement and participation, go a long way towards addressing some of the criticisms that are made. That is why I am so keen—and I have said that I will come back to the House on this—to have a mechanism that Members can input into so that we can see if the House can reach agreement on what that might look like in practice. We have had some discussions about that already.

The noble Lord, Lord Newby, made some points about allocation. We discussed this before on the Bill from the noble Lord, Lord Norton, which suggested that 20% of the House should be Cross-Benchers. Although that is a pretty fair figure for the Cross-Benchers, having a mechanism within your Lordships’ House that, in effect, determines what the size of one group should be does nothing about the relative size of other groups. One of the things I have looked at with some dismay over the years is how the government party has grown and grown. The noble Lord said his party had had only three new Members, most of them very recently. To come back to an earlier debate, at one point I think more new Ministers were appointed—in some cases for very short terms in office—to this side of the House than we had appointments in the whole of that time in opposition. We therefore need to get a better balance between the two parties.

The noble Lord, Lord Burns, is absolutely right. The House does some of its best work when we do not play the numbers game and say, “We’ve got more than you, we can win a vote”. We got into bad habits during some of the coalition years, when there was an automatic majority. We saw large numbers come in under Boris Johnson in particular: when the Government lost votes, their answer was to appoint more Peers. That did not have the effect that the Government wanted it to have. The House does its best work when there are roughly equal numbers between the Government and opposition parties, and when we are more deliberative in our approach rather than thinking that everything has to be resolved by voting. The House was designed to take that sort of approach. But the House is larger than it needs to be and it does not reflect the work we do or how we operate.

The noble Lord, Lord Burns, did the House a great service with his report; he focused minds. These are issues that we will return to, but he established an important principle that the House should look at dealing with some of these issues. It is very important that we do, because our views on how we should operate matter. This goes back to earlier debates about the skills and experience required, and about the make-up of the House that we want to see. We will have that debate in a moment, I am sure, on the amendments from the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra. This has been an important debate and I am grateful to both noble Lords for their amendments, but I would respectfully urge them not to press them.

[Lord Burns (CB)]

My Lords, I am very grateful for all the comments that have been made about the Lord Speaker’s Committee’s report and in response to the amendment. I am very grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Hain, who been supportive throughout this process; that has been important to ensure that we did really have cross-party support.

The noble Lord, Lord Newby, raised the allocation of places. I thought I mentioned this in my remarks, and it was certainly set out in some detail in the Lords Speaker’s Committee’s report. New appointments should be allocated according to the proportion of the votes in the previous general election. That would certainly be reflected in the number of Liberal Democrats. I appreciate there would be a problem if there was suddenly a very big shift in the voting behaviour in the country—for example, if a new party emerged. Then, of course, there would be some issues about balance.

The noble Baroness, Lady Finn, emphasised the whole question of whether it really matters what size the House is—it needs to come and go according to the rhythm of the place. But the reality is that without a ceiling on the House, the numbers have gone up and up over the whole period since there have been life peerages. There is no control mechanism with these arrangements. Whatever we do in the short term to bring down the numbers, if we do not have a commitment on what we want the size of the House to be and a mechanism for keeping it there, I can see nothing other than that the numbers will continue to rise.

House of Lords (Hereditary Peers) Bill

Lord Burns Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 10th March 2025 Lords Chamber

[Earl Attlee (Con)]

My Lords, the noble Baroness is of course absolutely correct on her point and I strongly support her.

The issue of fixed-term peerages or membership of the House is indeed closely related to the issue of age limits, so I have some sympathy with what the noble Baroness, Lady Garden, said. I think that the overall answer to both issues is a retirement age that is agreed or understood at the time of appointment for new Peers. I hope that gives some comfort to the noble Lord, Lord Desai.

Once the hereditary Peers have gone, the remaining Peers who are over 70 now will come under considerable media pressure. It is no use avoiding this point. To an even greater extent than younger Peers, such older Peers are, rightly, not very responsive to what the media think or what the media want them to do. Rather, they do what they believe is in the public interest and in accordance with the Nolan principles. I am not sure that that is what the media want. I think that having 80 year-old Peers will be made to seem just as indefensible as hereditaries are incorrectly claimed to be today.

I would not underestimate the value to the House of Lords of having some Peers whose experience goes back a very long way. For instance, I advised a noble Baroness on the Cross Benches who was faced with an assisted dying Bill. She erroneously believed that she could not try to kill the Bill at Second Reading; I advised her that she could and that I had seen it done some time before. Sure enough, she succeeded in her endeavours. Unfortunately, when drafting this speech, I could not avoid the words “kill”, “fatal” or “euthanise” or the phrase “put out of its misery” when talking about the procedure related to an assisted dying Bill.

I am not opposed to term limits, provided that those who propose them are clear about what they want the House to do. However, the Wakeham report identified a danger, in that term limits could deter potential new Members—a point well made by the noble Lord, Lord Cromwell.

[Lord Burns (CB)]

My Lords, perhaps I could comment on one or two of the points being made. The Lord Speaker’s Committee, which I chaired, did indeed make the proposal that there should be either 15-year or 20-year term limits. We looked at both of them and came down in the end marginally in favour of 15-year term limits.

That was against the background not of this Bill, of course, but of also promoting the idea of a ceiling on the size of the House of Lords. The great argument in favour of term limits is that it generates a predictable number and a predictable flow of levers, which can then work alongside a limit on the size of the House. It then provides the scope for both refreshment of the House and a change in the political balance over a period of time, which is also very important, and it all can be done in an orderly way. The proposal that we made was in this context of several other changes that were suggested, rather than something which was standing on its own.

The proposal we made was also to be applied only to new Peers. We said that it should begin then and was a long-term proposal. It was the only real mechanism we could find whereby you could stabilise the numbers over time and have the capacity to make changes. After all, there are term limits for most people in most legislatures. Most of them are determined by the electorate and by what happens to people when they meet the voter. There is nothing new about this: it is a very useful mechanism, but not really a mechanism for this Bill. I accept that it is for another day, but in the argument about a more balanced and wider group of changes being made, I would be very supportive of this important mechanism at that time.

[Baroness Smith of Llanfaes (PC)]

My Lords, my Amendment 73 is included in this group and supported by my noble friend Lord Wigley and the noble Baroness, Lady Jones. I thank them for their support.

Most noble Lords will be aware by now that my goal is to see this place abolished and replaced with a democratic second Chamber. However, in the meantime, I am determined to push forward even small steps that can have a meaningful impact. Amendment 73 is a simple step towards achieving radical reform. I am asking His Majesty’s Government to implement a term limit for Members in this place, capped at no more than 10 years.

While I commend the tabling of several other amendments by noble Lords proposing term limits, the shortest among them is 15 years. By international standards, 15 years is extremely long for an appointed Chamber. In fact, it is three times longer than the most common term length of five years, with the next most common being just four years. Based on this evidence, we can also see that 10 years is extremely abnormal. However, I wish to note that my amendment seeks to establish a ceiling and not a target.

I have drafted Amendment 73 with a 10-year ceiling to allow His Majesty’s Government to investigate the various ranges of term limits before bringing forward a final proposal. I tabled the amendment because I firmly oppose the prospect that anyone should have a job for life. It is absurd in most settings, but completely inappropriate for an establishment that is supposed to be accountable to the people of these nations. We cannot honestly believe that someone can be forever representative of others.

Others have tabled amendments that would set a retirement age, which we will cover in the next group. Although this could be a good practice to introduce, I fear that setting a retirement age without a term limit would fail to address the imbalanced composition of this Chamber. This approach would not solve the issues that the Bill and these amendments aim to address—namely, the number of Members and the diversity of this Chamber.

Following my advocacy for term limits at Second Reading, I was asked by a Member of this House where I would get a job after my term was up. Would I not struggle with the loss of power and influence after being a Member of this place? I have reflected on this question, and I cannot escape the conclusion that it reveals a deeply flawed perception of what this institution should represent. It is precisely this kind of thinking that underscores the urgent need for term limits. No one in our position should see this role as a source of power. It is and must always be a responsibility, a duty to serve—not a privilege to cling to. If we ever lose sight of that, reform is not just desirable but essential. Therefore, I stand by my statement that term limits are the best way of addressing these issues. Implementing this amendment would guarantee that the Chamber undergoes regular renewal and revitalisation, with Members carrying out their duty with a strong sense of responsibility and commitment to their role, knowing that their time in office is limited and impactful.

Some argue that regular and continuous changes to the second Chamber might be disruptive. However, this amendment does not propose changes that would result in Members being unable to stand for re-election. I propose that we counter the supposed issue of turbulence by following the example of the Australian Senate. There, term limits are six years, with half the Senate elected every three years. This provides a staggered approach that ensures that at least a proportion of the upper Chamber is elected less recently than the lower Chamber. It means that membership is less affected by changes in the political mood. Implementing a term limit can also prove an effective way to ensure that Members of this Chamber do not exceed a certain number, and that representatives better reflect the voices of the public.

I would be grateful if the Minister could share with us some of her thinking about term limits. Does she see this as a possible reform that His Majesty’s Government would consider as part of this Bill or as a short new Bill? What is His Majesty’s Government’s view on life appointments?

House of Lords (Hereditary Peers) Bill

Lord Burns Excerpts

2nd reading
Wednesday 11th December 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Burns (CB)]

My Lords, I support the Bill, and I support it because, along with others, I cannot accept that there should be a fast-track, reserved route into this House because of a person’s parentage. Despite the long history of the House, which I respect, it cannot be right that 10% of the seats in this House should continue to be filled in this way.

My first reservation is the implication that all excepted hereditary Peers should be required to retire once the Bill becomes law. Often, they have given up alternative careers to join this House and they make a valuable contribution. As a group, they attend and vote, if anything, more often than life Peers.

However, I am afraid that the blame for this potential cliff edge lies clearly with the previous Government. The Private Member’s Bill of the noble Lord, Lord Grocott, provided ample opportunity to abolish the by-elections and to allow this category of membership to disappear gradually. Not only did they refuse to support the noble Lord’s Bill, they made appointments to this House disproportionately to their own party. They tried to defend it using the opportunistic argument that they were underrepresented in this House compared with the House of Commons. The result, as we know, is that the present Government arrived in office with around 100 fewer seats than the present Opposition.

I accept the criticism that, if all we do is remove the excepted hereditary Peers, this will leave this House in a position where the number, affiliation and timing of future appointments are entirely at the behest of the Prime Minister of the day. As we have seen in the past, this is a mechanism for leapfrogging between the parties and increasing the size of the House.

However, there is a better answer to this criticism than the continuation of the hereditary principle. As proposed by the Lord Speaker’s Committee, this could be avoided by having a limit on the size of the House and having a fair allocation of appointments to political parties, with reference to their performance at previous general elections. In addition, all appointments could be required to be approved by HOLAC.

I support the Government’s proposal that in future the relevant party should publish a statement of the reasons for a proposed appointment, if it is successful; but I would go further and require the individuals concerned to make a statement to HOLAC about the time they would devote to the activities of the House, and the ways in which they would contribute. This could also be published if they were successful.

It follows from my earlier comments that I have a second reservation: the Bill does not take the opportunity to impose a ceiling on the size of the House. Without a ceiling, I fear that it will be possible to fill all the spaces created by the removal of the excepted hereditary Peers by appointments at the whim of the Prime Minister. I hope that the Government can be persuaded to include in this Bill—or at a later point—a ceiling on the size of the House, and a mechanism for a fair allocation of appointments.

The presence of Members through the hereditary route is undoubtedly a historical anomaly. However, the position whereby a Prime Minister can make whatever number of appointments they wish, and to whichever party they choose, is also an anomaly. I am not sure which of these is the most difficult to justify.

House of Lords Reform

Lord Burns Excerpts

Tuesday 12th November 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Burns (CB)]

My Lords, reflecting my role with the Lord Speaker’s committee, I will speak about controlling the size of the House. The Lord Speaker’s committee started by trying to understand why the size of the House had risen in the way that it has and the pressures that have emerged on membership to bring about this increase over time. It has sometimes been a quite rapid increase. The committee concluded that there are several features of our existing arrangements that generate this problem, leading, of course, to the adverse publicity the House often receives. To solve the problem, we need to identify the outcome we seek and implement a package of measures that addresses these features.

The first feature is the absence of a limit on the size of the House, which makes the House of Lords almost unique among legislative Chambers. The second, which has already been mentioned, is that Prime Ministers can make any number of appointments and to whichever party they choose. It is a quite astonishing situation. It is not surprising that appointments during a Parliament have tended to be predominantly to the Prime Minister’s own party, and that decisions on appointments are not always based on the likely contribution a Member will make to the business of the House. Thirdly, there is no retirement age or term limit. The number of leavers is not predictable and generally it is less than the number of appointments Prime Ministers wish to make.

The consequence of these three features is constant “leap-frogging” when there is a change of Government, as successive Governments seek to change the balance of the House in their favour. Over time, as this is repeated, we see an inevitable increase in overall numbers. Putting this right is likely to require changing each of these features. I do not believe that there is any single measure that would in isolation sustainably solve the problem we have identified. Simply getting the number down today is not enough; it is also about keeping them down.

For me, the most important change remains that there should be a limit on the size of the House. It should probably be no larger than the House of Commons. When the Lord Speaker’s committee undertook its work, it was proposed that the House of Commons would come down to 600 Members. Of course, it has remained at 650, so we have more generalised this to say that we are looking for a House that has a membership no larger than the House of Commons.

On that basis, and if we had a limit, appointments would be made only when there are vacancies. This would go a long way to providing incentives for sensible appointments and departures. To avoid leap-frogging, there needs to be a fair balance of appointments between the parties so that, when there is a change of government, the new Government do not need to make a rush of appointments to catch up. The committee recommended that this should be based on an average of the percentage of votes and seats at the most recent general election.

Finally, there should be a term limit, an age limit or some combination of the two. This would ensure a steady flow of leavers to make way for refreshment and adjustment to the composition when it is needed.

What does this mean in practice for our present situation? First we need an agreement on these principles, and then we need agreement on a transition from where we are today.

For the purposes of my remarks and thinking about this, I assume that the House of Lords (Hereditary Peers) Bill becomes law, although I recognise from listening to the debate that this remains a very contentious issue. Today, including those on leave of absence or disqualified, there are 716 life Peers. Getting the numbers down to 650 during this Parliament probably requires introducing an age limit. Again, rather like the leader of the Liberal Democrats, I am not averse to age or retirement limits. They apply in almost every other activity that I have been associated with and are an essential part of the refreshment of organisations.

However, the Government’s manifesto proposal is to introduce a retirement age of 80, which would mean some 300 of the present life Peers retiring by 2029, if the Parliament runs its full course. This goes further than needed to have a House smaller than the House of Commons or to create space for rebalancing the numbers between the parties. On its own, my fear is that without a cap on the size at the same time, we will be back in the same place before long, despite having gone through this process. A higher retirement age of, say, 84 or 85 coming in following any legislation and then every year afterwards would be a more gradual process and could get us close to 650 Members by the end of the Parliament.

At some point there will have to be legislation, or agreement between the parties, on a fair allocation of future appointments between them along with a continuing proportion to the Cross Benches. I hope that within these principles, identifying what the problem has been about size, the Government are able to come forward with the kind of co-ordinated action I have described today rather than this emphasis upon one or two measures.