House of Lords (Hereditary Peers) Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateBaroness Smith of Llanfaes
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(2 days, 7 hours ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, my Amendments 70 and 72 are included in this group. On recent comments relating to the function of the House, I tried to table some amendments about the function of the House but it is out of the scope of this Bill, so it is not part of what we can debate.
Amendment 70 calls on His Majesty’s Government to review the appropriateness of an unelected Chamber. While I am a Member of this place, it is my mission to see this House abolished and replaced with an elected Chamber that better represents the needs, diversity, backgrounds and lived experiences of people across all four nations. As the late Earl of Sandwich pointed out in his valedictory speech, I will do my duty right up to abolition. My position on an unelected Chamber has been clear from my maiden speech in this place right up to today. An unelected Chamber is inappropriate, outdated and obviously undemocratic. Why is it that the UK promotes democracy at home and abroad, yet fails miserably in ensuring that our own nations are governed by a democratic mandate? With record low levels of trust in politics and a Government who have pledged to restore public confidence in the political system, surely now is the time to radically transform this place.
A recent poll by the Electoral Reform Society found that just 2% of the British public have confidence in the House of Lords. We must ask ourselves why that is. I suggest that an element of distress stems from the fact that this Chamber could not be further removed from the lives of the people we make decisions on behalf of, given that the public have no influence over who gets to become a Member of this place. In fact, the Prime Minister’s hold over appointments to this House was even challenged by the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, who said on our first day in Committee on this Bill:
“I simply will not be able to get a life peerage”.—[Official Report, 3/3/25; col. 80.]
We have become a gated community of more than 800 Members, without the public having a say in who those Members are. Democracy is built on the principle that people get to choose; they have a say in how their lives are governed. It seems contradictory that a body with no direct mandate from the electorate should have influence over matters that deeply affect people’s day-to-day lives.
As we are in Committee, we will all have the opportunity to contribute.
An unelected Chamber is, at best, an assault on democracy. I ask your Lordships to reflect on whether an unelected Chamber is appropriate in 2025. Amendment 70 calls on His Majesty’s Government to do just that. The Prime Minister, Keir Starmer, has himself previously stated that it is indefensible. It is time for His Majesty’s Government to act.
I now move to my second amendment in this group—
Before the noble Baroness moves to her second amendment—
As we are in Committee, if possible, I will complete my remarks.
Amendment 72 fleshes out how we could have an elected Chamber. There are currently 78 bicameral parliaments globally, with 55 of those being largely or wholly elected. We are an exception to that rule. The UK has one of only two second Chambers without any elected element, the other being Lesotho.
Another poll by the Electoral Reform Society found that an elected second Chamber was the most popular option, with 47% of the British public saying that they should have the power to choose through elections. Does this figure not clearly highlight the public’s desire to see a second Chamber that reflects their needs and values? We are not here to serve our own interests; we are here to represent the people across our nations. If we believe that, which I hope everyone here does, we have no problem in accepting and indeed promoting the abolition of an unelected Chamber in today’s world.
It has been reassuring to see several Members of your Lordships’ House tabling amendments to probe the establishment of a democratic House. I will briefly speak to these amendments before moving on to my own proposal on how we might want to achieve this through Amendment 72. Amendments 11 and 115, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Newby, function as good starting points for reforming the composition of this House, which I support. However, I do not believe that they go far enough in outlining the model that might bring about a Chamber that best represents the people of these nations. However, they have my support in progressing and securing a move to a democratic mandate for this House.
Amendment 72 seeks to address these gaps and offers a further fleshed-out solution. Plaid Cymru believes that proportional representation should be the mechanism used to elect representatives. Specifically, we favour the single transferable vote electoral system. This system allows voters to have a real choice on who represents them by reducing the pressure to vote tactically. I believe this system would establish a second Chamber that is truly elected by the people, creating a balanced Chamber where everyone is represented.
Adopting this system also results in a greater diversity of candidates, with multiple candidates selected by a party. That a second Chamber in the UK desperately needs more diversity if we are to see a more representative legislative body cannot be disputed. This is not wishful thinking; far from it. Northern Ireland, the Republic of Ireland, Malta and Scotland already use this system in some of their elections, and noble Lords noted other examples earlier.
Australia’s second Chamber also adopts this system, and it works. This has ensured that the Government are much less likely to control the Senate, meaning that the Senate is not always swayed by changing political tides, and the Chamber more accurately reflects the first voting preference of the electorate.
While I firmly believe that STV would be the preferable choice, there are multiple ways it could be implemented. Neither my own amendment nor the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Newby, specify it being 100% elected; there could be space for a Cross-Bench group to be represented as part of that model. It is crucial to consult a broad range of stakeholders to ensure that such a constitutional change follows a fully democratic process. That is why, in new subsection (2) proposed by Amendment 72, I have specified that the Secretary of State must consult various bodies, including devolved Governments, political parties and representative organisations.
If we are to establish a Chamber that generally serves the people of these nations, constitutional decisions must not be confined to the remit of Westminster alone. I call on His Majesty’s Government, as well as everyone in this place, to reconsider the appropriateness of an unelected Chamber in the 21st century and join me in my mission for abolition.
My Lords, perhaps I could comment on one or two of the points being made. The Lord Speaker’s Committee, which I chaired, did indeed make the proposal that there should be either 15-year or 20-year term limits. We looked at both of them and came down in the end marginally in favour of 15-year term limits.
That was against the background not of this Bill, of course, but of also promoting the idea of a ceiling on the size of the House of Lords. The great argument in favour of term limits is that it generates a predictable number and a predictable flow of levers, which can then work alongside a limit on the size of the House. It then provides the scope for both refreshment of the House and a change in the political balance over a period of time, which is also very important, and it all can be done in an orderly way. The proposal that we made was in this context of several other changes that were suggested, rather than something which was standing on its own.
The proposal we made was also to be applied only to new Peers. We said that it should begin then and was a long-term proposal. It was the only real mechanism we could find whereby you could stabilise the numbers over time and have the capacity to make changes. After all, there are term limits for most people in most legislatures. Most of them are determined by the electorate and by what happens to people when they meet the voter. There is nothing new about this: it is a very useful mechanism, but not really a mechanism for this Bill. I accept that it is for another day, but in the argument about a more balanced and wider group of changes being made, I would be very supportive of this important mechanism at that time.
My Lords, my Amendment 73 is included in this group and supported by my noble friend Lord Wigley and the noble Baroness, Lady Jones. I thank them for their support.
Most noble Lords will be aware by now that my goal is to see this place abolished and replaced with a democratic second Chamber. However, in the meantime, I am determined to push forward even small steps that can have a meaningful impact. Amendment 73 is a simple step towards achieving radical reform. I am asking His Majesty’s Government to implement a term limit for Members in this place, capped at no more than 10 years.
While I commend the tabling of several other amendments by noble Lords proposing term limits, the shortest among them is 15 years. By international standards, 15 years is extremely long for an appointed Chamber. In fact, it is three times longer than the most common term length of five years, with the next most common being just four years. Based on this evidence, we can also see that 10 years is extremely abnormal. However, I wish to note that my amendment seeks to establish a ceiling and not a target.
I have drafted Amendment 73 with a 10-year ceiling to allow His Majesty’s Government to investigate the various ranges of term limits before bringing forward a final proposal. I tabled the amendment because I firmly oppose the prospect that anyone should have a job for life. It is absurd in most settings, but completely inappropriate for an establishment that is supposed to be accountable to the people of these nations. We cannot honestly believe that someone can be forever representative of others.
Others have tabled amendments that would set a retirement age, which we will cover in the next group. Although this could be a good practice to introduce, I fear that setting a retirement age without a term limit would fail to address the imbalanced composition of this Chamber. This approach would not solve the issues that the Bill and these amendments aim to address—namely, the number of Members and the diversity of this Chamber.
Following my advocacy for term limits at Second Reading, I was asked by a Member of this House where I would get a job after my term was up. Would I not struggle with the loss of power and influence after being a Member of this place? I have reflected on this question, and I cannot escape the conclusion that it reveals a deeply flawed perception of what this institution should represent. It is precisely this kind of thinking that underscores the urgent need for term limits. No one in our position should see this role as a source of power. It is and must always be a responsibility, a duty to serve—not a privilege to cling to. If we ever lose sight of that, reform is not just desirable but essential. Therefore, I stand by my statement that term limits are the best way of addressing these issues. Implementing this amendment would guarantee that the Chamber undergoes regular renewal and revitalisation, with Members carrying out their duty with a strong sense of responsibility and commitment to their role, knowing that their time in office is limited and impactful.
Some argue that regular and continuous changes to the second Chamber might be disruptive. However, this amendment does not propose changes that would result in Members being unable to stand for re-election. I propose that we counter the supposed issue of turbulence by following the example of the Australian Senate. There, term limits are six years, with half the Senate elected every three years. This provides a staggered approach that ensures that at least a proportion of the upper Chamber is elected less recently than the lower Chamber. It means that membership is less affected by changes in the political mood. Implementing a term limit can also prove an effective way to ensure that Members of this Chamber do not exceed a certain number, and that representatives better reflect the voices of the public.
I would be grateful if the Minister could share with us some of her thinking about term limits. Does she see this as a possible reform that His Majesty’s Government would consider as part of this Bill or as a short new Bill? What is His Majesty’s Government’s view on life appointments?
My Lords, in view of the hour, I shall attempt to be brief, but I would like to speak in support of the thrust of the amendments proposed in this group. I do so in the context of the Government’s wider manifesto commitments.
I do not want to trespass upon or pre-empt discussion of the next group of amendments, which cover retirement on account of age. But if the Government’s objectives are to reduce the size of this House and continually to refresh the skills and experience of Members, retirement based on term rather than age is a viable and, I argue, preferable alternative. Given that the manifesto commitment to a retirement age is missing from this Bill and that, within a year of this commitment being formally made, new Peers above the proposed mandatory retirement age have already been appointed, one might objectively conclude that the Government may be reconsidering the method by which retirement can best be achieved.
Why do I favour the principle of term limits? Discrimination on the basis of age is illegal in many walks of life, including in the workplace. In the corporate world with which I am most familiar, law and best practice have moved away from age and towards terms. As far back as 2007, the Companies Act requirement setting the age limit for directors of public companies at 70 was repealed. This has effectively been replaced by the Corporate Governance Code, which stipulates that non-executive directors should be appointed for terms subject to re-election. This principle is generally considered to have served stakeholders well, and it is extremely rare that any company would seek to contravene it.
So what should that term be? These amendments span a range of 10 to 30 years, with the upper limit being achieved only by a series of five-year reappointments. Again, I take as my starting point the Corporate Governance Code. It provides that any term for a non-executive director beyond six years should be subject to particularly rigorous review and should take into account the need for progressive refreshing of the board. In practice, all other things being equal, directors would be asked to serve at least six years and most up to nine years. That naturally leads me towards the lower end of the ranges proposed.
I believe that there is merit in Members serving for at least two full parliamentary terms, 10 years, and that the flexibility of allowing a five-year extension is sensible. Beyond that, it may be that the balance of, on the one hand, continually refreshing the skills and experience of Members of the House and, on the other, retaining the wisdom and contribution of existing Members starts to become too skewed away from the former.
Most unhelpfully, my views do not conform precisely with any one of the amendments, but they are best aligned in principle and in detail with Amendment 13 in the name of the noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Harries, as amended by my noble friend Lord Hailsham in Amendment 15. However, I strongly believe that, given the significance of such a change, it must be right for transitional arrangements to be put in place for existing Peers. Amendment 66 in the name of the noble Viscount, Lord Thurso, distinguishes in this regard between existing peerages and peerages yet to be created, a proposal that has much merit.