Nuclear Weapons (International Relations Committee Report)

Debate between Lord Browne of Ladyton and Baroness Goldie

Tuesday 16th July 2019 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

My Lords, I first apologise for being slightly late into the Chamber; I was caught unawares by the preceding Statement ending a little early. I thank my noble friend Lord Howell for tabling this Motion and all noble Lords for their perceptive and helpful contributions. I particularly pay tribute to him and his committee colleagues for a thorough and comprehensive report. To me, it is a significant contribution to a subject of vital importance. I know my noble friend Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon is very sorry not to be responding to this Motion. He has important duties this week in Washington at the 2019 Ministerial to Advance Religious Freedom, hosted by the State Department. I also say to the noble Lord, Lord Collins, that we are all very glad to hear the positive news about his colleague, the noble Lord, Lord Judd.

This debate comes at a time when the international security environment is increasingly complex—at times fraught—and arms control frameworks are coming under increasing challenge. In this context, we should not underestimate the positive impact of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, and its enduring value as a central pillar of the rules-based international system that the United Kingdom has done so much to build and uphold. I welcome the chance to reflect on the achievements of the treaty, outline some of the challenges we face and set out what we are doing to overcome them.

The NPT was built on consensus and has been at the heart of global efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation and encourage nuclear disarmament efforts for nearly 50 years. It has overwhelmingly delivered on its objectives and we should celebrate its success. To quote the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, it has made “a massive contribution”. I realise that this is a difficult debate for the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb; I may not support her view on unilateral disarmament, but I respect and see the passion with which she holds it. Let me try to reassure her by now turning to the NPT and considering it in a little more detail.

First, the NPT has limited the proliferation of nuclear weapons. At the time of its inception, the world feared a widespread arms race that could have resulted in dozens of nuclear-armed states within decades. The NPT helped to persuade some countries to abandon their pursuit of nuclear weapons and to ensure that many more did not seek to acquire them. Secondly, it has provided the framework and confidence for a significant reduction in nuclear weapons following the end of the Cold War. The UK has provided a good exemplar, significantly reducing its nuclear weapon stockpile since the Cold War peak. Finally, the treaty extended the benefits of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy around the globe. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Grocott, for his recognition of these virtues. His map in the report is encouraging, and I commend him on his imagination in suggesting its inclusion.

The non-proliferation treaty continues to offer a framework that is central to our goal of achieving a world free from nuclear weapons. The value of this treaty is widely recognised by nuclear weapon states and non-nuclear weapon states alike, which is why it has received near-universal acceptance. As we approach the 50th anniversary of the treaty next year, noble Lords should be in no doubt that this Government remain committed to its step-by-step approach to multilateral disarmament. The noble Lord, Lord Purvis of Tweed, raised that point. This approach includes the universal application of the NPT, the prompt entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty and the start and successful conclusion of negotiations for a fissile material cut-off treaty in the Conference on Disarmament.

However, I must be candid: significant further disarmament is difficult to foresee in the current security environment. Some countries are expanding their nuclear arsenals and pursuing a reckless path of breaching arms control and disarmament treaties, as well as developing destabilising new delivery systems for nuclear weapons. We must remain resolute in working to deter such threats and in facing down those who seek to undermine decades of progress. Against this complex security backdrop, the UK’s independent nuclear deterrent remains essential to both our security and that of our NATO allies, for as long as the global security situation demands.

But even in this challenging context and environment, we are making progress towards verifiable, treaty-based future disarmament. Part of this requires us to understand and overcome the challenges in verifying nuclear disarmament, so that all states can have confidence in the process. The UK continues to play a leading role in developing verification tools and techniques working alongside nuclear and non-nuclear weapon states. We hosted the first-ever verification exercise for nuclear disarmament in 2017, as part of our quad partnership with Norway, Sweden and the United States. We are active participants in the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification. We also took part in the recent UN Group of Governmental Experts on verification.

Next year’s NPT review conference falls 75 years after nuclear weapons were released on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, 50 years after the NPT entered into force, and 25 years after it was indefinitely extended. It is clear to us that the NPT remains as relevant and important now as it has ever been. That is not just the United Kingdom’s view: it is widely shared around the world. However, we also know that even a treaty as important as this requires constant nurturing to ensure that it remains effective.

My noble friend Lord Howell mentioned that trust—I think that is the word that he used—is key and he is absolutely correct. The UK is doing everything we can to encourage trust and confidence, which is also important. That is why we are working with international partners to ensure that the review conference reinforces our shared interests and seeks to advance its goals.

My noble friend Lady Anelay of St Johns asked how we were preparing for this review conference and whether we can resolve differences. The noble Lord, Lord Collins, also raised that point. We recognise that achieving consensus at the review conference will be challenging, but we will invest all our energies in striving for a positive outcome. As part of our preparation between now and the conference, we will chair the P5 dialogue, which was established a decade ago by the United Kingdom to build mutual trust and confidence between the nuclear weapon states.

The noble Lords, Lord Browne of Ladyton, Lord Hannay and Lord Collins, the noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Harries of Pentregarth, and my noble friend Lord King raised some apprehensions about the backdrop to this conference. The noble Lord, Lord Browne of Ladyton, particularly raised the issue of new START. That is a bilateral treaty between the US and Russia. It is a decision for the US and Russia to take forward discussions about extending the treaty and we of course support effective arms control. There is no doubt that new START contributes to international stability. All allies support continued implementation, early and active dialogue and ways to improve strategic stability, and we will use our best efforts to encourage an extension of it. But at the end of the day it is a decision for the United States and Russia.

In an intervention, my noble friend Lord King raised the position of India and Pakistan. Having made his intervention, he now seems to have disappeared, but I will share with the rest of the Chamber that he wondered if they would be parties to the next P5 dialogue. It is correct that that would require the agreement of all P5 members because the P5 process is primarily for NPT issues, but we encourage discussion among all these countries in a variety of fora, so we have noted those important concerns. In addition, we plan to engage in discussions on transparency and risk reduction with all state parties.

Noble Lords raised a number of points that I would like to try to deal with, if I may. The question of cyber capability and cyber risks arose, and that is no surprise. It was raised by my noble friend Lord Howell and the noble Lords, Lord Browne of Ladyton, Lord Purvis of Tweed, Lord West and Lord Collins, the noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Harries of Pentregarth, and the noble Baroness, Lady Smith of Newnham. It is an important issue to raise in the context of the report and of this debate. The Government take their responsibilities for maintaining a credible independent nuclear deterrent extremely seriously. We have robust measures in place to keep that nuclear deterrent safe and secure. We invest significant resources in ensuring protection against cyber and other threats. However, as noble Lords will understand, it is not government policy to comment on specific security measures relating to the nuclear deterrent, for the purposes of safeguarding national security. I reassure noble Lords that, more broadly, the Government doubled investment in cybersecurity to £1.9 billion in the last strategic defence and security review in 2015. No one is indifferent to or casual about the immensity of that threat. It is the threat of the modern age and the Government are acutely aware of it.

[Lord Browne of Ladyton]

On the Government’s commitment to cybersecurity, every single time this issue is raised in whatever context in this House the government spokesperson raises this point about £1.9 billion—without explanation. The £1.9 billion announced in 2015 and again in 2016 is to cover five years of all the work that the Government do on cybersecurity in every aspect of public policy. But the National Audit Office reported on that in March this year. My reading of that report suggests that the true figure is £1.3 billion and that, in the first two years, the Treasury transferred 37% of the funding to other matters that were priorities for the Government that were not originally intended to be included. Can we please in future have specific information on the issue that is before the House about how much is being spent by the MoD on the Dreadnought programme and on cybersecurity? That is the question, not what the Government may or may not be spending on cybersecurity writ large.

[Baroness Goldie]

I hear the noble Lord, but he will understand as well as anyone, with his distinguished experience in these matters, that we cannot comment on specific security measures and I do not think he would expect the Government to do that. But I hear his detailed questioning about the funding. I have no specific information available this evening, but I undertake to make further investigation and write to him.

The noble Lord, Lord Purvis of Tweed, raised a couple of issues about policy and strategy—essentially, why the UK maintains a nuclear deterrent and what our commitment to disarmament is. I suggest that actually the two are not mutually exclusive. It is clear from the evidence that the committee received that the Government have a strong record on nuclear disarmament. We have significantly reduced the size of our own nuclear forces since the Cold War peak and we have about 1% of the total global stockpile. But it is absolutely clear that the independent nuclear deterrent remains essential to our security today and will do for as long as the global security situation demands. It has existed for more than 60 years to deter the most extreme threats to our national security and way of life and I submit that it is helping to guarantee our security and that of our allies. But the commitment that we have to the NPT is manifest. Noble Lords will understand my suggestion that the two positions are far from mutually exclusive.

The noble Lord, Lord Hannay, raised the matter of Russia and the strategic approach. His specific question was about whether at the recent meeting between the Prime Minister and President Putin any discussion had taken place. Apparently, a wide range of issues was discussed, including global security issues, but I have no more specific information than that.

My noble friend Lady Anelay raised paragraph 197 of the report and how the Government proposed to respond in practical terms in their dealings with nuclear possessor states. We have regular and frank exchanges on such issues through the P5 and bilaterally and we encourage all possessor states to recognise their responsibilities and to refrain from destabilising rhetoric and destabilising technology.

A number of noble Lords raised Iran, including my noble friend Lady Anelay and the noble Baroness, Lady Smith of Newnham. The UK expressed deep concern that Iran is pursuing activities inconsistent with its commitments under the JCPOA. We did that in a statement with France and Germany earlier this month. The UK remains committed to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. We think it is important for our security and for neutralising the threat of a nuclear-armed Iran. We and remaining parties are working hard to ensure that it is upheld for as long as Iran meets its commitments, including full IAEA access. I say to the noble Baronesses that the Government regret the United States’ decision to withdraw from the JCPOA and reimpose sanctions, but we continue to work with our European partners and Iran to try to find solutions to support economic relations.

I think my noble friend Lady Anelay also raised the Gulf of Oman and the Straits of Hormuz. We are concerned at tensions in that area and we are doing everything we can to de-escalate them by diplomatic means. However, international maritime law must be respected and upheld. We shall protect British shipping in the region. The recent escort of a British tanker by HMS “Montrose” demonstrated our resolve to offer that protection.

The noble Lord, Lord Grocott, raised the issue of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. We remain fully committed to the 1995 resolution on the Middle East and to the establishment of a zone free of all weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems in the Middle East. We believe that realistically that is going to be possible only when political solutions are found to the tensions in the region. We believe that the convening of a conference has potential but we think it will be worth while, valid and achievable only if it is on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at by all states in the region, as set out in the 2010 NPT review conference plan.

It is clear that the NPT has made a substantial contribution to international security and prosperity. It succeeded in all three of its pillars and has earned its place as the central pillar of the arms control architecture. This Government remain committed to multilateral disarmament. We will continue to work tirelessly to uphold the NPT and to explore practical ways to achieve a world without nuclear weapons.

This has been an extremely helpful and interesting debate. I once again commend my noble friend Lord Howell and his committee for their hard work in producing this report. It is a very useful report. I realise that this was difficult for the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, but the report and what we have debated this evening indicate what is possible when people are bonded by the same objective and motivated by the same desire. Perhaps perversely, she and I have the same objective; we just have different ways of arriving at it.

I conclude with the words of my noble friend Lady Anelay still ringing in my mind: a watched pot never boils. I think we all agree that this is a situation and a subject where we do not want the pot ever to boil.

Ebola Outbreak: Democratic Republic of the Congo

Debate between Lord Browne of Ladyton and Baroness Goldie

Monday 20th May 2019 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Goldie]

I thank the right reverend Prelate for his remarks. The whole Chamber will recognise that he speaks with deep personal knowledge, and I am sure a degree of personal pain, in understanding what is happening in that country. Sadly, it is the case that community trust is one of the most challenging aspects. When we consider that there have been ongoing attacks on both Ebola treatment centres and front-line health staff, it paints a very depressing picture indeed.

As I said, working in conjunction with the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and other global and NGO partners, we are endeavouring to address the very issues the right reverend Prelate talks about. My right honourable friend the Secretary of State for DfID made it clear in the other place that he is actively engaged in such dialogue to determine how pressure can best be brought to bear. He was very clear that pressure might have to be brought to bear on the Government and opposition parties, United Nations agencies, NGOs—whoever. Certainly, the UK Government are prepared to pursue that energetic role if that would make the attainment of treatment more realistic for the very people now needing it and surmount the challenges that the noble Lord, Lord Patel, rightly identified as being the impediment to getting treatment to those people.

[Lord Browne of Ladyton (Lab)]

My Lords, as the noble Lord, Lord Patel, said, we have the technical ability to tackle Ebola. We know that. This outbreak in the DRC faces an incredibly complex challenge of insecurity, which I do not intend to go into in much detail, but it also faces an underfunding challenge. I thank the Minister for repeating the Statement, which was comprehensive and very informative, and speaks well for the Government. The insecurity challenge is enormously difficult—war has been raging in the DRC for a long period—but the underfunding challenge is simple. The Red Cross says that it needs $30 million to carry out all of its activities in the DRC and to prepare the surrounding countries for the likelihood of spread. It has half of that. The international community has behaved disgracefully. It promised much more than it has delivered. The Government should concentrate on putting pressure on our international allies, friends and others to come up with the money that they said they would donate for this crisis.

[Baroness Goldie]

I thank the noble Lord. I am sure that the point he makes will resonate not just in this Chamber but beyond. He is right: funding remains a concern. The World Health Organization continues to report gaps in funding of critical activities. The UK has been one of the major donors alongside the USA, the World Bank, ECHO and Gavi, and continues to lobby other donors to contribute, but the noble Lord is right to identify an area of profound concern. Certainly, this Government will be untiring in our efforts to persuade other parties that they need to step up to the plate.

Brexit: Withdrawal Agreement and Political Declaration

Debate between Lord Browne of Ladyton and Baroness Goldie

Wednesday 9th January 2019 Lords Chamber

[Lord Browne of Ladyton (Lab)]

My Lords, I speak in support of the Motion of my noble friend Lady Smith of Basildon, and I am delighted to follow the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth of Drumlean, for a number of reasons. He has given me an opportunity to use a sentence that I never thought I would in my political career, which is that I agree with him. The Prime Minister’s deal is unacceptable. I am not tempted to engage with the elements of his excellent speech simply because I want to change the subject.

When she opened this debate on 10 December, the noble Baroness, Lady Evans, the Leader of the House, sought to persuade us that the withdrawal agreement and the political declaration represent the national interest and that they should be considered and,

“voted on as a package in the other place”.

She described the political declaration as outlining,

“the scope and terms for our country’s future relationship with the EU”.—[Official Report, 5/12/18; col. 979.]

Others have spoken before me, such as the noble Lords, Lord Dobbs and Lord Forsyth, and it seems to me that there is much more scope in this political declaration than there are terms. That relationship, she said, included security and defence, law enforcement and criminal justice, and referred to a security partnership which the Government assert will keep our citizens safe and will require negotiation of the broadest and most comprehensive security relationship in the EU’s history.

The UK’s internal security is a matter of the greatest importance and consequently I shall confine my remarks to the internal security challenges that the Prime Minister’s deal has generated for us, although, largely, these challenges are ignored by the Government Front Bench in this place and in the other place. On occasions their treatment of this issue has been more egregious than that.

On 17 December, when Theresa May returned from the European Council she said in a Statement to the other place,

“our Brexit deal includes the deepest security partnership that has ever been agreed with the EU”.—[Official Report, Commons, 17/12/18; col.527.]

At best, that language was odd; at worst, it was misleading. To clearly state that we have an agreement when no such agreement exists is misleading.

Thankfully, others were more straightforward. During the Recess, this issue dominated the news agenda for two days, on 27 and 28 December. The Metropolitan Police Commissioner, Cressida Dick, said in an interview on the “Today” programme that the consequences of not having a security deal—a no-deal Brexit—will,

“be more costly, undoubtedly … and potentially, yes, put the public at risk”.

In the same interview she said that our security would be lessened even if the Prime Minister’s deal is approved. That latter point received less publicity, but essentially is the issue that I want to expand on in this speech.

Apart from the Leader’s passing reference in her opening remarks to the necessity of the further work required to turn the political declaration into a legally binding treaty and the aspirational vocabulary of the declaration itself, no government spokesperson has ever given us any further information about how they plan to achieve their ambitious objective of,

“the deepest security partnership that has ever been agreed with the EU”.

Importantly, they have not admitted what they know to be the case—that the full benefit of membership of the EU in security terms cannot be replicated under the proposed deal at its very best. That was the very point that Cressida Dick made in her “Today” interview.

On 17 February 2018, at the Munich security conference, Theresa May pleaded for an urgent deal with the EU on post-Brexit security co-operation, warning:

“This cannot be a time”,


to,

“jeopardise the security of our citizens”.

Rightly, she said that the,

“threats we face do not recognise the borders of individual nations or discriminate between them”,

that a “deep and special partnership” in security was needed and that,

“we cannot delay discussions on this”.

In particular, she warned that if there is no special deal on security by the time Britain leaves, extraditions under the European arrest warrant will cease, and if the UK does not continue to be part of Europol, information sharing will be hampered, undermining the fight against terrorism, organised crime and cyberattacks, and putting all of our citizens at greater risk.

On 19 June in Vienna, in a speech at the EU Agency for Fundamental Rights, Michel Barnier clearly set out the EU 27 position on security co-operation. The European arrest warrant, Europol, The Schengen Information System, the European Investigation Order, and the ability to enforce judicial decisions across Europe in real time have obvious benefits for all Europeans, he said. Co-operation of this nature is both unique and unprecedented throughout the world but, as he set out in his speech, the trust that underpins this legal infrastructure requires common rules and safeguards, shared decision-making, joint supervision and implementation and a common court of justice.

What Monsieur Barnier described was an “ecosystem”. He was blunt in saying if you leave this ecosystem, you lose the benefits of this co-operation. While explaining that the EU wants an ambitious new relationship with the UK, he admitted that realism demands that we are honest about what is possible when the UK is outside of the EU’s area of justice, freedom and security and outside of both the EU and Schengen. My intention in this speech is to give the Minister the opportunity to be honest about what is possible in these circumstances.

I remind the House that in her Statement on the December European Council, the Prime Minister could not be said to have been fully honest with us when she said that we already had the necessary security partnership with the EU. Intelligence officers, police chiefs, security officials and even the Security Minister are constantly stressing how crucial quick and efficient data exchange is to counterterrorism, policing and law enforcement co-operation, and to Europe’s security. Most of this is done through access to EU databases, to which access is limited to those with EU or Schengen membership. There is clearly no guarantee that the UK could have access to this data post-transition, and there is no precedent for a non-EU country having such access.

At Munich, Theresa May reminded us that the UK has extradited 10,000 people through the European arrest warrant. For every eight warrants issued by other member states, we issue only one. She reminded us that the EAW had played a crucial role in supporting police co-operation in Northern Ireland and is fundamental to the security situation there. I remind noble Lords that before the European arrest warrant entered into force, 13 out of the then 25 member states, including Austria, Germany and Poland, had constitutional restrictions on extraditing their citizens. Some prohibited the extradition of their own nationals for all crimes. That is the situation in which we will find ourselves with those countries post our leaving the European Union.

In her opening remarks, the noble Baroness echoed a point that has been made repeatedly by the Prime Minister and other Ministers: that negotiating requires compromise. The question that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen of Elie, cannot duck in his response is: on what elements of security and to what extent are the Government willing to compromise? In the absence of an answer, the Government cannot expect our support. Nobody voted for less security when they voted for Brexit.

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

My Lords, the contributions are exceedingly interesting but overrun creep is beginning to enter the proceedings. I respectfully remind your Lordships of the advisory time limit of six minutes.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Debate between Lord Browne of Ladyton and Baroness Goldie

Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard - continued): House of Lords
Monday 26th February 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Browne of Ladyton (Lab)]

It is crucial that we understand that the Prime Minister proposed in Munich a treaty for what was referred to as “internal security”, which is internal security within the European Union. It would be a treaty which had plenty of detail and clearly reflected co-operation with the existing institutions of the European Union—that is where we get into discussion about the European Court of Justice. But for external security, there would be co-operation. Why this difference? Why a treaty for internal security, and why just co-operation on global security, with a clear indication that we would leave the European Union’s foreign policy on the date of Brexit?

[Baroness Goldie]

There seems to be an inescapable distinction between these two positions. In relation to the internal security of the EU, there can be a meaningful discussion about what we can do to assist and support that, but when it comes to external security and just as I have outlined, there is a multiplicity of other positions, agencies, alliances, relationships and partnerships which govern what we do. I can see that what would be appropriate to deal with one scenario might not be appropriate to deal with another, but I say that without prejudice to whatever the negotiations are currently covering. I am not privy to the detail of the negotiations, but there seems already to be evidence that constructive dialogue is taking place. From what we have heard from the Prime Minister and her absolute and unqualified commitment to security and to trying to embark on as close and harmonious a relationship as we can get with the EU post Brexit, there is no doubt about her conviction on these matters.

We have to work as closely as we can with the EU post Brexit. The Prime Minister has made that crystal clear and is right to do so. The UK is not without influence. As the noble Baroness, Lady Deech, noted, it enjoys a status in relation to these matters—I refer again to our P5 position on the United Nations Security Council. One area in which people have been sceptical is in their asking why the UK should be treated differently from other third-country partners as we try to negotiate new arrangements with the EU. Taskforce 50 noted in its presentation on external security that the EU would lose one of its two permanent members of the Security Council when the UK leaves. Taskforce 50 recognises that this could merit a specific dialogue and consultation mechanism with the UK.

Perhaps I may return to a very legitimate question posed by a number of your Lordships: what is all this going to look like and is there any sort of shape to it?