2 Lord Browne of Belmont debates involving the Attorney General

Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Bill

Lord Browne of Belmont Excerpts
Monday 24th June 2013

(10 years, 10 months ago)

Lords Chamber
Read Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
Lord Fowler Portrait Lord Fowler
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

If the noble Baroness does not mind, I am not going to give way again.

I do not think that we can or should try to double-guess what is taking place in the other place, or the process that it goes by, or the way it comes to a vote. We will get into a terrible mess if we do that. Not surprisingly, this proposal is going to be seen as a wrecking amendment in the hope, I presume, that it can be defeated when it comes to a referendum. I leave aside the dispute about opinion polls, although every poll I have seen actually appears to suggest that there is a healthy majority in favour of this proposition and not the other way around.

My major reservation is this—it is a point that was touched on by the noble Baroness—concerns the role of this House. We do valuable work checking and improving legislation. What we do not do is stand in the way of legislation so clearly passed by the other place and, incidentally, endorsed in this House. That is what the debate about the future of the House of Lords was all about: what our place was. It was not a sort of double-guessing on major things that come from the House of Commons. I do not think we can possibly defer for two years a piece of legislation that has been—I say it again—overwhelmingly passed by both Houses. We would not dream of doing that for any other legislation I can think of, saying that we would have a referendum in two years’ time, although it has been passed in this way. I do not think that we should do it now. In this case, the proposition of a referendum is misapplied and wrong.

Lord Browne of Belmont Portrait Lord Browne of Belmont
- Hansard - -

My Lords, I rise briefly to support Amendment 48. As has been made plain throughout the debates on the Bill, marriage is a vital institution and, as such, the subject of redefining marriage touches people’s deepest feelings and beliefs. It is not a change that should ever be countenanced without a clear manifesto mandate. I know that some noble Lords have tried to suggest that it is not always necessary to have a manifesto mandate. In response to that, however, I agree strongly with everything that the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Swansea, has said.

There are some changes that perhaps it is possible to introduce without a mandate, although I have to say that it does not seem particularly like best practice unless one is responding to an urgent national security imperative. When it comes to changing the definition of something that has been defined one way for millennia and in relation to which there is a real sense that Parliament has not so much defined marriage, but rather reflected a pre-existing definition, it is absolutely imperative to have a manifesto mandate. I find it shocking that such an innovation should have been produced without one.

I know that there is a notion that the Conservative Party’s A Contract for Equalities is somehow a manifesto mandate, but I believe that that does not stand up to scrutiny. In the first instance, that document was not the manifesto. In the second instance, it talked in terms only of considering same-sex marriage, but did not make a pledge to redefine it. The change it said the party would “consider”, on page 14 of the document, was to reclassify civil partnership as marriage. That is a considerably more moderate proposal than what has been presented in this Bill. In the third instance, it was not published until three days before the election, long after postal voting had begun.

The problems associated with the failure to approach the very far reaching changes proposed by the Bill without respect for the basic rules of democracy have been greatly compounded by the subsequent disregard for constitutional due process: the lack of a Green Paper, a White Paper, a draft Bill and pre-legislative scrutiny. Of particular concern, however, has been the way in which the one consultation on the Bill was conducted. The noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Swansea, has already commented on that.

Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Bill

Lord Browne of Belmont Excerpts
Monday 17th June 2013

(10 years, 10 months ago)

Lords Chamber
Read Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
Lord Browne of Belmont Portrait Lord Browne of Belmont
- Hansard - -

My Lords, I am pleased to support Amendment 16, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Cumberlege. As a former teacher, I am well aware that for many years the law has respected the conscientious objection rights of atheist teachers, who are not required to officiate at religious assemblies or to teach RE if they do not wish to do so. This respect for conscience in the workplace is despite the fact that, first, teachers are public servants, paid for by the taxpayer, and secondly, that religious assemblies and RE are public services. I have to say that this is absolutely right. Imagine living in a country, the laws of which were such that they would say to atheist teachers, “You must be willing to officiate at a religious assembly or lose your job and your livelihood”. That would be totally wrong.

The truth is that if the Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Bill is introduced unamended, far from creating the difficult precedent that the Minister in the other place suggests, we would be departing from an important liberal democratic precedent that makes it plain that there is space for different people, with different beliefs and identities, to be employed in the public sector.

I am well aware of the national registration panel’s briefing, which we have heard about this evening. In response, I should like to make two points. First, it does not seem very well connected to registrars. It is clear from the judgment in the Ladele case that there are a number of local authorities that make use of the fact that they do not have to designate all registrars as both marriage and civil partnership registrars precisely because conscientious objection is a concern for at least some registrars. I find it very strange that the panel seems unaware of, or is at least unwilling to acknowledge, this practice.

It is very important to remember that when, in 2005, your Lordships’ House scrutinised what was then the Civil Partnership Bill, the flexibility arising from the dual designation system was apparent and an expectation of reasonable accommodation in practice was expressed by the Labour Minister at the time, which was in sharp contrast to the Conservative Minister today. On 13 July 2005, the late Earl Ferrers said to the then Minister, the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Scotland:

“Is the noble Baroness saying that, although we must have tolerance, understanding and everything like that given the fact that other people have views different from ours, a registrar who holds certain beliefs, feels that they cannot carry out that part of their duty and says so will not be threatened with dismissal? As I understand it, they can be, for not doing their work. That is just as intolerable and non-understanding as the other way round”.

To this, the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Scotland, said:

“There are the Employment Equality (Religion or Belief) Regulations, which should preserve the opportunity for those who work to adhere to those religious beliefs. When many public functions are performed, there are a number of people of different beliefs, orientation and structures who can fill the place … Those who manage such situations sensibly if there is a conscientious genuine belief usually make alternative practical arrangements so that there is not embarrassment for the people who come forward for the service, and so that there is not the struggle of conscience for the person who legitimately wants to carry out a good job. Usually, both can be accommodated. In terms of delivery of a service in accordance with the law, public authorities must be able to make provision to enable the law of this land to be enforced”.—[Official Report, 13/7/05; col.1154.]

Secondly, I am disturbed that the panel brushes aside the hugely important issue of conscientious objection on the basis of administrative complexity. This is a very small price to pay for upholding our liberal democratic traditions. The noble and learned Baroness, Lady Scotland, did not take this view of reasonable accommodation and although Islington Council deliberately choose not to with respect to Lillian Ladele, the fact that other local authorities have satisfactorily provided reasonable accommodation suggests to me that it is eminently possible.

The marriage Bill before us today, however, presents a much worse threat to freedom of conscience than the Civil Partnership Act. The truth is that, although there was nothing in the Civil Partnership Act to stop local authorities like Islington insisting that all registrars were designated as both marriage and civil partnership registrars, the fact that local authorities do not have to do this means that there is potential for adopting a more enlightened approach. This has clearly happened in some areas, as the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Scotland, rather suggested it should. There will, however, be no scope for this in relation to the marriage Bill because people will continue to be designated simply as marriage registrars. There will not be an option of being designated as a different-sex marriage registrar or a same-sex marriage registrar. In effect, the line adopted by Islington, with no potential for reasonable accommodation, will be extended right across the board.

The national panel for registrars may not be bothered about conscience but I believe that we, as part of the Parliament of a leading liberal democracy, have a duty to be bothered. I submit that the marriage Bill would be dangerously illiberal without Amendment 16, and I commend it to the Committee.

Baroness Noakes Portrait Baroness Noakes
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

My Lords, I shall be brief because I am sure that we want to hear from the Front Benches fairly soon. I have been slightly disturbed by this debate, in part because one of the precedents that has been used to support this conscience objection is abortion. To try to equate the conscience provisions allowed in respect of abortion with those that might be put in place for civil marriage is to compare chalk and cheese. It is very inappropriate to try to do that.