(10 years, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I support these amendments. First, I declare an interest as the honorary president and a former director of the Child Poverty Action Group. It is an organisation which helped to pioneer the use of judicial review for the marginalised citizens about whom we heard in debating the previous amendment, thus emphasising that we are talking about not just the interests of lawyers but the interests of some of the most deprived, marginalised citizens of our country. I speak also as a member of the Joint Committee on Human Rights. I remind your Lordships’ House that in the first of our two reports on our grave concern about the human rights implications of these changes, we said:
“We therefore do not consider the Government to have demonstrated by clear evidence that … judicial review has ‘expanded massively’ in recent years as the Lord Chancellor claims, that there are real abuses of the process taking place, or that the current powers of the courts to deal with such abuse are inadequate”,
notwithstanding what the noble Lord, Lord Horam, said with regard to the previous amendment. I have reread our debates on this issue and I have read all the briefing that we have received. I can only come to the conclusion that the provisions in Part 4 are a series of highly imperfect solutions looking for a problem—a problem that no one else can see.
As regards Amendment 157, in Committee I raised the concerns of NGOs. I said that they warn of,
“the chilling or deterrent effect of these clauses, which appear to mean that people who are not directly party to the proceedings but who have supported an applicant could be held liable for costs”.—[Official Report, 30/7/14; col. 1601.]
Michael Spencer, solicitor for the Child Poverty Action Group, said:
“If individuals or groups fundraise or seek donations to help bring their case, the financial clauses of the Bill will put their donors and funders at risk too”.
The Minister responded quite fully to my concerns and fears. He said that,
“we do not believe that the provisions would affect the common law position concerning when costs would be awarded against a party … These clauses should not cause anyone to pay costs who would not do so under the current law, except those who should but of whom the court is unaware. I hope that will allay, to some extent, the fears that some have about making challenges to a school or some other small project, which they might reasonably hope would be the subject of a judicial review”.—[Official Report, 30/7/14; col. 1612.]
However, I fear that the concerns and worries of groups outside this House have not been allayed. As the most recent briefing from this very wide group of NGOs, which represents a wide range of lawyer and non-lawyer interests in this area, still raises concerns, I discussed with Justice why it was still worried about this, despite the reassuring words that the noble Lord gave us in Committee. Justice said:
“While the Minister’s assurance is welcome, as the Minister explains, he cannot predict how the courts will respond to the change in position proposed by the statute. Similarly, Parliament cannot have a full picture of the rules which the court will be applying, as the Bill provides for the detail of the change to be in the rules to be set down by the rules committee. Yet, there is nothing in the Bill which would send a message to the courts that they should not depart from their previous approach to the allocation of costs. If the Government doesn’t intend to change the position in the common law, the question is: ‘Why not make that clear on the face of the Bill?’. Instead, by leaving the ambiguity in place, and creating a clean statutory slate of instructions for the courts, Ministers are creating a real risk that individuals will be deterred from litigating while the costs risk is ascertained. As and until the position is clear, individual solicitors will be unable to advise their clients on the likely costs risk, if any. Caution will be required. The breadth of the disclosure requirement in Clause 71 makes this chilling and deterrent effect particularly dangerous”.
I will not go on but there is a real danger here that I hope we in this House will prevent happening.
My Lords, I, too, support Amendment 157 for the reasons already given by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and the noble Baroness, Lady Lister. There are indeed currently real perils in Clause 71 in the way of the chilling effect that it must inevitably have. In Committee on 30 July, as reported at col. 1607, in relation to what was then Clause 65 and is now Clause 71, the Minister twice said that the senior judiciary welcomed this provision. I was troubled by that and looked at the response of the senior judiciary of last November. I hope that I have the right document and that I have isolated the right paragraphs; that is, paragraphs 34 and 38. I am sure that the Minister will correct me if I am wrong, They suggest that, in certain circumstances, there should be mandatory disclosure of financial circumstances. As I read that response—and I am unsurprised by this—the important point is that it refers only to when determining whether to make a protective costs order or when questioning,
“whether to make a costs order against a non-party”.
Those are not routine events, and they would not require, as the clause as it stands does, a disclosure of financial resources on all applications. If I am wrong about that the Minister will correct me, but if I am right, with respect, that wholly deprives him of the support on which he rested in Committee: the senior judiciary’s response.
My Lords, I simply do not accept that it is right that a requirement for financial disclosure should be imposed before the permission stage in a judicial review application. The time for considering such information is when the order for costs is considered, and not before. At the costs stage—the stage with which Clause 72 is concerned—it is clear which side has won, and the judge knows who is and who is not vulnerable to a costs order. Only at that stage is the issue of financial support relevant, and at that stage the present position is that the judge already has the power to make a costs order against a non-party who has financially supported an unmeritorious application. There is no utility in expanding or developing that power further. But if there is to be legislation, I urge the House to accept that it should be left to the discretion of the judge as to what order for costs he makes. There may be some sense, however, in legislating for the court at that stage to have the power to require financial information in order to help the judge form a conclusion. That is the limited purpose of my amendments to Clause 72. With your Lordships’ consent, I shall detain the House no further.
(10 years, 2 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, in over half a century in the law, inevitably one comes across a number of injustices in individual cases of one sort or another. However, I think I can fairly say that I have never come across an injustice as plain and persistent as this on an institutionalised basis, because that is what this is, and it grows worse with every passing year.
In order to understand how truly shocking it is, it is necessary to understand three basic matters. First, preventive detention, which IPPs essentially amount to—incarcerating people on an indefinite basis, not as punishment for what they have done but to guard against the risk that they may cause harm if they are set at liberty—is basically inimical to our sense of fairness. It is true that we accept that discretionary life sentences can be passed in the cases of the most serious and dangerous offenders, but that is really a very far cry from IPPs, with which we are concerned here, which extended to no fewer than 153 specified different crimes. They were, of course, as has been explained, abolished in 2012 once the basic unfairnesses finally came to be recognised.
(10 years, 4 months ago)
Lords ChamberIn that case I look forward to addressing the Committee on that matter later.
My Lords, I add my name to those who have raised the objections to these clauses. The noble Lord, Lord Davies, says that one should have greater precision if one is going to legislate in this way. The fact is that you cannot have greater precision. This feature of the Bill, like so many other features of Part 4, should be left to the courts to work out. As has already been said, there is an existing and entirely satisfactory body of law which governs the ability to pursue cost orders from unseen funders and backers of litigation—those who mischievously or for their own advantage support litigation—but not from those who, appropriately and philanthropically, rightly back public interest causes.
Indeed, in the justice briefing on these aspects of the Bill there is a footnote—a reference to a case that the noble Lord, Lord Davies, mentioned a few moments ago: Hamilton v Al Fayed (No. 2), which was decided in 2003. Noble Lords will find this an illuminating judgment—it is one that I myself wrote—that provides an ample basis for developing this area of the law. This should be left to the courts. We should not seek to deal with it in this way, which is necessarily going to lack precision because legislation cannot address all the varying circumstances that could arise.
In the circumstances, I am following what the noble and learned Lord is saying particularly closely. He seems to think that it is adequate that the courts should set rules on these matters. Does he not agree that it is very important that a citizen should always know in advance whether he or she is incurring liability, just like a solicitor needs to know in advance whether he or she is breaking the law? There should be no ambiguity in these matters. It should be quite clear what constitutes support, potential support or the creation of potential liability. It is very unreasonable that the citizen should be left in any doubt on that subject.
I am grateful for that intervention, which in fact underlines the point. The fact is that it is impossible. No one could draft a set of principles or rules that would accurately dictate in advance how the judicial discretion in this matter would be exercised in all possible circumstances. All that one can do is to give indications. That is what we sought to do in Hamilton and it is what the courts will do on a case-by-case basis when this question arises. You cannot categorically set out all the various circumstances. Costs are always a difficult matter. They are left to judicial discretion, and that is how it has worked down the generations. No one has ever previously tried to prescribe that the courts must in certain circumstances—or must not, in other highly specific circumstances—order costs. The real problem with this provision is that it will be used to limit access to judicial review to those who have substantial independent means. It will be used effectively to deter others from pursuing litigation because they will feel that they are at risk of endangering their supporting family or other properly supporting bodies.
My Lords, I am delighted to hear from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, with all his experience, that the system of financing litigation by the no-win no-fee system, as it has been called, is working reasonably well. Many noble Lords will remember that the introduction of that system was not without a certain amount of difficulty for those who were promoting it.
I think that it is not correct to say that legal aid has been removed from judicial review. My understanding is that legal aid is available up to the point at which the judicial review is permitted to go ahead or not. Subject to this, the payments to the lawyer in question will depend on whether or not the judicial review is allowed to go ahead from the point at which the respondent to the judicial review has replied to the description of the review that is put forward under the protocol. Nothing else, as far as I understand, is affecting legal aid. That seems to me completely reasonable in the circumstances of judicial review.
The last time I spoke on this part of the Bill, I hope that I made it clear that I cherish judicial review as a very important aspect of our judicial process. However, I have pointed out, and I believe that it is beyond doubt, that the scope for judicial review is a deal greater than it was many years ago when the finality clauses were in force in many provisions of statute. One has to be careful in approaching any restrictions on judicial review, though, as the noble and learned Lord who is the President of the Supreme Court has said. I am certain that the clauses that we are dealing with today, particularly the first of them, are very much in that category, and that considerable care is required.
One of the difficulties about judicial review that has been brought to my attention quite frequently over the past years is the sort of circumstance that the noble Lord, Lord Marks, referred to. I will not preface it in the way that was done earlier—I am sure that he will understand why not. In a village, nearly all the villagers are interested in having a certain decision of the local authority overturned. The villagers go to their lawyer, who says, “Well now, let’s see. Is there anybody in the village who is rather poorly off?”. Perhaps, fortunately for the system, there is no such person, in which case they have to continue on the ordinary basis, without legal aid. However, if somebody in the village qualifies for legal aid, under the scheme that can operate we will find that the whole village is able to go ahead on the basis of legal aid in such a way that if the application is unsuccessful, the litigant who is legally aided is of course protected against a court order.
The last time I spoke I illustrated how that had happened in quite a considerable campaign against the previous Government’s educational policy on academies. In the literature that was produced at the time, one thing that was said was, “So far, all the people who are applicants are entitled to legal aid, so the whole litigation will be at the expense of the taxpayer”. That is a difficult situation. The point is not that the person of little means is being in any way impeded, but that they have become an instrument for attacking the taxpayer generally. I am not sure as yet what the right way to deal with that problem is, but it certainly needs to be dealt with. I suppose that the courts could deal with it, but the difficulty is that there are a lot of individual applications, each of which is usually dealt with separately. In the case of the Government’s policy on academies, most of the attacks were based on local considerations—although, as was said, the whole scheme was being attacked.
I certainly regard it as of the utmost importance that any rules of this kind that are put forward are very carefully scrutinised. It may well be that as phrased in this clause they are somewhat on the wide side. However, it does seem that there is a problem that your Lordships will need to address in some way to preserve justice for the taxpayer, as well as for the litigant. I am not at all in favour of putting any more difficulties in the way of a proper litigant applying for judicial review than exist at the present time. I am concerned at the development of matters around judicial review over the years—and over recent years in particular. To have a shell company that is set up particularly for the purpose of promoting a judicial review strikes me as somewhat strange, and whether the rules are sufficient to cope with that is a matter that I would like to hear about.
The other aspect, referred to by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, is standing. I mentioned the other day that I was nominated as senior counsel for the Crown in the original decision on standing in this House, but the courts have expanded the concept of standing quite fully since then. I am not certain whether it embraces the standing of a shell company set up by people to protect themselves against the possibility of court costs. No doubt those who are more familiar with recent practice will be able to help me on that point. For the time being, it seems to me that there is a problem to be dealt with, and I am anxious to learn whether the proposals in the Bill or the amendments are a better way of dealing with it.
(10 years, 4 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, first, I apologise that I have not spoken on the Bill before, but I wanted to intervene on Part 4. At Second Reading, the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, observed that Part 4 raises “citizens’ issues”. I hope that noble Lords will agree that it is therefore important that non-lawyers—who were referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Carlile—add their voice in support of the highly expert advice from the great legal minds in your Lordships’ House. Not only are those citizens’ issues, but they affect in particular poor and marginalised citizens, including, in the words of the Bar Council,
“some of the weakest and most vulnerable in society”.
Here I declare an interest as an honorary president of the Child Poverty Action Group, and a former director and legal research officer—believe it or not, although I am not a lawyer—of that group back in the 1970s, when the group spear-headed what came to be known as the social security law test case strategy, under the late Sir Henry Hodge, or the plain Henry Hodge as he was then, as CPAG’s solicitor. According to an evaluation of that strategy, Henry Hodge saw it as having an,
“independent value in obtaining substantive improvements in the law and in producing a higher standard of behaviour from administrators”.
Those are still two important functions of judicial review that are now under threat.
I fear that CPAG may be one of the organisations that the Government had in their sights, given that Mr Iain Duncan Smith accused it of “ridiculous and irresponsible behaviour” and “an ill-judged PR stunt” when the High Court dismissed a challenge to the housing benefit cap, for which it had been granted a cost protection order and permission on the basis that the case was arguable and raised issues of public importance. In contrast, Sir Stephen Sedley, in oral evidence to the Joint Committee on Human Rights, of which I am a member—I have a feeling that the Minister was himself a highly valued member at that point—said that,
“not all public interest litigation is hostile; it can be creatively used, and has been in the past. The Child Poverty Action Group was a pioneer in this respect, to elucidate the law to the benefit of everybody who is involved. Social security is a very good example, because it is an arcane and hideously complex area of law, where it is easy to get things wrong and a mistake can affect millions of people. It is very much to the advantage of everybody if the Government collaborates with challengers like the CPAG in getting the issue to the core”.
I speak today not so much as an honorary president of CPAG but as a member of the Joint Committee on Human Rights, which recommended that this clause be deleted from the Bill. I therefore support the contention that it should not stand part of the Bill, as well as supporting those amendments that would revert to the status quo. I will not rehearse at any length the arguments of the JCHR, some of which were quoted on Second Reading; there are arguments of both principle and practice, including that we should not be condoning unlawful decision-making, and the danger that it would mean that the permission stage became a full dress rehearsal and therefore could be more rather than less costly. However I would like to emphasise what is perhaps a key human rights point, when we said that it may give rise to breaches of the right of access to court in ECHR Article 6(1),
“a right which, in order to be practical and effective rather than theoretical and illusory, includes the right of access to a legally enforceable remedy”.
On this argument alone I believe that the clause should not stand part of the Bill. But as we have heard today, and earlier at Second Reading, there are also other persuasive arguments.
My Lords, I support all the detailed amendments in this group but, more fundamentally, I support the root and branch opposition raised by all those who have put their names to Clauses 64 to 67 not standing part of the Bill. It is with regard to that basic question that I want to say a few words today. Whether the thinking which underlies these provisions is, as some would suggest, positively and consciously mischievous, or merely misconceived and mistaken, I do not know. However, it would be a grave misjudgment if we were to allow them to pass into law. If they are persisted in, I hope that on Report this House will reject them.
What the Government are proposing here is a heresy. With regard to Clause 64, it is a double heresy. Without repeating all that I said at Second Reading, I will try to explain what I mean. The basic heresy here is to treat judicial review—which of course is the title of the whole of this part of the Bill—as a matter generally suitable for legislation at all. Essentially, I suggest that it is not. I seriously wonder if those who are behind these proposals understand the intrinsic nature of this supervisory jurisdiction. Judicial review is no more and no less than the exercise of the courts’ inherent jurisdiction to ensure that the decision-making of the Government, their executive action, remains within the bounds of legal propriety. As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, explained today, it is judge-made law par excellence; it has been and should remain, essentially, a matter for development and control by the judges themselves. If ever there was an area of the law that for the most part should remain free from legislative interference, it is this. It is difficult, perhaps impossible, to think of any field of law less suitable for legislation, for government diktat as to its future development. Most obviously this is so with regard to provisions which, as here, are designed to essentially cramp and narrow down judges’ powers and discretions. In this field of inherent control of administrative action, it is intended to discourage those who seek to question the legality of governmental decision-making.
In truth, these provisions would make serious inroads into the separation of powers; they would represent a significant shift in the constitutional balance between the judiciary and the Executive. That is the basic heresy that underlies the entirety of Part 4—the supposition that Parliament rather than the judges should decide how the court’s supervisory jurisdiction should be exercised, and its development and control, which are essentially matters of procedure.
(10 years, 5 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I do not suggest for a moment that those in favour of the Bill, as I am, have any monopoly of compassion, wisdom, insight or humanity on the question before us. I recognise that there are powerful arguments and deeply held convictions on both sides of the debate. However, by the same token as the Supreme Court in its recent judgment recognised that, essentially, it is for Parliament rather than for judges whether and if so how to change the present law, I urge that, in circumstances such as these, with strongly held views on each side, Parliament itself should pay particular regard to the views and feelings of the public at large and, in this instance, should try to accommodate what, from my postbag and the statistics, is the substantial majority, who clamour for change. It is clear that many people are deeply unhappy with the law as it stands. We defy their views at our peril. The peril is that we lose respect for the law. That is indeed a slippery slope.
I shall say a brief word on the particular relevance of the Supreme Court case touched on by other noble Lords today. The court was concerned with two appeals which dealt with very different situations from those addressed by the present Bill. The first, main appeal concerned two catastrophically handicapped patients: the late Mr Nicklinson, his appeal being continued posthumously by his wife after he had painfully starved himself to death because his earlier appeal had been dismissed; and another man, both paralysed. Neither of them faced imminent death, but both were desperate to end their lives, which, after many years of suffering, they were each finding intolerable. The other appeal concerned somebody who wanted to end his life by going to Dignitas in Switzerland. He needed assistance from one of his carers, and he was trying to get the court to force the DPP to issue clear guidance in relation to healthcare professionals.
As your Lordships will readily see, neither appeal therefore concerned anyone in the very limited category of cases addressed by the Bill today: the terminally ill, those who can truly be said to have reached the final stage of their lives and are desperate to bring the misery of the dying process to a close. Although not directed specifically to our situation, the general tenor of the judgments—I have read them all—seems to me clearly to support the very modest and limited objective of the present Bill. None of the judges thought the present law satisfactory; all of them recognised the importance of personal autonomy—the right to choose at the end of life, as during life.
I would not want to hide the fact that some members of the court did send out, in addition, a clear message that Parliament really needs also to address the further questions raised by the Nicklinson kind of case. To that extent, at least, the noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Harries of Pentregarth, is right. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Neuberger, said,
“there seems to me to be significantly more justification in assisting people to die if they have the prospect of living for many years a life that they regarded as valueless, miserable and often painful, than if they have only a few months left to live”.
He added that, although it was understandable that in the case of those shortly to die the decision whether to permit them to be assisted should be left to doctors, it might well be preferable in cases such as that of Mr Nicklinson to have the decision taken instead by a High Court judge following a judicial process.
I rather agree with that but, with respect, that is for another day for argument on a very different Bill, which may well come but is not before us. The present Bill, I repeat, is confined to those already dying. I cannot accept that the relief of their particular plight requires or could easily accommodate the full panoply of the High Court process. Either way, the question of safeguards should be left to Committee; the Bill should be given its Second Reading.
(10 years, 5 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, most of what needs to be said on this amendment has already been said and said eloquently by my noble and learned friend Lord Lloyd of Berwick, who has championed the cause of this desperately unfortunate cohort of prisoners for some time past.
I have added my name to the amendment, however, and speak as one of five Members of this House sitting in an appellate capacity in May 2009 in the case of James, Wells and Lee before those prisoners took their case to Strasbourg. Although in this House we felt obliged to dismiss their appeals, all of us were fiercely critical of the way in which the IPP regime had been introduced in 2004 by the 2003 Act. I observed that it was a most regrettable thing that the Secretary of State had been found to be, indeed had admitted by then to having been, in systemic breach of his public law duty at least for the first two or three years of the regime. That was in the period prior to the 2008 amendments, so it was in respect of the period from 4 April 2005 to 14 July 2008.
The European Court of Human Rights, as is well known, went further than we had felt able to do. In the case of those three applicants, whose tariffs were respectively two years, one year, and nine months, all having been sentenced in 2005, the European Court concluded that,
“following the expiry of the applicants’ tariff periods and until steps were taken to progress them through the prison system with a view to providing them with access to appropriate rehabilitative courses”,
their detention had been arbitrary and therefore in breach of Article 5.1 of the convention. In so holding, the Strasbourg court emphasised, at paragraphs 203 and 204 of its judgment, that those three prisoners had been sentenced during the initial phase of the regime when the sentence was mandatory, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd, has explained, with the judges required to assume dangerousness—in their case—and leaving no room for the exercise of any judicial discretion. It is precisely that cohort of prisoners to whom our proposed amendment is directed and to whom it would apply.
In 2012, at much the same time as Strasbourg was deliberating on those cases, LASPO was enacted here, abolishing the IPP regime from 2012 for all time. Importantly for present purposes, as again the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd, has explained, it introduced a means of improving the lot of those unhappy prisoners who had earlier been sentenced under it. It did this by Section 128, enabling the Secretary of State by order in effect to relax the usual criteria by which the Parole Board decides whether to direct a prisoner’s release.
It is at this stage that I want to make brief mention of a celebrated case, already touched on by the noble and learned Lord and well known to all who are ever interested or concerned in public or administrative law. I refer to the case of Padfield v Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, decided by this House nearly 50 years ago in 1968. There, as here, a discretion had been conferred by legislation on the Minister. There, as here, the Minister had declined to exercise that discretion. I do not pretend that the factual context there was remotely analogous to that here, but I believe that the following, frequently cited passage from Lord Reid’s judgment has a real relevance in the present context, too. This I quote from the report in 1968 appeal cases at page 1030:
“Parliament must have conferred the discretion with the intention that it should be used to promote the policy and objects of the Act; the policy and objects of the Act must be determined by construing the Act as a whole and construction is always a matter of law for the court. In a matter of this kind it is not possible to draw a hard and fast line, but if the Minister, by reason of his having misconstrued the Act or for any other reason, so uses his discretion as to thwart or run counter to the policy and objects of the Act, then our law would be very defective if persons aggrieved were not entitled to the protection of the court”.
If one now asks, “What are the policies and objects of LASPO?”, the 2012 Act, there can surely be no doubt. Parliament was at one and the same time abolishing what by then had become recognised to be an unfair and unsustainable penal scheme, essentially providing as it had for preventive detention, and allowing the Secretary of State by order to abate or at any rate ameliorate the injustices that had arisen from the scheme and which remained from earlier years. The amendment would cut the Gordian knot with regard to the most unfairly treated group of IPP prisoners: those who must by definition have served at least three times—quite possibly, up to 20 times—the length of their tariff sentences. I say at least three times because, by definition, their tariffs were less than two years and they were sentenced before July 2008, which is now six years ago.
For my part, I urge in addition that the Secretary of State should now, at long last, exercise his Section 128 discretion in respect not only of that cohort but of others lucklessly left over from the IPP regime, for example, others sentenced in the earlier years when the court had no option but to pass indeterminate sentences. At the very least, surely the Secretary of State should now direct the Parole Board to reverse the burden of proof. At the moment, prisoners are required to prove that they would constitute no threat to the public on release. Surely that burden should now be placed on the Secretary of State for Justice.
However, for the 773 prisoners who would benefit from the amendment, we suggest that enough is enough. They should simply be freed. No doubt some will reoffend following release, but at least we shall have placed some limit on the ever-growing length of their preventive detention, and that stain will have been removed from our criminal justice system.
My Lords, this is my first contribution on the Bill; I apologise that I could not participate at Second Reading. The amendment deals with a matter about which I feel very strongly. I speak as a layman, not as a lawyer; we have heard excellent analysis from the noble and learned Lords, Lord Lloyd and Lord Brown.
At present, on figures I have received today, there are still 5,206 prisoners in the UK serving IPP sentences—sentences that were, as we have heard, abolished in 2012. Of those, 3,575 prisoners have already passed their tariff. As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd, mentioned, the Parole Board releases about 400 inmates every year at the present rate of release. That means it would take nine years to clear the backlog.
In March this year, I led a debate in your Lordships’ House calling for a rapid assessment of those serving those sentences. I argued that priority should be given to those who were originally given tariffs of two years or less. I will not repeat all the arguments today, but noble Lords may remember that in that debate, I mentioned that when the sentences were first introduced, courts had little discretion in choosing whether to impose an IPP sentence, and many were handed out for offences such as burglary and robbery. One tariff was set as low as 28 days.
I am therefore very glad to lend my support to Amendment 17. I am grateful to the noble and learned Lords, Lord Lloyd and Lord Brown, for tabling it. I warmly support the initiative. I ask the Minister whether he can sleep at night when he thinks of people who have been so long in prison—way beyond the period for which they expected to be there.
(10 years, 5 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I, too, congratulate the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, on securing this debate and on introducing it so engagingly. Although I prefer to regard the Motion as a call to arms rather than a glorification of our legal history, I cannot resist the temptation to start by listing some, at least, of the proud legal maxims that resonate throughout our history. Freedom is the birthright of every Englishman; an Englishman’s home is his castle; let right be done, though the heavens may fall; be ye never so high, the law is above you; the presumption of innocence—the golden thread that runs throughout our law; trial by jury—the lamp that shows that freedom lives; and habeas corpus.
Habeas corpus is literally a direction to a jailer to bring up the body of his captive in court, together with any suggested explanation for his detention. In this context I must mention Somersett’s case, in 1771, and Lord Mansfield’s historic holding that slavery was,
“so odious, that nothing can be suffered to support it, but positive law”,
and that in England there was none. The words that end that historic judgment are:
“The black must be discharged”.
But I always thought that counsel had the best line:
“The air of England is too pure for a slave to breathe”.
However, we must be careful not to appear immodest, or to boast about our past contributions to the rule of law. Rather than emphasise the pride that, naturally, we all take in our strong tradition of fair play and justice down the centuries—a tradition that we owe to our forebears—should we not rather focus on the need for our own generation to safeguard that reputation? That, surely, is the imperative today.
On the subject of boasting, I am afraid that I cannot resist quoting a little ditty that has long pleased me. It is displayed on a plaque in the men’s locker room at Huntercombe golf club, and it reads thus:
“Golf and boasting do not mix.
If you win by 7 and 6,
Apologise for what you’ve done
And write it up as 2 and 1”.
I am sure the Minister knows that ditty; certainly he is far more likely than me ever to have been in the position of winning by seven and six.
Today we are concerned with the law, not with golf, so—with profound apologies for my appalling doggerel—might not a rough legal equivalent of that ditty for today go something like this:
“The law and boasting do not mix.
Better far, let’s try to fix
Attempts to erode judicial review
By voting down provisions new”?
That, of course, is a reference, as has already been made by other contributors, to Part 4 of the Criminal Justice and Courts Bill now before this House in Committee, which contains provisions that seem to many of us to constitute a real threat to the courts’ supervisory jurisdiction and the judges’ power to hold government decision-making to account, particularly as these provisions come in the wake of the severe cuts to legal aid that, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, mentioned, were introduced earlier this year by secondary legislation. A few years ago I attended, as did others here, an international conference in Hong Kong under the title, Effective Judicial Review: a Cornerstone of Good Governance. So it is—and we diminish it at our peril.
The other central threat to this country’s international legal reputation that I, in common with the noble Lords, Lord Lester of Herne Hill and Lord Pannick, see is the readiness of too many nowadays to cavil at the constraints put on us by our being party to the European Convention on Human Rights—to the point, indeed, of dishonouring our obligation under Article 46 of that convention to comply with Strasbourg judgments in United Kingdom cases.
As has already been mentioned, the Government’s stance on prisoner voting is a classic illustration of that. The Joint Committee’s report last December is a model report, addressing the whole question of our relationship with Strasbourg, and it demands close attention and early action. I do not have time to recite some of the powerful conclusions of that committee, but it points out that one cannot cherry pick the obligations under the convention, as that would only give succour to states of the Council of Europe that have a poor record on protecting human rights, and which might draw on such an action as setting a precedent that they may wish to follow.
I invite the Minister, in his reply, to assure the House that the Government have no thought of withdrawing from the convention. Indeed, I hope that he will be able to assure us that the court’s judgment in Hirst is finally to be honoured, so that some prisoners, at least, will have the vote by next May. Assuredly we have a proud legal history. Let us ensure that we maintain it for the future.
(10 years, 5 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, there are parts of this Bill to be applauded and other parts, alas, to be decried. I for my part particularly welcome the new provisions that place restrictions on the use of cautions. The overuse of these in recent years has gravely weakened public confidence in the criminal justice system. I also welcome the creation of new criminal offences in respect of the ill-treatment or wilful neglect of adults in care homes, the subject of a number of well publicised cases that have deeply and understandably shocked the public.
However, I can only deplore much of what appears in Part 4 with regard to judicial review, the area of law that principally has concerned me over the past 35 years, ever since I was privileged to follow the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, as Treasury Counsel in 1979, before undertaking 28 years of judicial servitude. Necessarily, at Second Reading, one must be selective in one’s focus, and I shall therefore confine myself to comparatively brief comments on four topics only—IPPs, personal injury claims, juries and, finally, the proposed new test for refusing relief in judicial review challenges.
First, on IPPs, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd of Berwick, greatly to his credit, has for some time past, as we all know, steadfastly been pursuing the cause of these luckless prisoners—and, rightly, he continues to do so. Clause 9(3) returns to the topic, albeit, as I understand it, only for the very limited purpose of extending the Secretary of State’s power under Section 128 of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012—that is, the power to modify the test to be applied by the Parole Board in deciding whether to release these prisoners—to IPP prisoners in the event that they have once been released and then recalled. Astonishingly, however, the Secretary of State has yet to exercise that power under Section 128, even in relation to the 773 prisoners to whom the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd, referred, those who remain in prison long after their tariff sentences—often less than two years—expired, who were sentenced in the initial period after IPPs were first introduced in 2003, at a time when judges had no discretion but, instead, were under a statutory obligation to pass such sentences. In other words, this is before the 2008 modification of the regime, when it ceased to apply unless there was a tariff term of at least two years, when judicial discretion was to some extent introduced, and, of course, years before this entirely discredited form of sentence was finally abolished in 2012.
At the conclusion of the short debate on this problem back in March, the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, while noting that the Secretary of State,
“has not considered it so far appropriate to exercise the power given to him by the LASPO Act”,
recognised that:
“The sentence itself was clearly ill conceived and its impact was wholly underestimated”.—[Official Report, 27/3/14; col. 700.]
The noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd, must be right in saying that Section 128 was specifically enacted to enable this most egregiously ill-treated group of prisoners to be released earlier than they might otherwise hope to be. Frankly, it seems to me deplorable that to this day it has not been exercised. I can see no possible point in now extending it to the new class encompassed by Clause 9(3) if it is never going to be exercised. Surely, what this Bill should be doing is requiring a favourable exercise of the discretion. I hope that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd, will come back to that and seek to introduce it at Committee stage.
Secondly, I refer to personal injury claims. Like other noble Lords who have taken part in today’s debate, a considerable time ago I had some experience myself in this field. Clause 45 provides basically for the dismissal of personal injury claims if the claimant has been “fundamentally dishonest” in the way he has advanced the claim. For example, let us suppose that a claimant suffers a broken leg through the defendant’s negligence but, having in fact made a full recovery after six months, he nevertheless claims on the basis that years later he still cannot manage to walk 100 yards and fully expects to be disabled for life. If, as sometimes happens, he is then filmed playing football or possibly running a half-marathon, surely we would all agree that that would be clear evidence of fundamental dishonesty. It would surely be right that, instead of being awarded, say, the £5,000 that the claim might have been worth if honestly advanced, he should get nothing—unless, that is, the court thinks that he would thereby suffer substantial injustice.
For my part, in common with the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, but unlike, I fear, the noble Lords, Lord Beecham and Lord Marks, I support this provision. I find myself unpersuaded by the briefing that I suspect many of us will have received from the Association of Personal Injury Lawyers. True, it will be necessary on occasion to argue over whether the claimant’s untruthfulness or exaggerations constitute fundamental dishonesty and perhaps it will be necessary to argue whether dismissing his claim entirely would cause him substantial injustice. However, given the readiness of some these days to treat an accident as a God-given opportunity to make a fortune—“Whiplash Willie”, I seem to recall, was the name of a character played by Walter Matthau in a film some years back—this seems to be a clear steer to how judges should exercise their discretion in the matter. The modest narrowing of an existing discretion is a price worth paying for the discouragement which it is hoped this new provision will provide to those who are inclined or tempted to advance dishonest claims. Again, unlike I fear the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, I see no possible logic in suggesting that this provision should therefore be mirrored in regard to the defendant’s conduct of their defence. Surely, on analysis, there is no sensible parallel to be drawn between the opposing cases.
I turn briefly to juries. Clause 56(3), consistently with the recommendations of the Law Commission, rightly introduces a new offence of research by jurors—most typically, jurors using IT to discover, for example, whether a defendant has previous convictions. I support that. However, the Bill says nothing about research into juries, the question broached by the noble Lord, Lord Blair, in March when, as he explained today, he misunderstood the position, as indeed—he hinted at this too—did I. Section 8 of the Contempt of Court Act 1981 bars absolutely all possibility of research into juries. That is a provision with which I am very familiar given that the very reason it was introduced into the 1981 Act was that I myself had failed as counsel then acting on behalf of the Attorney-General in the prosecution of the New Statesman for contempt of court for publishing a juryman’s account of the jury’s deliberations in the Jeremy Thorpe trial. However, I knew nothing at all of any subsequent attempt to mitigate the effect of that section with regard to jury research. As the noble Lord, Lord Blair, today made plain, it seems that nobody else did either, with the possible exception of Professor Cheryl Thomas. Surely the Bill provides a perfect opportunity to correct what to many people will continue to appear to be an obstacle in the law.
I will briefly make a further point on juries. Is it not time to revisit the whole question of mode of trial for serious and complex fraud cases? The trial of such cases by a judge and two lay members chosen for their relevant expertise rather than by a jury would hugely reduce the length and cost of trials and at the same time increase the prospect of arriving at a sound verdict. Surely that, rather than drastically slashing counsel’s fees to a point at which the whole future of the criminal bar is now under grave threat, is the way to achieve economies in the criminal justice system without in any way damaging—on the contrary, it would advance—the fairness of the trial process. Indeed, that would allow more such cases to be brought to be trial, the better to deter the increasing number of those who engage in fraudulent white collar operations. That was the recommendation of the Roskill committee way back in 1986 and it was reinforced by the Auld report in 2001. The subsequent attempts to introduce this provision in Parliament are a sorry story. I suggest that we would do well to follow the course recently taken in the Defamation Act 2013, which by Section 11 provides that libel cases in future are routinely to be tried without a jury.
Finally, I turn to Part 4 of the Bill, which is the part that I regret so deeply and oppose sharply; the Government’s continuing attempt to curb the courts’ power by judicial review to supervise executive action. Regrettably, the Government have already begun to do this in the secondary legislation introduced earlier this year by substantially cutting public funding of judicial review, including, most unwisely, declining to fund leave applications unless they are successful. Now they seek to compound that by lowering the threshold for refusing permission to bring judicial review or, at the end of a hearing, for withholding any remedy—to reduce it from the existing test of inevitability to that of high likelihood.
As others have made clear, there are fundamental objections to that proposal, both in principle and as to the practicalities. So far as principle is concerned, this clause will in future require the court to reject a claim even though the decision may be deeply flawed in point of law simply because it is highly likely, although ex hypothesi not inevitable, that substantially the same decision would be arrived at, even if the matter was to be properly reconsidered and lawfully decided afresh.
Such an approach will allow public authorities to escape responsibility for their unlawful decisions. It overlooks both the central importance of honouring the rule of law and the inevitable feelings of resentment which one must feel, having been refused any remedy despite knowing that the decision taken against one was legally defective. It is worth repeating in this connection a short part of a celebrated dictum from a judgment given nearly half a century ago in the Chancery Division which is true in the context of a breach of the rules of natural justice but is equally applicable to the establishment of any other legal error in the decision-making process. The judgment in the case of John v Rees states:
“‘It may be that there are some who would decry the importance which the courts attach to the observance of the rules of natural justice. ‘When something is obvious,’ they may say, ‘why force everyone to go through the tiresome waste of time involved in framing charges and giving an opportunity to be heard? The result is obvious from the start.’ Those who take this view do not, I think, do themselves justice. As everybody who has anything to do with the law well knows, the path of the law is strewn with examples of open and shut cases which, somehow, were not; of unanswerable charges which, in the event, were completely answered; of inexplicable conduct which was fully explained; of fixed and unalterable determinations that, by discussion, suffered a change”.
As to the practicalities, one simply refers, as the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, has already done, to the report of the Bingham Centre in February of this year, which expresses the senior judiciary’s view that the proposed new test,
“‘would necessarily entail greater consideration of the facts, greater (early) work for defendants, and the prospect of dress rehearsal permission hearings’”.
The report continues:
“The proposal thus stands to elongate and complicate the permission stage, by encouraging defendants to file lengthy and detailed evidence, with consequent delay and increased cost to all parties”.
Certainly, there has been an increase in the use of judicial review over the years, but is this such a bad thing? More and more areas of our lives are controlled by public authorities. At the same time, we have become, understandably I suggest, less trusting and certainly less deferential towards those in authority over us. I sometimes wonder whether it did not all start with John McEnroe’s outraged questioning of line calls at Wimbledon way back in the 1970s. However, we should consider how in the long run his behaviour has contributed to the hugely improved policing of those lines that is in operation today. I speak as someone who was lucky enough to be on the centre court on Friday. By the same token, the use of judicial review has to my mind undoubtedly raised the standards of public decision-making in recent years. Alas, technology cannot be deployed to solve disputed calls in the law courts as on tennis courts, but the judges’ supervisory jurisdiction is assuredly the best safeguard that the public have against unlawful executive action and the abuse of power, and the Government most certainly ought not to be legislating to weaken it. Therefore, I join my voice to the many others who have already spoken, and those who are yet to speak, in condemning not only Clause 64 but the further provisions which the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, so powerfully analysed and criticised.
I apologise for taking so much of your Lordships’ time but, in truth, this is a Bill of the first importance and it contains a number of provisions of which we should be decidedly wary.
(10 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I supported the Government on the clause at Second Reading and again in Committee and on Report. At the risk of wearying your Lordships and displeasing, yet again, those who procured the original amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, I support the Government again on their proposed amendment and I resist that of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick.
For my part, I, too, accept that this reformulation is in substance no different from its predecessor. Because it avoids the explicit language of guilt or innocence, it may be regarded however, as better able to resist what at one stage was suggested to be its vulnerability to challenge under Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights.
I do not propose to repeat all the arguments that I canvassed in support of the Government’s approach at the earlier stages. I now make just three basic points. First, there is all the difference in the world between, on the one hand, a person’s right to be acquitted and thereafter presumed innocent whenever there is any lingering doubt as to his guilt and, on the other hand, the right to monetary compensation for his incarceration pending that eventual acquittal. On Report, the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, reminded us all, and indeed the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, reminds us again, that it is better that 10—the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, says 99—guilty men go free than that one innocent man be convicted. Of course, that is so and it is integral to our criminal justice system, but it by no means follows that it is better that 10, let alone 99, guilty men get financial compensation rather than that one innocent man goes uncompensated. That illustrates the total distinction between the presumption of innocence and the right to go free if there is any doubt at all about the safety of one’s conviction and, on the other hand, the right to monetary compensation for the period of incarceration until that innocence can be established.
Secondly, the present formulation put forward again by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, is, as has been explained, essentially that of the majority in the Supreme Court in Adams—a majority of five votes to four. The then Lord Chief Justice, my noble and learned friend Lord Judge, who, alas, cannot be here today, and I were in that minority of four. The majority preferred it to the test of the minority that the claimant should have to establish his innocence. In truth the majority’s formulation is a fudge—indeed, an unprincipled fudge. None of the parties in the case argued in support of it—not even leading counsel who appeared as interveners for Justice. They were all arguing for compensation to be paid to all those whose appeal eventually succeeds. Now no one pursues that absolutist view. Of course, under this fudge, compensation would still be required to be paid even to those who, albeit entitled to succeed on their appeals, can nevertheless be seen clearly to have committed the offence.
I have given various examples of this at earlier stages. Today I shall give just one. Let us suppose that a defendant confesses his guilt and in his confession discloses facts of which only the perpetrator of the crime to which he is confessing could have knowledge. Later, however, on a late appeal, he is able to establish that that confession was induced by, for example, a promise that if only he would confess his guilt he would get bail. Once that is established the confession has to be set aside as one induced by guilt, even though it is self-evidently true as a confession. He is entitled to succeed on his appeal but is he really to be regarded as entitled to compensation, which could run to hundreds of thousands of pounds? I would suggest not.
My third and final point is on certainty. Again, the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, has made this point. I should have said earlier that, alas, I missed the first few minutes of his speech as it never occurred to me, in common with one or two others, that this Bill would be reached at the stage that it was. I apologise for that but I think I heard everything that he said that needed to be heard by somebody supporting his case. The proposed formulation is very far from easy to apply. Perhaps a good illustration of that is the tragic case of Sally Clark—a case about which the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy of The Shaws, spoke more than once at earlier stages of the Bill. It is a case which raises considerable and understandable emotions. On my reading of that case—I believe this to be correct—the Court of Appeal never went further than to say that on the fresh evidence that had come to light a jury might well not have convicted her. It was not said, in the words of the proposed amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, that the fresh evidence showed—let alone showed “conclusively”—that the evidence against her at trial had been so undermined that no conviction could possibly have been based on it. Maybe, in the light of all the material, the jury would have convicted; maybe it would not.
If it is said that I am wrong in my understanding of that case, it just goes to show that the proposed formulation will lead, not to the desired clarity and certainty in the law, but to further protracted litigation on this issue. As the Minister said, based on the Court of Appeal judgment, it is perfectly simple for him to form a view —yes or no—on whether, in the light of all the material, this defendant was indeed innocent of the charge and therefore whether or not it was a clear miscarriage of justice in that sense. The elected Chamber rejected this House’s amendment first time round and I respectfully suggest that we should not challenge it again.
My Lords, I had the advantage of listening to the whole of the Minister’s address with great care. I respectfully say that it was very well put across. However, I remain of the view, advanced by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, that the Commons amendment should not be accepted. I have spoken on this matter on a number of previous occasions, so I will make a few short points.
I agree entirely with the Minister that the issue before us is what is meant by the phrase “miscarriage of justice”. This still remains in Section 133 of the 1988 Act because in this Bill we are adding a new subsection to try to explain what the basic rule, set out in subsection (1), is all about. Therefore one has to consider how that works out in practice, given the nature of our criminal appeal process. In effect, it is an element of working out the court’s function in the appeal and the position the Secretary of State must take, given the material in the Court of Appeal’s judgment.
The noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, has confirmed that the Court of Appeal does not have to ask itself whether the appellant was innocent: it has to consider whether the conviction was unsafe. No one is suggesting that that should be the test applied when working out whether there has been a miscarriage of justice. The problem with the test which the Minister is now suggesting and which is in the Commons amendment is that it is striving for something which is, in nearly every case, almost impossible to demonstrate. I prosecuted for four years in the course of my career at the Bar and secured a number of convictions. It frequently occurred to me that we—by which I mean the jury, the prosecutors and everyone else who was looking on—were not there. It is so difficult to work out what actually happened: one can only proceed on evidence. The Crown’s function is to demonstrate guilt as best it can on the evidence but it is extraordinarily difficult to work out whether somebody did not commit the crime and put it in a positive way in favour of the accused if you did not actually see what happened when the crime was committed. You have to rely on other people to demonstrate that fact. That is the basic problem with the test being suggested.
In my judgment in the case to which the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, referred, I recorded that when Article 14 of the covenant, from which we take the phrase, was being discussed it was suggested that the test of innocence should be put in to elaborate what was meant by miscarriage of justice, but it was not put in to the final draft. The matter was considered then but it was taken out and we are left with a phrase which we now have to construe and apply.
Without going on any further, I suggest that a better way of approaching it would be to tie the phrase, as carefully as we can, into the way our criminal process works, in a world where there can rarely be absolute certainty. We cannot achieve mathematical certainty in our system of criminal justice: we are not expected to. Because of that, I suggest we take the practical approach embodied in the phrase proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. I support his amendment.
My Lords, I remind the House that I served for 10 years as an assessor for compensation for miscarriages of justice. That role required me to assess compensation, not to determine eligibility. However, in order to determine compensation I was equipped with the factual basis for the ministerial decision to allow compensation to be awarded.
We are here faced with a choice between two different ways of seeking to achieve justice, and the key test for this House should be which way better serves the interests of justice. The Lords’ amendment creates a stiff test: you have to show conclusively—it is a tough obstacle—that the evidence was so undermined that no conviction could possibly be based on it. The evidence so undermined is a matter for judicial assessment in this context. Whether it makes a conviction impossible to sustain is a matter for judicial decision. Both the assessment and the decision arise in the process of whether guilt has been established, not whether innocence has been shown.
Because of that well established system, judges, both at trial and in the Court of Appeal, look at these matters of assessment and decision very carefully. The process is a fundamental part of the system; it is well established. The judges, the lawyers and the legal commentators know what is happening. It accords with what we have traditionally thought to be the best of legal principle in applying our criminal law. A miscarriage of justice is an aberrant product of our criminal law going wrong in its process. The system I have just described has sufficient clarity in its process so that when the test in the Lords’ amendment is applied to it, justice will usually be done if there is a miscarriage of justice.
What of the government test? The words “innocent” and “did not commit” we can treat as synonymous for the purpose of this argument. The government test involves the Minister looking for material to show innocence from proceedings that were designed to establish guilt. Other than the Criminal Cases Review Commission, of the potential sources the key source of his or her approach will be what happened in court then, or afterwards if there was an appeal, or a newly discovered fact well after that. So the context of the ministerial decision will be outwith our present system.
Indeed, the Minister will be applying himself or herself to making a quasi-judicial decision: should this person, in justice, be given compensation for this miscarriage of justice? It is a very serious decision most pertinently determined by solid evidence, and from where is he or she to extract it in our present system? The new fact which establishes innocence or that someone did not commit the offence has to be very powerful indeed—for example, irrefutable DNA evidence or a subsequently discovered group of witnesses who prove a rock solid alibi. There are very few sets of circumstances.
It will be of significance to this House—and I trust to the other place if this goes back to it—that no one on the government side in any debate so far has chosen to illustrate by example how their test would work and why the Lords’ test is not appropriate. Although proceedings before the assessing Minister are confidential, it is open to the applicant to make them public. I shall refer to two public examples which show that the Lords’ test would work in justice and the government test would not.
The first is the “arms to Iraq” case, in which some of the defendants got to court and no evidence was ultimately offered against them—there never was a trial. Others of those cases were stopped during the trial and in yet more cases there were acquittals. The result of that set of circumstances meant that in the ones where no evidence was offered or the judge stopped the trial, there never was an appeal; there never was any new evidence because the scenario was well known. We did what we thought was legal because the government agents and people responsible said that we could do it.
In those circumstances, with no Court of Appeal judgment, on the test in the Lords’ amendment it is almost certain that those people would have received compensation. If you do not offer any evidence, how can you possibly say that the conviction could be sustained? If the judge stops it on the basis of the Lords’ test, why not give compensation? How could these men “prove their innocence” in the context of the government test?
There is another very telling example. Many of you will remember the case of Colin Stagg and the murder of Rachel Nickell on Wimbledon Common. She was stabbed to death, with 49 blows, in front of her two year-old child. Stagg was one of many arrested and he was eventually charged. The judge threw the case out at the end of the prosecution case. This was in the mid-1990s and Stagg was vilified in the national press almost from day one. When the judge stopped the case, he went back to Wimbledon and lived by night because he was hounded and harassed in the street by day. He lived a hermit life for years. Eventually the Minister decided, on all the material before him, to grant compensation, and I made an award. It was only a year or two later that someone else, Robert Napper, was arrested for that murder. He pleaded guilty to manslaughter on the grounds of diminished responsibility and was confined to Broadmoor for the rest of his life.
How can anyone in this House plausibly suggest that Stagg should not have got compensation until someone else was proved to have been the person who killed Rachel Nickell? Who would not regard that as an affront to justice? The Minister at the time, in applying the law on eligibility at the time, gave Stagg an award. Under the Lords’ test he would get such an award today; under the government test he would not—he would have to wait and endure circumstances until someone else was shown to be the murderer.
My Lords, I just ask my noble friend to agree that, under any test, neither of these cases would qualify for compensation because compensation is payable not on an initial acquittal, a first appeal or an appeal brought in time, but only ever on a late appeal. They would therefore not have qualified anyway: it is only for a restricted group of cases in which they are not included.
Now that I am in the same House as the noble Lord and not appearing in front of him as an advocate, I very firmly disagree. Compensation for miscarriages of justice does not depend on a successful appeal. For years, in certain cases, awards have been made without such an appeal. In the examples I have given, no contrary example has been given thus far to show why the other test proposed by the Government should be put forward. I make the following concluding submission: the Lords amendment is based on well founded principle—the Adams terminology—arising from a well established system of criminal law and criminal justice. The government test is neither of those things. The Lords amendment better serves the interests of justice and this House should send it back to the Commons for reconsideration by MPs and by the Government in the interim.
(10 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I was a member of the court that considered Purdy and gave the last ever judgment in the House of Lords. Whether strictly we were entitled to direct the DPP to issue guidelines as to his prosecution policy may be doubted. However, it was the best we could do and I am very glad we did it. I very well remember Mrs Purdy’s evident delight at the comfort that she felt those guidelines would give her, perhaps even extending her life by giving her the assurance that, even if she left it too late to kill herself, in desperation her partner could come to her help.
As to the substance of the guidelines, as the noble Baroness, Lady Jay, has explained, it may be that a forthcoming judgment from the Supreme Court in two consolidated appeals will throw some further light on these, not least on the position of assisted suicide by doctors, nurses and other healthcare professionals. Obviously, legislation is better than guidelines but we must do the best we can with what we presently have.
My final point is that we should note, in my case with approval, that in certain respects these guidelines go further than the Bill proposed by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, as to what circumstances would be acceptable. That is unsurprising given that one of the truly tragic cases that we looked at in Purdy was that of Daniel James, a young man who suffered an appalling spinal injury in a rugby match and later was accompanied by his parents to Switzerland to end his life. Given that the boy had already tried more than once to commit suicide, his parents had repeatedly urged him not to and that his death caused them, far from any advantage—on the contrary—the deepest distress, surely it was right not to prosecute them. I hope that the House agrees with the view that that was the correct outcome of that case.