Armed Forces Bill

Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood Excerpts

Thursday 3rd March 2016 Grand Committee

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

I just want to make one or two short points. It is interesting that although the noble and gallant Lord is perfectly correct that it is not the practice in the United Kingdom for there to be any statutory limitation on prosecution for crimes other than summary crimes, it is quite commonplace in the civil law countries for there to be limitations. So our allies in France or Germany, for example, would, I suspect, be protected by a limitation of the kind proposed. I am not suggesting that we should adopt that philosophy, which is quite contrary to our practice, as we can see in cases of historical child abuse. I wonder, however, whether the wiser course, rather than going into the area of limitation, which is so difficult and would be seen as an invitation to start doing this for other crimes, would be simply to have a blanket immunity for our servicemen when engaged in military operations, of the kind that I think used to be the case—I stand to be corrected—before the law was changed some years ago by the previous Armed Forces Act. This is certainly an important point to consider, but I favour doing so not by way of limitation but by way of exclusion entirely for acts of that kind while engaged on military operations, while making it quite clear that we are not dealing with cases of one serviceman on another—let us say of one serviceman assaulting another, stealing from him or things like that.

[Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood (CB)]

My Lords, as I indicated at Second Reading, I, too, am entirely sympathetic to the general feeling underlying this amendment. As the noble and gallant Lord has said, he is not wedded to this language. I am not clear, for example, whether,

“engaged in military operations outside the United Kingdom”,

would include peacekeeping operations in Northern Ireland, or matters of that character. However, I also see the basic difficulty, as my noble and learned friend Lord Hope indicates. This is certainly contrary and alien to English law down the years. We recognise the problems of delay, and if you can show plain and incurable prejudice through delay, you might well get the cases struck out. One would hope for a measure of fastidious thought before anybody launches prosecutions in these cases. It is deeply offensive to people that, in relation to the problems in Northern Ireland, amnesty was given to a whole lot of terrorists, but there is still a risk, apparently, on the part of the soldiers who were acting on our behalf.

I am a bit troubled by my noble and learned friend Lord Hope’s suggestion of a blanket immunity. What happens if there is a clear case of murder on the face of it? Should we really, with ample evidence and so forth, say that there can be no prosecution? I do not know: would Sergeant Blackman have taken the benefit of that? One must have regard to where these things go, but I certainly hope that the Government will give very sympathetic thought to this. A clever and ingenious lawyer might be able to find some formula whereby what I suspect all of us here feel could be reflected in some form of protection for those on active service abroad.

[Baroness Smith of Newnham (LD)]

My Lords, I was not able to speak at Second Reading, and I would like to briefly reassure the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Craig, that the Liberal Democrats have no intention whatever of trying to sabotage this Bill in any vainglorious or other way. We are committed to the Bill, and, like other Members of your Lordships’ Committee, to ensuring that the Bill becomes as good as it can be.

We do not wish to civilianise the Armed Forces, as the noble Viscount, Lord Slim, said on Tuesday: we certainly have no intention of doing that. However, there are some concerns about this amendment. Although I accept that it is a probing amendment, we share the concerns of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, that there is a danger in either a blanket limitation or looking at things that are any sort of military operation. There may be cases that clearly should not be dealt with after 20 years; there may be other cases that need to be looked at. In cases of murder, rape or the sort of crimes that we were talking about in previous amendments, it would seem extremely strange to service men and women and their families if we somehow said, “If this happened in civilian life, you might get closure, but if it happens while your son or daughter is overseas engaged in military operations, there is a 20-year cut-off, and the rule of law no longer holds”. I ask the Minister whether it would be possible to find a way of dealing with the genuine concerns that have been put forward in the amendment that would ensure that service men and women and their families felt reassured that they were not going to lose the rule of law as would normally be expected.

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[Lord Thomas of Gresford (LD)]

My Lords, there is no limitation on serious criminal cases, and that is part of the criminal law. In this area, I think of the war crimes that, until very recently, were still being brought forward relating to the Second World War as a result of investigations into the actions of German soldiers in prison camps and elsewhere. The thought that that type of case would be barred through limitation would have a very unfortunate effect on the victims of the Holocaust, who feel those crimes so strongly, and rightly so.

As a result of the debates we had on Tuesday, and this debate, my view is that the clever and ingenious lawyers in the Ministry of Defence should be thinking about putting the concept of combat immunity into some statutory form, to define the boundaries of it so that commanders who are engaged in warfare know that if they are in a combat situation they do not have to worry about criminal civilian law affecting them personally, and so that the soldiers involved do not subsequently face criminal charges as a result of their conduct in the clash of arms—the warfare itself. But “military operations” as in the amendment can cover such a wide area and I do not think that we should go against the whole thrust of the common law and the whole purpose of the criminal law by an amendment of this sort. There are other ways. What is combat immunity? What are the boundaries? They may be fuzzy at the edges but I am sure they are capable of statutory definition.

[Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood]

I do not want to be tiresome but combat immunity, as I understand it, has never applied in the context of criminal law at all. It is a purely civil law concept.

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

Perhaps it could be used as a criminal law concept. Perhaps the lawyers would like to think about it. I follow what the noble and learned Lord says on that.

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There is a counterargument that it is impossible to prevent families misunderstanding and believing that there is some conspiracy at the MoD. That is certainly possible, but it is not a very good reason for not trying. I believe that knowledge counters fear and misunderstanding. It would enable the next of kin to explain to families and friends what actually happened from a position of strength and perhaps pride, rather than anguish.

[Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood]

My Lords, I had not intended to speak to this amendment; I ought to be better prepared. Down the years, I have often been involved with coronial law. Indeed, I was Treasury Counsel in the early 1980s when for the first time it was decided, contrary to my argument, that there could be an inquest in this country in respect of a death abroad. It was the Helen Smith case. She was the nurse who fell from a balcony in Jeddah on to some railings and impaled herself. There was long, fraught litigation in the early 1980s. Since then, this area has developed hugely and has been complicated and clouded by the impact, reverting to where we were earlier in the week, of Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights and the need, in certain circumstances, for an Article 2-compliant investigation into a death.

I confess that when I first read the proposed new clause, I rather thought that that essentially is the present law. I shall listen, fascinated, when the Minister tells us exactly what the present position is in terms of inquests in respect of such deaths as are encompassed here. Certainly, I understand that the coroner will be informed in every case. There will always be an inquest, and he will always determine by what means the death occurred. The phrase “and in what circumstances” may be more contentious because this is a very technical area and I seem to recall that that phrase has been the subject of a good deal of specific litigation about exactly what it encompasses.

There is routinely an inquest in these cases. As I understand it—but this is very much anecdotal—the result of our now having and retaining a chief coroner is that these inquests are now heard by a comparatively limited number of coroners and essentially they deal with these matters in a way which is regarded as essentially satisfactory on all sides. That may be a misunderstanding of the position, and I know there was a problem some years ago when coroners were thought to be seeking to investigate way beyond the scope of what ordinarily would be permitted in terms of inquiring into military supply and matters of that sort, but I thought it was now under control. However, I shall say no more. I do not think this is a very useful contribution. I shall listen to what the Minister says.

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

My Lords, there is one aspect of this amendment to which I think I should draw attention. It arises because of its scope. The amendment applies to every violent or unnatural death of every person subject to service law within the United Kingdom. The coronial system does not apply in Scotland. I do not know whether it is the intention that we should extend the coronial system to Scotland in the case of every violent or unnatural death, but the system which applies in Scotland is very simply this: every death of that kind is reported to the procurator fiscal of the area in which the event occurred. There is then an exercise of discretion because it does not follow that every death is subject to an inquiry. It is a matter for the procurator fiscal, possibly with the advice of a law officer or his counsel, to decide whether it is in the public interest that there should be an inquiry. If there is such an inquiry, it goes not to a coroner but to a sheriff, who does indeed determine by what means and in what circumstances the death occurred. It is there that the public interest is served because if there is something to learn from the event, the opportunity is taken through the accident inquiry to determine the circumstances and in some way to improve practice or inform the public about how events of that kind could be avoided in future.

As I listened to the debate I wondered whether that system applied in the case of persons subject to service law. I think I am right in saying that when one reflects on the tragic events on the Mull of Kintyre, when a Chinook helicopter flying from Northern Ireland to Scotland with a number of very senior people on board crashed and everybody was killed, that event was dealt with under the Scottish procedure. I would have thought that that procedure is perfectly adequate to cope with all that one would expect from events of this kind and the need for the circumstances to be inquired into.

There are two features that need to be stressed. First, not every death of this kind is the subject of an inquiry because it is only if the public interest requires it. On the other hand, where the inquiry is resorted to, it is a full inquiry, with the results that I think the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, is looking for; that is, the lessons to be learned from the evidence that is laid. I wonder whether he really does intend that every death—even a road accident, for example—occurring north of the border should be subject to this system; or, to take another example, whether training exercises in the Highlands, where unfortunately deaths do occur due to the very severe weather on mountains, should be subject to the coronial system. I think the Scottish prosecutors—the procurators fiscal, I should say—would rather that they retained control of these events and dealt with them under the Scottish procedure, which they would believe is perfectly adequate to provide the lessons that people need to avoid these events occurring again.

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I hope that the Minister’s statement covers everybody because the thing that struck a number of us when the discussion took place on the Bill was that, yet again, we were going to leave a small number of people out. In the overall cost, moral obligation and everything else, the one thing we must not do with this is leave somebody out. I hope that the department will pursue the matter and contact those it believes may be affected or hold a campaign to raise awareness so that every possible attempt is made to find and monitor. I strongly support the view of the noble Lord, Lord Alton, that we have to have some statistics on this. How else are we to measure what progress is being made? I strongly support the amendments and welcome the Minister’s statement. I hope that every single person will be covered and that we will not be coming back to find another anomaly within an anomaly within an anomaly.

[Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood]

My Lords, I, too, welcome the Government’s announcement proposing compensation for service personnel who have contracted mesothelioma. It perhaps does not matter, but I am rather concerned about the wording of Amendment 21, particularly proposed new subsection (2). In the second line of that proposed new subsection, the requirement on the scheme is to compensate those who,

“have been diagnosed with diffuse mesothelioma as a result of”,

working for the Armed Forces. The words “result of” create all sorts of problems because, as has already been explained—it is well known to all of us who have had to deal with this ghastly disease down the years—it is very difficult to know how one came by what may have been just a single brief exposure and thus how one came to suffer the disease.

I ask for some clarification: what is to be the scope of this proposed new scheme for compensation? Plainly, it will not be necessary to establish ordinary liability in the way of negligence or breach of some statutory duty. Will it be necessary to prove even that one has been exposed to asbestos in the course of one’s service? I did national service more than 60 years ago. If, say, after the 40-year period in which this can develop—it can actually probably be even longer than that, so say after 40, 50 or 60 years—suddenly one receives this terrible diagnosis, does the mere fact of having done national service or whatever 40 years or more earlier entitle one at that point, without more, to compensation? Will it be necessary to prove even exposure to asbestos?

I point out that in the non-military context the courts have been grappling with this problem for years. There was a case called Fairchild, then one called Barker, and then in 2011 I was in the Supreme Court for the last case on it: Sienkiewicz v Greif. We have pretty much arrived at the situation now where anybody can get compensation where they have this diagnosis and can show that they were exposed to asbestos during any earlier period—wherever it may have been, in schooling or employment—and assuming that there is money there, the employers were insured and all the rest of it. True, the claimant must establish liability, but that is not generally much of a problem. If they were exposed to asbestos the likelihood is that they will be able to show negligence or breach of some protective duty under some statute.

All I ask is that there be clarification: is this intended to apply—one hopes that it is—to literally anybody who served in the Armed Forces and later contracted mesothelioma, or will it be necessary to prove at any rate some exposure to asbestos? That may create difficulties if service was 30 or 40 years ago.

[Baroness Jolly]

My Lords, I add my congratulation to those of other noble Lords to everyone who campaigned for this so hard and for so long. It seems that these last few sufferers were almost proving elusive. I am delighted that the Government announced that they will bring them into the scheme. The British Legion has also been hugely active in this regard and deserves congratulation, too.

The noble Lord, Lord Alton of Liverpool, showed remarkable tenacity in all this, particularly today, and in his quest for research funding. As noble Lords said, research is critical. On that point, it is worth mentioning for the Committee—and the noble Lord, Lord Alton—that the NHS does not record employment. A veteran goes to sign up the day after he or she leaves the services and the NHS takes their name, address, number and whatever. That is something else he might need to think about. It is not just in this area that the NHS recording employment would be really useful. It would help with research, treatment and, in some cases, diagnosis. There is work still to be done there.

Although I welcome this amendment, the devil is of course in the detail. Tough decisions always have to be made about the lump sum balanced against the annual income from war pensions and anything supplementary, multiplied by the life expectancy of a partner. I would like to quiz the Minister slightly on how this will be managed. Will people be given advice and support? If that comes from within the Veterans Welfare Service, which is part of MoD, how can that advice and support be seen to be independent?