Charities (Protection and Social Investment) Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Bridges of Headley and Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts

Tuesday 2nd February 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts (Con)]

My Lords, I should like to join others and pour a little more honey over my noble friend’s head and over the head of the Bill team, which has worked hard to bring the good ship into harbour. I shall focus on Amendment 6 and I congratulate the Government on that amendment and the fundraising aspects of it. I urge them to keep up the pressure and wish my noble friend Lord Grade every success in this difficult task.

It is important that we are trying to strike a balance here, which is quite rightly focused on the public not being unduly hassled and being asked in the right way. That is absolutely appropriate, but we must not lose sight of the charities’ right to be able to ask, because if they cannot do so, the effect on our charitable sector, which is vital to our civil society, will be quite extreme. When I carried out the review for the Government a few years ago, it was clear that that balance had not been reached appropriately, given the alphabet soup of regulatory bodies and the different types of fundraisers who blame each other for their bad reputation, along with the fact that the public were confused and wanted a single point of contact. In my report, which was sent to Ministers in July 2012 and accepted by Ministers, I suggested a six-month deadline. Three years later, last summer, as the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter of Kentish Town, pointed out, we had the flashpoint over fundraising, caused by the sad case of Olive Cooke. I congratulate Sir Stuart Etherington and the Members of your Lordships’ House who took part in that review. I think they have come up with some excellent proposals. But this is the last chance of the last chance of the last chance saloon; we have been around this now two or three times.

I am not in favour of statutory regulation against a rapidly changing scene. However, I have to say to my noble friend and to the Minister that in my conversations with the sector there remains a distressing tendency still to see this as somebody else’s problem—still to say, “We are a charity and our reputation is everything, therefore we wouldn’t do anything wrong and how can you possibly think that we are doing anything wrong?”. It is an issue that has still to be hammered home in certain parts of the charity sector to make sure that the message gets over. The reputation of the sector is as strong as the weakest link in the chain, and there remain too many weak links in the chain, which I hope that my noble friend and his colleagues will be able to tackle.

My noble friend has to keep fingering the trigger marked 64C. We have to see his knuckle tightening around the trigger to make the sector understand that this is really important because the distressing tendency to think it will all go away remains. Last week, one charity said to me, “We don’t need to worry about it because we’re good. We’re a charity and the Government don’t want to pull the trigger anyway”. My noble friend must be ready to pull that trigger and make it clear that he will do it. I want to see his trigger finger whitening over the next few months.

[Lord Bridges of Headley]

My Lords, I am extremely grateful for those incredibly kind words. The Bill has been through a long journey of consultation, pre-legislative scrutiny and parliamentary scrutiny and has emerged all the better for it. I thank a number of noble Lords for all they have done, not just in this parliamentary Session but well before it to make the Bill such a success. The Bill has seen this House at its very best. Where we have differed, we have managed to iron out our differences on the Floor of the House and off it. We have made concessions in the light of very good points that were made by a number of noble Lords. The Bill is all the stronger for it.

I will keep my remarks very brief, but I associate myself with a lot of what my noble friend Lord Hodgson said. I thank him in particular for what he has done to make the Bill what it is today. We can get into lots of clichés about having last orders in the last chance saloon with my finger on the trigger. I think we all agree that the charitable sector must heed the measures now before it. It must act and show that it is acting in short order. We will all be keeping our eye on what it does.

On that point, I thank my noble friend Lord Grade for his update. We are right behind him as well as alongside him. I urge him to make all the use he can of the expertise and good will on all sides of this House as he ventures out on his enterprise. There is a lot of wisdom to be drawn from this House and a lot of good will to make sure that his regulatory flourish produces the results we all want.

Before I finish, I will say a couple of words of thanks. I thank the Whip, my noble friend Lord Younger of Leckie, the noble Baronesses, Lady Hayter and Lady Barker, and the noble Lord, Lord Watson of Invergowrie, all of whom have helped me on this, my first Bill. I repeat my thanks to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, and my noble friend Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts. I thank again my noble friend Lord Leigh of Hurley, the noble Baroness, Lady Pitkeathley, and the noble Lord, Lord Wallace of Saltaire, who helped me a lot during the summer, enabling us to make fast progress on the fundraising front. I thank the Cabinet Office and Charity Commission officials in the Bill team for their work in supporting the passage of the Bill.

We will soon hand over the Act to be implemented by the Charity Commission. I know that noble Lords will be watching closely to ensure that the powers in the Act are used fairly and proportionately. I am sure that they will be, and I look forward to a positive report when the Act comes to be reviewed in three years’ time. Charities’ life-blood is public trust and confidence, which have been undermined by several regulatory failures. The Bill will do much to support the effective protection and regulation of charities and will help restore the public trust and confidence on which charities rely.

Charities (Protection and Social Investment) Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Bridges of Headley and Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts

Monday 20th July 2015 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Barker]

My Lords, the House might find it useful to hear from the noble Lord, Lord Bridges, on the Government’s Amendments 26, 27 and 28, which were not grouped with the previous group starting with Amendment 25. I would find that helpful.

[Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts]

My Lords, these amendments are about the royal charter charities, so they are very different. We had so far been dealing with social investments and the definition of that. This group is about the special position of royal charter charities. I am not sure that it will detain us very long, but nevertheless it is a different topic and they have been separated by the Bill team into two different groups.

[Lord Bridges of Headley]

My Lords, if I am right, I will address Amendments 26 and 28, which relate to very minor improvements to language, adding an active grammatical formulation and a specific rather than generic identifier respectively. I trust that they will not require further explanation.

The amendment to new Section 292B(4) improves the wording of the specification around the exclusion of charities established by legislation or by royal charter. They have been excluded from the social investment power because of the differences in governance structure. The amendments here simply offer an improved form of wording to reflect this.

The addition of new Section 292B(5) is needed to explain better the territorial extent of the subsection on charities established by legislation, as set out in new Section 292B(4). It clarifies that the exclusion relates specifically to charities established by, or whose functions are set out in, legislation or secondary legislation authorised by Acts of Parliament or measures of the Welsh Assembly. I expect that these measures will not trouble noble Lords unduly, being of a rather technical nature without policy implications.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts]

My Lords, I am going for a third major prize now. I have retabled this amendment, which proposes a wholesale redrafting of Schedule 6 to the 2011 Act.

As I said before, this may sound a rather technical matter but, as I explained in Committee, it has a very important purpose: to improve access to justice for charities, especially smaller ones. The last Labour Government set up the Charity Tribunal in the 2006 Act, which was a very good development. Prior to that, only the High Court could provide a means of redress for small charities, which was expensive and slow. Charities, especially smaller charities, had no option but to submit to the directions and decisions of the Charity Commission. However, what was a good idea and gave with one hand took away with another. Schedule 6 is 10 pages long and complex in that it says what can be appealed against, who can bring the appeal and what the remedy is. It is difficult for charities and many charities’ lawyers to understand. The evidence to my review was that the sector found it complex and difficult to follow. My amendment is designed to sweep these complexities away.

In response to the amendment in Committee, my noble friend said:

“I am not sure that everyone shares my noble friend Lord Hodgson’s viewpoint on the difficulty of interpreting Schedule 6 to the Charities Act 2011. There are some who are attracted to the structure of Schedule 6 and find it easy to navigate. It allows one to look up a particular provision and quickly see who can appeal and what decisions are available to the tribunal. It is not something that has been raised with the Government as causing particular difficulty, other than by my noble friend”.—[Official Report, 6/7/15; col. GC 17.]

That stung me into action, and I decided that I was going to find out all about it. I have done some more research and discovered three things. First, there is a widely supported view that Schedule 6 is too complex and difficult to navigate. That supports my case for reform. Secondly, my amendment is too widely drafted as regards standing—that is, who may make an appeal. By way of example, many of the appeals that have been lodged to date in the tribunal in relation to schemes have been brought not by the charity trustees who had sought the proposed scheme themselves but by third parties objecting to the scheme, such as local residents objecting to a scheme in relation to parkland or parents at a school objecting to a scheme for the school. There have also been some politically motivated complaints. As a result, I have to accept the weakness of my amendment as drafted. Finally, and most importantly, my research revealed that my noble friend already has some powers to improve the operation of Schedule 6 without resort to primary legislation. Under Section 324 of the 2011 Act, entitled, “Power to amend provisions relating to appeals and applications to Tribunal”, my noble friend can act to improve the way the schedule operates.

If I accept that my amendment cannot do the business as presently drafted, all I am asking my noble friend to do tonight is to accept that there is a consensus among charity lawyers that Schedule 6 is absurdly complicated and not consistent in its principles and application and to say that he will initiate a review of the operation of Schedule 6 with the objectives of obtaining: first, a clear, generally applicable definition of a decision, including a non-decision; secondly, a clear principle of locus standi, which could and should include limitations based on remoteness from the decision’s effect; thirdly, recognition that the tribunal was intended to provide a straightforward basis of objective appeal against a regulator making decisions of direct impact, which justifies something beyond the judicial review principle; and fourthly, a logical staging through the Charity Commission’s internal review process to the tribunal as a next level. He can then use his Section 324 powers to introduce whatever interim improvements are possible until the next bus comes along to enable statutory improvements to be made.

It is easy to pass this off as a very technical matter, but access to justice is a very important principle and this undertaking to have a review would lead to improvements to that access for the charity sector. I beg to move.

[Lord Bridges of Headley]

My Lords, my noble friend Lord Hodgson has fought the corner of rationalising Charity Tribunal appeal rights for many years. Every time he gets knocked down, he gets straight back up and continues to fight from the blue corner. I applaud his persistence.

In principle, the Government have maintained a consistent position that they are not averse to rationalising the rights of appeal and review to the Charity Tribunal set out in Schedule 6, as my noble friend pointed out, but—it is an important “but”—we would not want to create new appeal rights where none currently exists that would add to the tribunal’s caseload. Neither would we want to expose the Charity Commission to challenge where it decides not to take action and where an appeal right does not currently exist. Creating rights of appeal where the Charity Commission decides not to take action could well result in an unmanageable workload of cases for the Charity Commission, diverting its resources. It would also effectively enable the tribunal to direct the use of the commission’s powers and resources. As I said before, we consider that the balance is about right under Schedule 6 as it stands in terms of what decisions can be appealed.

In terms of who can appeal, my noble friend Lord Hodgson made some fair points about legal standing to bring an appeal. For many appeal rights, the legal standing in relation to the Charity Tribunal is widely drawn, encompassing,

“any other person who is or may be affected by the decision”.

That is very wide compared to most other jurisdictions. However, it recognises that charities exist for the public benefit and that the regulator’s decisions about a charity can have a significant impact on people who would not normally be able to bring an appeal. I accept my noble friend’s point that some people find Schedule 6 clunky and difficult to use, but I am not sure how it could be condensed into a simple provision without inadvertently making the sorts of changes that we want to avoid.

The Government have agreed with many of my noble friend Lord Hodgson’s recommendations over the years. We find that he is usually right. I am sorry to say that this is a rare case where we will have to part company and agree to disagree on some of his points. I hope my noble friend will not be too disappointed to learn that I will not commit to any amendments on this subject. I am happy to reflect on the points that he raised—they were detailed points and I will not simply wave them away right now—and will listen if he thinks we can make improvements to Schedule 6 through the power to do so in secondary legislation. Again, I should be clear that I make no promises. As I already said, we do not want to introduce new appeal rights. I thank my noble friend for all he continues to contribute to this debate. While I cannot agree to his amendment, I very much hope that we can continue to have conversations about this matter.

[Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts]

I am grateful to my noble friend for his extensive response and kind remarks. I understand that my amendment is faulty. I have no wish to press it to a Division. That would be entirely wrong as it does not work. I just hope that at some point we can look at how Schedule 6 works and see whether there are ways that it can be made clearer, and if that can be done by secondary legislation. It would be wonderful if we could do that. If we have to come back to consider it another day then so be it. For tonight, I seek leave to withdraw the amendment.

Charities (Protection and Social Investment) Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Bridges of Headley and Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts

Monday 6th July 2015 Grand Committee

[Lord Bridges of Headley]

My Lords, I pay tribute to my noble friend Lord Hodgson for his determination, if not doggedness, on this issue and in seeing it being addressed. I should pay tribute also to his excellent eyesight for being able to read my brief and especially my handwriting, which is a first.

Before I go into the detail, let me take a step back and put this debate in a little context. We recognise that, increasingly, the public are looking to invest their money socially in a range of social investment sector organisations, including charities. This is a growing area of activity alongside areas that we are already familiar with, such as donations to charities, which of course remain significant.

In particular, we know that there is an increase in the number of members of the public making small, direct investments in charities and social enterprises. Specifically, we know that there has been an increase both in the value of investment offers—the market was worth £249 million in 2014, up 78% from 2013—and in the number of participants. More than 15,000 individuals invested in co-operatives, to which my noble friend referred, and community benefit societies in 2014—up 33% from 2013—so this is a growing market.

Such investments might take the form of shares in community enterprises, such as the more than 3,000 people who recently bought shares in Hastings Pier Charity, or they may take the form of bonds in charities. As my noble friend alludes to in his amendment, we know that for such investors the decision to make an investment in the charity or the social enterprise is often motivated by factors other than, or in addition to, the prospect of financial returns.

A recent study found that doing social or environmental good was an important factor in deciding to invest for 90% of investors in community shares, such as those in the Hastings pier project. I understand, however, that the effect of the financial promotion regime is an increasingly important issue for charities and social enterprises looking to raise funds from the public in this particular way. These financial promotion rules, which are designed to protect consumers, apply to many of these deals. Where they do not apply there are emerging voluntary regimes, such as the community shares mark, which was launched last week.

I understand that the aim of today’s amendment is prompted by concerns around the appropriateness of these rules for charities which want to raise investment funds from members of the public, just as they might ask for donations. These concerns indeed reflect reports from the social investment sector that issues around inconsistent treatment for the different types of social enterprises under these rules lead to disproportionate costs and unnecessary complexity. I also understand, as my noble friend said, that this is not the first time that these issues have been raised.

I want to assure noble Lords that the Government are indeed aware of these issues and, in response to interventions from your Lordships during the passage of the Financial Services Bill, the Government made very valuable changes to ensure that the FCA had the proper incentives to take into account the differing needs of different types of organisations that it regulates, including those of charities and social enterprises. Since then, the Government and the FCA have been working with the sector to consider evidence about the effectiveness of the regime, particularly in light of the report Marketing Social Investments—An Outline of the UK Financial Promotion Regime, which was published by the Social Investment Research Council last year. These discussions between the sector and the Treasury are live and ongoing, but I believe—indeed I am told—that real progress is being made in understanding the challenges faced by charities and social enterprises.

I also think that it is important that the issue of changes to the scope and substance of regulation raised today should be considered as part of those discussions between industry representatives, the FCA and the Treasury. I have, therefore, written to the Treasury to make it aware of the issues that have been raised to ensure that they are given full consideration. I will be meeting my right honourable friend the Economic Secretary to the Treasury to discuss them.

I am sorry to say that this is one of those issues that is a large hot potato—as the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, said—that sits both in the lap of the Cabinet Office and in the Treasury, but I am grasping my end of it with both hands and trying to ensure that action is taken. It is, of course, in all our interests that any regulation is proportionate, consistent and clear. Protection of consumers must be paramount, as the noble Lord, Lord Watson, said—a point with which I entirely agree. We also need to be careful that investors understand what they are investing in, as the noble Lord said, and that the reputation of the growing social investment market is protected. That is why the Treasury is engaging with key stakeholders and interested parties on these issues.

In addition to looking at suggestions, including in this amendment and what has been said in the debate, the Treasury will explore whether there are other non-legislative ways of mitigating burdens or costs to social investment offerings. Obviously there will need to be consultation on this point if further action needs to be taken. I warmly welcome my noble friend’s input to the Treasury on these points and, as I said, I am meeting my right honourable friend the Economic Secretary to the Treasury to discuss them. I invite my noble friend to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts]

I am grateful to my noble friend. Of course, I recognise that there has been progress. As I said earlier, the FCA has begun to move—the tectonic plates have begun to shift. I absolutely accept the strictures of the noble Lord, Lord Watson, about the need to protect consumers. I am sorry that I got so excited that I jumped up to interrupt him twice, for which I apologise. He is right that what we do not want to happen is too much weight being put on this new idea too early, where there is a scandal and it is all set back because obviously things that go wrong get more publicity than things that go right. I accept that.

I am grateful to my noble friend. I am happy to withdraw the amendment for the time being. I hope that we can perhaps have some further news from the Treasury side of the hot potato—do hot potatoes have sides?—or the other end of the hot potato before Report. This is an interesting issue and, to be honest and being candid with the Committee, it is only at times like this that we are able to push matters over the line. This is the moment. Once the Bill is gone the next opportunity to do this will be some way away. It would be a pity not to find something that we can coalesce around to make sure that the joint objectives that we have of a new social investment regime, proper consumer protection and a different type of regulation can be achieved. In the mean time I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts]

I am afraid that this is another of my long-standing quarrels. It is about the Charity Tribunal. Before the 2006 Act, the only appeal against the Charity Commission was to the High Court. That was expensive, slow and difficult to achieve. The then Labour Government, to their credit, introduced the Charity Tribunal in the 2006 Act. The plan was that it would improve access to justice: it would be quick, low-cost, user-friendly and non-adversarial. There was a subsidiary aspect to that, which I am not sure that the designers of the 2006 Act quite recognised, which was about helping more charity law precedents to emerge. Much of what charities are guided by now is quite old and backward-looking—we have discussed the tin-rattling regulations covering cash collections, which date from 1916. Re Resch, the big case about public benefit—an issue that we shall come to later this afternoon—concerning a private Australian hospital in the grounds of a state one dates from the 1920s. We were hoping that the Charity Tribunal would act to help bring charity law forward into the 20th and 21st centuries but the early experiences were a bit disappointing. As is too often the case, everybody reached for their lawyers—as they are entitled to do. I was not present at the end of the independent schools case that came before the tribunal, but I am told that nine QCs were present, which must have cost a bit of money.

However, although it has been slow, there has been progress. There has been more determination on the papers, which means that the tribunal does not require people to attend. More litigants have been appearing in person, which I think is also a good thing. During my review, a lot of evidence was received about the operations of the tribunal and ways they could be improved.

Some of these issues are being addressed by the Law Commission in its current consultation—which I think will be the escape hatch that my noble friend uses in a minute or two—but the Committee might like to be aware of a couple of extraordinary features. In order to appeal against the Charity Commission, a charity has to go to the commission to ask its permission as to whether the use of its funds to make the application is charitable. That seems to be entirely perverse. There is an inherent conflict of interest if the Charity Commission is on one side, the charity is on the other and the charity has to ask, “Is it fair to use this to attack you?”. That does not lead me to believe that there will be an even-handed decision. I hope that the Law Commission will move responsibility for this to the Charity Tribunal.

The second issue worth drawing to the Committee’s attention is that the Charity Commission cannot apply to the tribunal without the permission of the Attorney-General. It seems to me extraordinary that the top regulator in this sector does not have that freedom of action. It must be a threat to its independence if it has to go to a law officer of the Crown in order to be able to get determination of a case. I hope very much that the Law Commission will decide that the Charity Commission is free to act, even if it must of course still inform the Attorney-General. That would be a good way of bringing the law up to date.

There remains a major impediment to the effective working of the tribunal which the Law Commission has decided it cannot address, and that is the tribunal’s jurisdiction, which appears in Schedule 6 to the 2011 Act. There are 10 pages of it, with a series of headings about what the decision, direction or order is, who the applicants can be and what the tribunal’s powers are in response to a decision. That table was seen by the vast majority of contributors to my review as overly complicated and narrowly drawn. Even specialist charity lawyers complained of difficulty in understanding it. The list of cases brought before the tribunal also shows a large number being struck out for being outside the tribunal’s jurisdiction. That raises the question of whether its jurisdiction is sufficiently well defined to address the concerns people have about the commission’s work. Of course, with any forum there will always be cases that fall outside its jurisdiction, but in combination with the wider concerns about Schedule 6, the number of rejected cases raises questions.

The Schedule 6 table is focused on a specific range of formal legal decisions made by the commission. In some cases, but crucially not all of them, this includes the decision not to exercise a power, and the decision not to open a statutory inquiry into a charity is a frequently cited omission. Many of the decisions referred to in the schedule relate to the exercise of legal powers that the commission, as part of its more refined and focused approach to regulation, is choosing to make less frequent use of. Concern has therefore also been expressed that as the commission moves towards this lighter-touch regulatory regime, even more of its work will fall outside the scope of the tribunal’s jurisdiction.

Amendment 22B is designed to clarify the situation by providing a right of appeal against any legal decision of the Charity Commission and a right of review of any other decision by the commission. The new clause proposed in the amendment has two elements. The proposed changes to Section 319 of the 2011 Act deal with appeals and set out, very simply, who would be able to make the appeal: it can be any trustee or director of a charity or charitable company or,

“any other person who is the subject of the relevant decision”,

or is “significantly interested in” or “affected by” it. It lays out the powers the tribunal would have in responding to these appeals. The proposed changes to Section 321 deal with reviews. Finally, subsection (6) of the proposed new clause would delete the dreaded Schedule 6, which I hope will foreshorten and cut out the regulatory regime. This is not a complex issue. Access to the Charity Tribunal is unnecessarily complicated, particularly for smaller charities, and the charity world will appreciate and benefit from simplification. I beg to move.

[Lord Bridges of Headley]

My Lords, it is excellent to address another of my noble friend Lord Hodgson’s issues—I will not call it a bugbear. Obviously I am sympathetic to the aim of wanting to simplify the legislation because in many senses less is more. My noble friend advocated the approach taken in his amendment in his statutory report on the Charities Act 2006. I hope I will be forgiven for reminding noble Lords of the Government’s response:

“In principle the Government supports the rationalisation of the appeal rights in Schedule 6 to the Charities Act 2011, provided it can be done in a way that does not … expose the Charity Commission to challenges where it decides not to intervene in a charity in keeping with its risk and proportionality framework (this is already capable of Judicial Review); or … create any significant new appeal rights that would add to the jurisdiction’s case-load”.

I believe that this was a sensible position to take. We must remember that the Charity Commission has limited resources. We would not want to expose the commission to challenges where it decides not to intervene in a charity in keeping with its risk and proportionality framework. As I have said, this is already capable of judicial review. Providing a right of appeal to the tribunal could result in an unmanageable workload of cases for the Charity Commission, diverting its resources to defending proceedings in the tribunal, many of which may be spurious or vexatious. Appeal rights in the event of the commission not making a particular decision would in effect enable others to direct the use of commission powers and resources, rather than it being left to the good sense of the commission to decide such matters for itself within the scope of its objectives, functions, processes and duties.

We consider that the balance is about right under Schedule 6 as it currently stands. There is a right of appeal against the opening of a statutory inquiry but no right of appeal if the commission decides, for whatever reason, not to open one. We do not want to overburden the tribunal with significant new rights of appeal that are likely to generate a large number of cases where none had previously existed.

I am not sure that everyone shares my noble friend Lord Hodgson’s viewpoint on the difficulty of interpreting Schedule 6 to the Charities Act 2011. There are some who are attracted to the structure of Schedule 6 and find it easy to navigate. It allows one to look up a particular provision and quickly see who can appeal and what decisions are available to the tribunal. It is not something that has been raised with the Government as causing particular difficulty, other than by my noble friend.

Most of the Bill is about giving the Charity Commission the tools it needs to do its job, so I hope my noble friend will understand that, although I approve of his eye for simplification, I am very reluctant to consider anything that could divert its resources from its core functions. I hope that he will feel able to withdraw his amendment on that basis.

[Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts]

My Lords, I have not found many people who have said that Schedule 6 is easy to navigate. I did not get into too much of the detail but there is also the question of the timescales for making appeals. However, I can see that I am not going to make any progress with this.

I am disappointed that the Minister has fallen back on the issue of vexatious litigation. That suggests that the tribunal does not have the sense to strike out vexatious litigants by saying, “This isn’t a case”, and I do not find that that argument really holds water. What I think has happened is that small charities in particular are finding their legal position not as strong as it should be. I am sure that this will lead to additional casework for the Charity Commission but I do not mind about that: if the commission needs to be challenged, it needs to be challenged. If that happens unfairly then the Charity Tribunal will step in and say, “This is not a worthwhile case”, and strike it out. I understand that it has done so with other cases in the past. Still, that is as far as we are going to get today, so I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Charities (Protection and Social Investment) Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Bridges of Headley and Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts

Wednesday 1st July 2015 Grand Committee

[Lord Bridges of Headley]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, and my noble Friend, Lord Hodgson, for tabling these amendments. I entirely share the sentiments of many noble Lords that we need to examine the definitions in detail, although this might get very technical. This is clearly the first time that we have attempted to define social investment and set it out in statute. It is entirely right and proper that we take time to debate and define to make sure that what we are doing is fit for purpose.

I will pick up on what has been said about the definition of social investments. Traditionally, as your Lordships know, those charities that have money to invest have taken a two-pocket approach to pursuing their goal. On one side, they seek to maximise financial returns from their investments. On the other side, they distribute those returns to further their mission. Sometimes, but not always, they try to measure the impact they are having. I would argue that social investment is different, because it sits between these two pockets. It involves investments that further the charitable mission but also expect to generate a financial return. This means the capital can be recycled again and again, contributing to a sustainable model and reducing dependency on grants and donations. In the right conditions, it can enable a greater impact than the traditional model, and further benefits from the focus on measuring and reporting on the outcomes that have been generated.

Turning to the amendments, it may first be worth recognising that Clause 13 has been prepared by the Law Commission, as the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, said, in order to implement its recommendation for the creation of a new power, and associated duties, when making social investments. The Bill is not the Government’s interpretation of what the Law Commission recommended; rather, it is drafted by the Law Commission to reflect its own recommendations. In this way, the definition of social investment used for the purpose of this Bill has been deliberately drafted to be as wide as possible while retaining the distinctiveness of the “social” element. It covers a spectrum, from investments that are mostly intended to further charitable purposes but involve some return of capital, through to those that are primarily financial but have a small mission benefit. I think of these as the two poles at the extremes of the spectrum. At one end are social investments that look much like grants, with a very limited expected return of capital. At the other are social investments that look very similar to traditional financial investments, but have a small role in furthering a charitable purpose. Social investment must combine some aspect of each pole, but the nature of the combination is entirely flexible.

Neither the furtherance of the charity’s purposes nor the financial return should be required to take precedence. To hold one above the other would potentially restrict the breadth of investments that fall under the power, thereby making it less likely to be used. In order to maintain as wide a scope as possible for the power’s use, so that the power may have the largest possible impact, I hope the noble Baroness will withdraw her amendment.

On the other hand, the definition of social investment used here seeks to ensure that there is a direct relationship between the social investment and the charity’s purposes; in other words, there should be a clear causal connection between the act done by the charity and the charitable service ultimately provided. Allowing for indirect furthering of the charitable mission would mean that the power of social investment applied to investments that were purely financial but where the returns were used for charitable purposes. I thank my noble friend Lord Hodgson for raising this important consideration with me, but in order that the clear causal connection should be maintained I hope that he will be content to not move his amendment.

Turning to Amendments 16A, 18B and 20A, I thank my noble friend Lord Hodgson for the work that he has done and continues to do in this area. His input is of great help and has been of real benefit to the charity sector. My understanding is that these amendments are intended to ensure that the definition of social investment is wide and can cover all potential situations, even those where the furtherance of the charity’s mission is slight or occurs piecemeal. In particular, I understand that the intention is to make explicit that mixed-motive investments, as described in Charity Commission guidance note CC14, are covered by the definition.

I take this opportunity to state explicitly that the Bill has been drafted by the Law Commission to include MMI as one aspect of social investment. Furthermore, officials have been in continued dialogue with the Law Commission on this and other points, and the commission is satisfied that the drafting properly reflects the intent. So long as some direct furthering of the charity’s purposes is intended, no matter how small or partial, along with some anticipated return of capital, no matter how minimal, the investment is covered by the definition. Mixed-motive investment clearly falls within this. It partly furthers charitable purposes and partly achieves a financial return. I hope that this provides assurance to my noble friend and that he will feel comfortable not moving the amendment. I know that we seek a similar destination here, and I hope I have shown that the vessel that we are embarking in stands good for the journey.

[Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts]

We are on to angels on the head of a pin, to be honest; this is very technical. When we have had a chance to go through what the Law Commission has said and what the Minister has said today, if the Charity Law Association still thinks that there is an issue to be thrashed out here, it would be helpful if we could have an understanding today that we could come to see him to talk about this and sort it out. We are going to get no further today because this is a very narrow point, but people feel strongly about it.

[Lord Bridges of Headley]

My noble friend takes words out of my mouth. I was about to invite him and the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, to meet so that we can discuss this point and dance on the head of a pin together. I understand that we need to get this right.

I confirm that the relevant guidance from the Charity Commission—CC14—will be revised following the passage of the Bill. The commission will take steps to make sure that charities that want to make social investments are clear about the scope of the power and what it would mean for them, as well as how the commission can and will monitor for abuse of the power. The commission will update its relevant guidance for trustees’ duties where needed. It will also consult stakeholders—a mix of legal advisers, investment bodies and charities—to ensure that any guidance produced is of practical use and widespread application. Any such guidance would be produced in time for the implementation of the power. I hope that that begins to address some of the Committee’s points but, as I said, I would be happy to meet my noble friend and the noble Baroness.

Charities (Protection and Social Investment) Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Bridges of Headley and Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts

Tuesday 23rd June 2015 Grand Committee

[Lord Bridges of Headley]

My Lords, following what the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, said in response to the last amendment, I will just put on record that I would certainly not wish to give the impression that I am complacent about these issues. I completely understand that we need to debate and discuss them. As I said right at the start, we need to kick the tyres here. I just wanted to make that perfectly clear.

Let me start by dealing, first, with the proposed new clause on serious incident reporting. It might help if I explain briefly the position as it currently stands. The Charity Commission already requires serious incident reporting from charities with an income of over £25,000 as part of annual return requirements and encourages all charities to report serious incidents immediately as a matter of good practice. The Charity Commission’s annual return regulations require charity trustees to sign a declaration each year that there have been no serious incidents in the charity in the year or to give reference to any serious incident reports already made to the regulator and also report serious incidents that have not previously been reported.

On the lists that have been referred to in the debate, I do not think that the order of the listing suggests how serious the Charity Commission thinks those issues are. However, I can tell the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, that the Charity Commission will look again at the issues it defines as serious.

There are various other legal requirements on charity trustees to report certain matters immediately. For example, there is a duty under terrorism legislation to disclose information about certain possible terrorist financing based offences to the police. Specifically on safeguarding, the Safeguarding Vulnerable Groups Act 2006 places a requirement or legal duty on employers and volunteer managers of people working with children or vulnerable adults to make a referral to the DBS in certain circumstances where a person has been dismissed or removed from working with children or vulnerable adults. That is in addition to any referral to a body such as a local authority safeguarding team.

As regards charities themselves, charity trustees are ultimately responsible for safeguarding within their charity. The Charity Commission’s role in safeguarding is to ensure that charity trustees take steps to protect and safeguard their beneficiaries. This means that charities working with vulnerable beneficiaries must have in place appropriate safeguarding policies and procedures, and must monitor them on an ongoing basis to ensure they are effectively implemented. The Charity Commission can and does take action against charities and trustees where they fail to do so but it is not the role of the Charity Commission to investigate suspected abuse. If there are allegations of abuse of vulnerable beneficiaries, the Charity Commission expects trustees to handle them properly and, where appropriate, report allegations to the police, social services or other agencies. Where the commission itself has serious concerns, it can and does refer them to the police or other agencies.

As I said at Second Reading, the Bill is about striking the right balance. While on the face of it there are many attractions to imposing a new serious incident reporting duty on charities, we have to acknowledge that it would be a new reporting requirement that would affect tens of thousands of small charities. Furthermore, and this is an important point, there is also the concern that the charities that would meet their obligations under a duty to immediately report serious incidents are those charities that would do so as a matter of good practice, and have already taken appropriate action to address the issue. Charities bent on abusing their position of trust would be unlikely to report the matter to their regulator. The danger would be that we would simply create a lot of red tape for the vast majority of honest charities, while those poorly managed or involved in abuse would ignore the requirement.

Under the amendment, diligent trustees might consider it necessary to report to the Charity Commission every time there was a risk to beneficiaries or the charity’s reputation. It is not hard to see how the commission could be inundated with queries and unnecessary reports. There is also the question about whether the commission would be able to cope, and what it would do with such a volume of reports.

The Government are committed to minimising regulatory burdens for charities, particularly small charities. We do not want to impose new burdens, particularly when the implications for the commission and the impact on charities have not been fully considered.

I do not want to appear overly negative towards this amendment as I believe there is much to be said for it, but I hope that the noble Baroness will also accept that there are downsides and that we do not want to tie up small charities with red tape. I hope that on that basis she will feel able to withdraw her amendment.

[Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts]

I have a question, which does not have to be answered today. The Minister refers to the fact that the Charity Commission generally refers matters to the police. Are we satisfied that police forces around the country always refer matters to the commission? I wonder sometimes if the commission is not up here while the police forces down there are looking into things. Is the information flow sufficiently strong? I am not asking for a response today; this is something that we can pick up later. However, it is an issue that has come up from time to time in the discussions that we have been having.