HMS “Ocean”

Lord Boyce Excerpts

Monday 7th November 2016 Lords Chamber

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, as the noble Lord knows, the specified service life for HMS “Ocean” was 20 years as from 1998, and we announced in the SDSR 2015 that she would be taken out of service in 2018. The Royal Navy has been clear that, following the decommissioning of HMS “Ocean”, its priority was to maintain surface lift capability using “Albion” and “Bulwark” while preparing to bring the carriers into service with a smooth sequencing programme. I do not share the noble Lord’s perception of the Royal Navy as suffering cuts; if anything, it is very much on the up. We have the arrival of the two Queen Elizabeth-class carriers to look forward to, which will provide immensely greater capability than we have at the moment.

[Lord Boyce (CB)]

My Lords, I am afraid that I do not find the Minister’s Answer to the Question asked by the noble Lord, Lord West, particularly convincing. Does the Minister agree that paying off “Ocean” makes no strategic sense and that, despite what he said, it has been done because defence is badly underfunded and, in the Royal Navy’s case, badly underresourced in people as well? Does he agree that it was a mistake to impose an unrealistically low manpower ceiling in the 2010 defence review and to compound that mistake by not addressing it properly in the 2015 defence review, and that the current underfunding of defence resources, which is requiring the services to make cuts of some 10%, is having a very bad effect on training and the quality of life of our soldiers, sailors and airmen?

Naval Warships: Repair at Sea

Lord Boyce Excerpts

Tuesday 13th September 2016 Lords Chamber

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, the noble Lord made a series of points and asked a series of questions. Of course, there are always acute cost pressures where we have a service at the cutting-edge of excellence, as the Royal Navy is. But there is now a range of ways in which the Royal Navy delivers operational maintenance and repair to the fleet. It can often be, as I am sure the noble Lord knows, through a Royal Navy repair and maintenance party being deployed to a ship or, more likely, as will be the case with the carriers, through the ship’s own personnel and capabilities. In addition, we have well-established commercial arrangements and international agreements, such as the use of other countries’ bases and facilities. I would mention that, due to a successful recruitment campaign, RFA manning is currently on target, with many vacancies oversubscribed.

[Lord Boyce (CB)]

My Lords, with due respect, I fear that the Minister’s Answer to the Question of the noble Lord, Lord Astor, is somewhat complacent. The fact is that the Navy’s attribute to be deployable worldwide without any host nation support is critical. Where I believe it is complacent is that the noble Earl overlooks what happens in conflict. We are scarred with examples of where allies and international agreements sometimes fall away when we get into conflict situations. RFA “Diligence” may be only one component of our support but it is a critical one, especially for the servicing, maintenance and repair of nuclear submarines, which cannot get into ports where there are no nuclear-cleared berths. Will the Minister please reflect on that and reassure the House that the Ministry of Defence may look at this again?

[Earl Howe]

The House will listen with great respect to the noble and gallant Lord, with his enormous experience. The approach now being taken by the Royal Navy is to upskill our own engineers and give them an opportunity to use their skills. That is a good thing and, to that end, we are working with industry to improve training in diagnostics and repair techniques, which puts the service man and woman at the centre of operational maintenance. I will, however, reflect on the points that the noble and gallant Lord has made.

Armed Forces: Future Force 2020

Lord Boyce Excerpts

Thursday 25th February 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Harrison (Lab)]

My Lords—

[Lord Boyce (CB)]

My Lords—

[The Lord Privy Seal (Baroness Stowell of Beeston) (Con)]

My Lords, I think that the House is signalling that it wants to hear from the Cross-Benchers.

[Lord Boyce]

My Lords, a skill set for which there is an ever growing need is, of course, engineering, especially nuclear engineering. Will the Minister say what progress has been made with industry to ensure a flow of that talent between industry and the services, particularly for those who have left the services and joined industry and then been brought back into the services to help out?

[Earl Howe]

The noble and gallant Lord is absolutely right. On nuclear engineers, we have adopted what we call an enterprise approach, which essentially means working with the wider defence industry to better share experience and best practice and to develop career management, manning and access to the key skills that we need to create a more attractive career path for nuclear engineers. There are other elements as well. We need to have proper staged financial incentives, and we have retention incentives for those already working for the Royal Navy. There is no single answer, but I think that this is the way ahead—in particular, working closely with university and technical colleges to support the development of those skilled individuals.

Armed Forces Bill

Lord Boyce Excerpts

Thursday 11th February 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Boyce (CB)]

My Lords, it is a great pleasure to follow on from the maiden speech of the noble Baroness, Lady Pidding. With over 30 years of voluntary political service behind her, I am quite sure that she is a welcome addition to the House with such experience. I am sure we all agree that her maiden speech was delivered with a nice touch, and I am quite certain she can return to judging elocution and speech competitions with great and totally deserved confidence. Also, her apposite and most supportive comments about our Armed Forces were very welcome and, given my background, I was very pleased to hear them. In all, it was a speech that offered a nice and pleasant foretaste of interventions to come.

Like the noble Baroness, I pay tribute to the men and women of our Armed Forces and their families who support them. Without the families, our servicemen and servicewomen could not do so well the job that they do.

I had the pleasure, if that is the right word, to be involved in a small way in the 2006 and 2011 Armed Forces Bills when they processed through this House. As was referred to by the Minister, it is good to see that this Bill is of significantly less complexity than the other two, especially the 2006 bumper Bill. Indeed, the fact that there are relatively few matters to address on this occasion, and most of them largely uncontentious and of a tidying-up nature, speaks well of the work that was done five and 10 years ago. I am particularly pleased that there is nothing before us which obviously threatens the service ethos or the command chain and the crucial role that they both have in fighting effectiveness—a point that is all too often forgotten by some. I trust that it will stay that way through Committee stage.

Having said that, I do have some comments. I want to follow up on and empathise with the comments of the noble Lord, Lord West, about mesothelioma. I note that the ongoing work on compensation for veterans suffering from this awful sickness was mentioned in the other place with respect to this Bill. Although it is pleasing to note that progress has been made on this, with a recent settlement announced by the Armed Forces Minister, the relatively small group of veterans who remain excluded because they fall the wrong side of the date lines set last year is regrettable. It seems manifestly unfair and runs counter to the tenets of the Armed Forces covenant. Perhaps the Minister will comment on why this should not find space in the Bill.

Secondly, I, too, wish to raise the subject of “lawfare”, as it sometimes known, and I make no apology for repeating what my noble and gallant friend Lord Craig of Radley said in his excellent speech. Absent from this Bill is any mention of lawfare or the increasing legal encirclement of our Armed Forces. For example, the Minister will be aware of the growing concern within the Armed Forces regarding Crown immunity, or lack of it, in warfare situations—a concern fuelled by the large number of cases being investigated of alleged inappropriate behaviour in the field in Iraq or Afghanistan, or accusations of the use of allegedly inappropriate equipment which overlook the precept in war that you have to fight with what you have got. There can be no better warning of where we have got to on this than the fact that some insurance companies are now touting insurance to commanding officers against the possibility of their being involved in litigation at some stage.

I realise that the Minister will say that commanding officers or people in command will be looked after by the MoD, but the point is that there is a perception in the public that military leaders down to junior level could be in the dock arising from actions and decisions within the Geneva Convention that have been taken in the heat of battle. All this is in danger of leading to a worrying risk averseness that will imperil operational effectiveness. Therefore I ask the Minister to say why the subject should not be addressed in this Bill. If it is not going to be addressed in this Bill, how are the Government going to reassure our service men and women on this point?

Finally, I understand that there are some other improvements to the service justice system which have not been included in the Bill—such as, for example, a provision to enable civilian courts to transfer suitable cases involving service personnel to courts martial; and, on courts martial, to address a concern about the ability of a board to find a person guilty in a serious case by a simple majority, by changing that to a qualified majority or one dissenting vote to come more in line with civilian practice.

I suspect that I am not going to agree with everything that the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, will say in Committee, but on those particular subjects I think we probably are in agreement. So I ask the Minister to explain why such improvements have been omitted from the Bill and to assure the House that they will not be left out until the next quinquennial review.

Vanguard Submarine Replacement

Lord Boyce Excerpts

Wednesday 10th February 2016 Lords Chamber

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, I have no wish to score party-political points on a matter as serious as this. The noble Lord may remember that Parliament voted in 2007 to support the programme to replace the Vanguard-class submarines. That authorised the investment in the programme, including the design work and the long leads. This is the stage we are at now. If we had not commenced the work when we did, it would not have been possible to design and construct the successor submarines before the Vanguard class left service. We are moving ahead with all speed. We are committed to a parliamentary vote because it is only right and proper to give the democratically elected Chamber of Parliament the opportunity to endorse the principle of the deterrent.

[Lord Boyce (CB)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for that confirmation of the Government’s commitment to the successor programme. There has been some badly informed talk by some people in positions of responsibility on the subject of the vulnerability of the successor to detection in the future. Does the Minister agree that such statements are totally speculative; show serious lack of understanding of anti-submarine warfare, the science of oceanography and the science of the impenetrability of water; and are probably being made with irresponsibly and wilfully misleading intent?

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, yes. To be effective, the nuclear deterrent has to be credible. We take the responsibility to maintain a credible nuclear deterrent extremely seriously. We continually assess all the threats and review them against the capability of our submarines to ensure their current and future operational effectiveness, including threats against cyber and unmanned vehicles. We are confident that the deterrent remains safe and secure and will be so in the future.

Strategic Defence and Security Review

Lord Boyce Excerpts

Thursday 3rd December 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Boyce (CB)]

My Lords, I declare my interests as in the register. It has been good to see that this SDSR has arrested the decline of the defence budget over the past five years and made some attempt to redress some of the woefully short-sighted decisions made in 2010. It is particularly encouraging to see in the Prime Minister’s foreword to the review his recognition of the need for,

“sea lanes to stay open and the arteries of global commerce to remain free flowing”,

and, from this, maritime security and the role of the Royal Navy moving back to where it should be in the centre of our defence strategy.

However, in the context of keeping sea lanes open, I have two concerns. First, safe navigation is fundamental. The Minister will be aware of the vulnerability of the global navigation satellite system—GNSS—to interruption and jamming and of the availability of eLoran, which is not similarly susceptible and provides a safe back-up in this eventuality. I declare an interest in this as an Elder Brother of Trinity House. Would the Minister care to comment on the Government’s intentions regarding a reliable and robust alternative to GNSS when eLoran is terminated at the end of this year when the French shut down their station, a station without which the eLoran system cannot function? There is a national resilience component to this—it is not just safe navigation—with regards to GNSS-generated positioning, navigation and timing, or PNT. It is on its signals that key elements of much of our national infrastructure depend.

Secondly on safe sea lanes, and as I mentioned in the debate following the Statement on the SDSR in the House last week, we should be concerned about the small size of our destroyer/frigate force. These are the workhorses of the fleet on which we depend to keep the sea lanes open. In replying to questions, the Minister said:

“As regards the sufficiency of ships, we are advised by the Chief of Naval Staff that a 19-ship destroyer and frigate fleet, capable of co-operating on a global scale, is what is required”.—[Official Report, 23/11/15; col. 518.]

That may be so, and it may be what the Chief of Naval Staff said, but that is only because the number of tasks that we have traditionally and quite properly undertaken has been cut to accommodate the paucity of escorts.

For example, if the aspiration to meet national security objective 2, which is to project our global influence, is to be sensibly realised so far as the Royal Navy’s contribution to the core MoD task of defence engagement is concerned, we need more ships to cover the necessary footprint. Although we may be able to draw some comfort about the announcement of the concept of designing and building a new class of lighter, flexible, general-purpose frigates, it is simply too long to wait until the 2030s to see them.

In the upcoming and new national shipbuilding strategy, I exhort the Government to see what can be done to bring forward the introduction of those ships into service. This will benefit the industry by having a better shipbuilding drumbeat; it will generate earlier foreign sales potential, where other navies like to see the Royal Navy using a class of ship before they buy into it; and, of course, it would underpin the United Kingdom’s role in supporting international security and stability in the light of the SDSR.

National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015

Lord Boyce Excerpts

Monday 23rd November 2015 Lords Chamber

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, the noble Baroness should not read anything in particular into what she perceives as a paucity of mention of the European Union in this document. There is no doubt that our membership of the European Union adds value to our defence capability. We have only to look at the operation in the Mediterranean to rescue migrants earlier this year to see how the European Union came together. I was in Brussels last week at a meeting of the European Defence Agency, which is another means whereby member states can collaborate to ensure that we have such things as common standards in air-to-air refuelling, aircraft safety and a range of other areas. The European Union is a vehicle for co-operation, in parallel to our membership of NATO, and I would be the first to pay tribute to the work of its member states in protecting the security of Europe.

[Lord Boyce (CB)]

My Lords, I declare my interests as in the register. We should welcome this arrest in the decline in defence spending. We should also welcome the Government’s rather belated recognition of the damage that was done in the 2010 SDSR. But repairing the holes in our capability caused by that damage will take years and we need it today. In that context, for example, it is to be welcomed that the Statement says:

“We need the sea lanes to stay open and the arteries of global commerce to remain free flowing”,

but for that we need sufficient escorts. Does the Minister agree that it is not enough to say that we will not reduce our destroyer and frigate force from 19? Does he not agree that that force is far too small and that waiting until the 1930s, as the Statement says, is completely unacceptable?

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, I think the noble and gallant Lord meant the 2030s. This has been a matter of very deep consideration in the SDSR process. The commitment to maintaining our fleet of 19 frigates and destroyers is still there, as I have said. The Navy needs eight Type 26 frigates to undertake the core anti-submarine warfare role and we remain committed to building those ships. We are taking more time to mature the design and drive down the costs before we cut steel on the first Type 26. Meanwhile, we will build two more offshore patrol vessels to ensure continuity of work on the Clyde and to provide more capability to the Royal Navy.

The concept of designing and building a new class of lighter, flexible, general-purpose frigate is, I hope, interesting to noble Lords. We are clear that behind that lies an aspiration to increase the total number of frigates and destroyers available to the Royal Navy. If we can produce something that is more generic—that is less high-spec when it does not need to be state-of-the-art high-spec—that should benefit the reach and capability of the Royal Navy in the round. It should also benefit shipbuilders in Scotland and the rest of the UK. We will publish a new shipbuilding strategy in 2016 setting out the detail of that.

The Role and Capabilities of the UK Armed Forces, in the Light of Global and Domestic Threats to Stability and Security

Lord Boyce Excerpts

Tuesday 15th September 2015 Grand Committee

[Lord Boyce (CB)]

My Lords, I declare my interests as in the register. I am also grateful to the Minister for initiating this debate.

So far as the global aspects of the Motion are concerned, I can infer from comments from the Prime Minister and the Government, reiterated by the Minister in his opening remarks, that there is an aspiration for the UK to continue to be a global force for good, and that that should be across a full range of activities: trade, diplomacy, aid, security and so on. That is only right and proper for a nation with our history, our dependence on overseas trade, our membership of such bodies as the P5 and G7 and our key leadership roles in a number of international organisations. To meet that aspiration in a world that is increasingly dangerous, or, to use the Minister’s words, “darker and more dangerous”, the Government rightly look to the Armed Forces as a key tool in their range of options. This tool must have credibility with important allies, especially the United States, it must be able to counter threats to our stability and security wherever they may arise—especially those that can materialise in our homeland—and it must have a reputation for professionalism that is a comfort to friends and a discomfort to potential opponents.

All this needs to be underpinned by a new set of defence planning assumptions that have relevance to today’s scenarios to replace those laid out in SDSR 2010, which so lamentably failed to predict any of the crises of the last five years, driven as it was to ignore anything that might interfere with the lust for cutting the defence budget. An example of this was the complacency of the national security strategy in categorising,

“A conventional attack by a state on another NATO or EU member to which the UK would have to respond”,

as being the lowest possible threat, a complacency that has been shattered by Russia’s behaviour over the last couple of years. I trust that will be rectified in the upcoming review.

To fulfil a role that can deliver all the Government’s aspirations, the Armed Forces must have the capability to deploy at range, which means having endurance, sustainability and the capability to operate through the full spectrum of warfare, from high-intensity conflict through peacekeeping and humanitarian tasks to defence diplomacy. In broad terms, such capabilities exist in most part today—albeit with one or two significant omissions—and in the forward defence programme will do so in future in terms of quality, but, as I have already implied, this quality must be of a nature that makes us a partner of choice when operating with allies, particularly the USA. We ignore the interoperability component of our capabilities at our peril and regrettably this is something we are sometimes guilty of doing.

If we are—or will be by 2020—in a relatively good place in terms of quality, the same cannot be said of quantity. It is conceivable that our Armed Forces may be able to go anywhere but they certainly cannot be everywhere, with their overall order of battle shrunk to a scale not seen since the 1920s; they are already unable to fulfil all the tasks that the Government would have them do. For example, we note some NATO commitments being capped, and the stretch on the armed services is seeing some important activities deemed to be of lower priority. I am thinking particularly of high-level training, which is so crucial to fighting effectiveness. Some of those important activities are being put aside because the capacity to undertake them and meet front-line commitments is insufficient.

There are many examples in the land, sea and air domains of where the knife of SDSR 2010 cut too deep, but let me give a couple of examples from the maritime area. Our destroyer frigate force, as I have said before in the House, is woefully depleted and it cannot deploy on a scale apposite to a country with global interests and aspirations in an uncertain world in which there are more national, NATO and allied active maritime operations running than 15 years ago when we had 30% more escorts. This situation is exacerbated by the workhorses of the fleet, the Type 23 class of frigates, approaching the ends of their lives, with their replacements, the Global Combat Ship, the Type 26—which looks to be the right answer for defence and the Navy—still over the horizon, with no promise of an increase in numbers from a bare 13. Furthermore, the postulated build delivery rate for the new ship is set at one ship every two years, which is difficult to understand. It makes no sense in shipbuilding terms. The drumbeat will be far too slow for efficient shipyard management. It will certainly not allow for the expeditious regeneration of a modern frigate capability and puts us in danger of seeing force levels drop while in transition, and the ageing Type 23s will also become increasingly expensive to keep running, assuming they are capable of doing so. The dearth of a fit-for-task national shipbuilding strategy is all too evident, and perhaps the Minister might comment on whether such a strategy, which of course has wider ramifications than just frigates, is going to be produced.

Secondly, our fleet submarine numbers, at seven rather than the originally planned 10, are equally too low—a serious strategic oversight, given what they can offer, particularly in special operations. Thirdly, our two carriers are currently planned to have far too few Joint Strike Fighters to allow what is promised by this transformation in our strategic posture to be fully exploitable. This undermines the credibility and utility of what should be a major strategic asset.

Finally, as many other noble Lords have mentioned, the lack of a maritime patrol aircraft capability, removed in the aforesaid lamentable 2010 defence review, is a major drawback in having a fully effective maritime defence, especially at a time of a burgeoning submarine threat—from Russia in particular, literally on our doorstep.

The signs that this situation might be rectified look pretty bleak. Much of our deficiency must be put down to the inadequate funding, including the 9% cut, that defence has received over the past five years, so the recent promise of not allowing the defence budget to drop below 2% is of course to be welcomed. We shall, of course, be watching carefully to see if there will be further creative accounting to deliver this 2%, such as occurred in the last Parliament. In that context, it would be good if the Minister could reassure the Committee that other aspects of security funding previously not in the defence budget will not be swept into it to make up the numbers.

To look on the more positive side, it would appear that if rebalancing of the defence budget across the services is achieved—and that is quite a large “if”—then the Armed Forces may in fact be in a healthier budgetary and capability state in 2019, perhaps even making Future Force 2020 realisable. Does the Minister agree with that? However, getting to 2019 is going to be more problematic. The in-year savings that have been imposed, which the noble Lord, Lord Selkirk of Douglas, mentioned, and the Cabinet’s planned efficiency drive seriously threaten the Armed Forces in the short term in both capability and morale terms. It may be sufficiently bad to derail Future Force 2020.

I mention morale because much of the brunt of these short-term cuts will fall on the quality of life of our soldiers, sailors and airmen, which in turn will affect recruitment and, more importantly, retention. Perhaps the Minister would comment on how much attention has been paid to the effect of individual savings measures and their aggregation on people and their dependants. People are of course the critical component of the capability of all three services, especially the Royal Navy at the moment. The imposed manpower ceiling on the Navy, combined with significant problems being experienced in certain categories, especially engineers, is putting at risk operational viability. The coming SDSR has to recognise this. It will be a material failure if it fails to do so.

I wish to make a couple of extra points before I conclude. First, I associate myself with the comments made by my noble and gallant friend Lord Craig on attrition and conventional deterrence. I hope that those two words will appear in the future SDSR. Secondly, I ought to mention our strategic deterrent. The Government have made absolutely clear their commitment to a like-for-like replacement of the Vanguard class submarines and continuous at-sea deterrence, and that is to be applauded. I just observe that it is a pity they did not get round to agreeing to this in principle in Parliament before the Summer Recess, as I mentioned in the debate that we had in the summer. I hope that the Government remain confident about getting this through the new-look other place when the time comes.

The role that the United Kingdom Armed Forces should play in the light of global and domestic threats to stability and security is clear. Their capability fully to discharge that role properly is questionable, and it will be interesting to see whether the Government, when they announce the 2015 SDSR in November, before the end of this year, first get right their appreciation of the worldwide situation, which so impacts on our domestic stability and security—something that they failed to do in 2010—and, secondly, whether they will demonstrate in the SDSR the courage to match aspirations with resources, if necessary, as the noble Lord, Lord King of Bridgwater, mentioned, increasing the 2%, if defence truly is the first duty of government. That always sounds very hollow to me when considering, for example, the ring-fencing of the aid budget.

Defence: Budget

Lord Boyce Excerpts

Wednesday 17th June 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Boyce (CB)]

My Lords, I declare my interests as in the register. SDSR 2010 was not sound. It failed lamentably in predicting the crises that have cropped up in the last five years and, for example, removed our carrier capability just as it could have been used to great effect off Libya. In all, it left our forces fundamentally weakened. This was acknowledged by the Prime Minister in 2010 when he said:

“My own strong view is that this structure will require year-on-year real-terms growth in the defence budget in the years beyond 2015.”

Notwithstanding that, and given the short time given to compile it, this SDSR looks like being a thinly disguised cuts exercise that will emerge with no properly thought-through strategic vision or recognition of threats such as those posed by Russia. Force 2020 is a distant pipe dream. It seems to be on track to reinforce the perception around the world that we are a “has-been” and no longer a serious player—especially on the part of the United States. We should be particularly alarmed by the latter; a huge, unquantifiable amount comes our way in defence terms, underpinned by the United States’ confidence in our capability. We are seriously imperilling this.

Much has been said this evening about the totemic 2%, and I use the word “totemic” advisedly. This is about more than just money; it is about leadership. It is no use Ministers saying that we are better on defence spending that other European NATO partners. Surely the United Kingdom should be above chasing the lowest common denominator. The Prime Minister set the 2% challenge at the NATO Summit in Wales—he needs to follow his own lead. We have, by the way, already sunk below 2% if you really look at the figures, even allowing for the creative accounting by the last Government in sweeping into the 2% items previously excluded, such as the costs of contingency operations. I have no doubt that further fudging is on its way.

If the Government are prepared to ring-fence aid to foreign countries, it seems bizarre that we are not prepared to do at least the same for the defence of our own country. It is interesting to note that some difficulty is being experienced in spending the aid budget at the rate it needs to be of £30 million a day. I am not surprised—nor will I be about how much of that will be wasted. Perhaps the Minister would like to comment on that. Is he prepared to say whether part of our strategy is to be a global player? If it is, he should recognise that we need to see a commitment to a bigger defence budget—or at least 2% unfudged—to allow us to have a global footprint and, especially, our destroyer frigate force, which is, as I have said before in this place, anorexic.

Turning briefly to the nuclear deterrent, it is good to see the Government’s affirmation that we should replace our Vanguard-class Trident submarines with four new boats. I recognise that the main gate for this is not until next year, but perhaps the Minister could say why it is not possible to get this intent approved in principle now. Finally, I totally endorse the comments made my noble and gallant friend Lord Craig of Radley regarding attrition.

Falkland Islands Defence Review

Lord Boyce Excerpts

Tuesday 24th March 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Astor of Hever]

My Lords, I pay tribute to those brave sailors who went down on the noble Lord’s ship. He asked me about the oil situation. The Falkland Islands Government have said that if the oil exploration is successful they would wish to share some of their revenues with the UK to offset the costs to Her Majesty’s Government of the defence of the islands.

[Lord Boyce (CB)]

My Lords, we on these Benches share in the complimentary comments on the Minister’s contribution to all defence questions—I thank him very much indeed. I hear what the Minister said about there being a destroyer or frigate available to go down and help the patrol ship should the occasion arise, but sometimes these destroyers or frigates can be quite a long way away. Does the Minister agree that the best form of defence for the Falkland Islands is to have a visible, upthreat, maritime presence of significance? A patrol ship does a good job, but it is not a very serious deterrent. Therefore does he agree that the frequency with which the destroyers or frigates can get down to the Falkland Islands and show themselves there from time to time should be increased—and that there should be the odd submarine visit as well? As a corollary to that, we need a destroyer frigate force larger than the 19 we currently have.

[Lord Astor of Hever]

My Lords, I can assure the noble and gallant Lord that the destroyers and frigates are within a certain number of days’ sailing distance from the Falkland Islands—we are very insistent on that. I think he will agree with me that sometimes an invisible deterrent is as effective.