Crime and Policing Bill

Debate between Lord Berkeley of Knighton and Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames

Wednesday 11th March 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Berkeley of Knighton (CB)]

My Lords, I have some sympathy with the noble Lord Jackson, especially around people stealing mobile phones. However, when I read proposed new subsection (2), about people covering their face to stop identification, I thought that the problem about that was the same as my noble friend Lord Pannick mentioned. I used to cycle a great deal and I always wore a scarf, partly because of fumes, as he said, but because I seemed to be ingesting a vast number of insects and found this really rather objectionable, whether I had had lunch or not. For that reason, I am rather worried about this amendment.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, Amendment 385 is the face covering amendment, in which I note that motorcyclists strangely are not covered but scooter riders are. I am not sure I see the need for a new general stand-alone police power to require someone to stop, and I see real dangers in requiring someone to remove a face covering.

The police already have, as the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, referred to, a discretionary power under Section 163 of the Road Traffic Act 1988 to require any motorist or anybody propelling a mechanical vehicle or a cycle to stop—and a mechanical vehicle would include motor scooters and motorcycles. That power is very wide. It is generally considered to be directed to enable the police to conduct traffic checks. That is perceived as part of the compact between Governments and road users: if you use the roads, the corollary is that police officers can require you to stop as part of performing their function of regulating the traffic. An extra power to stop is entirely unnecessary.

The noble Lord, Lord Jackson, has rightly drawn attention to the specific case of mobile phone theft, reckless riding, riding on the pavements and so forth, but his amendment does not refer to the need for a reasonable suspicion that anyone required to remove a face covering is committing a crime. It seems to me that that was the point alluded to by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and ought to be an essential part of any new offence. As has been pointed out inventively, lots of people wear face coverings on cycles or scooters. The noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, referred to the need to keep warm, and others referred to the need to avoid fumes.

In terms of wearing helmets which conceal identity, there is the safety aspect. The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, considered the avoidance of germs, and the noble Lord, Lord Berkeley of Knighton, had additional and inventive reasons for wearing face coverings, including the avoidance of ingesting insects. However, the serious point is that there can be dangers and there can be fear caused by people nefariously covering their faces. If there is a reasonable suspicion of crime, then that may be a reason for taking action. Without that, this amendment is hopeless. For my part, I am not happy when delivery drivers call at people’s homes completely covered up, because you never know whether their purposes are honest or not. At least a home owner can refuse ingress, but I would not support a general power to prevent people from wearing face coverings or a power to stop that was specifically directed at that.

On Amendment 386, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Bailey of Paddington, it may have surprised some of us that police officers do not have a power to ensure that keys are taken out of ignitions, and that this amendment was directed at keyless or driverless cars. I should have thought, along with the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, that it was sensible for police officers to ask people to get out of cars if they think that the cars that they have already stopped under Section 163 of the Road Traffic Act ought to be vacated in the interests of public safety and the avoidance of crime. I take the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, that sometimes it is sensible not to get them to get out of the car if they look particularly big or threatening; nevertheless, I see the reason for this amendment, but I would have thought it goes wider than driverless or keyless cars.

As to Amendment 387A from the noble Baroness, Lady Buscombe, I suspect that the whole House has a great deal of sympathy with her speech about organised criminal networks and driving unacceptable businesses from our streets, villages and towns—she even covered the quiet lanes in our villages—but her amendment, on which I share the view of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, is not directed to anything that would necessarily achieve a great deal in respect of driving that kind of illegitimate or non-tax-paying business from our streets. The amendment is limited to extending the existing periods of closure notices and closure orders. For my part, before that amendment could be approved, I would want to see serious evidence that it would have some impact on these offences. I would also like to hear the Government’s view. At the moment, there is very little evidence as to why the existing periods for closure notices and closure orders are insufficient.

Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Debate between Lord Berkeley of Knighton and Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames

Report stage
Wednesday 12th January 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, I spoke at length on this amendment in Committee and attended the meeting with the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, the noble Baroness, Lady Coussins, and the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Leeds, who also signed the amendment. It has led to a full and thorough response from the Minister, and we expect him to announce a full and independent review. If that is right, that is extremely welcome news. I join the noble Baroness, Lady Coussins, in saying that it would be extremely helpful to have an indication of the timescale of such a review—if that is to be announced—because of the imminence of the renewal of the contracts. It would also be extremely helpful for us to have an indication of how the independence of the review will be assured, because independence is a relatively flexible word, and it is an extremely important part of this.

For all the reasons given by the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, the standard of interpretation is incredibly important to the maintenance of justice where there are litigants, parties or witnesses for whom English is not their first language. We talked about the importance of having the undisguised and unchanged evidence of the witness before the court in an evidential case without the interpreter’s view of matters intervening. That calls for the very highest standards of quality and for any review to be completely independent.

[Lord Berkeley of Knighton (CB)]

My Lords, I too spoke in Committee, and I have been copied in on the very helpful response from the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson. I felt he was trying to embrace this important subject. To extend the point made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, a little, one has to understand that when people are in court, it is not just a question of interpretation; quite often, it is case of compassion and being able to communicate with a witness or a defendant. If there is a language barrier, those are the first things that tend to go out of the window.

Just to lower the conversation slightly, I mentioned in Committee an occasion on which the word “cow” was confused with the word “car”—a cow was observed travelling at 90 miles an hour.

I think it would be good to finish my brief contribution to this debate by repeating the explanatory statement of the noble Baroness:

“This amendment would establish minimum standards for qualifications and experience for interpreters in courts and tribunals, along the lines of the Police Approved Interpreters Scheme.”


I find it very hard to see why the Government would not want to embrace that.

Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Debate between Lord Berkeley of Knighton and Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames

Lords Hansard - part one & Committee stage
Monday 22nd November 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Berkeley of Knighton (CB)]

I wholeheartedly endorse my noble friend’s amendment, having seen on a couple of occasions interpreters who I seriously thought could barely speak English. Imagine the confusion when the interpreter translated “car” as “cow”. The judge became pretty exasperated at this point. However, there is one obstacle to this that I see. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, mentioned one obstacle, but the other might be that it is very difficult at the moment for courts to find interpreters at all. I seriously worry that there is going to be a shortage of interpreters, although I still feel that we should get the standard up, whatever happens. Perhaps we need to have courses for interpreters with proper qualifications making it a career in which people who could become interpreters could find some sort of vocation.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, I have put my name to this amendment for all the reasons put forward by the noble Baroness, Lady Coussins, in opening. She has campaigned for this change for a long time and has a great deal of knowledge and experience on the subject. We have also heard from the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Leeds, the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, and my noble friend Lord Thomas, who still supports this reform despite the success of his experience with the Polish testator. I will therefore add little.

There is an answer to the points made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, about the availability of interpreters and the need for speed in getting them to court, and by the noble Lord, Lord Berkeley of Knighton, about there being enough registered interpreters. I accept, as I expect would the noble Baroness, that there would be a need to transition the introduction of these proposals and to take steps to ensure that there were enough registered interpreters. We also have to consider the availability of interpretation in the very unusual languages that she mentioned.

This amendment is important. The duty of an interpreter in courts and tribunals is limited and specific. It is a duty to act as a conduit and only as a conduit; accurately to convey the meaning of the court’s proceedings to the non-English speaker; then, if and when that non-English speaker gives evidence, to convey the court’s and counsel’s questions to that non-English speaker; and lastly, and most importantly, to convey the non-English-speaking witness’s evidence to the court. That all demands accuracy, and to provide that accuracy requires a great deal of skill.

However, it is a duty to act as a conduit only, the aim being to overcome the language barrier. It is decidedly not to render assistance of a more general kind to the non-English-speaking participant in legal proceedings, still less to provide some kind of informal independent advice service. Yet, in spite of those very clear principles, many of us who have practised in courts and tribunals have seen how interpreters, often motivated by the best of intentions, can fail in their task. The inadequacies have been extensively and well highlighted by the noble Baroness, Lady Coussins.

There are two main reasons for such a failure. The first is that some set out to act as interpreters when they lack the necessary linguistic skills and they simply get the translation wrong. Sometimes the inaccuracy is noticed by someone in court who understands and speaks the language concerned who can then ensure that the witness’s meaning is further explored, but on other occasions it is not, and when it is not then injustices occur.

The second problem is that some interpreters overreach themselves. Again, often they are not motivated by an improper wish to intervene in the proceedings with ideas of their own, yet they do precisely that. They discuss evidence with the witness and act as assistants and advisers as well as interpreters. The noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, pointed out that on some occasions the integrity of the witness and of the proceedings is called into question. That is wrong, and it subverts the proceedings of the court or tribunal concerned. The way in which we must deal with these issues is quite simply by training and minimum standards, and that is exactly what the amendment seeks to achieve.

I add this final point: I hope that, in order to maintain registration, it would be necessary to have adequate programmes of continuing education. Interpretation is a difficult skill that requires specialist and professional training and needs constant maintaining. I hope the Government will bring a positive response to this amendment.