Lord Bellamy
Main Page: Lord Bellamy (Conservative - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Bellamy's debates with the Home Office
(1 year, 2 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, for explaining this really quite complex area. The only thing I was going to ask the Minister was whether he could explain the timeframes within which the appeal must be lodged: seven days for the Upper Tribunal and then 23 days for a further appeal to the Court of Appeal or the Court of Session. Are those timeframes standard in these types of cases? How have they arrived at them?
The noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, expressed the case very fully and I thought the way the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, summarised it was a fair comment about the accessibility of these processes to people taking part in them.
My Lords, Clauses 43 to 51 are an essential part of the scheme of the Bill, just like Clause 54 on legal aid, which we discussed earlier. I think by now your Lordships are very familiar with the scheme of the Bill but, just briefly, for the record, I will try to outline these clauses and answer the questions that have arisen as we go through.
The first thing the Bill does is to render certain claims —protection of human rights and modern slavery claims—non-suspensive so that making them does not delay the removal of an illegal migrant to a safe third country. However, the Bill then provides safeguards for removal in two cases: where there is a serious harm suspensive claim and where there is a factual suspensive claim—there has been a mistake as to whether the conditions are met.
Then the Bill goes on to provide that if the Secretary of State refuses those claims there is then an appeal to the Upper Tribunal. In general, the Government’s position is that that provides proper safeguards. It does not dismiss safeguards—if I may use the phrase just used by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick—it strikes a fair balance between expedition and fairness to the migrant. It does not in any way destroy justice because the ultimate decision in relation to the suspensive claims is in the hands of a very respected and senior judicial body and legal aid is available in order to bring those claims.
The basic timetable, to answer the question from the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, is that there are seven working days from receipt of the notice of removal to bring the claim, subject to the possibility of an extension if that is necessary to secure justice in a particular case. The 23-day period—I think I am right although I will correct myself in writing if I am wrong—is for the Upper Tribunal to take its decision. Those time limits for appeals are specific to this Bill. This is an expedited procedure that provides strict time limits, but in the Government’s view they are fair time limits.
One should make it clear that we have two situations. The first is where the Secretary of State certifies that the claim is clearly unfounded. In that circumstance, the person concerned has to apply for permission to appeal. That is the current approach, as I and the Government understand it, in the asylum and human rights system. It is effectively to weed out unmeritorious appeals as those designed to do no more than frustrate removal. Those cases are decided by the tribunal on the papers. Similarly, if you make a late suspensive claim—a claim out of time—it will be considered only if there are compelling reasons. That is at the level of the Secretary of State but if they consider that there are no compelling reasons, you can go to the tribunal and say, “There are compelling reasons why I was out of time”. Again, that is for the tribunal to decide on the papers.
These provisions are designed to ensure that claims are made at the earliest opportunity and prevent late claims being used to frustrate removal, undermining the overall effectiveness of the claims process. Once a claim has been made to the Secretary of State but not refused, and then to the Upper Tribunal as well, the whole process is suspended until the tribunal has taken a decision, so there is protection during that period.
Clause 47 also deals with another problem that constantly arises in this kind of case, where somebody tries to raise something new at a late stage. Again, there is a procedure for dealing with that: effectively, that the new matter can be considered by the Upper Tribunal only if there have been compelling reasons for it not to have been raised earlier. In relation to late claims, claims out of time and new matters, there are those checks to prevent the system being abused.
Clause 48 then requires the various timeframes to be respected. It places a requirement on the tribunal procedure rules to secure that those timeframes are respected. As I have just said, there are seven working days for the submission of a substantive appeal—I think that is in Clause 48(1)(a)—and a 23 working-day period for the tribunal to decide that substantive appeal. Those timeframes may, as I say, be extended. What we have here is a process that, in the Government’s view, is essentially a fast-track process but none the less a fair and balanced one.
These very short timescales are no doubt part of the deterrent effect which the Government are seeking to put in place through the Bill. What estimate have the Government made about the workload on the tribunal process? Is it really sustainable to have such short timescales?
My Lords, the Government have been working closely with the senior judiciary to ensure that we have the relevant judicial manpower and resources to deal with the workload. I am not, as of this moment, in a position to give specific details but one of the reasons for allowing the judges of the First-tier Tribunal to sit in the Upper Tribunal, which gives us a pretty wide pool to draw upon, is that it enables us to draw upon recorders, retired judges and others. The Government are at the moment satisfied from the discussions they have had that there will be sufficient judicial capacity to meet any reasonably foreseeable workload, but that is a perfectly good question and I thank the noble Lord for raising it.
I will come in a moment to the point from the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, about judges in general, but I will first deal with government Amendment 115A, which provides for the first set of tribunal rules effectively to be made by the Lord Chancellor rather than, as would normally be the case, by the Tribunal Procedure Committee. That committee normally takes quite a long time to make new rules—maybe 12 months or more—so, since we are working to implement the Bill as soon as practicable, government Amendment 115A provides for the first set of tribunal procedure rules, including these time limits, to be made by the Lord Chancellor so that we have the relevant tribunal procedure rules in place as soon as possible after Royal Assent.
I thank the Minister for his responses. I am not really persuaded by his answer on Clause 49: that these are just some little minor issues that cannot be JRed from the Upper Tribunal. Subsection (3) states that
“the Upper Tribunal is not to be regarded as having exceeded its powers by reason of any error made in reaching the decision”.
So the fact that it has made an error is apparently not subject to judicial review, which seems to me not particularly minor. An application for judicial review can be made if the tribunal
“has acted … in bad faith or … in such a procedurally defective way as amounts to a fundamental breach of the principles of natural justice”.
I do not suppose those crop up very often, and I would imagine that bad faith would be very difficult, if not impossible, to establish, so I do not think there is much wiggle room in Clause 49—but those who know more about how these things work might have other thoughts, and if they do I would be grateful if they would share them with me in due course.
I do not think the Minister covered the point about First-tier Tribunal judges being appointed to act as Upper Tribunal judges. If he did not—I will check what he said—perhaps he could write to me with any answers.
I will happily write to the noble Baroness. I thought I had covered it when I said that it was creating a pool. The noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, nods. It is creating a pool of judges so we have enough judges of relevant standing and experience to decide what are essentially factual questions. These are relatively limited factual questions.
I apologise. I was clearly inattentive as I was trying to look at the other groups that are coming up. Even so, I think concerns remain about promoting, and possibly overpromoting, people before they are ready. What the Government are proposing to do seems a little odd.
On the tribunal rules, I note the Minister’s citation of a precedent, but at one point he said that the problem is that the committee works too slowly. I would have thought that if processes do not work very well or do not work in a reasonable timeframe, the way to resolve that is to work with the relevant bodies to speed them up rather than to grab power from them. However, I find that this Government seem to have an appetite for grabbing powers from everybody else, whether it is the courts, other agencies or indeed Parliament. I worry that the Government are getting rather too big for their boots. Perhaps one day they will even come a cropper. That said, I think I have probably taken these issues as far as they can go.