Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill

Debate between Lord Beith and Lord Campbell of Pittenweem

Tuesday 6th January 2015 Commons Chamber

[Sir Menzies Campbell]

I must begin by apologising for not being present at the outset of the debate. The business of the House accelerated beyond my expectation and I am not as fleet of foot, perhaps, as I once was.

In the felicitous event that my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve) and I had been sitting together in judgment, I would have contented myself by simply saying “I concur”, because there was nothing in what he said with which I would want to take issue. Indeed, there was a great deal in what the mover of the amendment, the right hon. Member for Delyn (Mr Hanson), said with which I would agree. It is not necessary for me to delay the House over-long. It seems quite clear that the issue is whether the commencement of the sort of proceedings that regulated return would involve should be a matter of Executive responsibility or whether there should be judicial oversight.

I suspect that those who believe in judicial oversight do so as a matter of instinct, and perhaps not necessarily of logic, whereas, on the other side of the argument, people will think that an Executive decision is sufficient. As I explained on Second Reading, I have come down on one side of the argument against the background of reservations that I had, and still have, about the legitimacy even of managed return. A matter of this kind essentially enervates; it goes beyond TPIMs. It is a fundamental thing to say to someone who is a British citizen, “You may not return to this country.” That being so, we should incline towards the whole notion of judicial oversight.

That is a question of principle, but there is a pragmatism about it as well, because it would mean that every case would be considered on its own merits and that the Home Secretary of the time would have the protection of the court in proceeding in this direction. If the matter is left as one of judicial review, as it almost inevitably would be, there would be a period of uncertainty. In the course of a judicial review, the standard is not to satisfy oneself that there is a justification for the order but to satisfy oneself as to whether the execution of a discretion has been reasonable. It is sometimes described as having to demonstrate that a decision made as part of a ministerial discretion is arbitrary, perverse or capricious. That is a much more limited and very different approach from that proposed in the amendments. There should be a proper warrant for something that has an enervating effect on the rights of the individual. If one takes the view that rights depend only on loyalty to the principles under which those rights are exercised, then that opens up a very substantial door into areas where, for example, anyone who took a life would inevitably not be allowed the protection of life imprisonment but would be regarded as someone who, having taken a life, should sacrifice his or her own life. Our law has moved very firmly in the direction of judicial oversight.

I will vote for these amendments if they are pressed—indeed, I have told the Liberal Democrat Chief Whip that I intend to do so—because I think that this is a matter of principle. I will do my best to persuade reasonable men and women of the Liberal Democrats here present that they should do so also.

Having heard the debate so far, and having heard what was said on Second Reading and in Committee, I hope that the Minister may feel that this is an opportunity to try to produce a solution that reflects the view of the vast majority of the House rather than one that divides the House. In matters of this kind, it is always vital that if one possibly can, one should accept the will, if not of the whole House, then of the vast majority of the House. These are inevitably controversial issues, not least, as I said, because they have an enervating effect on fundamental rights. I shall wait with interest to hear what the Minister says. I hope that he will take account, if not of what I have said, then of the very eloquent and measured contribution of my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield.

[Sir Alan Beith (Berwick-upon-Tweed) (LD)]

I seek clarification from my right hon. and learned Friend, based on his considerable knowledge and experience, on what question the court would address if it is not the judicial review question as to whether the Home Secretary acted reasonably in the determination that he or she has made. What question would the court address under the proceeding that he would like us to have?

[Sir Menzies Campbell]

The question is one of the Home Secretary having to persuade the court that he or she was entitled to make the order that was sought. In doing so, consideration would have to be given to all the individual circumstances that lay around that application. When one has gone a step further to judicial review, the question is not whether the decision was right or wrong but whether it was reasonable. That is a wholly different element of judicial oversight from the one that the amendments seek to achieve.

The Minister is a sensible individual, and he will, I am sure, understand the extent of the unease—that is perhaps the best way to put it—about this matter across the Floor of the House. He has within his power the opportunity to remove that unease by being sympathetic towards the points that have been made in the speeches we have heard so far.

Syria and the Use of Chemical Weapons

Debate between Lord Beith and Lord Campbell of Pittenweem

Thursday 29th August 2013 Commons Chamber

[Sir Menzies Campbell (North East Fife) (LD)]

It is no secret that, notwithstanding the horrors of Damascus, I have reservations about the use of military action in the circumstances with which we are engaged. In particular, I have reservations relating to the absence of a proper role for the United Nations. However, as the Government motion now sets out, there is a role for the inspectors, there is a duty imposed on the Secretary-General, and there is an endorsement to use every effort to secure a United Nations Security Council resolution under chapter VII of its charter. In addition, and I will come back to this in a moment, the motion provides that for all of us—supporters, sceptics or opponents—there will be an opportunity to pass judgment on any question of British involvement at a further stage when, not surprisingly perhaps, rather more information may be available.

[Sir Alan Beith (Berwick-upon-Tweed) (LD)]

Does my right hon. and learned Friend agree that for some of us at least, tonight’s vote will not predetermine that we are satisfied at the next stage that there is a coherent plan that does not inflict too much damage on neighbouring countries?

[Sir Menzies Campbell]

I think my right hon. Friend is referring, by way of inference, to the suggestion that there has been briefing that those who voted for the Government motion would be endorsing in-principle military action. Most of us have been around here long enough to know how often briefing is a long way from the truth. Anyone who is in any doubt about that should read the precise terms of the Government’s motion.

The effort to achieve a resolution under chapter VII is a vital component of the doctrine of the responsibility to protect, because if no such resolution is achieved—here, I agree with the Attorney-General—we turn to what was once called humanitarian intervention and now is called responsibility to protect. It is a fundamental of that doctrine that every possible political and diplomatic alternative will have been explored and found not to be capable.

I want to applaud, if I may, Mr Speaker, the House for taking the unusual step—in my view wholly justified—of publishing the Attorney-General’s advice. Those of us with long memories will remember that 10 years ago we were not favoured with anything like as much detail. It is also worth pointing out that there was no second vote 10 years ago. Within 24 hours of the motion being passed by the House endorsing the Labour Government’s proposals, the Tomahawk cruise missiles began to rain down on Baghdad.

It respectfully seems to me that we need to examine the matter not in response to the emotion that it undoubtedly engenders in all of us. Emotion is no substitute for judgment in matters of this kind. We must look beyond what might be achieved in the short term, to the medium term and the long term.

Justice and Security Bill [Lords]

Debate between Lord Beith and Lord Campbell of Pittenweem

Thursday 7th March 2013 Commons Chamber

[Sir Menzies Campbell]

I am entirely sympathetic to what the hon. Member for Brighton, Pavilion (Caroline Lucas) has said about that case. However, a statutory avenue is already available under the Regulation and Investigatory Powers Act 2000, which set up the Investigatory Powers Tribunal. Further to the intervention by the right hon. Member for Knowsley (Mr Howarth), a fellow member of the Committee, one might not be able to describe the proposed power that she wishes to provide as quasi-judicial, but it might possess a hybrid relationship in being both investigative and judicial, or in a position of seeking to create redress.

Apart from that, there is a fundamental statutory point. The hon. Lady’s proposed subsection (4A) refers to a situation in which

“a plausible claim has been made by or on behalf of an individual to the ISC that the Security Service…has disseminated any information to any recipient concerning any person that appears to be…materially false; and…harmful to the person defamed.”

The breadth of that goes far beyond even the jurisdiction of any court in the United Kingdom of which I am aware. Proposed subsection (4B) says that

“the ISC shall fully and expeditiously investigate the claim”—

so it does involve an investigative function—

“and, where the claim appears to be well founded, shall ensure that the misinformation is expeditiously corrected.”

But by what means? The ISC is not in a position to implement any such action. The amendment is not legally well-founded. In any event, as has been pointed out, its scope goes far beyond anything that the Committee’s staff and resources would permit. Moreover, there is no indication of how the powers would be exercised or how they could ever be implemented.

[Sir Alan Beith]

I want to consider briefly the restrictive wording of parts of clause 2 and the voluntary issue that has been raised by a number of Members.

I served on the Intelligence and Security Committee for about 11 years from its very beginning. It was a slow and painful task to get the first generation of heads of agencies and civil servants from Departments to understand the Committee’s need for a deep understanding of the relevant matters in order for us to do our job effectively. Subsequent generations of heads of agencies were ready to involve the Committee more closely and to bring up operational matters, whatever the statute said. It did not take me long to realise that it was not possible for members of the Committee to do their job properly unless they understood how various kinds of operations were conducted and the constraints and problems faced by the agencies. In particular, it was not possible to discharge an important responsibility without an understanding of operational matters.

One of the purposes of the ISC, where Members of both Houses of Parliament look closely at the work of agencies, is to give people on the outside—both in this place and in the community at large—a sense that Members who are there by democratic means are observing the agencies sufficiently closely to give confidence that their work is within the framework not only of the law, but of the ethics and principles by which we try to run our country. The background is that agencies were often accused of doing precisely the opposite in years gone by. Unless we can give people that confidence and say, “Yes, I have looked very closely at this matter and I do not think you need to be concerned about it,” the Committee will not be discharging properly one of its most important roles. We found that we had to look very closely at operational matters and that became easier as time went on.

The work sometimes involves what are, in effect, ongoing intelligence operations. In some fields, the work never stops and an operation to do with a particular recurrent problem does not have a simple end, so the provision in clause 2(3)(a)(i) is restrictive.

I fully understand how the Government have arrived at the word “voluntarily”. It would have been absurd if the wording had prevented the Committee from continuing to work closely with the agencies in the way it has done in recent years. That would have been ridiculous, so the word is there for a perfectly respectable reason. Indeed, things have been improved by the insistence that, if the Committee requests something, that does not by definition make it involuntary. However, I still think, as the hon. Member for New Forest East (Dr Lewis) said, that that is not the kind of language we want to see in the Bill. Nor does it give people outside the confidence that this Committee will be able to find out whether something is going wrong when it needs to do so, or that it can be relied on when it seeks to give assurance that all is reasonably well.

The task of getting this right is by no means over. The memorandum of understanding may be able to deal with those issues better, but, even then, words are being put on paper and when that happens, as we have discovered, simple, practical and sensible ways of doing things may appear to be precluded. Moreover, when there is friction or tension, it becomes easier for the head of an agency or, at least as often—indeed, perhaps more often—a Minister or civil servant to say, “This goes beyond the memorandum of understanding. It is outwith the terms of the statute.” We have heard such language and the right hon. Member for Torfaen (Paul Murphy), who is a previous Chairman of the Committee, will remember how rigid some people in the relevant Departments could be from time to time.

Ministers need to make it clear, as they have done to some extent in these discussions, that it is in the interests of the democratic accountability of these extremely important and valuable agencies that the public have confidence, not only in the agencies, but in that process of democratic accountability, circumscribed as it is by the need to protect the work of those agencies.