Family Courts

Debate between Lord Beith and Jonathan Djanogly

Thursday 24th May 2012 Westminster Hall

[Mr Djanogly]

I will come back to my hon. Friend on that point.

We wish to see a stronger, clearer role for judges in setting a timetable for family cases and ensuring that those cases are managed and completed in a timely and efficient manner. The judiciary are therefore key partners in all of this work. I have had a number of conversations with Mr Justice Ryder, the judge in charge of modernisation, about our reform plans. I am pleased to report that we are working closely with the judiciary, with full regard to their judicial independence. For example, we have already established the Family Business Authority. It brings together the family judiciary and the administration in a decision-making forum. The group takes a strategic look at the family jurisdiction and is well placed to support the modernisation of family justice.

On private law disputes, there were very few points of difference between the Government and the family justice review panel, but there was one on the issue of shared parenting. The Justice Committee has taken a close interest in that, and the Under-Secretary of State for Education, the hon. Member for East Worthing and Shoreham (Tim Loughton), and I will give evidence next month to the Committee on the Government’s position. A ministerial working group has been looking at it and has met three times. We intend to consult shortly on options for legislation.

We need to send a clear message to parents that in the absence of any welfare concerns both should be involved in their child’s upbringing. Without pre-empting the consultation, I should like to make it clear that nothing we propose will undermine the existing principle that the welfare of the child is the court’s paramount consideration. Safety will remain an important factor. In answer to points raised by my right hon. Friend the Member for Berwick-upon-Tweed and the right hon. Member for Dwyfor Meirionnydd (Mr Llwyd), our proposed amendment to the Children Act 1989 will send a clear signal to separated parents that courts will take into account the principle that both should continue to be actively involved in their children’s lives. In doing so, it will help to dispel the perception that there is an inbuilt legal bias towards one parent. There is a real feeling among many people that that is the case, which results in a mistrust of the family justice system.

The proposed amendment will encourage more separated parents to resolve their disputes out of court and agree care arrangements that fully involve both parents. An obstructive parent seeking to frustrate contact between the child and his or her other parent should not be able to use the court system to legitimise such activity without good reason.

[Sir Alan Beith]

rose—

[Mr Djanogly]

I will just finish this point. This change is not about equality in the time that a child spends with each parent after separation. Every family and every child’s circumstances are different and the courts will continue to make decisions on that basis.

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[Sir Alan Beith]

There have been quite intensive discussions about this issue in government. In trying to use the law as a signal, there is a danger that the courts will be obliged to take into account a further element of complexity when making a judgment. The signal that it gives some parents in dispute may be that there is another point on which they can engage the court in order to keep the case going. It is more likely to do that than to give a signal to parents about what they themselves should do.

[Mr Djanogly]

The right hon. Gentleman makes a fair point. This was what came up in Australia. The Government have looked carefully at the lessons of the Australian experience of legislating in this area, which was highlighted by the family justice review. Direct comparisons with the experience in Australia are misleading; it is certainly not our intention to mirror the structure of the Australian legislation or to create new layers of complexity in our existing system.

Contributors all mentioned the importance of early intervention. I agree with my right hon. Friend that it is an essential component in solving this issue. The Department for Work and Pensions, the Department for Education and the Ministry of Justice are working closely together on this so that a parent’s first port of call will be an online hub that will provide practical information and advice and will signpost appropriate services.

We have introduced measures to strengthen consideration of mediation and to explore how that can work alongside parenting programmes and other interventions to help parents focus on a child’s needs. I will say a bit more about mediation later. In addition, we are working to develop parenting agreements as a tool to help parents agree arrangements that are child focused and practical.

The DFE is providing an early intervention grant worth about £2 billion, which is flexible funding for local authorities to spend on their early intervention priorities from Sure Start through to crime prevention. The Justice Committee will know about the Youth Justice Board and the custody pathfinder projects, which give pilot areas custody funding up front for the under-18s. That will incentivise local authorities to intervene early before young people become serial offenders.

Many other cases could be settled away from court. Too many people go to court to resolve their private disputes and fail to grasp the fact that the court is required to focus on the child’s welfare needs. That may mean that neither parent is happy with the decisions that are made. For many such parents, the family courts are not the best way of settling disputes about a child’s future. Mediation can be quicker and cheaper, and can provide better outcomes, especially if compared with drawn-out court hearings. It is important that mediation is considered at the earliest opportunity before positions become entrenched. An amicable solution is better than a litigious one.

Referrals to mediation in publicly funded cases are up by nearly 12% since the introduction of the pre-application protocol last April. However, I remain concerned about the protocol’s effectiveness in privately funded cases, and there is a need to tackle inconsistencies in approach across the courts. That is why we will make statutory changes to make it a prerequisite that anyone who wishes to begin court action must first attend a mediation information and assessment meeting to find out about and consider mediation. We remain committed to make public funding available for mediation through legal aid for those who are eligible and expect to fund an additional £10 million for mediation services.

I should point out to the hon. Member for Hammersmith that the Government have no plans to stop making available legal aid for children where they are a party to family proceedings. Various hon. Members mentioned litigants in person. We accept that the reforms will mean an increase in litigants in person. However, unrepresented parties have always been a feature of the justice system—some because they cannot afford representation and others because they choose not to be represented. Paying for a lawyer, whether out of private pockets or public funds, is not always necessary. Judges make significant efforts to assist litigants in person, explaining procedures and what is expected of them. We estimate that about 40% of private law children’s cases involve one or more litigants in person. The proportion in divorce cases is much higher than that.

Oral Answers to Questions

Debate between Lord Beith and Jonathan Djanogly

Tuesday 31st January 2012 Commons Chamber

[Mr Djanogly]

Specifically, legal aid will be provided for a lot of debt advice after our changes. We are reducing our spend on legal aid, and law centres will be affected by that, but the Government recognise and highly value the important role of not-for-profit organisations such as law centres. That is why we launched a £107 million transition fund last year and the £20 million advice services fund this year. It is why the Cabinet Office has also announced a review of not-for-profit advice centres, which is a welcome and important development.

[Sir Alan Beith (Berwick-upon-Tweed) (LD)]

Is it not an assumption behind the Government’s reforms that the availability of advice needs to replace a great deal of litigation? If that is to be achieved, is it not necessary to ensure that there is a long-term, not merely a short-term, solution to some of the funding problems of law centres and citizens advice bureaux?

[Mr Djanogly]

My right hon. Friend makes an important point. We are changing the way funding works and looking for alternatives to be taken up. However, we appreciate that, in the meantime, while the reorganisations are happening, there is a need to support law centres, which is why we are looking at transitional provisions to ease that passage.

Public Bodies Bill [Lords]

Debate between Lord Beith and Jonathan Djanogly

Tuesday 29th November 2011 Commons Chamber

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice (Mr Jonathan Djanogly)]

I beg to move,

That this House does not insist on their Amendment No. 47 to which the Lords have disagreed.

Following consideration of Commons amendments in the other place last Wednesday, hon. Members will know that the Government no longer intend to abolish the Youth Justice Board as part of the Bill. Therefore, I will not be asking hon. Members to insist on the Government amendment agreed by this House on Report. The amendment has reintroduced the Youth Justice Board into schedule 1 to the Bill. As my noble friend Lord McNally made clear in the other place, the Government have never waivered in our commitment to maintaining a distinct focus on the needs of children and young people in the youth justice system. We have never proposed to remove youth offending teams or dismantle the dedicated secure estate for young people.

[Sir Alan Beith (Berwick-upon-Tweed) (LD)]

It is an unusual experience for a Committee to publish just after midnight a report containing recommendations that are accepted by midday the following day. As my hon. Friend has mentioned youth offending teams, I wanted to remind him that the Justice Committee, as well as pointing to the dangers of abolishing the Youth Justice Board, stated that if it survived it would have to take a lighter touch and a less centralised approach to the management of youth offending teams than it had taken in the otherwise good work it had done.

[Mr Djanogly]

I thank my right hon. Friend for that contribution and acknowledge that the recommendation appeared in his report. I will certainly take it back to the Under-Secretary of State for Justice, my hon. Friend the Member for Reigate (Mr Blunt), who will take up the matter in due course.

Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill

Debate between Lord Beith and Jonathan Djanogly

Tuesday 1st November 2011 Commons Chamber

[Mr Djanogly]

New clauses 18 to 22 seek to prohibit the payment and receipt of referral fees in personal injury cases by regulated persons, namely solicitors, barristers, claim management companies and insurers.

I pay tribute at the outset to the work of the right hon. Member for Blackburn (Mr Straw) in pursuing the case for a ban on referral fees. I know that there are some differences between us about the detail of how we should implement the ban—we will come to his amendments in due course—but those differences of detail should not obscure our agreement in principle on tackling this important issue. I acknowledge his efforts in this regard.

I must also mention the consistent campaign by the right hon. Member for Berwick-upon-Tweed (Sir Alan Beith) as Chair of the Justice Committee, who has also been a very keen supporter of the ban. I note that last week his Committee formally welcomed our commitment to the ban, which will be implemented by these clauses. I should also acknowledge the work of the Transport Committee, chaired by the hon. Member for Liverpool, Riverside (Mrs Ellman), before whom I was privileged to appear last month.

My right hon. and learned Friend the Secretary of State for Justice announced the Government’s intention to ban the payment and receipt of referral fees in personal injury cases by way of a written ministerial statement to the House on 9 September 2011.

I strongly believe that the current arrangements under which lawyers and others are able to pay and receive fees for referring work have led to both higher costs and the growth of an industry that pursues claimants for profit. By introducing the new clause, the Government are taking decisive and much needed action to remove these incentives.

Right hon. and hon. Members will be aware that Lord Justice Jackson recommended that referral fees should be banned as part of his comprehensive package of recommendations to make the costs of the civil litigation more proportionate and this recommendation was echoed by Lord Young in his report “Common Sense Common Safety”. The Bill already includes provisions to implement the other key elements of those recommendations. The referral fees ban under our new clause will complement the wider Jackson reform already in the Bill by further reducing the costs of personal injury litigation and deterring frivolous or unnecessary claims from being pursued in the courts.

The new clause creates a regulatory offence for any breach of the prohibition. It will be for the appropriate regulators, for example the Law Society, the Financial Services Authority or the claims management regulator, to enforce the prohibition. The regulators will also be responsible for taking appropriate action against regulated persons for any breaches. We have thought carefully about how to ensure that all the main players, including insurers, are captured by the ban, which is why there is a separate clause, new clause 20, giving the Treasury powers to make regulations allowing the FSA to enforce the ban under its existing regulatory powers.

There have been calls from some people, but not most people, for the payment and receipt of referral fees to be made a criminal offence. Not least among those who have called for that is the right hon. Member for Blackburn, who has tabled amendment (e) to that effect. We considered the matter carefully but believe that creating a criminal offence would be a very blunt instrument in this case. One would have to prove beyond reasonable doubt that consideration had changed hands for the referral of a potential claimant, but the grounds for determining whether something was or was not a referral fee could be blurred. It would be very difficult to convict in many cases on the basis of the complexity of those arrangements. That is why we consider a regulatory offence to be more appropriate, whereby the principle of what is happening can be looked at by the regulator and a view can be taken.

I am conscious that a criminal offence would impose additional costs on the police and the courts in investigating and enforcing a ban. I believe that a regulatory prohibition covering all the main players in the sector, including lawyers, claims management companies and insurers, is the most appropriate and effective response to the issue. I am confident that the industry regulators are best placed to investigate and enforce the regulatory ban.

[Sir Alan Beith]

As my hon. Friend has indicated, I strongly support the action he is taking, but is it not the case that in many of those circumstances a criminal offence may well have been committed by way of a breach of the Data Protection Act 1998? The problem then is that custodial sentences are not available for someone who is doing that on a large scale and making a great deal of money by releasing personal information and committing a criminal offence.

[Mr Djanogly]

My right hon. Friend makes a good point. It is not one that is covered by the Bill, but it is something that the Government are looking into, and I hope that there will be further developments on that in due course.

--- Later in debate ---

[Sir Alan Beith]

Like the hon. Member for North Durham (Mr Jones), I had coal mines in my constituency. There were three working mines there, and I saw evidence of the scandal that he described. It was absolutely dreadful in many ways. Today, I want to ask for clarification of the Government’s intentions in two areas. One relates to the broadening of this issue beyond personal injury. New clause 18 provides for the Lord Chancellor to make regulations specifying wider ranges of legal businesses. I hope that there is a clear intention on the Government’s part, probably involving consultation, to move on to all the sectors in which referral fees have the potential to distort or damage competition or to undermine the position of the consumer. I would like a clear indication that the Government are going to examine a number of other areas.

Secondly, the Minister was very helpful earlier on the question of custodial sentences for breaches of the Data Protection Act, and I hope that that means that the Government have moved on from their position of saying, “We’ll have to wait until the end of the Leveson inquiry.” That represented a complete misunderstanding of the situation. The question of custodial sentences for data protection offences is not primarily about the issues that have been raised in the Leveson inquiry about the media; it is about the everyday circumstances of our constituents whose personal information is abused by the organisations that hold it. That matter ought not to have to wait until the completion of an inquiry into a wider range of issues. I hope that the Minister’s earlier helpfulness will be repeated in implementing a measure on which the House has already decided—namely, that there should be a custodial penalty in such cases.

[Mr Djanogly]

We have had a good, far-ranging debate this afternoon. Given that another important debate needs to be completed by 8 o’clock, I am sorry to say that I shall have to make my way quickly through the points that have been raised. I am pleased to hear at least a grudging agreement in principle with our ban on referral fees from the hon. Member for Hammersmith (Mr Slaughter). I thank my right hon. Friend the Member for Carshalton and Wallington (Tom Brake) and all the other right hon. and hon. Members for their support for our desire to implement the ban. I am pleased that the debate today has been about how that should be done, not about whether it should be done.

The hon. Member for Hammersmith asked why we had not consulted on banning referral fees, and I can tell him that Lord Justice Jackson made 109 recommendations, and it would not have been practical to consult on them all at once. It also made good sense to await the outcome of the Legal Services Board’s work in this area. Many respondents to our consultation on implementing Lord Justice Jackson’s recommendations included their views on referral fees. Those views, along with the work undertaken by the LSB and the Transport Committee, have been carefully considered. The hon. Gentleman clearly raised some serious issues relating to the regulation of claims management companies, but they were not directly relevant to the Bill. I must point out that, in the past year, the Ministry of Justice has cancelled 349 authorisations of CMCs, whereas in the last year of the Labour Government, it cancelled only 35.

The hon. Member for North Durham (Mr Jones) asked a number of important questions. If he does not mind, I will write to him about those issues. I can say, however, that under the Compensation Act 2006, it is an offence to provide regulated claims management services unless authorised or exempt. The hon. Gentleman will not be surprised to learn that the exemption applies to trade unions, and that is part of the problem that he rightly highlighted. I was present at the debate that he held on that subject several years ago.

The hon. Member for Hammersmith covered several other matters, but he essentially spoke to tomorrow’s debate, and we will deal with those issues then. My right hon. Friend the Member for Carshalton and Wallington asked about some important aspects relating to the consumer. The Chairman of the Transport Select Committee, the hon. Member for Liverpool, Riverside (Mrs Ellman), rightly mentioned that share premiums had risen by 40% in the last year alone. This is of course a matter of concern, and we have discussed it with the Association of British Insurers. It has said that if the proposals are effected with the other changes to recoverability of success fees in after-the-event insurance, it would hope to see a fall in insurance premiums. I certainly hope that that is a credible position.

As I said at the outset, there is broad support across the House for a ban on referral fees, although there is some disagreement on how best to implement the ban. The right hon. Member for Blackburn (Mr Straw) spoke to his amendments with typical passion, but I would like to set out briefly why the Government cannot support them. Amendments (a) to (c) to new clause 18 seek to capture within the prohibition all arrangements to pay or receive referral fees, even when a payment has not yet been made. These amendments might have been tabled in support of his amendment to make the payment and receipt of referral fees a criminal offence. However, I am concerned that capturing an agreement to pay referral fees when payment might not have occurred would be very difficult to enforce. A solicitor’s accounts, for example, might well show that a particular payment had been made that could, on the face of it, be a referral fee. However, it is unlikely that agreements, which in some cases might be no more than verbal agreements, could be so readily identified without time-consuming investigation. In any event, we do not think that it is necessary to provide for this eventuality, first because such agreements would be unenforceable under subsection (6) of new clause 19 and, secondly, because whatever might be agreed, the payment of the referral fee would still be prohibited. So, in practice, it is unlikely that a party would enter into an agreement to pay a referral fee when payment would be a breach of the prohibition and the agreement would not be enforceable.

I have already dealt, in moving the new clause, with the arguments against amendment (e), which seeks to create a new criminal offence. I should just reiterate that the Government are fully committed to ensuring that the ban will work effectively.

Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill

Debate between Lord Beith and Jonathan Djanogly

Monday 31st October 2011 Commons Chamber

[Mr Djanogly]

I am not entirely sure whether the right hon. Lady is talking about all cases of divorce or partners separating, or just those where there is domestic violence. However, I can tell her that in 90% of cases where there is a separating of the ways, the couple will reach an agreement. We are therefore talking about the remaining 10%. What we are saying in terms of policy is that for basic divorce—if divorce can ever be basic—people should not rely on legal aid for carving up the family assets or settling contact issues. However, I want to make it clear that funding for victims of domestic violence who seek a protective order will remain available.

[Sir Alan Beith (Berwick-upon-Tweed) (LD)]

Is it not also important to point out that the family courts have great difficulty dealing with contact issues, many of which are naturally unsuited to such treatment? Frankly, it is not very easy for a court to sort out arguments about whether a child can go to the scout group on a Friday night or whether they have to be with the other parent.

[Mr Djanogly]

My right hon. Friend makes an important point. I can tell him and other hon. Members that it has become clear to me, from my many meetings over the last year and a half with mediators and lobby groups such as those already mentioned, that in the vast majority of cases the parties are better off sorting out their problems together with the help of the mediator. For the most part, mediation is empowering. In most cases, the best way forward is for people to be able to sort out their own futures and those of their children without being told what to do by a judge, and that is what the Government support.

--- Later in debate ---

[Sir Alan Beith]

What that 61% success rate on appeal demonstrates is a bad decision-making system. Ought not the Minister be more sympathetic to the Justice Committee’s view that Departments that make their decisions so badly that they generate large numbers of successful appeals should be penalised, perhaps even to the extent of contributing to a fund for the advice agencies that help the people who are affected?

[Mr Djanogly]

My right hon. Friend makes a good point. High levels of successful appeals perhaps show that too many cases are going before the tribunals in the first place. The other day, I saw a figure of about 80% for special educational needs tribunals, which was not very impressive either. I can also tell him that I am personally engaging with Ministers in the Home Office, the Department for Work and Pensions and the Department for Education with the specific intention of getting them to work with the Department of Justice to improve their initial decision making. I am pleased to say that they are all are working with us, and that they want to make the system better. This is a matter of significant concern to me, not least because I would like to see fewer appeals relating to my Department coming through the courts and tribunals.

The hon. Member for Brighton, Pavilion (Caroline Lucas) talked about domestic violence, immigration and legal aid. She also talked about people who fall outside the domestic violence immigration rule, such as EEA nationals. As I mentioned earlier, we are looking at cases of EEA spouses who have suffered dramatic abuse. The right hon. Member for Dwyfor Meirionnydd mentioned immigration judicial reviews. I think that he accused the Government of putting appellants into a Catch-22 situation because legal aid would not be available for immigration appeals or for some judicial reviews. I can tell him, however, that people will still be able to appeal immigration decisions themselves and, as is often the case at the moment, they will still be able to get legal aid for a subsequent judicial review, as long as it is not on exactly the same or substantially similar issues, or on a removal direction. As I said earlier, we are making various exceptions to the exclusions, which will include ensuring that, when there has been no possibility of an appeal, legal aid will remain for judicial review.

My right hon. Friend the Member for Bermondsey and Old Southwark raised various points about immigration, and I will write to him about those. He specifically mentioned children, as did other hon. Members, so I shall briefly address that point. In most immigration cases, a child’s interests are represented by their parent or guardian. Most cases in which a child is unaccompanied involve an asylum claim, and legal aid will remain for those cases as at present. Unaccompanied children with an asylum or immigration issue would have a social worker assigned to them, whose role would include helping the child to gain access to the same advice and support as a child who was permanently settled in the UK. They could also offer assistance with filling in forms and explaining terms, and give emotional support. Legal support in such immigration cases may be found, if needed, from law centres and from pro bono legal representation. The Refugee Council provides services for separated children, which can include litigation friends.

A number of hon. Members asked how we justified plans that could disproportionately affect women. That question has also been asked in relation to disabled people, ethnic minorities and people who live in rural areas. The equalities impact assessment, published alongside the Government’s response to consultation, sets out our analysis of how the reforms will affect people with protected characteristics as set out in the Equality Act 2010. We have identified the potential for the reforms to have a greater impact on some groups, but we believe that those impacts are proportionate, and justified by the need to meet our objectives, including the pressing need to make savings from legal aid. We are also keeping discrimination claims relating to a contravention of the Equality Act 2010 within the scope of legal aid, which we consider will make a significant contribution to the fulfilment of our public sector equality duty.

The hon. Member for Stretford and Urmston asked about the removal of legal aid in many family cases, which she said would remove access to justice from many people. She asked how that could be right. Legal aid will remain available for family mediation and private family law cases, including private law children and family proceedings and ancillary relief proceedings. We want to encourage more use of such mediation. In ancillary relief cases, courts will be able to make orders for payment against a third party or a party who has the means to fund the costs of representation for the other party. Removing costly and often unnecessary legal aid does not mean removing access to justice. Litigants in person already feature in the justice system. Judges and magistrates currently assist litigants in person without compromising their impartiality, and we expect that to continue.

Finally, I was asked whether we expect all cases to be resolved through mediation. As I said earlier, the answer is categorically no. Cases involving domestic violence and child abuse, and emergency cases will still not be required to go through mediation. In addition, exceptional funding will be available when necessary for the UK to meet its international and domestic legal obligations via a proposed scheme for excluded cases. On that note, I rest my case.

Amendment 10 agreed to.

Public Bodies Bill [Lords]

Debate between Lord Beith and Jonathan Djanogly

Tuesday 25th October 2011 Commons Chamber

[Mr Djanogly]

I will come on to the costings and explain why the costings provided by the last Government were correct—we checked them—but let me finish what I was saying.

The powers will allow the Department of Health to proceed with its proposals to introduce a new system for examining the causes of death, thereby fulfilling one of the key recommendations of Dame Janet Smith’s report on the Shipman inquiry.

Concerns were expressed in Committee that I might not give this work the priority that it deserves. That could not be further from the truth. In particular, we have plans to establish a new ministerial board to drive these reforms, to provide oversight of the non-judicial aspects of the coroner system, and to provide a direct line of accountability on these matters to Parliament. We will also establish a bereaved organisations committee that will support the board and provide those who represent bereaved families with a direct line to Ministers.

[Sir Alan Beith]

One of the concerns of the Justice Committee has been about the uncertain and widely differing arrangements for providing financial support for coroners and the widely differing arrangements for providing coroners officers, who are sometimes provided by the police and sometimes by the local authority, with no uniform standard of training. Will the system that the Minister is describing deal with this problem?

[Mr Djanogly]

Yes, the board will be there to address policy issues such as those that my right hon. Friend mentioned. It is important to keep in mind that the position of chief coroner would have had power over none of those.

The ministerial board will meet quarterly, with the dates fixed and publicised well in advance so that meetings cannot be cancelled without good reason. The board will also have a strong independent feel to it, with coroners and other members sitting on it, together with representatives from the bereaved organisations committee.

The new committee will be independently chaired and I have given commitments that the chair cannot be appointed or removed without the approval of committee members. I would expect the chair to become a powerful advocate for the bereaved and be a champion of coroner reform. If the Government are not delivering on this package of reforms, I would expect the chair to hold us to account.

The bereaved organisations committee will have a particular remit to monitor the new charter for coroner services. The charter, which we intend to publish in early 2012 following the recent consultation exercise, will set out for the first time the standards of service that those coming into contact with the system can and should expect. This will play a vital role in driving up standards of service and helping people to understand their rights and responsibilities in relation to the coroner system.

Oral Answers to Questions

Debate between Lord Beith and Jonathan Djanogly

Tuesday 13th September 2011 Commons Chamber

[Mr Djanogly]

We remain committed to fundamental reform of the coronial system. I know that there are particular issues to address in the hon. Gentleman’s constituency, and they are being dealt with. Implementing the office of the chief coroner would require new funding, which simply is not available in the current economic climate. Our proposals will allow us to deliver those reforms, but without those additional costs.

[Sir Alan Beith (Berwick-upon-Tweed) (LD)]

Does my hon. Friend recognise that there is a much cheaper and more cost-effective way of raising professional standards and creating a head of the coronial profession? That would involve designating a serving coroner as chief coroner and giving just minimal assistance to support him in that role.

[Mr Djanogly]

Unfortunately, the existing legislation would not allow that; the job would have to be done by a High Court judge or a circuit judge. The point of the matter is that we are putting in place a ministerial committee, which will answer to Parliament in a way that a chief coroner never could.

Oral Answers to Questions

Debate between Lord Beith and Jonathan Djanogly

Tuesday 28th June 2011 Commons Chamber

[Sir Alan Beith (Berwick-upon-Tweed) (LD)]

Why does the Minister not merely look at referral fees, but give us a clear commitment that that outrage will be removed under the Bill?

[Mr Djanogly]

The Legal Services Board reported on that only a matter of weeks ago. We are looking at its recommendations, which go much further than a ban and, in particular, deal with transparency, which was what the Select Committee on Transport focused on. We will look carefully at all these issues.

Estates of Deceased Persons (Forfeiture Rule and Law of Succession) Bill

Debate between Lord Beith and Jonathan Djanogly

Friday 21st January 2011 Commons Chamber

[Mr Djanogly]

I am delighted to pull the House back to the important issue of succession.

I was just saying that the property of the killer’s parents was distributed according to the statutory intestacy rules. The intestacy rules are a default regime; they apply where a person has not exercised his or her right to make a will or to the extent that his or her will is not valid. Their aim is to safeguard the deceased person’s family by providing for them from the deceased person’s estate in a manner that is thought to mirror the wishes of the average person had he or she made a will.

Generally speaking, an intestate estate will pass to the surviving spouse or civil partner and the deceased’s children first, but if the deceased is not survived by either of them, then other blood relatives of the deceased will inherit the estate in a strict order of priority set out in section 46 of the Administration of Estates Act 1925, as amended. I am not going to read out the rules, but if any hon. Members wishes to know more about them, I shall provide the information.

When there are no known eligible blood relatives to inherit, the estate is dealt with by the Treasury solicitor. On receiving the estate, the Treasury solicitor will make full inquiries into the estate and will advertise for eligible kin in the hope of distributing the estate. If there appear to be no eligible kin, or none can be traced, the estate becomes “bona vacantia” which means “ownerless goods” and it will pass to the Crown, the Duchy of Cornwall or the Duchy of Lancaster, depending on where in England or Wales the deceased lived.

When a minor inherits on intestacy, the property to which they will be entitled is held on trust. The terms of that trust are specified in the intestacy rules. Basically, the trustees will hold the property for the benefit of the child until he or she reaches the age of 18 or marries or enters a civil partnership under that age.

All that may seem relatively straightforward, and hon. Members could be forgiven for thinking that the grandchild in the DWS case would have inherited their property on reaching the age of 18, or marrying or forming a civil partnership before then, but there is a devil in the detail and, sadly, there was a family dispute that led to litigation. That culminated in the decision of the Court of Appeal in 2000 in the case Re DWS (Deceased). By that time, it was agreed that the son himself could not inherit because, as he had murdered his parents, the forfeiture rule prevented it. The forfeiture rule is a common law rule, applying the general rule of public policy that a person is not able to benefit from their wrongdoing. It is illustrated by the 1892 case of Cleaver v. Mutual Reserve Fund Life Association, when it was held that a person is not entitled to benefit from the estate of a person he or she has unlawfully killed.

A person who is convicted of the unlawful killing of another, or of aiding, abetting or counselling another to do so, is automatically disqualified from inheriting from his or her victim under the forfeiture rule. However, persons convicted of manslaughter or other offences less serious than murder may still be permitted relief to inherit the victim’s property by the court under the Forfeiture Act 1982.

The question for the court in Re DWS (deceased) was who would receive the grandfather’s property. Had the son died before his father, the property would have gone to the son’s only child, who was aged only two at the time of the murder and was also the grandfather’s only grandchild. However, the son—that is, the killer—was not dead, but merely disqualified from inheriting because of the operation of the forfeiture rule.

The relevant provision of the intestacy rules setting out the statutory trusts contained in the Administration of Estates Act 1925 provides that the grandchild will inherit only if his or her parent has already died. The court accordingly decided that the law did not allow the grandson to take the property. Instead, it was decided that the property would have to go to the estate of the dead grandfather’s sister, who had also died by the time of the court case. Thus, in this situation, not only is the killer disqualified from inheriting, but so also are all the killer’s direct descendants. The Court of Appeal expressed concern that this may have been an unforeseen and unintended consequence of the present intestacy rules.

In July 2003, the then Department for Constitutional Affairs, whose responsibilities in this regard have been assumed by the Ministry of Justice, asked the Law Commission to review the relationship between the forfeiture rule and the law of succession. The terms of reference were as follows: first, that in conjunction with its work on illegal transactions, the Law Commission should review the relationship between the forfeiture and intestacy rules; secondly, that the review should be carried out with reference to the difficulties highlighted in the case of Re DWS (deceased) and should explore ways the law might be reformed to prevent apparently unfair outcomes of this sort; and, thirdly, that the review should also consider any ancillary areas of succession law that might produce analogous outcomes—for example, disclaimer and attesting beneficiaries.

In October 2003, the Law Commission published a consultation paper, “The Forfeiture Rule and the Law of Succession”, which considered the problem raised in Re DWS, and discussed whether a similar problem arose in other contexts. The consultation paper provisionally proposed that in cases such as Re DWS there should be a “deemed predecease” solution—that is, where a person forfeits a benefit on intestacy through having killed the deceased, the estate should be distributed as if the killer had died immediately before the deceased. The Law Commission also proposed that the deemed predecease rule should apply where a gift under a will fails because of the forfeiture rule.

[Sir Alan Beith]

It is perhaps worth placing on the record—the Committee specifically sought to inquire into this—that the deemed predeceased rule has no other legal effect. In other words, determining that someone is deceased for the purposes of inheritance does not affect any other legal provision or right relating to them.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Djanogly]

I thank my right hon. Friend for setting out that important point. If that were not the case, it could have serious knock-on effects for other cases.

The Law Commission received responses to the consultation paper from 31 individuals and organisations. Those included leading academics in the field of succession law; the Society of Legal Scholars, Property and Trusts Section; a number of individual judges, including Lord Justice Sedley, one of the members of the Court of Appeal who had heard the Re DWS case, whose response wholeheartedly endorsed the Law Commission’s proposed solution; the Association of District Judges; specialist solicitors from leading firms; the Inland Revenue; the Bar Council; the Law Society; and the Chancery Bar Association. Most of the respondents agreed that the current law was unsatisfactory, that in Re DWS (deceased) the grandchild ought to have inherited, and that a “deemed predecease” rule would be the best way of achieving this.

The Chancery Bar Association must, however, be singled out for particular mention. It spotted that there was an analogous, albeit rare, circumstance, elsewhere in the law of intestacy, that should be addressed. This arises from the fact that where a child inherits from a parent or other relative on intestacy, that child’s interest is held “contingently” on the statutory trusts under the intestacy rules.

In July 2005, the Law Commission’s final report, “The Forfeiture Rule and the Law of Succession” was presented to Parliament. The report recommended that a “deemed predecease” solution should apply in three situations. First, where a person disclaims or forfeits the right to inherit from a person who has died intestate, the intestacy rules should then be applied as if the killer had died immediately before the intestate. Secondly, where a person disclaims or forfeits a benefit under a will, the will should be applied as if the killer had died immediately before the testator, unless the will contains a provision to the contrary. Thirdly, where a person loses a benefit under an intestacy by dying unmarried and a minor, but leaves children, the property should devolve as if that person had died immediately before the intestate. The Civil Law Reform Bill incorporated provisions to this effect, subject to minor modifications relating to the role of the public trustee, which for reasons I shall explain, need not concern us now.

I hope this explanation of the genesis of this Bill makes clear the problems that it is trying to address. The overall point is that in the three circumstances identified— forfeiture, disclaimer and the rights of the children of a minor heir on intestacy—the detail of the law does not produce the desired result. The general policy on intestacy is that once the interest of any spouse or civil partner has been satisfied, the property of the deceased should pass to closer blood relatives before more distant ones: the children of the deceased, for example, should be preferred to siblings of the deceased.

Where there is a valid will, the general policy of the law is that the wishes of the testator—the person who made the will—should determine who is to inherit what from the estate of the deceased. That gives effect to the principle of freedom of testamentary disposition, which lies at the heart of our succession law in England and Wales, and which was referred to by my right hon. Friend the Member for East Yorkshire and others.

The effect of the Bill will therefore be to change the law in the three areas mentioned, so that it is consistent with the general policy of the law. First, as was highlighted in the 2001 Court of Appeal decision in Re DWS (deceased), where a person forfeits an inheritance on intestacy because he or she has killed the person from whom he or she would have inherited, his or her children will also be disinherited. The forfeiture rule thereby disinherits not only the criminal but also the innocent grandchildren of the victim.

This problem is not confined to intestacy. For example, where there is a will that contains a gift specifying who is to inherit, if the first named recipient dies before the testator and that recipient forfeits his or her inheritance, the default gift cannot take effect because the recipient is still alive. Similarly, if there is a will giving a gift to a child of the testator without any further provision, the law implies a term that the gift will pass to his or her children if he or she predeceases the testator. If the testator’s child forfeits his inheritance, his or her children—the testator’s grandchildren—will not be able to inherit.

The same problem arises in both testate and intestate successions where the person who would be first entitled disclaims the inheritance. Anyone claiming through him or her will not be able to inherit. Let me explain the term “disclaimer” as that was raised by my right hon. Friend the Member for East Yorkshire, and discussed further by my hon. Friends the Members for Christchurch and for North East Somerset in the context of disclaiming gifts under a will. There was a further question as to why this needed to be done.

A beneficiary is free to accept or disclaim—that is, refuse—a gift that has been left to him or her in a will. The unwanted gift will form part of the testator’s residuary estate—the part of the estate remaining when all the specific gifts have been satisfied— unless, as is less usual, he or she has made a default gift in the event of a disclaimer. If the will does not make provision for the disposal of the estate, it will be distributed according to the intestacy rules.

My hon. Friend the Member for Christchurch went on to ask why that should be the case. Figures are not kept on the number of people who disclaim gifts in wills. However, in its consultation paper, “The Forfeiture Rule and the Law of Succession”—CP No. 172—the Law Commission commented that the usual reasons for disclaimer in will cases will either be to secure beneficial tax consequences or to enable the beneficiary to avoid inheriting onerous property such as a lease with repairing covenants. My hon. Friend then asked whether the disclaimer provision opens the way to evade inheritance tax. The answer is no, because in the example we have before us, the son could achieve the same results as a disclaimer under the Bill by varying the will or the intestacy rules. Deeds of variation can be used to vary the distribution of the estate for inheritance tax or capital gains tax purposes. That is only possible where all the original beneficiaries agree and the tax legislation permits it. These variations will often include disclaimers by some or all of the original beneficiaries, and the Bill simply enables the intended recipient to disclaim without thereby disinheriting anyone entitled to claim through him or her.

My hon. Friend the Member for North East Somerset then asked whether a disclaimer of inheritance can instead take the money and give it away. The answer is yes; the money would then be his or hers to do with as he or she wished, but he or she could not disclaim part of an inheritance, or having disclaimed, specify where the inheritance should go. That is for the deceased to say in a will or the intestacy rules, which act as a deemed will, if I can put it in those terms. So a beneficiary of an intestate estate is free to accept or disclaim the inheritance. When the disclaimer is a child of the deceased, the disclaimed interests passes to the child’s siblings. Clauses 1 and 2 of the Bill address those issues.

There is the rather unusual situation, which was spotted by the Chancery Bar Association—I take my hat off to the assiduous lawyer who noticed this one—in which if a person under the age of 18 who is prospectively entitled to inherit property under the intestacy rules, perhaps from his or her parent, dies before reaching the age of majority, leaving children but without having married or entered a civil partnership, those children cannot inherit in place of their parent. Right hon. and hon. Members used several interesting possibilities to explain how that could be put into practice, but that happens because the parent did not reach the age of majority or marry or form a civil partnership under that age. In more legal language, the parent did not attain a vested interest. That anomalous outcome, rare as it might be, discriminates against those children.

Clause 3 addresses that issue. In all three cases, the Bill would solve the problems by deeming the person who loses the inheritance to have died before the person whose estate is being distributed. That means that on intestacy, the children of the person losing out will be able to inherit under the statutory intestacy rules and, if there is a will, that the actual or deemed wishes of the testator will prevail. In short, the aim of the Bill is to try to ensure that the “right” people inherit. The Government support that aim.

I shall comment on the differences between the Law Commission’s draft Bill, published in 2005, and the equivalent provisions in the draft Civil Law Reform Bill, published in 2009. These issues were raised by my right hon. Friend the Member for Berwick-upon-Tweed, and my hon. Friend the Member for Christchurch touched on them, too. They largely derive from the comments of the Justice Committee and the people who gave evidence to it. Some of the changes are drafting changes, but others were more significant. The question arises of why they should have been left out of the Bill.

Although the Justice Committee welcomed the proposal to ensure that minors who inherit under the provision have their inheritance protected, several criticisms were made of the special trust advice chosen by the Law Commission to achieve that aim. On consideration of the responses to the consultation and the evidence to the Justice Committee, it has become clear that the special trust was unnecessary and would be problematic and expensive to operate. The existing law, which already imposes a trust and gives the court power to appoint alternative trustees and supervise those trusts, gives the property of minors adequate protection. We therefore believe that the Bill meets the concerns of the Justice Committee in that regard.

The Justice Committee welcomed the reforms and reached two conclusions. First, it stated:

“We welcome this clause as ending the current rule which penalises the children or other heirs of a killer who are themselves not only entirely innocent but are the people whom the deceased would probably have wanted to benefit from the estate in any event. We also welcome the proposal to ensure that minors who inherit under this provision have their inheritance protected.”

Secondly, it pointed out:

“We recommend the Government to re-examine the drafting of clauses 15 to 17 in the light of the comments made by the Bar Council and the Law Society. We expect all minors to receive suitable protection under the bill. Equally, we share the Law Society’s concern that nothing be done to impair the validity of existing wills.”

The main difference, however, as my right hon. Friend the Member for Berwick-upon-Tweed pointed out, is that the earlier draft Bills contained specific provisions intended to ensure that in forfeiture cases the criminal was prevented from gaining any benefit from the inheritance that would, under the terms of the draft Bill, pass to his or her children. Those special trust provisions attracted a good deal of criticism from witnesses to the Justice Committee and people who replied to the Ministry of Justice’s consultation on the draft Civil Law Reform Bill.

Two respondents—the Law Society and the Bar—considered that the safeguard provisions were not necessary because legislation already exists that would protect an infant beneficiary’s inheritance in forfeiture cases if such protection were to be needed. Both referred to section 116 of the Senior Courts Act 1981, which provides the court with discretion to pass over any prior claims to a grant and appoint someone else if by reason of any special circumstances it appears necessary or expedient to do so.

The Bar also mentioned section 114(2) of the 1981 Act, which provides that wherever a minority interest arises under a will or on intestacy, a grant should be made to a trust corporation or to two individuals, unless it appears to the court to be expedient that there should be a sole personal representative.

The same two respondents also expressed concern about the limited application of the safeguard provisions, which is restricted to the infant children or more remote issue of the offender, and only then if, as the Bar noted, the infant inherits by virtue of the reform rather than under, for example, a default gift in a will. It considered that there may be cases where court intervention is needed to prevent potential abuse of the inheritance, where those inheriting are infants but are not directly related to the offender.

The Bar also objected to the width of the power of the court to allocate any property in which the infant had an interest to the trust, and it raised a fundamental concern about the workability of the provisions, where both the infant and the disqualified person would inevitably benefit from the trust property—for example, where the former matrimonial home was held under the trust, and the infant and the disqualified person were both living there.

The Bar concluded:

“On balance, we consider the provision”

to safeguard an infant after forfeiture

“to be unhelpful, and likely to lead to increased expense in the administration of estates in circumstances which are bound to be tragic but are otherwise unpredictable.”

The Government have given particularly careful consideration to those comments, which we have discussed with the Law Commission and with Master Winegarten of the chancery division of the High Court, who was very critical of the special trust provisions. We agree with the Justice Committee that minors who inherit should have their inheritance protected and that all minors should have suitable protection under the Bill. However, it is clear from our more detailed consideration of how the special trust provisions would work that they are unnecessary, problematic and expensive to operate.

As my right hon. Friend the Member for Berwick-upon-Tweed pointed out, the Civil Law Reform Bill contained special trust provisions for children. He asked whether this Bill provides protection now that the special trust provisions have been taken out, an issue which I have dealt with. In our view, the existing law, which already imposes a trust to the benefit of minor children and gives the court power to supervise the administration of estates, gives effective and adequate protection.

[Sir Alan Beith]

My hon. Friend is giving a detailed analysis and providing fairly compelling reasons why the specific provisions involve many problems. However, it is not only the protection of the minor’s inheritance that is at stake, but the maintenance of the principle that the person who has carried out the murder should not benefit from that murder, which might happen indirectly.

[Mr Djanogly]

I take my right hon. Friend’s point. As we have discussed, I agree that there is the technical possibility of the murderer taking advantage, but it is far fetched. Indeed, my right hon. Friend has mentioned that that assumes that the murderer had a solid knowledge of the laws of succession, which would include the certain knowledge that they would spend many years in prison. As my right hon. Friend the Member for East Yorkshire pointed out, the Bill does not affect the forfeiture rule. In the light of the responses to the consultations by the Law Commission and the Ministry of Justice and the pre-legislative scrutiny by the Justice Committee of all those proposals, we do not believe that allowing a killer’s children to inherit from the victim will encourage people to kill.

[Sir Alan Beith]

My hon. Friend has misunderstood my point, which does not concern the absurd issue of deterrence. Someone who has committed a murder—they may even be in prison—may be able to evade financial responsibilities as a result of the provisions. It is not far fetched that those who have committed murder would seek to gain some benefit from the money that would rightly pass to their children under such provisions.

[Mr Djanogly]

I thank my right hon. Friend for making that clear.

The Law Society also made an important point about the wording of the provisions in new section 33A(2) of the Wills Act 1837, which would be inserted by clause 2(1) of the Bill. Earlier draft Bills provided that where a person disclaims, or is disqualified by the operation of the forfeiture rule from inheriting under the deceased person’s will, the will is to be construed as if that person had died immediately before the deceased, save in so far as there is any provision in the will about how the devise or bequest is to take effect. The Law Society thought that this “any provision” test was more demanding than the “unless a contrary intention appears by the will” test in other related statutory provisions, and the Bill now follows those other provisions. We hope that will provide consistency and simplicity.

We welcome my right hon. Friend the Member for East Yorkshire’s decision to make the Bill consistent with the Wills Act and I should add, for completeness, that the Law Commission is content with the Bill in its present form. We are very grateful to the Justice Committee and its witnesses, particularly the Bar and the Law Society, for drawing attention to these matters. The approach in the Bill is the right one. This is a small but worthwhile piece of technical law reform produced by the Law Commission. I applaud my right hon. Friend for taking up this serious topic and I wish the Bill a fair passage through this House and the other place.

Oral Answers to Questions

Debate between Lord Beith and Jonathan Djanogly

Tuesday 11th January 2011 Commons Chamber

[Mr Djanogly]

As the hon. Gentleman intimated, the housing budget for legal aid will have savings. However, he failed to mention that it will go down from some £50 million of spending to £38 million of spending; this area of spend is not going to disappear. If an individual or family are subjected to having their home repossessed or if there is any chance of their losing their homes, legal aid will remain available.

[Sir Alan Beith (Berwick-upon-Tweed) (LD)]

Are Ministers not going to have to take steps to convince people that they will not be put at a disadvantage by appearing before tribunals without legal representation? Is the Minister going to take steps to ensure that voluntary organisations can provide people with the support that they would need to appear in person at tribunals?

[Mr Djanogly]

My right hon. Friend makes an important point. This issue is wider than purely legal aid; it is also about how we give what is often non-legal advice. To a great extent, that is provided by the not-for-profit sector. I have had some half a dozen meetings in recent weeks with the not-for-profit sector. We also accept that there is a co-ordinating role across Government to ensure that we minimise any gaps.

Courts Service Estate

Debate between Lord Beith and Jonathan Djanogly

Tuesday 14th December 2010 Commons Chamber

[Mr Djanogly]

In his rather concise statement—or perhaps it was not—the shadow Minister said that the savings are not particularly significant, and then immediately went on to accuse the Government of asset stripping. I do not see the consistency in that. However, the economic circumstances that Britain faces and the imperative of reducing the national debt pile amassed by the previous Government’s bout of carefree spending impacts on our proposals, which form part of the commitment of the Ministry of Justice to reducing spending by £2 billion.

Savings apart, I am convinced that the current court system is not efficient enough, that it should provide better value for money, that it should make better use of technology, and that it should provide a better service for court users. The hon. Gentleman accuses me of the wholesale closure of legal aid and CABs, and of the wholesale massacre of the Courts Service, but he must tell us where he would rationalise and save.

The Labour party manifesto said:

“To help protect frontline services, we will find greater savings in legal aid and the courts system”.

If the hon. Gentleman is to be credible, therefore, he must give us his view of how justice is to be delivered. If he would put more money into legal aid, would he take even more money out of the courts, or vice versa? Until he tells us how he would be prepared to spend the money, I am afraid that he will not get people’s trust on this matter. He seems to suggest that closing courts is bad in every case.

The hon. Gentleman asked for the financial workings, and I am pleased to say that the impact assessments have been published and are there for him to look at. The utilisation figures take into account the additional work and remaining courts that will come into existence. The timetable is that the first courts will start to close on 1 April next year, and I can confirm that travel arrangements will be organised on a local basis. It is important to make the point that during these reorganisation proposals, we have been considering not just closures but how we can best reorganise the remaining Courts Service. That includes looking at how people can best get to their local courts.

Delivering justice is about more than protecting bricks and mortar. The hon. Gentleman talks about it being like Facebook. In reality, courts are not like post offices either—they are not places that people go to every day of the week. Of equal importance is the quality of justice. It is important that people have use of a fit-for-purpose building that has good listing facilities and gets cases heard promptly. Proximity is important, but it is only one of a number of issues to be considered, and we have considered those issues carefully.

[Sir Alan Beith (Berwick-upon-Tweed) (LD)]

There is clearly a case for making savings where courts are close together or little used. However, why have Ministers taken relatively little account of the representations of the Lord Chief Justice, particularly on the Courts Service in what he described as vast rural areas, such as Alnwick and Tynedale in Northumberland and places elsewhere in the country? Will benches not find it necessary—at least sometimes—to go out to parts of their areas, possibly even to hear cases in places where they are still courthouses, given that they cannot be sold and are still public property?

[Mr Djanogly]

My right hon. Friend is passionate about the Courts Service, as I know not least from my appearance before him and the Justice Committee. However, it is important to point out that the Lord Chief Justice’s response came from the foreword to a report of the senior presiding judge, and that the report did not represent a response on behalf of the entire judiciary. The senior presiding judge was collecting the remarks by various judges around the country. It needs to be seen in that context. Indeed, the report was given careful consideration, as were all the responses.