Public Order Bill

Debate between Lord Beith and Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb

Committee stage
Wednesday 16th November 2022 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

My Lords, I am not going to describe all the amendments in this group. I am hoping that noble Lords will introduce their own.

I have one point to make about the arrest of Charlotte Lynch. I had the dubious pleasure of sitting on a panel with David Lloyd, the PCC for Hertfordshire, who seemed to suggest that it was the journalist’s fault and that journalists should not report on protests. He believed in a free press, but not always, so I was slightly worried about the Minister’s reaction, but he said that he used the wrong word.

All these offences deserve to be probed because they are so badly drafted, so broadly drafted, that we cannot be sure what they mean. For example, the Bill names the offence of locking on, but the definition is much broader. The Bill talks of a person attaching themselves or an object to another person, another object or land. What does “attach” mean? Does it mean people linking arms or holding hands? What if they were tied together by a ribbon with a loose bow that you could undo? Would that be attached? Exactly what does it mean? If it is easy to remove the attachment, does it count? Is it still criminal? It seems that these offences are absurd. I do not understand where the threshold is for criminal conduct. It makes the whole Bill worthless if we cannot be sure what it means, and certainly the courts are going to have a field day with this. I beg to move.

[Lord Beith (LD)]

My Lords, the noble Baroness has raised the absurdity of the locking-on offence and the problems that will arise, which are addressed by some of the amendments in this group.

I want to introduce the Minister to an issue he may not be familiar with—perhaps it does not happen in his part of the country. Quite a lot of young couples go about carrying padlocks. Why do they do that? It might not be immediately apparent to a constable that they are wishing to pledge their lifelong devotion to each other. They go to a place such as the High Level Bridge in Newcastle, and they attach the padlock to the bridge; they then throw the key into the water. Explaining that that is what you are about to do might be pretty difficult when your average police constable says that you are carrying a padlock, obviously intending to lock on to somewhere. But they do not lock on to anything—except perhaps each other, and they might be caught by that, as the noble Baroness just pointed out. That is simply one example.

Another obvious example which has been raised by noble Lords before is that of bicycle padlocks. People have to carry them whenever they are going to use their bicycle. Again, these are pretty obvious cases for the locking-on offence as the Government have conceived it.

These are things that just happen in ordinary life. When you compound the offence created in the Bill with the offence of obstruction of a constable, you can see really difficult situations arising, where citizens with no intention of creating serious disruption are nevertheless caught because they are carrying such things in the vicinity of somewhere where serious disruption might be about to arise, or might be known to be about to arise.

I really think that the Government have got to clean up this Bill if they want to proceed with it, and remove from it things that drag ordinary citizens into conflict with the criminal law when they have no criminal intent at all—and do not need to have for the purpose of some of these offences—and are not involved in serious protest. Serious protest is itself, of course, an often justifiable activity, as the courts have demonstrated in some recent cases. Quite apart from the problems faced by those who want to engage in legitimate protest, we should not be passing legislation that simply confuses ordinary citizens as to what they are allowed to do.

Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Debate between Lord Beith and Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb

Lords Hansard - Part 1 & Lords Hansard - part one & Report stage
Wednesday 15th December 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Beith (LD)]

My Lords, I certainly want to hear what the Minister has to say because I will go home very uneasy indeed if I pass up the opportunity for a vote to make it clear that this House rejects the system that has developed into a gross distortion of both our justice system and our sense of values about the circumstances in which someone can be incarcerated and those in which they are entitled to recover their freedom. We cannot tolerate this continuing. There is a hope that the Minister will say things that will enable us to feel that we are making some progress, but some of us will not sleep well tonight if we leave this place without being sure that some progress will be made.

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

My Lords—

Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Debate between Lord Beith and Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb

Committee stage
Wednesday 24th November 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Beith (LD)]

My Lords, I will speak to two amendments in my name. By way of preface, I must say how much I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, in his masterful presentation of the case against what the Government are doing, and of the observations of the Joint Committee on Human Rights.

The noble Lord mentioned proportionality. Proportionality was central to the case of Ziegler and others in the Supreme Court back in July. I thought the wording it used, as reported by the Times, summed up my feeling in a way:

“Peaceful protest was capable of constituting a ‘lawful excuse’ for deliberate physical obstruction of the highway … There had to be an evaluation on the facts of each case to determine whether any restrictions on the protesters’ rights to freedom of expression and freedom of peaceful association was proportionate. There should be a certain degree of tolerance to disruption to ordinary life caused by the exercise of those freedoms.”


I do not think the Government like the concept of proportionality, and the whole direction of these clauses—and those in the subsequent group, more recently tabled —illustrates that.

The amendments I have tabled are probing one feature, which is the word “unease”. They are Amendments 297 and 307. In the new subsection that the Government propose, which is about

“the noise generated by persons taking part in”

an assembly, there is reference to the impact it may have on “persons in the vicinity” of that assembly

“if … it may result in the intimidation or harassment of persons of reasonable firmness with the characteristics of persons likely to be in the vicinity”.

A court is going to have some fun working out what the characteristics are of people likely to be in the vicinity, but that is another part of the story.

The subsection also applies if

“it may cause such persons to suffer serious unease”.

That is a very low bar indeed. It made me think of the Governor of the Bank of England speaking to the Treasury Committee a couple of weeks ago. He said that he was “very uneasy” about the inflation situation¸ but not so uneasy that he sought to raise the interest rates. In his view of vocabulary, “uneasy” is clearly nowhere near the top at all.

It is the purpose of numerous protests to make people uneasy; I have been made uneasy by both the intensity and subject matter of protests. The protests that went on in Glasgow were designed to make people feel uneasy about what is happening to the planet, and to do so in ways which might even more directly make them feel uneasy, by noticing that such a large number of people are involved and making such a lot of noise.

However, it has always been so. John Wesley and his followers made people uneasy, by preaching loudly out in the open air and singing loud hymns. It was to make them uneasy about the life they were leading and trying to cause them to change their way of life. I have been confronted in my time by all sorts of demonstrations and protestors, putting forward views which I sometimes agreed with and sometimes did not. But being even seriously uneasy does not seem any reasonable basis on which to restrict the rights of protest. I simply cannot conceive that the Government have any other intention than to make protest much more difficult, even in circumstances which most people, on reflection, would accept were reasonable.

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

My Lords, we have had some powerful speeches already and it is a real pleasure to hear them. This was supposed to be the worst bit of the Bill. It is a terrible Bill but this was meant to be the absolute pits. However, the Government have made things worse by bringing in the latest amendments, so this is not the worst bit any more; it is just the next worst bit.

I have signed about a dozen amendments in this group. I could have signed them all and definitely support them all. Many of them are good, and worth raising, but the only real way forward is to remove these clauses altogether. I hope that opposition parties can join together to do that on Report, because our civil liberties and human rights are far too important to be negated in this way.

Amendment 293 from the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, sets the scene perfectly because it stresses the importance of the right to protest in a free country. We always look down our noses at all these illiberal countries abroad who suppress their citizens—their human rights and liberty to protest—but this Government are trying to do exactly the same. Any restriction on the right to protest has to be really carefully considered, not rushed in with 18 pages of amendments at the last minute and without any proper discussion.

There is a balancing act between the rights of individuals and those of wider society. The balancing act already happens because there is a great number of restrictions on protest in this country. The police have many powers, which they use, and many tactics—some of which go too far, such as kettling. The Government want to ramp up these restrictions even more: being noisy or annoying could be banned. Some Peers could be banned because they are annoying. We could end up with the only protests, as has been said, being the ones that are so quiet and uneventful that they achieve absolutely nothing.

This is deep, dark politics. This is about a Conservative Government wanting to rewrite completely how we operate within society, as individuals against the state. I think they are planning, or hoping, to remain the dominant political party for generations to come. That is what could happen through these terrible amendments.

If you make protests impossible to perform legally, criminalise non-violent direct action, abolish or restrict the ability of citizens to challenge the Government in court through judicial reviews, turn people against lawyers, gerrymander the election boundaries and dish out cash in the way that looks best for Conservative MPs, that is deep, dark politics. Many of us here are not particularly political and perhaps do not see the dangers inherent in what you, the Government, are doing. It all seems like a calculated ploy to turn all the cards in favour of an unaccountable Government that cannot be challenged in the courts, at the ballot box or on the streets. We all have to unite against this and deleting these clauses from the Bill is the beginning of that fight.

I have a tiny quibble on the issue that noble Peers have mentioned about the survival of the planet. The chances are that the planet will survive. What we are doing in this climate crisis is destroying the little bit of ecosphere that supports human life, so that is what we have to think about. It is not about survival of the planet but about survival of people.

Investigatory Powers Bill

Debate between Lord Beith and Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb

Wednesday 13th July 2016 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

The amendment is about applications to intercept being made by a judicial commissioner, not the Secretary of State via the Prime Minister. Amendment 43B sets out some additional requirements to be taken into account.

The debate has been fascinating because there has been a lot of use of words such as “reasonable”, “proportionate” and even “democratic accountability”. We all probably draw the lines on those matters at different places, and I certainly do so. My amendments speak to the area that has been covered by the Wilson doctrine of 1966 on parliamentarians’ correspondence and communications. The doctrine was explored by the two Green parliamentarians, Caroline Lucas in the other place and myself in your Lordships’ House, at the Investigatory Powers Tribunal. After successive Prime Ministers—even recently—have declared that the Wilson doctrine was still in force, we in fact found at the IPT that it applied only to targeted, not incidental, interceptions. The doctrine therefore has proved to be fairly worthless.

For me, the surveillance of parliamentarians is a constitutional issue, because it is our job to hold the Executive to account, without interference and without inhibition. In addition, of course, constituents have a right to privacy, which is not acknowledged enough at times. It goes without saying that criminals have to be caught. People always raise the issue of what happens if we have a parliamentarian who is a paedophile; of course, I would seek to see that criminal found and removed. The Joint Committee on Human Rights said that the current drafting,

“does not eliminate the risk of a partisan motivation, whether real or apparent”—

that is if a Government Member does it—and it fails to supply,

“a safeguard commensurate with the importance of the public interest at stake”.

As I have explained in your Lordships’ House several times, I was targeted by the police and put on their domestic extremist database. I feel that, if somebody like me can be targeted as a domestic extremist—I was an elected politician at the time and was actually sitting on the Metropolitan Police Authority, overseeing the police—then I am very nervous about where such authorisation comes from. I would argue that there are simply not enough safeguards for unhindered scrutiny of the Executive by parliamentarians, which is obviously vital for any democracy.

We heard today the Prime Minster—now the previous Prime Minister—saying in his valedictory speech that he saluted the robustness of our challenging of our leaders here in Britain. This whole Bill puts that at risk; it does not allow us to do our job properly without the risk of interference. I hope that the Minister will not try to reassure me by telling me that the Government are in listening mode, because that is exactly what I am frightened of. I beg to move.

[Lord Beith (LD)]

My Lords, my Amendment 44 in this group might appear to want to resurrect the Wilson doctrine but it is really only to give it a decent burial. The Constitution Committee, of which I am a member, said in its report published on Monday that,

“the surveillance of parliamentarians is a significant constitutional issue”,

and that the committee,

“would welcome clarification from the Government of its current understanding of the Wilson Doctrine”.

The amendment allows for that and allows us to consider whether the procedures in the Bill make a better job of dealing with the difficult issue of whether communications of an elected member of a legislature should be intercepted and, if so, on what authority.

While it existed, the Wilson doctrine had merit in that it produced a higher threshold, mainly the involvement of the Prime Minister, and that in so far as it was observed—I have reason to believe that it often was observed in practice and that this was recognised to be a different situation to other interceptions—it played that useful role. However, it was riddled with failings. All it did, if your Lordships read it, was to set out the policy of a particular Government at a particular time. What it of course set out was not that the communications of parliamentarians would never be intercepted but that the Government’s policy at the time was not to do so and the Prime Minister would come before the House at a time of his choosing—presumably at a time when it would no longer be damaging to the investigation—and advise the House that the policy had been changed. It was a very odd doctrine; the Prime Minister could come to the House and say, “We’ve changed the policy but we’re going to change it back now because that inquiry has been dealt with”. It is one of the inherent inconsistencies in the doctrine.

It was never clear whether the doctrine bound any subsequent Government either not to intercept MPs’ communication or to come to the House at a time of their choosing to reveal that the policy had been changed. It raises a fascinating issue since, so far as I can see, no Prime Minister has ever come to the House and said what situation we were in—or are in, until this legislation is passed—under that doctrine. It clearly was not fit for purpose. We therefore have to ask ourselves whether the procedures in the Bill that essentially try to do the same thing—that is, to involve the Prime Minister and raise it to a higher level within the Executive—are a sufficient extra safeguard for the constituents and whistleblowers who will communicate with their MPs or with legislators. They may be doing so because they are aware of some evil going on within the very organisation that might seek to intercept their communications. We have to have some regard to this.

The Joint Committee on Human Rights recommended that the Speaker of the House of Commons and, by analogy, Speakers of other legislatures should have a role in this. Although I am attracted by the intention, I find it slightly difficult because of the position it would put the Speaker in. The analogy is drawn with the procedures which were recommended following the serving of a search warrant in the House of Commons in the Damian Green case. It was felt that if in future the Speaker was consulted before a search warrant would be executed on parliamentary premises, then it was an appropriate precedent.

There is trouble with that precedent. If a search takes place on the premises it does not remain secret for very long. It becomes pretty obvious that it has taken place. If an interception was taking place, then the Speaker might be in possession of the knowledge that MP X’s communications are being intercepted for a considerable period, during which he has to have normal dealings with that Member of Parliament, call that Member of Parliament in debate and so on. That strikes me as a rather difficult position in which to put the Speaker of the House of Commons, the Lord Speaker in this House or a Speaker in any other legislature.

Incidentally, the involvement of other legislatures in the provisions in the Bill is an advance on the Wilson doctrine which applied only, as far as I am aware, to the House of Commons. I find myself before this House having to rely on the Bill as it stands and the prime ministerial involvement as being a significantly higher threshold. As one has always been worried about the supremacy of the Executive in this activity, I cannot be entirely content with that except for the fact that we are building in a process of judicial oversight, which I have advocated for many years and I am delighted to find in the Bill, and have been discussing what the conditions for that oversight are.

I would not want us to get into the position which, as I understand it, would arise from the amendment moved by the noble Baroness because I do not want a judicial authority appearing to be the initiator of an interception. That seems to me to get the role completely wrong. A law and order organisation or national security organisation has to be the initiator and the Secretary of State one of the routes through which it goes on its way to be authorised. The procedure under the Bill would also involve the Prime Minister in this process. I probably have to be content with that unless someone comes up with something better or someone convinces me that the Joint Committee’s recommendation does not have the disadvantage that I mentioned. Of course, I do not have the slightest intention of pursuing Amendment 44 and attempting to write into the Bill the provisions of the obsolete Wilson doctrine but it is perhaps worth reminding ourselves of it.