European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Beith Excerpts

Committee: 5th sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 7th March 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Beith (LD)]

My Lords, if the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, is wondering why the word “appropriate” does not fit into the context of trying to limit judicial discretion, he should look at how many times it is used in this and other Bills to give Ministers the opportunity to decide one way or the other, in what are quite clearly different kinds of decisions from those you would expect judges to make.

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

My Lords, with respect to the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, what the noble Lord, Lord Pannick said in reply is in my experience absolutely right. To a judge, the word “relevant” requires him to look at the issues that need to be decided. It is a much tighter word than “appropriate”, and is used frequently. In case law, one searches for the point that is directly relevant to the point at issue. It may be that legal terminology is best adopted because that is what judges understand. It is a different kind of word from “appropriate”, which judges do not normally use. Therefore, I suggest it is a better word to use in this context.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Beith Excerpts

Committee: 4th sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 5th March 2018 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

My Lords, we are now looking again at the principle of supremacy and status. I agree with a great deal—in fact, almost all—of what the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, said. However, in the various amendments I have sprinkled around, I differ with him on one fundamental point: I always wish to preserve the rights of individuals and businesses to have legislation struck down. That is their current position in that they can have EU law struck down. I put forward my alternative plan in Amendment 32A; I will explain how I got to it.

Broadly speaking, there are three baskets of EU laws. In basket 1, there are the treaties and the Charter of Fundamental Rights, which have to be followed by the European court. They are not revocable, as I am sure noble Lords know, and it is a big procedure to change them. In basket 2, I put legislative acts, meaning regulations and directives that set policy. To be precise, they can be identified by the article of the procedure in the treaty that they were made under. In the Lisbon treaty—the TFEU—it would be Article 289. The important point for noble Lords to hold in their minds is that these regulations and directives set policy. Basket 2 legislation can also be struck down by the European court—including on an action from individuals and businesses—for being incompatible with the treaty or the charter. A recent example is the data retention regulation that was ruled disproportionate in cases brought by Digital Rights Ireland and others. In basket 3, I put the implementation of Acts and delegated Acts and their predecessors. In the Lisbon treaty, that comes under Articles 290 and 291. These can be struck down by the European court for being incompatible with the treaty or the charter, as well as for being incompatible with the powers and instructions that were delegated to it in the legislation on which it depends.

If we take rights as our guide—by which I mean the right of an individual or business to challenge the validity of a bad law—then we get to the categorisation that the EU gives to law: that it is all secondary, except for the treaties and the charter. It is quite easy to accept that retained EU general principles—corresponding to basket 1, as I called it—should have primary status. Once converted under Clause 7, it would be wrong if they were changed or revoked other than by an Act of Parliament.

Basket 3 regulations are very close to statutory instruments in the way that they are made based on delegated powers, including an all-or-nothing single vote in the Council or Parliament to turn the whole lot down. There is also similarity in the ways they can be invalidated in court. That is quite easy to map on to our statutory instrument. Basket 2 is harder. The policy content and procedure of making the law look a lot like the making of an Act of Parliament; that leads some—I think Professor Craig was one of them—to conclude that it should map on to primary legislation. But then, if primary, it cannot be quashed under the general principles, so the rights of individuals and businesses are lost. Of course, if noble Lords look at Schedule 1—as we will later today—it can be seen that the Government’s intention is that there is no right of action on a failure to comply with the general principles of EU law. That is wrong. Treating legislation as primary carries the same cost that the Constitution Committee accepts. As it says in paragraph 48 of its report:

“Treating retained direct EU law as primary legislation for all—including”,


Human Rights Act,

“purposes is not without constitutional costs”.

I consider that cost to be too high because I give more weight to maintaining status quo rights and the reasonable expectations of individuals and businesses than making judgments easier or fewer.

We have to address that question several times in the Bill. Each time, I come down on the side of the people’s rights. No manifestos have ever said, “We want to take back control, including your right to challenge bad law”. However, the secondary legislation nature of basket 2 may require some further protection from overly easy change and revocation by statutory instruments, especially once things are no longer pinned in place because we are not part of the EU. In the EU, this was not made by a statutory instrument-type process, nor is it amendable in that way, so basket 2—although of secondary legislation status—could be deemed amendable in life after Clause 7 only by an Act of Parliament. This idea is similar to the one we debated regarding Amendment 21 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter. Such treatment means that there is a special category for these laws, but we are in an unusual situation. The fact is that basket 2 is an intermediate, piggy-in-the-middle category. It is secondary legislation-plus, or primary legislation-minus. It could be replicated more or less by secondary legislation plus amendment protection, or the other way round as primary legislation but challengeable as to validity, although that is a bit more controversial.

The piggy-in-the-middle nature shows up in other ways. Basket 2 legislation actually contains within the individual documents a great deal of detail that in the UK domestic system would be done in delegated secondary legislation. It is the same with directives: a greater level of detail is there than in the lean and mean UK Acts of Parliament. That is even more the case after implementation for the secondary legislation made under the European Communities Act. For example, look at the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Bill, which recently received its Third Reading in this House. The money laundering regulations 2017, based on the fourth anti-money laundering directive, are some 112 pages plus a glossary. They were replaced in the Bill by one clause of 28 lines, including the headings and a three-and-a-half-page schedule listing delegated powers. It has been much amended and improved, but the contrast in content is much the same. If we made secondary legislation transposing directives into primary legislation, there would be a great deal of detail on which I would not wish to say I gave the sovereignty of Parliament a totally unchallengeable status.

There are three parts to my amendment. The first would reword the supremacy principle. I intend it to do the same thing and I am not precious about the wording. In fact, I just modified the Constitution Committee’s idea and stole the idea that you allocate precedence as if it were primary legislation, but in my plan the only bit of primary legislation it gets is the precedence. The second part would allocate secondary status to basket 2 retained legislation, and indeed to basket 3—everything except for Acts, because where we have Acts they already are and look like Acts. I then allocate primary status to EU general principles. As I have indicated, for life after Clause 7, basket 2 could be made so as to require amendment by primary legislation. Possibly that belongs in Clause 7 or somewhere else.

[Lord Beith (LD)]

My Lords, my noble friend Lady Bowles has identified a problem that goes beyond what the committee sought to solve in its proposal, and proposed an ingenious way of trying to deal with it. The committee’s proposal seeks to protect the important bits of that legislation from the degree of vulnerability provided by the repeal of statutory instruments under our present procedures. It is an intriguing point in some ways, because I expect this to be a shrinking area of law over time. If we leave the EU, one assumes that much of this legislation will in time be replaced by new legislation bringing that area of law up to date, not because it is EU law but because things move on and there is a need to do so.

That reminds us of the danger that the committee set out at paragraph 103 of its report. It said:

“If the ‘supremacy principle’ were to continue to feature in the Bill, clause 5(3) would need to be amended to clarify the extent to which retained EU law can be modified while retaining the benefit of that principle, and to clarify in what circumstances the modification of pre-exit domestic law would be such as to turn it into post-exit domestic law that is no longer vulnerable to the operation of the ‘supremacy principle’”.


We chose not to go down that road or try to define it because it seemed an extremely bad situation to get into. One other problem that I will add to the list so well adumbrated by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, occurs in paragraph 87 of the report, which points out that Clause 5 would also need to be amended,

“to provide courts … with suitable guidance for the purpose of determining whether a rule of the common law should be taken to have been ‘made’ before or after exit”.

If that is not done then the procedure that the Government have chosen will yet again promote and continue uncertainty. In both cases it would be better to go for some version of what the committee proposed.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Beith Excerpts

Committee: 4th sitting (Hansard - continued): House of Lords
Monday 5th March 2018 Lords Chamber

[The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Keen of Elie) (Con)]

My Lords, I thank noble Lords for their brevity.

Amendment 40ZA, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, seeks to ensure that challenges to validity could continue on general principles of EU law grounds. I will address concerns raised on general principles in more detail later. First, Schedule 1 generally ends the ability to bring challenges on validity grounds to what will become retained EU law after we leave the EU. We recognise, however, that in some circumstances, individuals and businesses may be individually affected by an EU instrument. For example, a decision of an EU institution or body may be addressed directly to an individual or business. After exit, they would continue to be able to challenge such decisions—in so far as they apply in the EU—before the CJEU, and to have them annulled. Of course, the converted form of the decision would however remain in force within the UK as retained EU law.

The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, asked whether paragraph 1 of Schedule 1 would, after exit day, prevent a challenge to a provision of retained EU law by reference to common-law principles. I understand that the answer is no, it would not, and it is not intended to do so. I hope that that meets the position that he raised with me a moment ago.

Domestic courts currently have no jurisdiction to annul an EU measure or declare it invalid, and we do not believe it would be right to hand them a new jurisdiction which asks them effectively to assume the role of the CJEU in this context. This amendment would effectively ask our courts to consider whether the EU acted incompatibly with the general principles when it made an EU instrument. Generally speaking, this is a function that we do not consider it appropriate to confer on domestic courts.

Therefore, although I appreciate the points raised by the noble Baroness, the amendment would undermine the Government’s stated policy of a clear exclusion of both validity challenges and general principle challenges provided for within Schedule 1. However, we recognise that there might be some limited circumstances in which it would be sensible to maintain the ability to challenge retained EU law on validity grounds. The Bill therefore contains a power set out in paragraph 1(2)(b) of Schedule 1, to which the noble Baroness alluded, which would enable the Minister to make regulations providing for a right of challenge in domestic law to the validity of retained EU law in specified circumstances.

Sub-paragraph (3) sets out that those regulations may provide that a challenge which would previously have proceeded against an EU institution may, after exit, proceed against a UK public authority, because of course there would be no EU institution against which it could be directed. I seek to reassure the noble Baroness that the word “may” is there as a precautionary term lest, in the context of trying to make such a regulatory power, it be perceived that there is no easily identifiable body against which the matter can be directed. However, the intent is that it should be possible to proceed against a public body in those circumstances.

[Lord Beith (LD)]

Can the noble and learned Lord envisage the circumstances in which such regulations would be made? Will Ministers have to decide between now and exit day a category of matters for which such regulation is to be provided, or are we to await a case coming up which ought to have been the subject of regulations which are then made? That surely cannot be possible.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

With respect, it is a precautionary power and it is intended that, where the circumstances arise, the Minister will address himself to those circumstances and contemplate the making of appropriate regulations.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Beith Excerpts

Committee: 3rd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 28th February 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Beith (LD)]

My Lords, I speak as a member of the Constitution Committee to make it clear that the committee would say that the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, has spoken very lucidly for it in setting out the amendment. We are talking about provisions in Acts of Parliament—the Equality Act is one example—that implement EU obligations and would not be repealed by withdrawal or by the repeal of the European Communities Act. Yet Clause 2 opens up to the process of repeal and modification by statutory instrument provisions in UK statutes and in the legislation of the Scottish and Welsh Parliaments. These are provisions in law that are not nullified or made inoperative by the act of withdrawal; they would stay on the statute book. Of course, the legislation may contain features that do not of necessity arise from the requirements of EU directives or other EU obligations. We talk much about British gold-plating of EU measures. We will probably find in a number of measures which this clause would draw in features which were clearly not within the scope of the requirement placed on us by our membership of the European Union. The committee concluded:

“The effect is to inflate the range of domestic law—including primary legislation—in relation to which the ministerial “correction” powers … can be exercised”.


These are powers the extent and scope of which are extremely worrying to the committee.

As the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, said, the Bingham Centre has produced a helpful analysis of many of the things that the committee was concerned about. In almost all cases, it agrees with the committee’s analysis, but, in some, it does not agree with the committee’s proposed remedies. In this case, it suggests that if we go down the route proposed by Amendment 15, there should be an amendment to Clause 6 to make it clear that provisions in EU case law should be taken into account when interpreting EU-derived law which is already on the statute book. The logic is that it is far better that the law is in only one place rather than in two, but we would not want by that means to take away from the court the opportunity to take into account EU-derived case law prior to our withdrawal from the EU, if it ever happens.

The committee is on to an important point. I hope that we can explore as a result of this short debate ways of dealing with it.

[Baroness Taylor of Bolton (Lab)]

My Lords, while I do not want this section of the debate to be dominated by members of the Constitution Committee, I should congratulate my noble friend Lord Pannick on the way he presented the amendment despite it certainly not being in the interest of the legal profession—if we manage to get legal certainty in the Bill, the lawyers will not have their field day. However, I fear that, unless we achieve legal certainty and the clarity that my noble friend mentioned, we will be in real difficulty. Our committee has put forward suggestions, but we do not think that they are the only ways forward. It is important at this stage that the Government recognise the extent of the problem and the damage that will be done if we do not have some amendment and some concessions from them in this area. It is of course an area linked to the other parts of the Bill, because, unless we make changes here, the powers that the Government will have under Clause 7 will be completely unacceptable because of the breadth of legislation there captured.

I therefore urge the Minister to reflect carefully not only on the suggestions of the Constitution Committee but on those of others outside, because this problem will dog the Bill for ever if we do not make some changes here.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Beith Excerpts

Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard - continued): House of Lords
Monday 26th February 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I must compliment the noble and learned Lord on his second sight. As I was about to say, the next argument put to us is that if we say that the charter is not adding anything, what is the problem with keeping it? I hope that is a fair summary of the noble and learned Lord’s intervention. With respect, this argument simply fails to take account of how the charter applies at present. The charter and the rights that it reaffirmed have a limited application. They apply to the EU institutions all of the time, but apply only to member states acting within the scope of EU law. We will no longer be a member state and so we will be no longer be acting within the scope of EU law. Simply retaining the charter would not reflect the realities of leaving the EU. It cannot be right that a document called the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union could continue to be used as the justification to bring cases that would lead ultimately to the striking down of UK primary legislation after we leave the EU. Outside our membership of the EU, it is simply not appropriate to retain the charter.

There are also practical questions to consider. It would be no simple matter to say that we are keeping the charter. The amendments in this group all attempt, in various ways, to solve the riddle of how an instrument inherently linked to and constrained by our membership of the EU could apply purely domestically. They each highlight the complexity involved in such an exercise.

In Amendment 13A, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, requires the Government to lay a report on how the charter will continue to apply to retained EU law after we leave the EU. However, his other amendments are far from clear on precisely how he intends the charter to have effect domestically after exit. They would remove the exclusion of the charter provided for in Clause 5, presumably with the intention that it would now form part of retained EU law. I note that one of his amendments would excise the definition of what the charter is from the Bill, despite going on to say that this undefined, unclear thing will continue to have effect in relation to retained EU law under Clauses 2, 3 and 4. What would our courts make of that? Many articles of the charter set out principles, not rights, which can be relied on directly by individuals. How would these have effect after exit? Eight articles of the charter constitute rights intrinsically linked to EU citizenship—for example, the right to vote in an EU parliamentary election. Of course, they claw at the air—we appreciate that—but they do nothing.

Let us pause again on the fact that the charter applies to member states only when acting within the scope of EU law. Presumably, if retained under the Bill, the charter would then apply only when we were acting within the scope of retained EU law, which I believe is the elaboration that the noble and learned Lord made in response to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood. Over time, our domestic law will evolve and new laws will be made by this sovereign Parliament and the devolved legislatures that will start to replace and supersede this category of retained EU law. We would be retaining the charter, in whatever capacity the noble and learned Lord intends, only for an ever-diminishing proportion of our law. This further risks incorporating complexity and confusion into our domestic statute book.

We should not overstate the accessibility of the current rights regime, which relies on citizens knowing—

[Lord Beith (LD)]

The noble and learned Lord is right in that assertion, but it does not follow that retained European law should not be read across in the form of the charter as well as its other features on exit day. Lots of things will change over time. Parliament will no doubt amend retained European law so that it ceases to be retained European law, but the Bill is about legal continuity and what the situation is on exit day. For this purpose, surely the Minister should accept what is being proposed.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I entirely agree with the noble Lord as to what this Bill is about. With regard to the charter, the point is that it does not bring anything over on its own. We already have these rights and obligations, as established by the principles of EU law, convention law and the common law.

As to a concern that something is omitted at the end of the day, as I indicated, we would address that to ensure that all rights are brought across. However, with great respect to the noble Lord, Lord Cashman, I do not believe that you can never have too many belts and braces. If you have too many belts and braces, eventually you cannot stand up. It is therefore important that we approach this issue with a degree of proportionality, if I may use a European term.

Following on from the point I made earlier, retaining the charter for what will become a fluid and changing category of law risks legislatively binding us to a document that would bring the illusion of clarity in the short term but serve only to undermine it in the longer term. Indeed, the other amendments in this group raise similar issues to those put forward by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith.

My noble friend Lord Hailsham has tabled amendments that seek to build on the amendments put forward by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith. They seek to assign the status of primary legislation to the European Charter of Fundamental Rights. For reasons that we will go into in a later group, the Government believe that the question of assigning status to retained EU law is complex and should be approached with caution. I hope that we can come back to this question when we have concluded our debate on the approach to rights protection and to status more generally. I will not seek to take up time on that issue at this stage.

I suspect that the amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, would also add to the confusion. Seeking to afford charter rights the same level of protection as convention rights under the Human Rights Act 1998 is fraught with difficulty. Charter rights do not correspond exactly to ECHR rights and apply in different ways. The charter also contains non-justiciable principles as well as rights, and it is unclear what status these would have in domestic law under his amendment. Moreover, it does not deal with how explanations to the charter articles should be treated or how certain sections of the Human Rights Act would apply to charter rights. I appreciate that we are in Committee and that the noble Lord is entitled to say that he will look more carefully at the form of the amendment and perhaps elaborate upon it in due course, but there are fundamental difficulties with the approach he is attempting to take in simply trying to incorporate the charter when, as indeed the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, himself observed, the expression of rights in the charter does not coincide precisely with the expression of rights in the convention.

I would like to emphasise again that we remain committed to listening to this House and indeed to working constructively to ensure that we have a functioning statute book which maximises legal certainty. I understand the concerns expressed by some about whether some rights would somehow be left behind, but if we can and do identify a risk of such rights being left behind, we are entirely open to the proposition that we have to address that by way of amendment to the Bill, and we will seek to do that. I wish to reassure noble Lords on that point.

Legal System: Prosecutorial Policy

Lord Beith Excerpts

Thursday 18th January 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Beith (LD)]

My Lords, I am delighted to follow the noble and learned Lord, Lord Morris, and appreciate his wisdom in bringing this matter before the House—although I am slightly embarrassed to be sandwiched between two such experienced practitioners as the noble and learned Lord and the former Lord Chief Justice, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas. I will refer briefly to each of the three propositions that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Morris, set out in the Question he put before the House.

Does the system do justice to alleged victims? There are many ways in which it does not, but I ask, in particular: is there is a danger that not all the cases which could meet the evidence test are taken to trial because of the pressure on police or CPS resources, or perhaps because there is a wish for the trial and the prosecution case to be manageable in court and capable of being absorbed during the process of a jury trial? If that happens, for example, in a case of rape or serious sexual assault, does that lead, possibly, to a lesser sentence than might otherwise have been passed and create the situation that we have seen in the Worboys case? That is the first question that I want the Minister to reflect on.

The second question is: does the failure to meet disclosure requirements harm defendants and, in some cases, victims? Certainly it harms defendants—recent cases have given vivid illustration of that. Defendants have often spent a long period on police bail, during which their reputation and their standing in the community have been severely damaged if not totally destroyed, for a case which does not in the end come to trial or which collapses in court because disclosure requirements have not been met. Of course, it can cause harm to victims as well, partly because it discourages them from coming forward when they see collapsed cases, and perhaps in some cases because matters which might have convinced the jury of guilt do not go forward because failure to disclose has wrecked the trial by that point.

The inspectorate report to which the noble and learned Lord, Lord Morris, referred was absolutely scathing. It said:

“The inspection found that police scheduling (the process of recording details of both sensitive and non-sensitive material) is routinely poor, while revelation by the police to the prosecutor of material that may undermine the prosecution case or assist the defence case is rare”.


The auditing process was criticised with the comment that it was,

“likely to reflect badly on the criminal justice system in the eyes of victims and witnesses”.

I recently had the experience of doing five weeks on a jury at the Old Bailey. One thing I took away from that was a realisation—that no amount of evidence given to the Justice Committee had fully persuaded me of—of the sheer scale of the disclosure requirements when faced with social media, CCTV, number plate recognition and all the other technical aids which have been so important and, indeed, so valuable in demonstrating guilt in many cases. The quantities of material involved, and the police time taken up before and during the court proceedings, are enormous requirements. They magnify massively the disclosure requirements and the means necessary to achieve what we all seek: namely, the proper and timely disclosure of exculpatory material to the defence. This scale of material clearly calls for a fundamental revision of how disclosure is managed. I hope, again, that the Minister has been reflecting on that in the light of recent cases.

That brings me to the third leg of the question: the relationship between the police and the Crown Prosecution Service. The CPS might well be expected to play a bigger part in trying to make sure that the police do what they need to do—ensure that potentially exculpatory material is found—and that in general this mass of material is properly used.

The relationship between the police and the Crown Prosecution Service is closer than it used to be, with more pre-charge advice. There was quite a movement in that direction a few years ago, which included trying to co-locate the CPS with the police, although I detect a slight pulling back from that because of the fear that the independence of each side could be jeopardised in some way. In this respect I would like the Minister to reflect, with his own considerable knowledge, on whether there are advantages in the system in Scotland, and in some other European countries, or whether those systems pay too high a price in terms of the independence of the prosecutor from the police and vice versa. In Scotland the procurator fiscal and Crown counsel are in a position to direct police inquiries, which is not the case in England. Is the price paid for that the diminution of the respective independence of the two bodies, or is it something we ought to look at? Would it be helpful in trying to ensure that the kind of machinery we now need to handle these disclosure issues is put in place in police forces and integrated with the Crown Prosecution Service?

All this has massive resource implications and we cannot simply run away from them. The fact that we now have a wide range of material that can demonstrate either guilt or innocence—and is very important in doing so—is something we neither can nor want to change. However, it places much heavier requirements on the system, and I would be grateful for the Minister’s reflections on how that can be dealt with.

Transparency of the Parole Board and Victim Support

Lord Beith Excerpts

Tuesday 9th January 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I note what the noble Baroness has said, and I quite understand the basis on which she expresses these views. As I have already said, there is a question about the discretionary contact where a case has not actually been prosecuted. Clearly, we must have that in mind when we take the question of the VCS forward. As I observed earlier, it would not be appropriate for me at this stage to set out the parameters of a review that is under contemplation at present.

[Lord Beith (LD)]

When cases show a pattern of serial and prolific offending, ought it not to be considered by the prosecution service that how many cases to prosecute should not be unduly restrained by either CPS resources or court resources, because of the effect that may have on the sentencing?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I do not understand that they are ever determined by reference to court resources at all. The CPS has to make an independent judgment on these matters. It applies its evidential tests to the complaints that are brought before it by the police, to determine whether or not the prosecution should appropriately be taken forward. One has to acknowledge that there are cases when victims come forward, and yet, because of the particular circumstances, it is not possible for the CPS to determine that the evidential test has been met.

Probation Service

Lord Beith Excerpts

Thursday 14th December 2017 Lords Chamber

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, I endorse entirely the observations made by the noble Lord. It is for the courts to impose programme requirements as part of the community or suspended sentences orders that they make. Clearly, we have to ensure that they continue to have faith in the system when they are making those orders.

[Lord Beith (LD)]

My Lords, surely the case is overwhelming for a careful review of what the Government were warned about by the House of Commons Justice Committee and others: not providing the resources for Through the Gate supervision of prisoners, which was the purpose of the reform, would ensure that it would fail. Given that the structure has not worked either because, as the Minister has indicated, far more people have been referred to the National Probation Service because of the level of their offence, it is surely time to review the operation of the scheme.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, we do not consider that a root-and-branch analysis or going back to the drawing board is required at this time. However, we are taking active steps to address the very point that the noble Lord raises. Indeed, we are paying CRCs significantly more in the way of funding to ensure that they can deliver the services required, including, critically, Through the Gate services.

Scotland Act 1998 (Specification of Devolved Tax) (Wild Fisheries) Order 2017

Lord Beith Excerpts

Wednesday 29th November 2017 Grand Committee

[Lord Steel of Aikwood (LD)]

My Lords, I suppose I should begin, like everybody else, by sucking up to the Deputy Chairman and the Minister and saying how pleasant it is to be here with them. I do not remember this ever happening in this Room before, but the House of Lords exists to be pleasant and I am delighted to join in welcoming them here. In fact, a few moments ago the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, made a quite gratuitous and kindly reference to me, no doubt anticipating that I might give him support if there were a vote. In fact, I would not have done, but nevertheless the atmosphere of pleasantry is something I am happy to continue.

I have a purely personal interest in this matter, in that I fish occasionally on the Tweed and more regularly on a loch in the Scottish Borders, which I will return to in a moment. I think the Minister will agree that this order is somewhat unusual in that it is predicated on a Scottish Parliament Bill that we have not yet seen. That makes it a little difficult to understand but none the less, in principle, we will support it. That is presumably why the Sewel convention does not apply in this case, because it is bestowing more powers on the Scottish Parliament under the Scotland Act. Like the noble Lord, Lord McAvoy, I would like to hear a little more about the consultation that the Minister has had with colleagues in the Scottish Government about how this is going to operate.

I have two questions about the order. The first relates to the amendment of Chapter 7 of the Scotland Act, on page 2 of the order. It states:

“This subsection applies to taxes on the … occupiers ... of the right to fish in wild fisheries”.


I operate a syndicate on a loch in the Scottish Borders. One of the members of the syndicate is the former sheriff, who will certainly be breathing down my neck if we do not get this right. Does that mean that when I pay, as I do, a handsome sum to His Grace the Duke of Buccleuch for the right to fish on his loch, that makes me an occupier of the right to fish in the waters? In other words, am I, in supporting this order, liable to find myself subject to taxation in future?

My second question is one that I anticipate my noble friend Lord Beith is about to ask. Fisheries in Scotland are governed under legislation that was passed way back in the 1950s. In the case of the Tweed, Scottish legislation covers the south bank; in other words, people operating in England are subject to Scots law in this peculiar circumstance. I wonder whether this order applies to them as well.

[Lord Beith (LD)]

My Lords, my noble friend did not realise quite how far the provision he has just cited extends. Legislation, particularly the Scotland Act 1998 (River Tweed) Order 2006, embraces the whole of the Tweed district, which includes all the tributaries of the Tweed and tributaries of the rivers which are tributaries of the Tweed, whether they are in England or Scotland. Of course, many of them are in England, such as the Till, for example. The Tweed river system has always been managed as a single system, which makes a great deal of sense. It would be odd to do it otherwise.

However, there are some problems inherent in this, as there were in the 2006 order. The Minister said that the Bill will not affect other parts of the United Kingdom—I hope I am not quoting him wrongly. If that is the case, it will be an interesting reversion to the previous way of legislating in this area. My initial assumption was that this order might affect all the tributaries of the Tweed. The basic question is: can somebody have a fine or levy placed upon them by the Scottish Government when they are not only resident in England but the activity to which the levy relates is wholly in England? Can someone who is the owner or occupier of a fishing right on, say, the Till, be required to pay a levy by the Scottish Government?

There may be a perfectly good case for them being required to pay that levy, but if there is, that surely should be a decision on which the United Kingdom Parliament—the only Parliament which represents England—should continue to have a say in future. It seems constitutionally repugnant for the Scottish Parliament to be able to pass laws or impose levies in England, just as it would be repugnant now under devolution to do the reverse in this area. That is what I would like clarification on as I think something of a wrong turning was taken in the 2006 order, and I do not want to see it repeated in subsequent orders, such as the one we are considering today.

[Lord Foulkes of Cumnock (Lab)]

My Lords, the Minister will be pleased to hear I have nothing to say on this subject.

[Lord Duncan of Springbank]

I thought the last order was complicated. I will try to do justice to the questions. I welcome the support of the noble Lord, Lord McAvoy, and others. The noble Lord rightly asked what consultation has been undertaken. There has been significant collaboration between the UK and Scottish Governments over the impetus behind this approach. Noble Lords are right to note that there is no Bill as yet, but the argument underpinning this approach is that in due course there will be. This is in anticipation of that. We have international obligations on behalf of the salmon in a river, which the UK Government are taking very seriously. The recognition here is that the administration of that will rest with the Scottish Government in this instance. We will continue to ensure the outcome of that management is carefully considered so that we can move forward.

The noble Lord, Lord Steel, also asked about consultation. I hope my response answers his question. He asked whether he will be paying the tax, or whether the Duke of Buccleuch is the individual. Helpfully, I have the answer to that, I believe, on two pieces of paper. No, the Scottish Government do not intend to change the existing process to collect the salmon levy locally. The Scottish Government have ruled out the introduction of other taxes. However, these powers will future-proof wild fisheries management, ensuring that Scottish Ministers have the levers at their disposal should new evidence or circumstances merit the introduction of new taxes on the users, such as through a rod licence. The answer is no at the moment, but if a rod licence comes in it will be yes. I hope the noble Lord is okay so far.

The noble Lord, Lord Beith, asked quite a detailed and important question. I remember many years ago when I was a geography student that one of the big challenges was to try to determine exactly where tributaries were because it depends on the season, the rain and so on. Scottish legislation will be subject to the rules of legislative competence in Section 29(2)(a) of the Scotland Act, so English fisheries cannot be taxed. I think that answers his question quite clearly.

[Lord Beith]

Yes.

[Lord Duncan of Springbank]

That is very helpful. I thank my team very much; that was exactly the answer I was looking for in that instance. Good.

The noble Earl, Lord Cork and Orrery, asked an important question as well. The answer to where the money will be spent is that the salmon levies will be utilised in the district in which they are raised. I hope that gives some comfort to him in that regard.

I think those are the answers to the questions noble Lords posed. I hope that that is satisfactory.

Prisons: Safety and Security

Lord Beith Excerpts

Wednesday 21st December 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Beith (LD)]

Will Ministers address the urgent need to deal with the release of IPP prisoners who are beyond their tariff? What use is being made of the reserve list, which Mr Grayling set up in 2014 when he was Secretary of State, of former prison officers and others who could be called in during situations such as this?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I am obliged to the noble Lord. Public protection remains a key priority in the context of how we deal with IPP prisoners. These people have been sentenced for offences involving serious violence and serious sexual crime. We set up a new unit within the Ministry of Justice to tackle the backlog with respect to IPP prisoners and we are working with the Parole Board to improve the efficiency of that process. We have an enhanced case-management system. We are diverting recall cases away from the Parole Board so that it can focus on reviewing IPP prisoners. In the past year, 38% of IPP prisoners who attended oral hearings completed by the Parole Board went on to be released. So matters are improving. Indeed, in the last year we released 512 IPP prisoners from custody—the largest number so far—bringing the total figure below 4,000.