Civil Liability Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Beecham and Lord Hunt of Wirral

Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 15th May 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hunt of Wirral (Con)]

My Lords, I declare my interest as set out in the register, particularly as a partner in the global commercial law firm DAC Beachcroft. I completely agree with the words of the noble Earl. I understand that it is a favourite expression of officials in the Ministry of Justice that they are proceeding “at pace”. This group of amendments and the important concept of a shadow process prior to Royal Assent at Amendment 89, which we will look at a little later, give the Minister a range of options from which to choose to demonstrate that he intends to do just that.

I will focus on and entirely support Amendments 58 and 94. The Bill allows a number of different periods, which could lead to delay. The amendments ask the Minister to consider better and more rigorous options. The idea of any delay between Royal Assent and commencement is of particular concern because it is open-ended and uncontrolled. As has been mentioned, in his letter of 30 April to noble Lords the Minister suggests that a period of two months may be needed, but there is no indication why. No regulations are needed. The decisions that need to be made to constitute the expert panel, as just mentioned by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, are obvious ones, and even if they have not been made already, the Minister still has a few months before Royal Assent in which to consider them.

My concern is that there is nothing to keep it to two months; it could turn into two years or more. I recall that the Third Parties (Rights against Insurers) Act 2010 was an uncontroversial statute, so much so that it was first considered in this House under the accelerated procedures for Bills proposed by the Law Commission, and indeed I participated in those debates. It received Royal Assent on 25 March 2010 but was not brought into force until 1 August 2016, more than six years later. I am sure that that will not happen in this case, but it is an example of how open-ended periods can give rise to all sorts of uncertainty and problems.

I am personally attracted to the idea of removing any possible delay between Royal Assent and commencement or between the commencement of Part 2 and the start of the first review. I therefore earnestly encourage the Minister to find a way of accepting these two amendments.

[Lord Beecham]

My Lords, I simply wish to confirm that we on this side agree with what noble Lords have suggested, so the quicker we can get things moving, the better for everyone.

Deregulation Bill

Debate between Lord Beecham and Lord Hunt of Wirral

Tuesday 3rd February 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hunt of Wirral (Con)]

My Lords, I declare my interest as vice-chair of the All-Party Parliamentary Group on Equalities and the other interests recorded in the register. I am sure that the whole House will join the noble Lord, Lord Low of Dalston, in sending our very best wishes to my noble friend Lord Lester of Herne Hill as he recovers from surgery. My thanks are redoubled because my participation in this debate was demanded by my noble friend, who pointed out to me what I had said in the debate on the Equality Bill in 2010. Some of your Lordships may wish that their words were not so remembered, but the encyclopaedic mind of my noble friend Lord Lester suddenly pointed out to me—in these words, I think—that, “Our Government are doing something the opposite of which you argued so forcefully in 2010”. He reminded me that I had urged then that,

“not only should due regard be paid to eliminating discrimination but that there should be a much more proactive element”.—[Official Report, 27/1/10; col. 1492.]

I spoke on what is now section 124 of the Equality Act 2010, when, as shadow Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, I pointed out the deficiencies in the then clause.

In many ways, the noble Lord, Lord Low of Dalston, has just repeated what I felt was a brilliant summary of the criticism of Clause 124, expressed by both government and business representatives. He gave four telling points. Against that background, I can well understand why my noble friend wishes to remove the power of employment tribunals to make recommendations to employers and other respondents in cases where there has been a finding of unlawful discrimination, harassment or victimisation but where the claimant no longer works for the employer.

There is a better way, which I tried to suggest at the time to the Labour Government, but, sadly, they refused to listen on that occasion; I hope that the Opposition are listening carefully now. We need to retain but clarify the power in Section 124. I very much hope that noble Lords will agree that there is a need for reform rather than abolition. Those are the circumstances in which I put my name to the amendment tabled by my noble friend Lord Lester of Herne Hill.

There are, however, problems. Undoubtedly, this was discovered by the then Labour Government. I think that the noble Baroness, Lady Royall, dealt with the matter from the Government Benches at that stage. As the equality and diversity commission has pointed out, this amendment could lead to a tribunal having to hear additional evidence and argument in order to decide whether the adverse effect of the discrimination on those other than the employee bringing the case was serious. I have no wish to cause such complications.

My noble friend has already proved himself to be so amenable that I think that the noble Lord, Lord McKenzie, has gone away to recover, as I cannot see him in the Chamber. My noble friend, assisted by the clerks—who I hope might assist us once again—bent over backwards in trying to find out how Section 124 could be further improved, particularly to avoid the risk I mentioned and to address the criticisms—those four key issues—which have been so clearly set out. The noble Lord, Lord Low of Dalston, sought to deal with them, but the criticisms remain. They concern the way in which the wider recommendations power has been used to date and its effect on businesses. One way to tackle the issue would be to limit the power of the tribunal so that it cannot recommend a respondent to take steps which are disproportionate. The commission has suggested that that might be a way forward. It also recommends that Section 124 be improved by making a failure to comply without reasonable excuse an unlawful act for the purposes of the Equality Act 2006.

In previous debates, I have urged that a clear enforcement mechanism should be introduced. I repeat what I said in the Chamber on a previous occasion, as these words were repeated to me by the noble Lord, Lord Lester. Speaking from the Conservative Benches, I said:

“Of course we believe that the provisions must be enforceable. If an organisation has been acting illegally and subverting the equality provisions, it should have to obey the recommendations”.—[Official Report, 27/1/2010; col. 1470.]

Of course, the Government did not pay attention. The noble Baroness, Lady Royall, said that it would be inappropriate to introduce enforcement powers. However, we have to think about introducing to or leaving on the statute book a power with no enforcement mechanism at all. I hope, therefore, that my noble friend will come forward with the answer. I can hardly wait to hear his speech.

[Lord Beecham (Lab)]

My Lords, first, I endorse very warmly the amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Low, and supported by the noble Lord, Lord Hunt. They make a powerful case. I hope that, after also hearing from my noble friend Lady Thornton, the Minister will be persuaded to give some ground, as what they say is very compelling indeed. However, this may be a little academic given the fact that there has been an 80% reduction in the number of cases brought to employment tribunals since the charges were imposed by the Government last year. It seems to me that we are seeing the whole system being rather rapidly eroded. I hope that the Minister, in reporting back to his colleagues about the outcome of this debate, whatever it may be, will invite them to look again at the status of employment tribunals, and the great reduction in cases being brought, to see whether they intend to allow this nearly 50 year-old provision to wither on the vine, because that is the impression that is being widely—and, I think, rightly—inferred from the history of what has happened over the past year or 18 months.

Social Action, Responsibility and Heroism Bill

Debate between Lord Beecham and Lord Hunt of Wirral

Tuesday 6th January 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hunt of Wirral (Con)]

My Lords, I declare my interest as a partner in the global commercial law firm DAC Beachcroft and refer to my other interests in the register.

However, for the purpose of this short debate I add that I have just this morning returned from an expedition to Antarctica, where I must say my boundaries were severely tested. I found myself in the company of adventurers, and I have to tell the Minister that they greeted the Bill with enthusiasm. They took the view that we have achieved the wrong balance, with too much emphasis on health and safety, which, sadly, has led to the cancellation of a lot of trips similar to the one that I went on—I now hold an award and a certificate for following in the steps of Roald Amundsen. I did not go quite as far as he did, but I feel that I have seen the effect of taking risks on the development of one’s own personality and abilities. Younger people certainly benefit from those boundaries being tested. Therefore I bring to the Minister unbridled enthusiasm for the Bill and a slight questioning of why senior lawyers have found fault with it so much.

I speak from my own experience, having dealt with the Compensation Bill, which is generally accepted as a good Bill. At the time, it came under severe attack from some of the most senior lawyers in this House, who tried to explain that it did not add anything and that it should all be left to the judges. They asked why on earth we were repeating the judgment of the very senior noble and learned Lord, Lord Scott of Foscote, who set out the position very clearly indeed, which we repeated in Clause 1 of the Compensation Act 2006. But the general view is that that has done a great deal to calm people down and to stop the cancellation of a lot of adventure holidays.

Finally, I say to my noble friend the Minister how pleased I am that he has decided to delete the word “generally” and insert the word “predominantly”. I thought about all sorts of other words that could be used, as he may have guessed, but I think that the word “predominantly”—for someone to have to demonstrate “a predominantly responsible approach towards protecting the safety or other interests of others”—really clarifies the position brilliantly. I am very grateful to my noble friend for proposing that amendment today.

All that I will say to the other lawyers in the House, who are far more senior than I could ever aspire to be, although I have been in the same firm now for 50 years, is that I bow to their judgments—indeed, I have to observe them and listen to them on many occasions. However, I question for a moment whether it might not be more acceptable for the House to recognise that this Bill will do much to further the opportunities, particularly for younger people, to take the sort of risks that perhaps at my age I should never even have dreamt of, such as traversing the crevasses that I did over the weekend. I think that it did me a lot of good and will do them a lot of good, too.

[Lord Beecham (Lab)]

My Lords, I was anticipating that the Minister would now move his amendment, but perhaps in the circumstances it would be sensible if I spoke from the Opposition Front Bench.

The literary world is familiar with the concept of vanity publishing; this Bill is an example of its parliamentary equivalent, vanity legislation. Clause 3, with or without the government amendment, or that of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, is the only clause that even purports to effect a change in the law—and that, in the words of Shakespeare’s Richard III, whose subject Ministers, and this Minister in particular, have so frequently prayed in aid, in a manner so “lamely and unfashionable” as to make it worse, not better.

It is noteworthy that, time and again, as this essentially trivial measure has made its way through both Houses, Ministers have harped on the alleged need, in the words of the Minister at Report,

“to provide reassurance to ordinary, hard-working people who have adopted such an approach towards the safety or other interests of others during the course of an activity, that the courts will always take this into account in the event that something goes wrong and they are sued”.

In a remarkable non sequitur, the Minister went on to express the hope that,

“this will also give them greater confidence in standing up to those who try to bring opportunistic and speculative claims by showing them that the law is on their side”.—[Official Report, 15/12/14; col. 34.]

That is a reference to the dreaded compensation culture which apparently haunts the sleepless nights of Ministers, potential defendants and their insurers—and now, we understand, possibly penguins in the Antarctic—but whose actual existence is more imaginary, in terms of cases brought, than real.

Social Action, Responsibility and Heroism Bill

Debate between Lord Beecham and Lord Hunt of Wirral

Tuesday 18th November 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Beecham (Lab)]

I have to say that I have no great expectations in that regard.

[Lord Hunt of Wirral]

I should stop now. However, I want to stress here that we are not talking about Fagin-type organised crime or Bill Sikes’s opportunist crime, but about the inflation of otherwise genuine claims. It has become a huge industry and insurers are now being forced to spend millions of pounds to tackle it. Organised gangs are at the heart of the increase in the number of these induced accidents. “Crash for cash” not only threatens motorists’ safety but also their pockets. It is estimated that it adds about £400 million to the annual cost of car insurance.

It has become an unfortunate fact that as a society we are faced with so many whiplash claims. It would be easy just to blame the claims farmers, and the House has heard my views on them before. However, despite a series of measures, often encouraged in this House, they continue to proliferate. They plague us with nuisance calls and texts about injury claims from accidents in which we have never been involved and that we have never heard of.

On the subject of nuisance calls, although I welcome the recent consultation by the Department for Culture, Media and Sport, I believe that the current threshold of substantial damage or distress is just too high and that the Information Commissioner’s Office needs to lower the test to ensure that it can tackle more effectively those who are abusing the system and bombarding the British public. I beg to move.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Hunt of Wirral]

My Lords, I am very grateful to all those who have spoken in this debate. I am only comforted by the fact that the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, had rather made up his mind before he heard my speech, because I referred to a number of issues which—I hope—cause him considerable concern. I commend the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Walton of Detchant, because there is a serious problem here and we cannot ignore it.

I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, for his kind remarks at the outset of his speech. I readily accept his acknowledgement that there is a problem here. He may or may not recall—but I know that the noble Lord, Lord McKenzie, behind him, will—that the previous Government attempted to introduce a scheme of rehabilitation rather than cash in employers’ liability claims. It was Jane Kennedy, the Minister, who proposed that. Sadly, although I supported it strongly, it did not succeed at the time. The pilot scheme was rejected but I hope that this House will return to the issue of rehabilitation because we have to make sure that people get the treatment they need. I was taught that at the outset, when I had the honour to become solicitor for the Transport and General Workers’ Union. I became one of the legendary Mr Albert Blyghton’s solicitors, and we constantly strived to get employers to introduce a better system of rehabilitation. I am not sure that we have reached that stage yet.

[Lord Beecham]

I was also one Mr Albert Blyghton’s solicitors.

[Lord Beecham]

That is about right. I am sure that the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, and I, when representing members of that trade union in their claims, would have sought rehabilitation but we would also have sought proper compensation for the injuries that they suffered. The two things are not necessarily in conflict but I would not like to see rehabilitation to the exclusion of proper compensation in the appropriate case.

[Lord Hunt of Wirral]

In the appropriate case. I hope that the noble Lord will not mind if I look for agreement in his disagreement. However, there is a general view that we cannot go on like this, and I am pleased in particular with the words of my noble friend the Minister. I will go away and ponder carefully the various ideas he put forward on tackling a menace to society. It is harassing a substantial number of people, which is why I want to return to this subject at a later stage but, in the mean time, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Hunt of Wirral]

My Lords, I am very grateful to my noble friend Lord Hodgson for his support. I say to the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, that I should like to return to this subject again at a later stage. In the mean time, if he could reflect on the case of Wilkinson v City of York Council, he would understand that I am not seeking to achieve what he described. I seek merely to respond to the words of the Court of Appeal in that case. I will not go into too much detail, but he will see what I mean if I quote just one sentence:

“A judge, it seems to me, should be slow to reject the evidence given by a responsible council official that resources did not permit a more frequent inspection than that which was given”.

The conclusion in that case was that, whereas the question of manpower resources was able to be considered in relation to other sections in the Highways Act, the particular section—Section 58—did not make reference to this shortage of resources as a factor to be taken into account. Therefore, the Court of Appeal concluded that Parliament had not wanted it to be a relevant factor. I therefore hope that the noble Lord will see that I am seeking to meet a particular problem in a specific way.

[Lord Beecham]

I understand the point that the noble Lord is making, and I will certainly look at that case. However, his amendment does not seem to be confined to that particular issue; it would apply much more generally, and I invite him perhaps to consider whether it would be better narrowed to the kind of incidents to which he has referred. Having said that, I do not necessarily pledge myself to support him should he come back with something like that. It seems that the way he has put the matter is rather different from how the amendments as presently drafted would be interpreted.

[Lord Hunt of Wirral]

I am very grateful to the noble Lord, and to the Minister for his comments. I will of course reflect on and consider the points that have been raised. In the mean time, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Beecham]

My Lords, Amendment 6 deals with the provisions of Clause 3, which purports to be—and as I understand it, the Government agree to be—the only substantive change in the law that the Bill promotes. That, of course, raises the question of the relevance of the other clauses of this ephemeral legislative concoction, but it is also unacceptable in itself.

Clause 3 requires the court to,

“have regard to whether the person, in carrying out the activity in the course of which the alleged negligence or breach of statutory duty occurred, demonstrated a generally responsible approach towards protecting the safety or other interests of others”.

At Second Reading I asked what was meant by a “generally responsible” approach. The Minister did not vouchsafe a reply. I do not blame him. The Lord Chancellor and the Minister in the Commons were unable to supply a meaningful interpretation: a case of the inscrutable in search of the unintelligible, or perhaps vice versa.

The Government’s obsession with the so-called compensation culture was reflected in the Lord Chancellor’s response to an Oral Question quoted by the Joint Committee on Human Rights at paragraph 2.35 of its report. The Lord Chancellor talked of the need,

“to provide a deterrent to an employee who tries it on in the face of a responsible employer who has done the right thing, when someone in their employment has done something stupid and still tries to sue. As part of our long-term economic plan”—

I note in parenthesis that it is a long-term economic plan which appears to be growing ever more long-term by the day—

“I want to see those responsible employers protected against spurious claims, and that is what the Bill will do”.—[Official Report, Commons, 1/7/14; col. 731.]

There are, to put it mildly, several problems with that argument. The first is the sheer paucity of evidence for the existence of the compensation culture, apart perhaps from the road traffic cases of whiplash and the like about which we have heard so much today. The second is the apparent belief that the courts are unable to detect whether or not a claim is spurious, given that a claimant has to prove it. The third is that, despite its apparent belief that the Bill,

“is not designed to reduce standards of health and safety in the workplace”,

and,

“will not protect negligent employers who do not have a responsible approach to health and safety”,

the Joint Committee concluded that:

“To the extent that Clause 3 of the Bill will lead to some health and safety cases against employers being decided differently, we do not consider that the Government has demonstrated the need to change the law to restrict employees’ right of access to court for personal injury in the workplace”.

Can the Minister give an assurance that the Joint Committee’s fears in that respect are misplaced and that the Bill is not intended to and will not affect such health and safety cases? He gave a general assurance this afternoon, for which I am grateful, about claims for employers’ liability. The JCHR raised a specific point in relation to health and safety, and perhaps he will deal with that aspect.

The fourth problem is that the Bill is not, in any event, confined to personal injury cases, and still less to cases brought by employees against their employer, which seemed to be the burden of the Lord Chancellor’s principal concern. Clause 3 refers not just to injury but to safety and “other interests”. It must be taken to include economic interests, such as claims concerning damage to property or professional negligence by, say, an accountant, a financial adviser or, heaven help me, a solicitor. This much was made clear by Mr Vara in his heroic attempts to make the case for this generally irresponsible measure. At column 693 of Hansard he proudly announced:

“We have deliberately drafted the clause broadly ... This ensures that it will be relevant in a wide range of situations … The clause is not restricted to personal injury claims and could in principle be applicable in relation to other instances of negligence, such as damage to property or economic loss, where issues of safety may not necessarily be relevant”.—[Official Report, Commons, 20/10/14; col. 693.]

Presumably, issues of heroism would be equally irrelevant. Note that he assumes that negligence exists in such claims but excuses it in the manner of the old saw about the housemaid’s baby: “It’s only a little one”—a “Downton Abbey” analogy, I suppose. It is a rather curious way to approach legislation.

Perhaps the Minister will tell us the difference between being responsible and being generally responsible, and why the clause extends to a wide variety of claims which have nothing whatever to do with social action, volunteering or heroism. Perhaps he will also comment on the paucity of any evidence provided to the Joint Committee by the Government in answer to its request for examples of what the Lord Chancellor described as,

“a jobsworth culture or a legalistic culture that seems to stop common sense in its tracks”.

It asked for such information but received none. Where, one might ask, is the evidence of a common-sense approach, let alone one grounded in an understanding of the law and the courts that one has the right to expect a Lord Chancellor to display?

The twofold approach that I adopt in moving the amendment and speaking to the clause stand part debate is, first, to endeavour to effect a modest improvement in Clause 3 by removing the word “generally” so that that fairly vague and opaque term disappears; and, secondly, to address the general position in relation to the clause stand part debate—that this is the only substantive change in the Bill, and it is not acceptable. If the Government continue to press for this it will certainly be a matter to which I will return on Report. I hope the Government will concede that it is ill designed and likely to produce effects that are not consistent with the overall theme, however repetitive it might be, of the Compensation Act 2006, and therefore that it contributes nothing but potential difficulty for the future. I beg to move.

[Lord Hunt of Wirral]

My Lords, in drawing attention to Amendment 7, I am returning to the points I referred to earlier. The first part of the amendment reminds the Committee how society as a whole has become a victim of insurance fraud where organised criminals are now manufacturing situations in which innocent motorists are caused to collide with their vehicles in a manner which indicates negligence on the part of the innocent motorist. That is why I wanted to bring this amendment again to the attention of the House.

The second part of the amendment intends once again to remind your Lordships of the importance of non-monetary offers and, where they have been made by defendants, how they should be considered when the courts come to decide whether to award damages and the extent of the damages payable. I know that rehabilitation treatment is often offered to those injured in accidents but in many cases, because of the action of an intermediary, that treatment is often refused by the injured party and the period of suffering prolonged in an attempt to increase the award of damages in which that intermediary may be interested. If the courts were to be permitted to order that the treatment provided by a defendant and his representatives is a fair reward in compensation for the injury suffered, then the motivation of fraudsters to pursue “crash for cash” accidents should be reduced.

Criminal Justice and Courts Bill

Debate between Lord Beecham and Lord Hunt of Wirral

Wednesday 22nd October 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hunt of Wirral]

I am very grateful to my noble friend the Minister.

[Lord Beecham]

I am afraid I cannot beat the brevity of that. I would like a little guidance from the Minister about the nature of the regulation. Can he give any indication of how effective whatever the regulatory body is—I confess that I do not know which it is—in overseeing this practice? I am entirely with the Government in wishing to ensure that such practices are limited as much as possible, for precisely the reasons that were mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, and with which we all concur: the promulgation of false claims, which is wrong in itself and, of course, a drain on the economy generally. I am not clear what the regulatory system currently is, or how effective it is. While supporting the Government’s intentions in the amendment, it would be helpful to have an impression of that.

Criminal Justice and Courts Bill

Debate between Lord Beecham and Lord Hunt of Wirral

Wednesday 23rd July 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hunt of Wirral]

My Lords, I thank my noble friend the Minister, in particular for his generous tribute to the way in which I introduced the amendment. However, I am gravely disappointed by the reaction of the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, whom I have always felt to be my noble friend, in seeking to categorise me in some way. Perhaps I should have declared an interest as a solicitor for many years for the Transport and General Workers’ Union, acting in many claims. Perhaps I should have declared an interest as acting for the child most seriously damaged by the thalidomide drug, in a lengthy court action against Distillers. Perhaps it is all my fault that he should have categorised me in the way that he did—but I regret it.

As to my noble friend Lord Marks, I think that we are more or less in agreement, and I thank him for what he said. All I would say is that I do not think that we should have just a discretionary power because, as my noble friend the Minister just said, we all surely want to combine to send a strong message from this House that dishonesty must never pay. That is the purpose behind this.

I say to the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, whom I still regard as my noble friend, that he ought to have a word with Mr Jack Straw, who has been fighting hard on behalf of genuine claimants and seeking to eradicate this tendency to exaggerate claims and to make us the whiplash capital of Europe.

I think that the Government are taking a step in the right direction. I am very grateful to the Minister for agreeing to look at certain aspects again. In the light of that, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

[Lord Beecham]

My Lords, I have clearly upset the noble Lord. It certainly was not my intention to do so. We have a very long association, going back to the time when we were involved in the inner city partnership in Newcastle. We have always got on very well. I intended no imputation whatever upon the noble Lord. I do think that the insurance industry, as an industry, has been overpersuasive with the present Administration, in particular with the Conservative Party.

However, that is no reflection on the noble Lord. I made it clear that he has behaved with complete propriety, as he always has. I am sorry if I have upset him; I can say no more than that. I apologise if that has been the effect—it was certainly not intended. I look forward to engaging in civilised conflict with him from time to time over this and other measures in the spirit that we have enjoyed hitherto. I certainly would not like him to leave the Chamber tonight feeling that I have cast any slur or imputation upon him. He is widely recognised as extremely able and a man who has devoted a great part of his life to public service. I would not wish in any way to detract from his record or his sincerity.

Criminal Justice and Courts Bill

Debate between Lord Beecham and Lord Hunt of Wirral

Monday 30th June 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hunt of Wirral (Con)]

My Lords, first I declare my interests as set out in the register, in particular as a practising solicitor and partner for the last 46 years in an international commercial law firm, DAC Beachcroft. I am also very proud to be vice-chairman of Justice. I am relieved and pleased to see in her place the chair, the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy of The Shaws. I know that she will deal with some of the points, in particular those just raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Campbell of Surbiton, because Justice is concerned that the Bill raises significant issues in its proposals for the change to criminal and civil law regarding access to justice. I think we all want time to reflect on what the noble Baroness said about Clauses 64, 65 and 66, and we look forward to hearing the Minister’s reply.

I wish to concentrate on two areas, referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, from the opposition Benches. I would first like ask him why he looked at me so critically when he said “cavalier”. I am not quite sure why he did this. I could respond by saying that it takes a Roundhead to spot a Cavalier, but I would not dream of doing so.

[Lord Beecham]

The noble Lord makes precisely the remark I was about to make. I was not conscious of looking at the noble Lord. A cat, of course, may look at a king. I hope I may look at the noble Lord occasionally.

[Lord Hunt of Wirral]

I am relieved, mainly because I always pride myself on being a master of the single entendre, so I am happy I did not go down that route.

I formally welcome the Bill as an opportunity continually to revise the law. In many respects this House points out, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd of Berwick, did once again, that we must be very careful about passing new laws and new provisions, but we must always reflect on how we can improve the existing law while always avoiding the law of unintended consequences. I suppose I could slightly misquote Socrates by saying that good people do not need laws; bad people will always find a way around them. Therefore, we must proceed with caution, particularly when we create new offences.

If I could I will also add my own experience of speaking from the opposition Bench on the Compensation Act 2006, when the regulation of claims management was first brought in. Kevin Rousell has done a magnificent job with limited resources in running that unit. It was always agreed from this Bench by the then Minister, the noble Baroness, Lady Ashton, that the claims management unit within the Ministry of Justice would act as a sort of temporary regulator and eventually the Legal Services Board would take on the responsibility for proper regulation. I know that some of my noble friends have elsewhere urged that it should be the FCA that takes on responsibility, but I think we have to deal with proper and effective regulation of claims management companies.

The claims farmers allege that I have a vendetta against them—and I plead guilty, because I think that some of them are responsible for the most outrageous practices. The noble Lord, Lord Marks, referred to the element of fundamental dishonesty, to which I shall return in a moment. When we get these phone calls and text messages when we have not had an accident, let alone a whiplash injury, urging us to bring a claim and being assured that we can get money and that it will not cost us a penny, I really think that we have to take further measures to regulate the sector.

The Bill is significant and far-reaching, and I want to concentrate first on Clauses 17 and 18. Once again we had a gap in the law. As one of my colleagues pointed out, in effect this is legislation to fill an odd gap, whereby a carer could wilfully neglect or ill treat an incapable patient and be criminally prosecuted for it but commit the same act in relation to a capable patient and have no obvious route to criminal sanction. That was the gap. We are now moving in another direction, where we must be careful about the law of unintended consequences. This new offence—in particular, the addition of a provider level, which is in effect a corporate offence—is a significant addition, augmenting the Care Quality Commission’s regulatory breach channels of sanction and duplicating the Health and Safety Executive’s regulatory sanctions against corporate bodies and directors. So we have to think through how we make sure that we avoid doing exactly the opposite of what is intended.

I urge on my noble friend the Minister the need for clear advice to the sector and the police. In particular, how is it decided that the differences between these three offences, or perhaps even four offences in some cases, should be clearly laid down? How is it to be decided which cases go into which investigative process? A provider could face three or four investigative threats arising from a single event. How well formed is that necessary clarity? I agree with my noble friend that we have to do something; we cannot allow the situation to develop whereby people who are guilty of very serious acts are able to escape unpunished. Equally, we must heed those in the professional organisations who point out that there has to be a need for the Crown Prosecution Service to develop clear guidelines as to the circumstances in which prosecution will follow, to quote the BMA,

“to provide care workers with the assurances they need to encourage incident reporting”.

It is an area on which I hope we will focus when we go into Committee.

I move on to the other part of the Bill that appeared for the first time at the last moment in the other place. Clause 45 is called, “Personal injury claims: cases of fundamental dishonesty”. It is very difficult to disagree that when someone has been fundamentally dishonest they should not be punished in some way. As with claims farmers, we have seen far too much of this dishonesty, so to stop someone who has a valid claim from exaggerating any part of it, which is the deterrent effect of what is proposed, is an admirable intention. But what does it mean to be fundamentally dishonest? What is the difference between dishonesty and fundamental dishonesty? Is it a civil standard of proof? To impose a criminal standard of proof would make it extremely difficult to bring any defence on this basis.

We also have the situation, which I have known in my career as a practising solicitor, where quite often an overzealous claimant lawyer will include all sorts of areas of claim for which the claimant probably never had it in mind to sue and perhaps will link subsequent injuries to the original accident, when they were clearly due to something that happened afterwards and independently. How are we going to deal with a genuine injury that has nothing at all to do with the incident that has given rise to the claim?

I do not say for a moment that we are opening up Pandora’s box, because I strongly support the view that we have to eradicate dishonesty from civil claims. However, we have to proceed carefully and with caution, and there may be a need for clarification and further amendment.

I say this as someone who practises in this area: we do often see genuine claims. However, as many noble Lords pointed out in previous debates, we are seeing far too many exaggerated claims and claims that have no real fundamental basis for litigation. Therefore I particularly want for all those concerned in this area a clear message that dishonesty is not to be tolerated. If that message can be strong enough, we will have achieved something.

Finally, as far as the National Health Service is concerned, we are seeing very substantial claims for future care, some of which dwarf the rest of the claim and which are far bigger and more extensive than I ever experienced when dealing with matters like this, where I often found that the person who was injured was far better off in a hospital that dealt with similar cases—whether it was a broken neck from jumping into a swimming pool or something of that nature—and being alongside people with a similar injury, rather than being allowed to develop a whole hospital around their home.

We have to be mindful of the Chief Medical Officer’s report, Making Amends. It was a long time ago, but at the time we all welcomed it when he said that it was necessary to review again Section 2 of the Law Reform (Personal Injuries) Act 1948. I think that time is now upon us. I also urge my noble friend the Minister to consider, as he looks at personal injury claims of this nature generally, introducing some form of capping, so that much needed money, particularly in the National Health Service, is not diverted into dealing with very substantial claims for future care but is far better directed to the necessary rehabilitation that so many of us have supported for so long.

Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill

Debate between Lord Beecham and Lord Hunt of Wirral

Wednesday 14th March 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Beecham]

My Lords, this amendment deals with referral fees. The Bill provides rules against referral fees and defines the nature of regulated persons, who are effectively prohibited from receiving a payment for referring prescribed legal business to another person. Under Clause 54(4), the legal services in question relate to,

“a claim or potential claim for damages for personal injury or death”,

or where,

“the business is of a description specified in regulations made by the Lord Chancellor”.

I do not know quite what is envisaged by the latter provision, but it is clear that the aim is to inhibit the referral of personal injury claims in return for payment. The regulated person, who for these purposes would presumably be acting on behalf of an injured person, would also be in breach of the subsection if he arranged for another person to provide services to the injured party and was paid or had been paid for making the arrangement.

A number of issues arise from this. The first is that the payment need not necessarily be financial; it could also involve, for example, the provision of another service. It might fall within the scope of the clause—I am not sure whether this was intended—if an organisation referred a client to a solicitor and, as part of their service, the solicitor prepared a will for that client or gave legal advice on another matter that was not related to the personal injury or other category that the Lord Chancellor might specify.

The purpose of Amendment 142E is to make it clear that a person would not be in breach of this subsection if the body to which the payment is made—that is, the person referring the client—is a not-for-profit organisation. There are of course organisations, such as charities and the like, which refer their members or others to solicitors and perhaps other professionals, and receive payment in return. In particular, I understand that a number of medical charities do this. I suppose that at one time organisations such as the Automobile Association, or other motoring organisations that are no longer membership organisations in the traditional sense, might have done likewise. Since they are not-for-profit organisations, it does not seem appropriate that this bar should be in place.

The situation is not analogous to that which the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, dealt with in terms of third-party funding, about which he is absolutely right to be exercised. Therefore, it should not be caught within the prohibition that is envisaged here. It could certainly do considerable harm to organisations and, for that matter, limit the benefit to clients of being referred. As I said, they might be referred on the basis of free advice or advice at a reduced cost, which would presumably appeal to the Government—quite rightly since they are talking about reductions in cost.

Therefore, I hope that the noble Lord will look again at this situation, perhaps with a view to coming back to it at Third Reading if he cannot accede to this measure tonight. There are other amendments before us in this group and there is to be a further amendment which will be taken next Tuesday, so we are not quite in the position of closing the door yet—not before Third Reading in any event. In these circumstances, I beg to move Amendment 142E.

[Lord Hunt of Wirral]

My Lords, in speaking to Amendments 146A and 148A, I wish to say how strongly I support in principle the Government’s proposal to ban referral fees. I declare my interest as a partner in DAC Beachcroft, the international commercial law firm. My amendments are intended simply to clear up some possible loopholes. Having just heard the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, I caution how important it is to have a blanket ban because any ban that is implemented has to work. However watertight the ban is—my amendments are intended to help the Government achieve that objective—it is critical that we also remove the incentive for referral and profit share by removing the excessive legal costs from the system. There are many vested interests here and a lot of money is at stake—too much money in my view.

At present, solicitors acting for claimants can still afford to pay out more than half of their fees to a third party whose only role is to buy and sell on the details of an injured person. That cannot be right. Amendment 146A would make a minor change to Clause 54(4) by inserting,

“which consist of or include damages”.

I raised in Committee the spectre of the current wording permitting the payment of a referral fee for some non-injury element of an injury claim, completely bypassing the Government’s intentions. I look forward to hearing my noble friend the Minister’s comments on that.

Amendment 148A would insert,

“whether received by the person referring prescribed legal business or not”,

into Clause 54(8). I highlighted in Committee this gap in the drafting which could be exploited simply by the way in which payment is routed. Again, I await my noble friend the Minister’s answer.

Finally, I would also be very interested to hear whether my noble friend can give this House a commitment about just how much of the excess cost can now be taken out of the system altogether, which is, frankly, a more effective remedy than tightening up the drafting.