Criminal Justice and Courts Bill
Lord Beecham Excerpts(10 years, 4 months ago)
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Lord Faulks
I understand the noble Lord’s mathematics and on the current numbers there would be a logic behind them, but this is a pathfinder college and as such we are not committed to going further. However, it may well be that we will be moving in that direction. If your Lordships’ House or Parliament does not share our vision for secure colleges, the construction of the next generation of facilities will have to take place within the existing framework for young offender institutions in secure training centres. But we believe that a fresh approach and a new framework will provide a better way of ensuring that our planned new institutions educate and rehabilitate more effectively than the existing ones.
A great deal of anxiety has been expressed about the rules, in particular the use of force. In answer to my noble friend Lord Carlile, private providers will not be able to make up their own rules on the use of force, and it is not true that they will be able to do so. Rules on the use of force will be clearly set out in the secure college rules and we have committed to consult not just on the rules but on the content of the rules.
Lord Beecham
Can the noble Lord confirm that the rules will be subject to parliamentary approval?
Lord Faulks
They will be part of the consultation in the course of amendment but not specifically subject to parliamentary approval as such. I say that subject to correction, but I think that that is the position. My noble friend Lady Berridge asked about reporting restrictions and made an important point about the youth court. I can confirm that the Government are looking carefully at that particular issue.
The question of juror research was raised by noble Lord, Lord Blair, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood. I have some sympathy with the point about the need for greater understanding of what is or is not permitted in terms of research into juries. I cannot commit the resources of the Ministry of Justice to provide the information being sought, but I will take this back and try to provide some form of clarity. Professor Cheryl Thomas appears to encounter no difficulty in analysing the information and I think the contrary argument is that any other information tends to be anecdotal. It does seem to me that simply to accept that jury trial is the right answer without proper examination is not a proper approach to this matter. I also note the comments made by the noble and learned Lord about Lord Roskill’s commission all those years ago, and I take his point about the reduction in costs. Sooner or later, viscerally attached though we are in this country to trial by jury, that does not obviate the need to examine and re-examine whether it is appropriate in all circumstances. As he quite rightly said, the Defamation Act 2013 is a recent example of where trial by jury is no longer to be available.
Perhaps I may conclude with some comments on Part 4. To say that this part was not entirely welcomed would be something of an understatement. Noble Lords have made some remarkable speeches in the course of the debate and it is absolutely clear that the relevant clauses will be subject to the degree of scrutiny that one would expect on a series of provisions of this sort. I hope that noble Lords will forgive me if I keep my remarks short and respond in detail to the many amendments that I expect to receive on these matters in due course.
It was suggested that there had not been much growth in judicial review as most of them were either immigration or asylum judicial reviews. I would like to set out to the House that, as is shown in the published national statistics, the number of civil judicial reviews, not including immigration and asylum claims, increased by 27% between 2000 and 2013, albeit that we accept that such claims continue to represent a small proportion of the total number of claims. However, the Government continue to believe that there are fundamental issues with how judicial reviews are brought that require proportionate reform. Although I know there was little support for these changes, I think it was accepted that from time to time this area of law can need examination, re-examination and amendment. I said in opening and I repeat now that it is no part of the Government's approach to this that judicial review is not a vital part of the checks on administrative action, whether on central or local government or other arms of the state. We are concerned by these various provisions to restrict the costs of obtaining judicial review and to ensure that interveners’ participation in reviews is at least more circumscribed than it is at the moment. I accept that interveners can provide valuable assistance in judicial reviews having—I declare an interest—taken part by representing one of the parties and on more than one occasion acting for an intervener. However, there has been a proliferation of interventions. If one looks at reported cases now, almost any case at Appeal Court level appears to attract a considerable level of intervention and some of it is duplicated. It often takes the form of very lengthy skeleton arguments and many volumes of authorities. Although judges do their best to make economic use of the available material, all parties involved in the case are thereby put to the expense of having to deal with the magnitude of the contributions made by interveners.
While I do not reject the proposition that interveners can add value, we must look at the cost consequences of those who use judicial review as a form of campaign. That word was used during the course of the debate by the noble Baroness, Lady Campbell of Surbiton. Campaigning organisations have an enormous value, but it should not be thought that judicial review is simply a method of campaigning. Judicial review is concerned with unlawful activity: it is not just another way of expressing the various objectives of a campaign.
Lord Beecham
Does the Minister accept that no intervention can take place without the leave of the court? What he is saying is surely somewhat derogatory of the decision of the judges to permit interventions.
Lord Faulks
My answer to that is that the hypothetical Mr Justice Beecham on a busy list is told that there might be an intervention of one sort. He may not be able to anticipate the level of the intervention that is then forthcoming in terms of its size and the number of others who intervene. The noble Lord scowls, but I am endeavouring to answer his question so perhaps he should not do so. Then, in due course, a hearing takes place by which time an enormous amount of material can be provided and the scope of the case can expand. This is not an evil, but it ought to be controlled. It is difficult without continuity of the judges involved in this to control it in the way that it should be.
Criminal Justice and Courts Bill
Lord Beecham Excerpts(10 years, 4 months ago)
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Lord Beecham (Lab)
My Lords, another parliamentary day, another Criminal Justice and Courts Bill. The House will be grateful to the Minister for his comprehensive guided tour of the Bill’s proposals but the reality is that we are presented once again with a veritable pot pourri of legislative proposals, the customary mix of the worthy and the welcome, the half-baked and the harmful. This time, some 16 measures were added to the mix two days before Report and Third Reading in the Commons, with little or no time for debate. Therefore, they arrive here today effectively sight unseen.
Today, a pot pourri merits this dictionary definition:
“A mix of dried petals and spices in a bowl designed to perfume a room”,
but the original French stands for a stew made from different kinds of meat—literally a rotten pot—and too much of this Bill fits the latter description.
There are certainly parts to welcome—for example, the provisions about police corruption, extreme pornography, malicious communications and care worker offences of ill treatment or wilful neglect. However, there are others, notably those dealing with secure colleges and judicial review, which demonstrate the propensity of this Government in general, and this Lord Chancellor in particular, to indulge in grandstanding on issues of crime and justice on the basis of the most tenuous evidence, and with a disturbing determination to curtail judicial discretion.
I will deal later with those matters but, at this stage, will cite two examples of the Government’s cavalier approach. The first is the headline-grabbing proposal, referred to by the Minister this afternoon, to increase the maximum sentence for causing death by dangerous driving while disqualified to 10 years’ imprisonment. It is a serious offence, but one of which only 13 defendants were convicted last year. The second is the claim that the number of cases of judicial review has soared from 4,500 a year to 12,400, which was repeated by the Minister in last Thursday’s Times, whereas almost the entire increase was due to asylum and immigration cases, which are now dealt with under the tribunal system, not by judicial review, thereby reducing the workload and, presumably, therefore, the cost, of the Administrative Court by nearly two-thirds.
A more insidious approach is the trend in criminal law of imposing mandatory sentences, and in judicial review of making it more difficult and potentially much more expensive to challenge the lawfulness of decision-making by the state or its agencies. On these matters, the Joint Committee on Human Rights has been forthright in its criticisms, but the Government, as ever, merely shrug them off.
Part 1 of the Bill, whose objectives of protecting the public we entirely endorse, contains provisions which exemplify the failings that I have mentioned. Thus, Clause 4 will require an under-resourced and overstretched Parole Board to be involved in determining whether prisoners serving extended sentences should be released, as automatic release rules are changed. What proposal do the Government have to provide the Parole Board with the additional resources that it needs to cope with its present workload, let alone that which would flow from the provisions of this Bill?
Clause 6 makes electronic tagging mandatory for offenders released on licence, under regulations to be prescribed by the Secretary of State, despite the lamentable experience of the current tagging system, which is used essentially to check whether curfew or exclusion requirements are complied with. What will be the benefits and the costs of this quantum leap in the application of tagging? Do the Government accept that the code of practice to govern the use of tagging will be subject to parliamentary approval? Will a draft be available for the Committee stage of this Bill, or at least on Report? Clause 7 imposes extra work on the Parole Board in respect of prisoners recalled from release, when what is surely needed is effective supervision of such prisoners. Clause 8 gives the Secretary of State the power to change the test for release after recall by regulation, when this should surely be done by primary legislation.
Part 2 of the Bill deals with young offenders. I will come later to the question of secure colleges, but I welcome Clause 32, which requires the presence of an appropriate adult when a youth caution or youth conditional caution is given to someone under the age of 17. I join the Magistrates’ Association, however, in requesting guidance on the definition of an appropriate adult. Part 3 will allow minor offences to be dealt with it on the papers by a single magistrate—in effect, in chambers—where a defendant has not requested a hearing. My noble friend Lord Ponsonby will speak to this issue, but having only last Friday met magistrates of the Northumbria Bench, I incline to the view of those who say the defendant should have to agree to such a course, where appropriate, after proper advice. After all, not everybody who receives a court communication will be able to understand it. I am also sympathetic to those who say two magistrates should sit on such cases, although perhaps there should be an experiment to see whether there is a satisfactory outcome with a single magistrate. In any event, disposal should be in public, not necessarily in the traditional court room, so that justice can be seen and reported to be done.
A more troubling proposition is contained in Clause 42 in relation to criminal court charges—to which the Minister referred—under which offenders should be made to pay towards the cost of running the courts. This clause is a classic example of the Government’s casual approach to legislation. The requirement is mandatory, when it should, if imposed at all, be discretionary and decided by the judges. There is no impact assessment, either on the offender or the cost of enforcing the system. It ignores the risk that people may plead guilty, at least to the less serious charges, on financial grounds; and ignores both the reality of life for offenders and the system’s present inability to deal with unpaid fines and confiscation orders.
The Prison Reform Trust points out that offenders are twice as likely to have employment problems as the average, four times as likely to have housing problems, 13 times as likely to be homeless, and three and a half times as likely to be in debt. Meanwhile Justice points out that Her Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals Service is owed £2 billion— including £1.3 billion in unenforced confiscation orders—and in 2010 the debt for criminal penalties was £608 million, two-thirds of which had been outstanding for more than 12 months. One might have thought that the Government would give priority to collecting these debts, rather than creating this new provision.
Finally in Part 3, I mention the belated inclusion in Clause 45, no doubt once again at the behest of the Conservative Party’s friends and supporters in the insurance industry, of yet another mandatory requirement, namely that if the court in a civil case is satisfied on the balance of probabilities that a claimant has been “fundamentally dishonest”—whatever that means—in relation to his claim, it must dismiss the claim unless this would cause substantial injustice. Again, this is presumably a moveable feast. Of course, a court can already penalise a claimant in costs if it is satisfied that a claim has been exaggerated but, more to the point, this is an entirely one-sided sanction. A defendant behaving in similar fashion would suffer no penalty, even though such conduct in a personal injury claim could itself add to the claimant’s suffering.
I now turn to the two most controversial elements of the Bill: secure colleges and judicial review. In relation to the former, the Government’s transforming rehabilitation programme appears to have failed. The Secretary of State has reoffended. There is an uncanny similarity between what happened over the probation service in the Offender Rehabilitation Act and this proposal. Once again, the Government are pressing ahead with their policy in advance of parliamentary approval, although at least it has not been left to Members of this House—as it was last year with probation—to ensure that the matter is debated. Yet the Government are appointing a contractor, before the Bill is enacted, to build a 330-place college. Admittedly, it will not be built before the Bill is enacted but, even so, one might have thought that this was somewhat premature. The important point, however, is that such a college would account for as many as a quarter of young offenders in detention. The objective of providing education is of course welcome, but it is self-evident that many youngsters would be a long way from home, and there are serious questions about the desirability of housing girls alongside boys and the youngest offenders alongside those in their later teenage years, as the Joint Committee on Human Rights has pointed out. There is also the question of cost. The Prison Reform Trust legitimately asks where the £85-million cost is coming from.
More important is the apparent determination of the Government to rely once again on some private sector provider to run the establishment and, significantly, to confer on it and its employees the right to use force to maintain good order and discipline,
“if authorised … by college rules”,
as set out in Schedule 6. Who will make these rules? Will they be subject to parliamentary approval, and if so by which method? Why have the Government rejected the advice of the Joint Committee on Human Rights that the use of force on children and young people for the purpose of good order and discipline is incompatible with Articles 3 and 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights? Why will they not adopt the committee’s obviously correct formulation that secure college rules should,
“only authorise the use of reasonable force on children as a last resort; only for the purposes of preventing harm to the child or others, and that only the minimum force necessary should be used”?
We have heard too many disturbing accounts of excessive force being used by private contractors on inmates of Yarl’s Wood and on deportees to countenance the possibility of similar actions in secure colleges. This policy—the objects of which we of course agree with—needs rethinking The Government should pilot a much smaller scheme with a narrower age range, close to where the children come from. It is difficult to avoid the suspicion that, as with the larger adult prisons the Government are bent on building, they are more concerned with reducing per capita costs than providing the necessary services at an appropriate and local level. Wholesaling and warehousing large numbers of damaged and vulnerable youngsters is not the way forward.
Finally, and perhaps most disturbingly, we come to Part 4 and the Government’s latest efforts to undermine judicial review. The Government are very deliberately making it much more difficult to challenge the lawfulness of decision-making, at least for those with limited financial resources. I have already disposed of the bogus claim that the current case load is excessive. Let me now deal with the barriers that are being deliberately being put in place to obstruct access to justice in this area, so vital to our democracy and system of government. Let us not forget the fences already in place in the form of restrictions to legal aid and on the payment of fees for preparatory work, which so often leads to matters being satisfactorily resolved without proceeding to trial. Once again substituting their judgment for that of the judiciary, the Government, in Clause 64, impose a mandatory requirement to refuse relief at the permission stage,
“if it appears … highly likely that the outcome … would not have been substantially different if the conduct complained of had not occurred”.
How can the court do that without a full consideration of the case? In that event, where is the saving? How, given that legal aid is not available for that stage, can a claimant make his case? Moreover, if procedural or legal errors are made, there must be some mechanism by which those failures can be challenged, even if the ultimate outcome is the same. That is what the rule of law requires.
Clauses 65 and 66, to which the Minister referred, deal with the finances and membership of applicants and organisations and require the court to take that information into account when determining costs—another mandatory imposition, clearly designed to discourage organisations and supporters, including, as Liberty points out, charities, solicitors acting pro bono or even family members, from supporting a claim where no legal aid is available. That principle is extended by Clause 67 to interveners: those who, after applying for the leave of the court to intervene to take part in the case—a necessary step—can then be required to pay not only their own costs but any costs incurred by other parties as a result. Only exceptional circumstances, typically not defined, but originally to be defined by secondary legislation, would avoid this. However, the court already has discretion in these matters. Why include this provision at all, except as a deterrent? We are talking, essentially, about public interest intervention, not individuals pursuing their own interests. In the Bill as it stands, there is a clear threat to organisations such as Liberty, Justice and the Howard League, which have played such an important part in defending the rule of law. I very much welcome the promise the Minister has made today. I hope there will be a judicious review of an injudicious proposal and that we will have an opportunity to see the results of that in Committee.
The Secretary of State has claimed that pressure groups use individuals as “human shields” to challenge the Government—a claim rejected by the Joint Committee on Human Rights and the Public Bill Committee. Moreover, as Liberty points out, the court has discretion as to whether to allow an intervention. We look forward to hearing the outcome of the Minister’s latest deliberations.
Two further matters that relate to costs are contained in Clauses 68 and 69. Cost-capping orders for claimants are welcome, but crucially can be made only on application after the permission stage. Much work will have been done up to that point and there will be no protection from liability for costs for an applicant if unsuccessful. That is no great problem for a developer seeking judicial review against a local authority, but it is quite otherwise for an applicant of modest means or a charity. The provision that secondary legislation may specify the ingredients of a public interest claim is absolutely unacceptable, especially as the Government are likely to be the defendant in many judicial review cases. Clause 69 once again imposes a mandatory duty to limit the costs that can be recovered by an applicant with a controlled costs order, thereby creating reciprocal costs protection to the defendant entirely irrespective of means. Equally, that is an entirely unreasonable fettering of the existing judicial discretion.
As I have said before, despite the assurances of the Minister, judicial review, like legal aid, is being deliberately dismantled. Characteristically, the Minister has given a lucid exposition of a deeply flawed Bill. The Opposition will work with others across the House to improve it where we can and oppose those provisions that we cannot. There are thoughtful Members on the government Benches who must share some of the misgivings that will be voiced around the House today. I hope we can work together in the interests of justice to improve this legislation.
Lord Hunt of Wirral (Con)
My Lords, first I declare my interests as set out in the register, in particular as a practising solicitor and partner for the last 46 years in an international commercial law firm, DAC Beachcroft. I am also very proud to be vice-chairman of Justice. I am relieved and pleased to see in her place the chair, the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy of The Shaws. I know that she will deal with some of the points, in particular those just raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Campbell of Surbiton, because Justice is concerned that the Bill raises significant issues in its proposals for the change to criminal and civil law regarding access to justice. I think we all want time to reflect on what the noble Baroness said about Clauses 64, 65 and 66, and we look forward to hearing the Minister’s reply.
I wish to concentrate on two areas, referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, from the opposition Benches. I would first like ask him why he looked at me so critically when he said “cavalier”. I am not quite sure why he did this. I could respond by saying that it takes a Roundhead to spot a Cavalier, but I would not dream of doing so.
Lord Beecham
The noble Lord makes precisely the remark I was about to make. I was not conscious of looking at the noble Lord. A cat, of course, may look at a king. I hope I may look at the noble Lord occasionally.
Lord Hunt of Wirral
I am relieved, mainly because I always pride myself on being a master of the single entendre, so I am happy I did not go down that route.
I formally welcome the Bill as an opportunity continually to revise the law. In many respects this House points out, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd of Berwick, did once again, that we must be very careful about passing new laws and new provisions, but we must always reflect on how we can improve the existing law while always avoiding the law of unintended consequences. I suppose I could slightly misquote Socrates by saying that good people do not need laws; bad people will always find a way around them. Therefore, we must proceed with caution, particularly when we create new offences.
If I could I will also add my own experience of speaking from the opposition Bench on the Compensation Act 2006, when the regulation of claims management was first brought in. Kevin Rousell has done a magnificent job with limited resources in running that unit. It was always agreed from this Bench by the then Minister, the noble Baroness, Lady Ashton, that the claims management unit within the Ministry of Justice would act as a sort of temporary regulator and eventually the Legal Services Board would take on the responsibility for proper regulation. I know that some of my noble friends have elsewhere urged that it should be the FCA that takes on responsibility, but I think we have to deal with proper and effective regulation of claims management companies.
The claims farmers allege that I have a vendetta against them—and I plead guilty, because I think that some of them are responsible for the most outrageous practices. The noble Lord, Lord Marks, referred to the element of fundamental dishonesty, to which I shall return in a moment. When we get these phone calls and text messages when we have not had an accident, let alone a whiplash injury, urging us to bring a claim and being assured that we can get money and that it will not cost us a penny, I really think that we have to take further measures to regulate the sector.
The Bill is significant and far-reaching, and I want to concentrate first on Clauses 17 and 18. Once again we had a gap in the law. As one of my colleagues pointed out, in effect this is legislation to fill an odd gap, whereby a carer could wilfully neglect or ill treat an incapable patient and be criminally prosecuted for it but commit the same act in relation to a capable patient and have no obvious route to criminal sanction. That was the gap. We are now moving in another direction, where we must be careful about the law of unintended consequences. This new offence—in particular, the addition of a provider level, which is in effect a corporate offence—is a significant addition, augmenting the Care Quality Commission’s regulatory breach channels of sanction and duplicating the Health and Safety Executive’s regulatory sanctions against corporate bodies and directors. So we have to think through how we make sure that we avoid doing exactly the opposite of what is intended.
I urge on my noble friend the Minister the need for clear advice to the sector and the police. In particular, how is it decided that the differences between these three offences, or perhaps even four offences in some cases, should be clearly laid down? How is it to be decided which cases go into which investigative process? A provider could face three or four investigative threats arising from a single event. How well formed is that necessary clarity? I agree with my noble friend that we have to do something; we cannot allow the situation to develop whereby people who are guilty of very serious acts are able to escape unpunished. Equally, we must heed those in the professional organisations who point out that there has to be a need for the Crown Prosecution Service to develop clear guidelines as to the circumstances in which prosecution will follow, to quote the BMA,
“to provide care workers with the assurances they need to encourage incident reporting”.
It is an area on which I hope we will focus when we go into Committee.
I move on to the other part of the Bill that appeared for the first time at the last moment in the other place. Clause 45 is called, “Personal injury claims: cases of fundamental dishonesty”. It is very difficult to disagree that when someone has been fundamentally dishonest they should not be punished in some way. As with claims farmers, we have seen far too much of this dishonesty, so to stop someone who has a valid claim from exaggerating any part of it, which is the deterrent effect of what is proposed, is an admirable intention. But what does it mean to be fundamentally dishonest? What is the difference between dishonesty and fundamental dishonesty? Is it a civil standard of proof? To impose a criminal standard of proof would make it extremely difficult to bring any defence on this basis.
We also have the situation, which I have known in my career as a practising solicitor, where quite often an overzealous claimant lawyer will include all sorts of areas of claim for which the claimant probably never had it in mind to sue and perhaps will link subsequent injuries to the original accident, when they were clearly due to something that happened afterwards and independently. How are we going to deal with a genuine injury that has nothing at all to do with the incident that has given rise to the claim?
I do not say for a moment that we are opening up Pandora’s box, because I strongly support the view that we have to eradicate dishonesty from civil claims. However, we have to proceed carefully and with caution, and there may be a need for clarification and further amendment.
I say this as someone who practises in this area: we do often see genuine claims. However, as many noble Lords pointed out in previous debates, we are seeing far too many exaggerated claims and claims that have no real fundamental basis for litigation. Therefore I particularly want for all those concerned in this area a clear message that dishonesty is not to be tolerated. If that message can be strong enough, we will have achieved something.
Finally, as far as the National Health Service is concerned, we are seeing very substantial claims for future care, some of which dwarf the rest of the claim and which are far bigger and more extensive than I ever experienced when dealing with matters like this, where I often found that the person who was injured was far better off in a hospital that dealt with similar cases—whether it was a broken neck from jumping into a swimming pool or something of that nature—and being alongside people with a similar injury, rather than being allowed to develop a whole hospital around their home.
We have to be mindful of the Chief Medical Officer’s report, Making Amends. It was a long time ago, but at the time we all welcomed it when he said that it was necessary to review again Section 2 of the Law Reform (Personal Injuries) Act 1948. I think that time is now upon us. I also urge my noble friend the Minister to consider, as he looks at personal injury claims of this nature generally, introducing some form of capping, so that much needed money, particularly in the National Health Service, is not diverted into dealing with very substantial claims for future care but is far better directed to the necessary rehabilitation that so many of us have supported for so long.
Transfer of Tribunal Functions (Mobile Homes Act 2013 and Miscellaneous Amendments) Order 2014
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Lord Shipley (LD)
My Lords, I declare that I am a vice-president of the Local Government Association and a former council leader. Therefore, I have a keen interest in all aspects of local government matters.
I would like to ask about the level of fees to be charged rather than the transfer of jurisdiction, which is what the order is mainly about. My query relates to paragraph 7.2 of the Explanatory Memorandum, which states:
“The normal policy is that fees should be set at a level to recover no more than the full cost of providing the service”
I agree with that; that is the correct policy. However, will the Minister clarify whether the definition of full cost actually is full cost in this instance? It is a fee level of £155. Has that fee level been set to include a contribution to a council’s overheads rather than just being the recovery of the immediate direct cost?
I raise this because I think that it is an issue of principle. When I was a council leader, I discovered that in many instances, particularly in the regulatory and licensing areas, fees and charges were not, in fact, related to the total cost that a council incurred. That total cost includes its overheads for its premises, heating, lighting and so on. Too often fees were set to cover the cost of undertaking the immediate work involved. I seek assurance from the Minister that the total cost to a local authority has been included in paragraph 7.2 in setting the fee at £155.
Lord Beecham (Lab)
My Lords, I must follow the noble Lord, Lord Shipley, in declaring an interest as a vice-president of the Local Government Association and as a former leader of the same council for, if I may say so, quite a bit longer than the noble Lord. I have a certain sympathy with his view on this order to the extent that we are talking essentially about commercial organisations bearing the cost. The implication behind the noble Lord’s question is clear enough: is this a sufficient amount? If it were to fall on the occupier of a mobile home, I would be somewhat concerned about that. If the intention is that it should fall on the owner of the site as a commercial proposition, I think he makes a significant point. I am glad that he has made it because my only reservation about this order would have been to point to the split infinitive in the Explanatory Note.
Lord Faulks
I am grateful for the learned contribution from the north-east and for the grammatical point made so ably by the noble Lord, Lord Beecham. On the question of costs, as the Explanatory Note states, the position is that the fee of £155 is for making an application to the Property Chamber relating to a dispute over a mobile home. It is set at the same level as the fee applied to applications which follow similar tribunal processes for other applications. There are circumstances in which fee remissions can be obtained, but they are available only to individuals. On 7 October last the Government introduced reforms to the scheme of fee remissions in the courts and tribunals, and the purpose was to reduce the cost of the scheme to the taxpayer while ensuring that fee remissions were better targeted at those who cannot afford to pay the fee. They introduced a single fee remission scheme across the HM Courts and Tribunals Service, which is a simplified means test based on a gross monthly income and disposable capital test.
The question arises as to whether the costs payable in these cases should act as a deterrent to elderly residents. I think that, perhaps contrary to the sense of the debate so far, those concerned with these disputes are often people who would not normally venture into a court of any sort. This is to provide a relatively cost-neutral risk for those who want to resolve what can be quite highly charged disputes about their homes without great expense and involving the paraphernalia of lawyers. In fact, in answer to the question put by noble friend Lord Shipley, the fees reflect only the costs of the tribunal, not of the local authority. I accept his point that that means that there are a number of costs which are not reflected in that overall fee. What lies behind it is the provision of the sort of service I have endeavoured to describe.
So as further to assist those who might feel that they are receiving somewhat oppressive treatment from the site owners, and sadly there are some instances of that, the procedural rules contain provisions for cost awards if the tribunal considers that a party has acted unreasonably, although of course that is a judicial decision based on the particular facts of the case. Generally, however, costs are not awarded in the Property Chamber and parties meet their own expenses in bringing a case. These hearings are conducted by tribunal members who are experienced in the area and help unrepresented parties to frame questions where necessary, so clearly it is a cheap and, I hope, effective way of resolving disputes. However, I accept entirely what lies behind the question put by my noble friend Lord Shipley, which is that there is a cost involved which is borne by the local authority.
I hope that that deals with the points made by noble Lords. However unsatisfactory this might be to local authorities from the financial point of view, they are at least in the position of knowing that a useful service is being provided to those who are often in a vulnerable position in society. That is because those who acquire park homes, as they are known, often have little by way of rights and do not have clear contracts. Despite the fact that quite a lot of money is involved in these homes, there is nothing like the same security that someone would have if they were acquiring a house by the normal conveyancing route. This tribunal is providing an extremely useful and important source of remedy to help often vulnerable people.
To summarise, this order will make the changes necessary to transfer the functions conferred on the defunct residential property tribunals to the Property Chamber, so appeals against licensing decisions can be determined by the First-tier Tribunal. I commend this draft order to the Committee.
Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974 (Exceptions) Order 1975 (Amendment) (England and Wales) Order 2014
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Lord Beecham (Lab)
My Lords, I commend the Government’s stressing the importance of offender rehabilitation and their sensible way of dealing with spent convictions. I certainly support the order before us. However, it is confined to cases in which children are involved.
By sheer coincidence, last week the Government tabled a number of amendments to the Criminal Justice and Courts Bill, which will reach your Lordships’ House in about three weeks’ time, creating a series of offences concerning the ill treatment or wilful neglect of a range of people—not just children but other vulnerable people as well. That raises a question in my mind as to whether the order goes wide enough in terms of covering other people who are subject to care in the same way that the children referred to in it will be subject to care or reports. A wide range of people may be in such a position—for example, people suffering from mental health disorders or learning disabilities and those in elder care.
An area about which I have some general concerns is that of the Court of Protection and the appointment of deputies for people subject to powers of attorney. It seems to me that the same principles that the noble Lord rightly outlined in moving the order apply to those cases. I confess that I have not been able to check whether regulations already exist placing those involved in care in exactly the same position as those involved with children under this order, thereby enabling a check to be made on what would otherwise be spent convictions affecting this group. If that is the case, it is entirely satisfactory. If it is not yet the case, perhaps the Government will look at that.
I wish to raise a further point about the Chartered Institute of Legal Executives. The order refers to defined duties, as it were, and regulated work. A number of areas are defined. Probate and conveyancing are very sensibly added to the list as in those areas temptation could well be placed in the way of those with a record of dishonesty. However, in my submission, the same would apply to those engaged in guardianship work. I have in mind particularly powers of attorney, the Court of Protection and the role of deputies. The whole purpose of that court is to vest in the hands of a deputy power over the assets of a person who has become a patient within the meaning of the legislation. If that has not yet been embraced by previous regulations or is not implicitly included in this order, I suggest that the Government take a look at it because it seems to me a field which is certainly analogous to those which are clearly prescribed for CILEx in the order.
With those questions rather than reservations I am happy to support the order as it stands. If further regulations are required to deal with some of the points I have raised, perhaps the Government will look at those. They can be assured of our support if they decide that it is necessary to bring forward further regulations to cover the areas to which I have referred.
Crime and Courts Act 2013 (County Court and Family Court: Consequential Provision) Order 2014
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Lord Beecham (Lab)
My Lords, I am glad that in just under four years’ membership of the House, I have at last been able to persuade the Government to do something. I hope that this is the start of a trend for the last 12 months of the Government’s life. I would not dissent from the Minister’s proposal in these amendments, but I feel it is necessary to reflect a little on what is happening in the family court system because some worrying factors are emerging.
I cannot now recall whether the Minister was in his place in the Chamber during that part of the debate on the Queen’s Speech in which I spoke. I have no doubt that the noble Lord, Lord Taylor, will be replying in due course to some of the points I made, but some of them were around the business of the family court and, in particular, how the court is now operating. I am not speaking so much about the geographical location aspect—although that is a factor of some concern because now we have designated courts hearing these matters as opposed to just the local magistrates’ court which previously would have dealt with matters—but more particularly of the impact of the legal aid changes.
The Minister rightly referred to the fact that there is some legal aid available but, as noble Lords might recall, there was an extensive argument about the fact that a significant number of cases would fall outside the scope of legal aid, and it would appear that that is beginning to have a significant impact in turn, as was predicted, on the number of litigants in person in family court matters. I think the figure nationally has now risen to 52%. In the north-east, 61% of people in the family court are now unrepresented. That is apparently already causing significant delays to develop. Given the particularly sensitive area in which these cases are brought—disputes in the family are necessarily sensitive—that is an extremely unwelcome development. Of course, I cannot ask the Minister today to give any assurances about that matter, but I hope that he can say that the Government will be looking at the impact in terms of delay and the administration of justice in this sensitive area and will assess the position. It seems to me that that need not wait much longer because the legal aid impact has now been perceptible for some time, as these figures demonstrate. I hope the Government will take a look at the number of cases and the length of delays that are occurring and at whether any action can be taken to put that right because without that the reorganisation of the court structure will not achieve its objectives, which were to simplify the system and to make it more accessible and more efficient. That cannot be the case if unrepresented parties are clogging the courts, requiring adjournments and requiring the court effectively to intervene to run the case, as it were, when previously the parties would have had representatives who were capable of doing that and perhaps even of negotiating properly before the matter reached the court.
Having said that, we do not object to the order as laid but hope that the matters I have referred to today, which others have raised elsewhere, can be looked at and a response ultimately given.
Lord Faulks
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, who modestly did not acknowledge his own part in one part of the changes that we are proposing by this statutory instrument. As to litigants in person and the problems that they could cause in family justice, as the noble Lord would expect, I cannot comment on particular local difficulties. I understood him to be saying that his quarrel was not so much with the structure as with the practical difficulties that could be encountered by unrepresented litigants, with possible delays that might flow from that.
The Government want to help people to reach their own agreements outside court, when that is appropriate or safe. It is the case, and always has been, that people have to attend court on occasions, and the Government are taking a number of steps to assist litigants in person. We have provided funding to, among others, the Royal Courts of Justice and the Citizens Advice Bureau to develop and expand what is known as CourtNav—an application that helps selected users to complete applications to the courts in an effective way—and to Advicenow, to update a number of its guides, as well as to the Personal Support Unit, to provide free independent assistance to people facing proceedings without legal representation in civil and family courts. The Courts Service and the Ministry of Justice have also provided easy-to-understand practical information about family mediation, making an application to court and attending hearings. This has included updating leaflets available to court users and a number of videos have been made available online. I am sure that the noble Lord would like to have a look at those videos to assess their quality.
Judicial training is being delivered to support the implementation of the new private law programme—and this is an important feature. A key focus of the training is to ensure that judges, magistrates and legal advisers are better equipped to support litigants in person through the court process. I do not pretend that judges would not on the whole prefer litigants to be competently and well represented by lawyers, but as noble Lords are aware we are operating on a restricted budget and cuts have had to be made.
As to the number of litigants in person in family proceedings, I cannot give precise figures, but there have always been litigants in person in the family justice system. It is true that Her Majesty’s Courts & Tribunals Service data show a reduction in private law children disposals where both parties were represented in October to December of 2013, compared with the same period the previous year. Although the number of litigants in person has increased since LASPO came into effect, available data show that the time that cases are taking has remained steady. In private law, the average number of weeks to disposals remains steady at 16 to 18 weeks, but the Government are monitoring the situation and continue to do so very closely. The noble Lord is right to raise the issue—it is a source of anxiety—but I reassure him and other noble Lords that the Government are well aware of potential problems and will keep a close eye on the matter.
To sum up the statutory instrument, the order provides the vires by which legal aid may be provided for advocacy in a family court. It allows the Legal Aid Agency to provide legal aid for advocacy in the small number of cases that may still be before the family court under the old Access to Justice Act 1999, and it also allows interest to be automatically carried on certain orders made by the family court in the same way as it would have been carried when such orders were made by county courts. I commend the order to the Committee.
Law Commission
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Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts (Con)
My Lords, my noble friend on the Front Bench is well aware that I am no lawyer. He and indeed other Members of the Committee may therefore wonder why I have trespassed into this rather specialist area of the legal world—the role of the Law Commission. The answer is that a few years ago, when the new procedure devised to enable your Lordships’ House to consider Law Commission Bills not only faster but more effectively was introduced, I had the privilege of serving on the first Bill so dealt with, the Perpetuities and Accumulations Bill, which gave me first-hand knowledge of the valuable work done by the Law Commission.
When I talked to staff at the Law Commission, in a rather charmingly self-effacing, self-deprecating way they described their work as being “care and maintenance”. That gravely underestimates the value of what they do. For example, their work on the Consumer Insurance (Disclosure and Representations) Act—another Bill Committee on which I served—made significant improvements to the position of the man in the street seeking to obtain insurance. It restricted the ability of insurers to ask open-ended questions of the “Are there any other questions and facts that the insurer ought to be aware of” variety. The Bill Committee received evidence of cases where this had been much abused. An individual was refused treatment for his cancer on his private health insurance because he had failed to reveal to the insurer that he had visited his doctor—about flu, not cancer—a few weeks before his cancer was diagnosed.
I argue that the Law Commission does valuable work in improving equality of arms, in clarifying aspects of historical legislation that modern developments have made obscure, and generally—in that rather overused modern phrase—in helping to make the law fit for purpose. Of course, there are limitations to the work of the Law Commission. It must not and cannot trespass into party-political issues. Notwithstanding that, it provides a light-touch, swift way of keeping our law up to date. I was therefore distressed to learn that a number of Law Commission Bills that are, so to speak, on the runway do not appear to be being cleared for take-off. I want to focus on three of those now.
The first is a report on easements and covenants, published in June 2011—nearly three years ago. Inter alia, restrictions on landowners creating easements and covenants with variable impacts restrict their ability to obtain mortgage finance and so impact the development of large estates. The Bill would ease those challenges.
The second is an insurance contract law Bill, which is essentially a commercial follow-up to the consumer insurance Act that I referred to earlier. The Bill is particularly important for small businesses, such as a shop or a small family metal fabricating business, where the owners’ personal assets are co-mingled with those of the commercial operation. There is a practical reason for urgency on that Bill, in that Mr David Hertzell—the Law Commissioner responsible for all the work done on that Bill to date—retires in December this year. It would surely be an unnecessary own goal to lose his experience and expertise.
The third is a third parties (rights against insurers) Bill. A version of it received Royal Assent in 2010 but, for reasons that I have not been able to ascertain, it has never been implemented. It now needs to be updated by a short supplemental Bill. The Act’s purpose is to protect the insured where the insurer has gone out of business. It therefore has particular relevance for “long tail” claims, such as those relating to asbestosis.
The Government could, if they chose, quickly take forward that group of Bills. Are those Bills going to have the regulars of the saloon bar of the Dog and Duck dancing on the tables? No, they are not, but they are individually going to make a significant difference in their specialist areas. In particular, I venture the thought that your Lordships’ House is not going to be overburdened with legislation in the next Session. Therefore, what better way to use the House’s time and expertise than in considering these important but non-contentious pieces of legislation? I look forward to hearing, at least in outline, how my noble friend sees progress being made on these and indeed other Law Commission Bills.
A repetition of what happened to the Law Commission’s Bill on termination of tenancies for tenant default would surely be unacceptable. It was originally published by the Law Commission on 31 October 2006—seven and a half years ago. To date, no response to it has been forthcoming, from this or the previous Government. Governments are of course entitled to decline to take forward particular pieces of legislation but it is surely unacceptable not to respond to the Law Commission’s work. The Bill would do much to help businesses to stay in business by removing the perverse incentive that currently exists for landlords to change the locks on properties as early as possible. Sadly, the commission has concluded that since, as I explained, more than seven and a half years have now elapsed since the first consultation, the Bill is out of time. Consultation will have to begin again and all the public funds so far expended have been wasted.
For the remainder of my remarks, I will look forward at two Law Commission Bills currently in consultation. The first is the regulation of health and social care Bill. I have a shrewd suspicion that my noble friend Lord Kirkwood and the noble Lord, Lord Patel, will wish to pursue this in more detail. Health and social care professional regulation is currently provided under the provisions of the Medical Act 1983 and a series of parallel Acts for other health professions. In the words of the General Medical Council, the Medical Act is,
“outdated, complex, highly prescriptive and difficult to change. This makes it difficult to innovate and respond quickly and efficiently to society’s expectations in a rapidly changing healthcare environment”.
This Law Commission Bill is different from most of those that have gone before in that it is long and complex. Most Law Commission Bills are quite slim but this Bill is telephone directory-thick, and of course it has the capacity to become party political. The Bill is in danger of falling between various stools. Nevertheless, for the reasons that I have already outlined, it is a badly needed Bill in order to keep our regulatory framework up to date and so improve the protection of patients. So where is this Bill now? Is it still a Law Commission Bill or will it become a Department of Health Bill? If so far it is neither, when will the decision be made as to which legislative process is to be adopted?
I now turn to an area in which I have long taken an interest—the world of charities. Charities and voluntary groups do wonderful work across our civil society—in particular, tackling those hard-to-reach groups that present particularly intractable and challenging social problems. To their great credit, the Government recognise the role of the sector, but the charity sector is much impeded by an outdated legal structure, notably the fact that the current law makes no distinction between the duties of a trustee of an ordinary trust as opposed to a charitable one. This, linked to the complications and complexities of what is known as permanent endowment, has significantly impeded the development of social investment and the consequent growth of charities that could benefit from the availability of finance so provided. A Law Commission consultation paper on these issues has recently been published and the consultation period closes on 18 June. I hope that my noble friend will be able to tell me that the Government propose to move forward swiftly to the implementation phase thereafter.
Before I conclude, I have one further point. The Lord Chancellor produces an annual report on the work of the Law Commission. A little bird told me that the report for last year was to be published last Thursday, 8 May. I have searched on the parliamentary website for it without success. Fearing that this only revealed my technological incompetence, I sought the help of the Printed Paper Office, also to no avail. I should be grateful if my noble friend could confirm its whereabouts.
Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts
The noble Lord, Lord Beecham, is clearly more expert than I am at this. Half an hour ago, the Printed Paper Office told me that it did not have a copy. I now know its whereabouts. I thought that it might be published with a view to trying to spike my guns, but there we are. I look forward to the pleasure of reading it in due course.
I have argued that the Law Commission does valuable work that is far too valuable to be left to moulder on a Whitehall shelf. Proposals are awaiting implementation and the Government should use time in the next Session to bring these forward. I recognise that I have asked my noble friend a number of detailed questions, although I hope that I gave his office at least an outline of the lines that I proposed to follow. I would be perfectly happy if he were minded to write to me and Members of the Committee in reply.
What I am looking for is a general sense of urgency and commitment. Someone once described a Minister’s job as being a mixture of bomb disposal and Dyno-Rod. I want to be reassured this afternoon that my noble friend is the man from Dyno-Rod.
Lord Beecham
My Lords, I commend and support the noble Lords, Lord Kirkwood and Lord Patel, for their urging of the Government to proceed with the important legislation that they have described to the Committee in this debate. I will speak more generally about the work of the Law Commission. I plead guilty to technological ineptitude of a high order, but I was nevertheless able to download the report that was published, as the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, said, last Thursday and able to obtain a hard copy this morning, so I have a slight advantage over the noble Lord in the ineptitude stakes when it comes to this debate.
It was interesting to read the Report on the Implementation of Law Commission Proposals. It is an annual report published by the Ministry of Justice, and it finds the Lord Chancellor in splendid Candide mode. He reports in his foreword that new procedures were introduced in 2009 and have,
“reduced the time and resources required for a non controversial Law Commission Bill to pass through Parliament”.
He refers to the Government’s “improved record on implementation” during the year and claims that there has been,
“significant progress on implementing the Commission’s proposals”.
He holds,
“the excellent work of the Law Commission in very high regard”,
and says that,
“the progress we have made during this past year demonstrates the continued relevance and resilience of the Commission’s work”.
Well, no doubt it does, but it would be more persuasive of the Secretary of State and the Lord Chancellor if in fact some of the long-outstanding proposals made by the commission had been activated during that time, or indeed an even longer period of time. After all, as we have heard, a number of proposed Bills have lain around for some considerable time. There has been the electronic communications code Bill, referred to in paragraph 45 of the report, which was published in February 2013 and to which apparently a response is indicated by the end of 2014. That means it will be nearly two years before someone in Government gets around to responding. Then there is the public services ombudsman Bill, referred to on page 49, which was published in 2011 and to which a response is apparently to be made available this summer. If a local authority took three years to respond to something, the Local Government Ombudsman would be rather critical of what little progress had been made.
The noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, referred to the Bill about easements. That is not a matter likely to inflame public opinion or, I suspect, cause a great deal of division among Members of either House. Yet, as he pointed out, it was published in 2011 and a response is apparently due—I do not know whether the Minister or his advisers can tell us exactly when, but it is some time this year. Certainly, that is another three-year period. It is even worse for the High Court criminal procedures Bill, which was put forward in 2010. At page 55 we learn that a response will be made in the summer of 2014. That is a four-year gap.
As the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, rightly pointed out, there is the important termination of tenancies for tenant default Bill, which has been around for, as he said, seven and a half years. It is fair to say that the previous Government talked about doing something and did not get around to doing it, but it is four years on even since those days. It is interesting that in the 2013 implementation report, the Government stated that they had “discussed the proposals” and were,
“continuing discussions with the Commission”,
in relation to commercial tenancies. Those were referred to especially by the noble Lord, Lord Kirkwood. It will be interesting to learn if the Minister is able to update us today or subsequently on just how far those discussions have gone.
I have a closer interest in another aspect, which is private tenancies. A year ago, the Government were saying that they were also considering whether improvements could be made to the evictions procedure in the residential sector. Before Mr Grant Shapps—or Michael Green, as he is otherwise known—begins to accuse the Government of Venezuelan tendencies in respect of private rented property, perhaps the Minister will indicate whether the Government are seriously looking at this issue. They have been rather dismissive of proposals made by the Labour Party about elements of security of tenure, yet at least a year ago they were talking about looking seriously at precisely those issues.
In addition to those matters, there are still a number of outstanding matters in which the Government have apparently abandoned any prospect of taking Bills forward. With regard to the participating in crime Bill in May 2007, the cohabitation Bill in July 2007 and the conspiracy and attempts Bill in December 2009, the Government have indicated that they have no intention of taking up those recommendations for reform during the current Parliament. So that is one complete Parliament—one and a half, in two cases—gone without any action being taken, with no good explanation why the Government have come to that conclusion.
Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts
I had conversations with the Law Commission about where we were on these various issues. In two of the cases that the noble Lord has mentioned, the commission was concerned that they would get it into the arena of party-political warfare and concluded that it was not suitable to proceed further. That was the commission’s conclusion, not the Government’s. It is not a fair accusation that the Government have not acted; the Law Commission itself felt that these were not the right areas for it to be involved in.
Lord Beecham
The noble Lord may be right in respect of bringing stuff forward at the last minute in a five-year Parliament, but years have gone by. It cannot be said that political considerations would have been particularly relevant two or three years ago on matters that by that time had already been outstanding for four or five years. If these matters had been political, they would not have been included in the Law Commission’s programme in the first place or indeed agreed by the Government, because the Government agree these things. On the timing of an eventual Bill, I take the noble Lord’s point—it would perhaps be inappropriate to do that in the run-up to an election—but we have no indication at all of why the Government decided not to proceed with these Bills.
There are a couple of other Bills where apparently some sort of conclusion may be expected. There is a remedies against public authorities Bill, which celebrates its fourth birthday in 10 or 12 days’ time, on which the ministry committed to providing by Easter 2014 a complete analysis of the results of a pilot scheme. Are the Government ready to pronounce upon those results and, therefore, their intentions regarding that Bill? The other Bill to which there was a commitment to provide a response during the summer is a High Court jurisdiction in criminal cases Bill, which is now nearly three years old. Will we in fact get a response this summer, and is it possible for what I suspect will be such highly technical matters to be brought forward during the dog days of this Parliament—although, frankly, it does not look as though there will be much else to do? Then, as I said, there is the public services ombudsman Bill, to which a response was expected from the Cabinet Office, not the Ministry of Justice, by Easter. I am not aware that any such response has been in the public domain; again, perhaps, if not today then subsequently, we might find out.
All this raises questions not about how the commission works—it is doing its work—but about how that work is received and dealt with at the government end. It was interesting to read the triennial review of the Law Commission on this subject. Paragraph 43 asserts:
“The Law Commission faces many difficult challenges at the moment. It is currently developing its 12th Programme of Law Reform in an uncertain climate. The Protocol governing the Commission’s work provides that before approving the inclusion of a project in the overall programme the Lord Chancellor will expect the relevant Minister to give an undertaking that there is a serious intention to take forward law reform in this area”.
Touching on the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, it then asserts:
“With the timescale for the 12th Programme spanning the next General Election, the Commission and Ministers will be making decisions in a context where there is a great deal of uncertainty about whether the incoming Government will support any project”.
That raises two points. First, in respect of matters that cannot be concluded in this Parliament, will the Government facilitate discussions between the Opposition and the commission about what a future Government might do? I ask that particularly in the light of recent decisions by the Prime Minister not to facilitate discussions between the Civil Service and the Opposition until much later this year—much closer to a general election than has been indicated in the past. As noble Lords will understand, I have very strong objections to that of a political kind. However, with Law Commission Bills we are not talking about highly controversial political matters anyway. I cannot see that discussions would be at all embarrassing to the Government; these are not government policies that will be under review. I cannot see any difficulty in facilitating a discussion between the Opposition and the commission about the commission’s own agenda. It would be helpful to an incoming Government, which I hope to see—and which noble Lords opposite hope not to see—or for any future Opposition to have that kind of relationship with the commission, so that the whole process can be accelerated and the Law Commission does not have to start from scratch.
The Minister of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord Faulks) (Con)
I thank the noble Lord for giving way. Did the party opposite avail the Conservative Party of such an opportunity when they were in power?
Lord Beecham
I have no idea, but I am not bound by every decision, right or wrong, made by the previous Government. I hope that they did. I might equally ask, did the noble Lord’s party ask for such a facility? I assume he does not know that either. Let us start from a clean sheet, and suggest that it is an innovation that would be worth pursuing, whatever the Government of the day. It is not a political issue: there is nothing between us politically in this agenda.
The second thing sits rather oddly with the following paragraph of the triennial review report:
“The continuing pressures on public finances will add to these challenges”.
I wonder why that should be the case, unless the commission’s manpower has been reduced, or the capacity within Government departments to deal with it has been reduced. For the most part, these are not expenditure-related Bills. The report goes on:
“This has brought to the fore the need to clarify the Commission’s funding model so that clear principles are established. To live within its means the Commission will need to be flexible and agile and will have to make difficult choices about the projects it takes on”.
Yes, but I repeat: is the financing a real issue? I have spoken for 13 minutes; I shall be very quick now.
My last point is that the Lord Chancellor currently produces a report on behalf of the Government as a whole. There does not seem to be a proper connection between the relevant departments and the Ministry of Justice in the course of the consideration of implementing these programmes. It seems to me to be necessary for there to be a single body, and it may well be the MoJ, to oversee the whole process from the government side. That is where the delays seem to occur. There may or may not be good reasons for them but no one on the government side seems to be taking responsibility for the overall programme. If they did that, we might not have the disappointment that has been voiced by other noble Lords today, and we might have a better realisation of the commission’s objectives, which the Government certainly share, in principle.
Lord Brooke of Sutton Mandeville (Con)
If the Lord Chairman will allow me, may I ask a question before the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, sits down? It looks as though he would be prepared to answer one. I volunteered in the Chamber when the new arrangements came in—I think the noble Lord was by then in your Lordships’ House. When my brother was chairman of the Law Commission, he made considerable progress by the conversations he had with the shadow Law Officers in what was then the Labour Government. I am not in any way seeking inside information, but I would be interested to know whether that route was being pursued today in the same way that it successfully was in those days.
Lord Beecham
That is really the point that I was making about the commission. I confess that I cannot say what approaches my colleagues in the other place have made as shadow Law Officers, and I do not think that the Minister would know either. I will certainly look at that from my party’s perspective.
Lord Beecham
I did not raise the issue of rent control; I was talking specifically about security of tenure.
Lord Faulks
There is a complete answer to the concerns which the noble Lord was raising; perhaps I will not indulge myself by going into it now. Suffice it to say that the whole question is extremely difficult. I hope that he will accept that we operate continuously in a challenging economic environment. We have made significant progress in implementing the commission’s proposals. This Government, as, I am sure, does the party opposite, hold the Law Commission in very high regard. We continue to work with constructively with it. We have made great progress and can demonstrate by what has happened and what continues to happen the continued relevance and resilience of the commission’s work.
Civil Legal Aid (Remuneration) (Amendment) (No. 3) Regulations 2014
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Lord Beecham (Lab)
My Lords, once again we are debating matters concerning legal aid and, once again, almost universally around your Lordships’ House, there is criticism of the Government—tellingly, from experienced, distinguished lawyers and, perhaps even more tellingly, from non-lawyers. Those of us who have heard from the noble Baroness, Lady Campbell, with her particularly powerful and moving speech, and the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, who has consistently addressed the sort of concerns that he voiced tonight, will understand the depth of feeling that the Government’s proposals have aroused. It is striking also that, once again, not a single voice has been heard in support of the Government. The noble Lord the Minister has been given his brief and he will undoubtedly, in his usual charming and skilful way, discharge it capably, but he will do entirely without legal or political aid. That is some commentary on how these matters are viewed.
This set of regulations is but one of a series intended to restrict access to judicial review, especially for those with limited financial resources. The ostensible justification, as we have heard, is to save public money. However, as we have also heard, the actual savings are likely to be minimal—£1 million to £3 million—just as they were from the changes to prison law and in respect of compensation for miscarriages of justice. Last week it emerged that unpaid fines have reached £250 million—more than enough to fund legal aid in these contentious areas and others for several years. It is not being cynical to suggest that we are seeing the gradual demolition of judicial review on the instalment plan. In the next Session we will have the dubious pleasure of debating yet another of the Lord Chancellor’s lethal legal cocktails: the Criminal Justice and Courts Bill, which, among other things, seeks radically to transform the approach to judicial review in the highly controversial area of planning. A Government who purport to want to reduce the role of the state seem uncommonly keen to make it more difficult to challenge the state’s decisions, or those of other public agencies.
The late and much lamented Lord Bingham summarised the role of the judiciary and of judicial review in chapter 6 of his seminal work The Rule of Law, to which the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, referred. In it, he said:
“But in properly exercising judicial power to hold ministers, officials and public bodies to account, the judges usurp no authority. They exercise a constitutional power which the rule of law requires that they should exercise”.
He added tellingly:
“This does not of course endear them to those whose decisions are successfully challenged. Least of all does it endear them when the decision is a high-profile decision of … the government of the day”.
It is in that context that it falls to us to consider these regulations. They have, as we have heard, attracted severe criticism from the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee in its 37th report published on 27 March. I note in parenthesis that the regulations were laid on 14 March and came into effect on 22 April, so that Parliament had virtually no time to consider them or the committee’s report before they became law. This is a matter which the Government and the House should perhaps look into, and the committee itself drew attention to that point in paragraph 15 of its report.
However, the position in relation to the Joint Committee on Human Rights is, if anything, even worse. Its report was published only a week ago and is equally critical in terms of both substance and process, going so far as to recommend that the regulations be withdrawn and be made the subject of primary legislation by tabling amendments to the Criminal Justice and Courts Bill, as advocated tonight by the noble Lords, Lord Pannick and Lord Cormack. Will the Government accept this proposal, and if not, why not? There is no shortage of available parliamentary time, as our extended recesses demonstrate.
The Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee’s report raises a series of concerns, many of them identified as long ago as September 2013 in a special edition of the journal Judicial Review, of which the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, who is not in his place tonight, is a consulting editor, drawing on responses to the Government’s consultation on—in a wonderfully Orwellian phrase—“Transforming Legal Aid”.
What answers do the Government have to the questions posed by the committee on the impact of the changes on the payment system, the number of cases which would engender discretionary payments, and the issue of cost-shifting from the legal aid budget to other areas? Has the Ministry of Justice met the demand of the committee to clarify,
“exactly what work will, and will not, be paid for and how the Legal Aid Agency will exercise its discretion over payment”?
Your Lordships will bear in mind the vestigial number of cases in which the Legal Aid Agency’s discretion has been exercised in favour of claimants under the exceptional funding process. In that context, the committee referred to the circularity of the process by which the agency would review a decision on receiving payment, with the consequential result, in this Grayling in Wonderland world, of its own decision being subject potentially to judicial review.
The Government’s intention not to exclude legal aid for the preparatory work for an application may be welcome but, as the committee points out, that intention appears to conflict with the Civil Procedure Rules, which make payment for such work discretionary. How does the Minister respond to that point raised by the committee?
This is, of course, one aspect of the so-called “chilling effect”, to which many consultees and Members of your Lordships House tonight have referred; that is, the reluctance of practitioners to undertake work within the tightly limited timescale of only three months—soon to be further reduced, by the way, for planning matters—to lodge an application for which they may not be paid. Again, the committee draws attention to this issue at paragraph 20. What assurances, and examples, can the Minister give about this key issue, and will he confirm, in the words of paragraph 21 of the report, that “unambiguous guidance” on how the Legal Aid Agency intends to exercise its discretion will be published after consultation, or, better yet, will he set out a clear definition in these or further regulations?
This, after all, is the nub of the issue. As the Bingham Centre for the Rule of Law pointed out, it is privately funded cases that are more readily pursued and less likely to succeed, with permission granted to 48% of legally aided applicants against 9% of others. Nor is there anything to suggest that legally aided judicial review cases,
“are pursued in a reckless way that results in a relatively high number of ‘weak’ cases”.
That statement comes from the Bingham centre. More legally aided cases do not proceed to the stage of seeking permission, such that it is clear that legal aid lawyers are acting responsibly.
The centre points out that no reference is made to the behaviour of defendants in relation to applications for permission. Will the Minister undertake to review this aspect, which might encourage a more reasonable response and/or generate some benefits in terms of cost? Similarly, will the Minister consider the suggestion of Michael Fordham QC, supported tonight by the noble Lords, Lord Pannick and Lord Carlile, to revisit the ministry’s own proposal for a mechanism under which the judge initially considering an application for permission could issue a “totally without merit” certificate?
Transforming Rehabilitation: Mental Health
Lord Beecham Excerpts(10 years, 6 months ago)
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Lord Faulks
There is an obligation to treat offenders and non-offenders the same. The circumstances in which they come to be treated may be different. Those who are in prison may suffer from a number of different mental illnesses. Their treatment is the responsibility of NHS England. Of course, there are complications with the delivery of treatment in the community as well, but there is no absolute difference in the treatment that is appropriate to you when you are an offender in prison or out of prison or are an ordinary member of the public. Clearly there are matters of co-ordination that the noble Baroness would say are not sufficiently attended to.
Lord Beecham (Lab)
Between 2010 and September 2012, 86% of the prison and probation-related work contracted out to the private sector by NOMS went to G4S, Serco and Sodexo. If the Minister is so confident of the performance of these contractors in this important and sensitive area, why has the Ministry of Justice refused to disclose the figures for the succeeding year, even after an FoI request from the Centre for Crime and Justice Studies? Is he aware that just three third-sector organisations accounted for two-thirds of the third-sector expenditure in the same field?
Lord Faulks
I cannot comment on the details of the noble Lord’s question, but I assure him that neither of those two organisations are part of the CRC delivery, as he may well be aware. The CRC contracts are being drawn up and will be in operation by 2015. This matter was fully debated before both Houses of Parliament and we believe that any difficulties should be capable of being found in the stress-testing that is currently being undergone.
County Court Remedies Regulations 2014
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The Minister of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord Faulks) (Con)
My Lords, this statutory instrument revokes and replaces the County Court Remedies Regulations 1991—the 1991 regulations. A draft was laid before Parliament on 10 March 2014 and is also being debated in the other place today. Subject to your Lordships’ consideration, the real change that will be made by this instrument concerns the county court’s jurisdiction in respect of applications for freezing orders. A freezing order is an interlocutory injunction that restrains a party in civil proceedings from disposing of or dealing with their own assets before judgment can be obtained or enforced. They are usually sought before proceedings are issued when the claimant fears that the defendant is likely to dispose of assets before proceedings are issued. However, a freezing order may be sought at any time during the course of proceedings and after judgment has been obtained.
The purpose of this instrument is to remove the current limitations that restrict the county court from issuing freezing orders. It will enable the county court to make freezing orders in all cases and enable claimants to make their applications for a freezing order in the court where their substantive cases are being heard. This may be at the High Court or, from 22 April, a county court hearing centre. The Committee will note, however, that the draft regulations do not lift the restrictions that prohibit the county court from granting a search order, which is an order—often known as an Anton Piller—requiring a party to admit another party to premises for the purpose of preserving evidence. The draft regulations therefore retain the current prohibition placed on search orders. The aim of the reform is to rebalance jurisdiction between the High Court and the county court and to make optimum use of judicial resources by widening, where appropriate, the jurisdiction of the county court, while enabling High Court judges to focus on cases that require a greater level of expertise.
Before setting out further details about this instrument and why the Government are taking this action, I will briefly explain some background to the reform. In March 2011, we set out our policy to reform the structure of the civil courts in a series of proposals in the public consultation document, Solving Disputes in the County Courts: Creating a Simpler, Quicker and More Proportionate System. Those proposals were based on some of the recommendations made by Sir Henry Brooke, a retired Lord Justice of Appeal, in his report Should the Civil Courts be Unified?, published in August 2008. The recommendations, which included permitting the county court to grant pre-judgment freezing orders, were aimed at improving the administration of civil justice and providing a more efficient use of judicial resources. In endorsing that recommendation, the Judicial Executive Board, which was chaired by the then Lord Chief Justice, Lord Judge, commented that it would introduce flexibility and obviate the need for technical transfers between the High Court and the county courts. The instrument under consideration today accordingly reflects Sir Henry’s recommendation in this regard.
I will now set out the problem with the current jurisdiction of the courts in relation to freezing orders and why the Government are taking this action. Currently, under the 1991 regulations, the county court’s jurisdiction to make freezing orders is limited to making orders for the purpose of preserving property that forms or may form the subject matter of proceedings, or to preserve assets following judgment, but prior to execution of that judgment.
Those limitations do not apply if the order is made by a Court of Appeal judge or a judge of the High Court sitting in the county court or a mercantile judge in respect of proceedings in the Central London County Court mercantile list. Save in those circumstances, the county court is prohibited from making pre-judgment freezing orders. In all other cases, if a freezing order is required in county court proceedings, the application must be made to the High Court, even though the substantive case is being heard in the county court.
The result is that in county court proceedings where a claimant wants to apply for a freezing order to prevent the defendant from moving or disposing of his assets, the claimant will have to apply to the Chancery Division of the High Court at the Royal Courts of Justice in London, the London Mercantile Court or the nearest local district registry. In doing so, the county court would have to transfer the case to the relevant court to consider the freezing-order application. Once the application is determined, the court will transfer the case back to the county court.
The implication of the current procedure is that claimants—for example, estate agents suing for small amounts of unpaid commission—have either to inundate the mercantile courts with applications for pre-judgment freezing orders or to apply to the Chancery Division of the High Court or a local district registry. That increases the workload of the High Court, which is unnecessary, particularly as the High Court should not be the point of entry for comparatively low-value claims for what could be a simple and straightforward case. Also, those transfers often result in delays not only in dealing with a particular freezing-order application, but in dealing with all cases promptly.
The Government are committed to providing an effective and efficient civil justice system with a flexible judiciary that is deployed in the most appropriate way. In view of the time and costs associated with issuing and allocating freezing-order applications in the High Court and the time taken to transfer the substantive cases, consider them and then transfer them back to the county court and the potential costs to parties, the Government considered that the jurisdiction of the county court to grant freezing orders ought to be extended. It was on that basis that the Government consulted on the proposal in its 2011 Solving Disputes consultation paper. Ninety per cent of respondents, who included legal practitioners, members of the judiciary, judicial bodies and regulatory bodies, were in support, on the basis that only suitably experienced and qualified circuit judges of the county courts should be given the jurisdiction.
In view of that overwhelming support, the Government announced their intention to enable the county court to grant freezing orders in all cases under its jurisdiction. The jurisdiction will be extended to circuit judges who have been nominated by the Lord Chief Justice. Consequently, the statutory instrument before us today gives effect to that commitment by revoking the 1991 regulations and, in doing so, removing the current limitations, to enable the county court to make freezing orders in all cases.
The changes brought by this statutory instrument support the Government’s commitment to an effective and efficient civil justice and courts system. We consider that the current position is disproportionate and that unnecessary costs are incurred. It follows that the current restriction on the county court’s jurisdiction to grant freezing orders constitutes a restriction on access to justice for court users. Consequently, it is our intention to lift those restrictions to broaden the county court’s jurisdiction in this regard to improve access to justice while optimising the use of judicial resources. That would mean that court users can have their freezing-order applications considered in the court where their substantive cases are being heard.
Invariably, this should contribute to a reduction in the volume of transfers from the county court to the High Court and the number of applications considered in the High Court. It would thereby provide efficiency benefits for the courts, since less time and fewer administrative and judicial resources would be needed to allocate these applications and transfer the substantive cases to the High Court. For the same reasons, court users could experience a more streamlined service and a reduction in transfers. As one respondent pointed out:
“Any power to help enforcement is a good move. Having to apply to the High Court often many miles away or in London can be wasteful in costs and time. There is no reason for a Circuit Judge not to deal with these applications”.
I therefore commend these draft regulations to the Committee. I beg to move.
Lord Beecham (Lab)
My Lords, I had anticipated that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Scott, would speak, which would have made me even more the lowest-ranked member of the legal profession to have spoken today, but I defer in any event to the Minister’s legal knowledge and expertise. As already indicated, I have no particular problem with this instrument.
However, it is ironic that the title of the response to the public consultation, which is not in itself a very brief title, is Solving Disputes in the County Courts: Creating a Simpler, Quicker and More Proportionate System. It is ironic because the original report on which the regulations are based was, as the Minister pointed out, published in 2008. It has taken three years from the publication of the response to bring forward the proposals before us today. This seems to be an example of the Bleak House style of legislation: you take an eternity to produce a response. That is not the fault of this particular Government; it seems to me characteristic of the way, perhaps in particular in legal affairs, matters take an inordinate time to be resolved. One thinks of the length of time it takes for any Law Commission report to come forward in the form of legislation. It is something perhaps that the Government could look at.
On the substance of the order, there is no particular problem, but I have just one question to ask about it. To begin with, it struck me that, even if there was an argument about the decision that might be taken by one of the newly appointed circuit judges as opposed to a High Court judge, there is of course in any event a right of appeal, so that those decisions can be challenged. However, I notice that, just four days ago, it was announced that the Supreme Court, following a hearing in the Court of Appeal, will now hear the case of Ablyazov, where the assets frozen amounted to some £40 million—this is not freezing a vehicle or goods; it is a very substantial sum of money. I wonder whether any consideration has been given to a threshold above which it might be expected that a case will still go to the High Court. I am not saying that circuit judges would be incapable of dealing with cases involving £40 million or more, but there might be some questions to be asked about that. Of course, even if people were dissatisfied with an order made by such a judge, there would still be the right of appeal, but I wonder whether consideration was given to some threshold above which a higher court judge might in the first instance be asked to make a determination. That is an aspect that might be kept under review. Subject to that, we would not quibble with the instrument before us.
Lord Faulks
My Lords, I am grateful for the observations from the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, who, as ever, is far too modest about his skill and expertise. On consultation, there was quite a hiatus following the original publication of the Brooke report. The consultation was deep and wide, involving all the appropriate parties—judicial and legal bodies, regulatory bodies, representative bodies, such as civil court users, local authorities, mediation and mediation advocates, academics, citizens advice bureaux, financial organisations, government departments and members of the public. It took a little time for the Government to produce their response, which was published in 2012, but since that time they have taken forward the Brooke recommendations to implement the single county court in the Crime and Courts Act 2013. In the light of the changes being made to the county court as a result of that legislation, we considered that it was appropriate for this and other Brooke recommendations to come into force on the implementation of the single county court.
On the second point made by the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, I think that he may have somewhat misunderstood the purport of this instrument. Of course, it extends the jurisdiction of the county court, but if it is attached to a money claim, the ceiling is £100,000, so that his scenario of £40 million would not come within the county court’s jurisdiction. It is always alarming to freeze a sum of that nature but, if there is a freezing order, as he will know, it may be ex parte originally, but there is always the possibility of the respondent coming back to court to modify, discharge or vary it or to apply exceptions to the order. Therefore, it is not as draconian a remedy as it seems, but it is an essential remedy sometimes to stop the dissipation of assets. The purpose of this extension of jurisdiction is to make sure that that valuable remedy exists whether the claim is £40 million or a much more modest sum. It allows there to be convenience for court users and it gives judges, who will have the necessary training, as wide a jurisdiction as required to enable those who seek to ensure that their assets, which they have a reasonable and proper expectation of recovering, are not frittered away and dissipated without justification. I hope that that satisfies the noble Lord.
Senior Judiciary: Women
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Lord Faulks
This is a difficult problem and the more that I have read about it the more difficult I think it is. It was much debated during the passage of the 2013 Act. The Government are doing their best to encourage diversity but the problem probably starts much earlier, in the structure of the relative professions. The number of women applicants for High Court positions is, sadly, still relatively low. That is less the case in the lower judiciary. The position is that there is one woman in the Supreme Court, and 19 out of 108 High Court judges are women, as are seven out of 38 Lords Justices in the Court of Appeal. This is a regrettable state of affairs and, clearly, we hope that things change.
Lord Beecham (Lab)
My Lords, I declare a paternal interest since my daughter sits as a part-time district judge. Given the high proportion of women among criminal and family law practitioners in particular, will the Government rethink the position that they set out in their response to the Transforming Legal Aid consultation in which, in relation to the need to promote diversity, they said that even if the reform of legal aid were,
“to make the attainment of the objectives more difficult, we consider that the changes are necessary and justified”?
Will the Government accept that they have a responsibility in this area, rather than simply asserting, as they did in the same response, that for underrepresented groups like women and BME aspirants, the primary responsibility is that of the Bar and the solicitors’ profession?
Lord Faulks
I agree with the noble Lord that the primary responsibility is for the professions: the Bar Standards Board and the Solicitors Regulation Authority. The question of legal aid, we submit, is not the right instrument in order to encourage diversity. The provision of legal aid depends upon trying to target those most in need of legal aid in accordance with the available budget.