Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateLord Bassam of Brighton
Main Page: Lord Bassam of Brighton (Labour - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Bassam of Brighton's debates with the Department for Business and Trade
(5 months, 2 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, the Government fundamentally believe that public transparency is vital for the new digital markets regime. We noted the strength of feeling on this issue from noble Lords in Committee, which is why the Government have tabled amendments to enhance the transparency of the regime. The amendments will require the Digital Markets Unit to publish the full notices relating to SMS designation, conduct requirements and PCIs, so that all interested parties can access them. Amendment 54 makes it explicit that the DMU may make redactions for confidentiality purposes when publishing notices or other documents.
Finally, as a consequence of the other amendments in this group, Amendment 3 will require the DMU to send other regulators a full copy of an SMS investigation notice provided to the firm under investigation, rather than a summary. I hope that noble Lords will support these amendments, which address concerns raised in Committee on the transparency of DMU decisions. I beg to move.
My Lords, as the Minister described, this group has government amendments, from Amendment 2 to Amendment 38, which add greater transparency to the process adopted by the CMA in disclosing information about cases involving SMS status firms where the challenger companies have an interest. We are pleased with the Minister’s amendments and, broadly speaking, happy to give them our support, as they respond to points that a number of noble Lords made at earlier stages of the Bill about the need for greater transparency and openness.
The SMS companies are in a position of significant market strength vis-à-vis the challenger firms and have a clear interest in seeing the bigger picture when disclosure is made of information that is of material interest. By obliging the publication of the notices and orders, rather than summaries of the documents, we feel that challenger companies will have greater access to key information that may impact on their market performance. Our amendments, from Amendment 4 to Amendment 39, attempt to achieve a similar result; I suspect that Ministers will argue that their amendments have greater elegance and a similar effect.
I turn to government Amendment 54 and our own Amendment 5. We are clearly of a similar mind and share concerns about commercial confidentiality so that, where reasonable, the redaction of documents can take place. We differ in our approach simply by suggesting that there should be a system for registering the documents that are relevant; the Minister might like to think about that at a later date. In essence, this is an operational issue so, to satisfy our concerns, perhaps he can put on record that there will be an effective system for the registration of documents and a notification process that enables the challenger firms to understand better what information has been disclosed to the CMA in the course of its inquiries. On that basis, we will be content not to move our amendments, and we thank the Government for responding to the concerns behind them.
My Lords, this is a very straightforward group, and I congratulate the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, and the noble Lord, Lord Bassam, on having persuaded the Government to move further on the transparency agenda. I like the description given by the noble Lord, Lord Bassam, of the government amendment being more elegant. It is nice to think of amendments being elegant; it is not often that we think in those terms. We very much support the new amendments with some of the caveats that he made.
My Lords, I very much support Amendment 61 moved by my noble friend and colleague Lord Clement-Jones. I am very much a believer in equality of arms. The issue of exemplary damages speaks exactly to that. I hope very much that the Government will take that on board, because it is a fundamental principle that makes a great deal of practical difference as well when wrong has happened and when people seek redress.
I support the two amendments tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Tyrie. Briefly, on Amendment 153, regarding the five-year review, I had the privilege of serving under the noble Lord’s chairmanship on the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards. In many ways that was similar to this Bill, but our proposals were exceedingly radical. They required very substantial change by the financial services industry. We very much wanted them to be reviewed after a period of time. We did not manage to trap that into legislation; it did not happen. Instead, when issues became evident where we had made changes—for example, on presumptions of guilt and in areas where there was intense lobbying on ring-fencing and whatever else—changes happened but not in a coherent and sensible way that benefited from that overarching focus that we had had during the original review. That has been a real weakness. We finally have a new committee in this House, the Financial Services Regulation Committee, providing some accountability to regulators, but that is an issue that we would have picked up on much earlier had we been in the process of doing a comprehensive review. That underscores many of the points that have been made about this issue.
We live in changing times. The idea that things stand still and you can do everything piecemeal is really not appropriate. However, I will speak most on the issue of whistleblowing. I have not otherwise participated on the Bill but, when I see the word “whistleblowing”, I am afraid that I suddenly find myself lured on to the Benches.
I very much ask the Government to take this issue on board, because I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Tyrie, and others: we will never get to grips with wrongdoing in any of the areas covered by the Bill, particularly with all the new complexities and the constant change within the digital and competitive arena, until we have an effective whistleblowing regime. We need a system that leads to the follow-up of valid tips from whistleblowers. Currently, looking at different regulators in many different fields is clearly completely haphazard. Some tips are followed up, some are dismissed and some are ignored. Secondly, and just as importantly, we need a proper arrangement to protect whistleblowers from retaliation, so they will not suffer detriment by coming forward.
Our current system depends on the Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998, which was a Private Member’s Bill that was brought forward then as part of employment law. It was ground-breaking at the time but has long been shown to be utterly inadequate compared with more recent schemes, particularly in the United States. Those US schemes have had an astonishing success rate in disclosing wrongdoing, leading to prosecutions, convictions and financial penalties.
I will use an example not from the anti-trust field but from a field that I know best and with which many will be familiar—the Securities and Exchange Commission. Since it brought in its whistleblowing scheme in 2011 under the then new Dodd-Frank legislation, by the end of fiscal year 2022, it had received over 83,000 tips from whistleblowers and collected in excess of $6 billion in financial penalties. In fact, there has been so much activity in the following years that those numbers would be significantly higher if we brought them up to date.
It is also fair to assume that billions of dollars of wrongdoing have been deterred by the fear of disclosure under such an effective whistleblowing regime. Not just the SEC but a number of entities use whistle- blowing legislation within the financial field; the Commodity Futures Trading Commission—CFTC—is another example that has had the same kind of success as the SEC. I find it rather disturbing that the CFTC is now doing road trips in the UK to encourage whistleblowers who are aware of financial wrongdoing with any US connection to contact it directly. In fact, something close to a quarter of the cases it is currently pursuing have a UK-based whistleblower somewhere within them, because finance is so international. Now the people at the CFTC are very careful not to criticise any UK regulators, but it is not a compliment that they feel it is necessary to be here to get their independent message across to anyone who has come across wrong-doing, with a US connection, in the financial field.
The Public Interest Disclosure Act is inadequate for at least four reasons, some of which were mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Tyrie. It does not require any follow-up on a tip, even if it is acknowledged to be valid. It covers only employees and not the many others, such as contractors or clients—all kinds of people come forward—who blow the whistle when they see wrongdoing. They are not covered at all and have zero protection at present. All it provides is anonymity for disclosures that are made to a prescribed group of people—basically, the regulators and MPs. Most whistleblowers are not anonymous; they will have raised issues with management, companies, employers, suppliers and clients. When they see something wrong, they do not instinctively think of themselves as whistleblowers in need of protection, and when they do, their identity is then known.
No regulator in the UK has ever acted to protect a whistleblower from retaliation. That retaliation is usually years spent in an employment tribunal or in the courts. For many whistleblowers, it is a loss of career. There is a wide scheme of informal blacklisting—we know of case after case. Many whistleblowers have to use their own resources because there is no legal aid to fight this process, so they run into financial ruin. You can imagine the mental health costs and the frequency with which families break down.
However, I have spoken to pretty much every UK regulator and typically—there are a few exceptions—they regard their own monitoring and supervision as entirely sufficient, with whistleblowing a mere marginal assistance. They also believe that whistleblowers should act out of duty and altruism, and not because there is protection from retaliation available or compensation for harm.
I have talked about the SEC and the CFTC and, prior to the Dodd-Frank legislation in the United States, which put in the strict whistleblowing rules and made them mandatory, US regulators had exactly the same attitude as the current UK regulators and the same failure to create a pattern of whistleblowing and to follow up cases. The change came with legislation.
In the sectors covered by the Bill, the rewards for wrongdoing are a huge temptation and require highly sophisticated expertise and knowledge. We can see why that is tough for a regulator to manage, unless it has a really effective whistleblowing programme. In its recent directive, the EU is now catching up with the United States in recognising whistleblowing as a key tool to expose wrongdoing early and to deter wrongful behaviour. It is time that we did the same.
I hope that the Minister takes back this message to those who are working on the reform of the whistleblowing framework, as it is really important. Sometimes one hears rumours that they are looking just to tweak existing legislation, but what is needed is a radical change that meets the needs and gives us the opportunity that an active whistleblowing community can deliver. I hope the Government will take on board that message.
My Lords, I promise that I am not going to stand for too long between this session and people’s desire to have supper. I have a few words to say, but I will try to keep them as brief as I can. This group of amendments deals with the interaction of the courts with regulation and redress, and we obviously support Amendment 61, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, on exemplary damages in class action cases. We will listen to the Minister’s explanation carefully and try to understand why the Government are continuing to resist this approach.
We recognise that government Amendment 62 is part of a wider initiative to put right the fallout from the Supreme Court judgment in the PACCAR case, which acted as an inhibition to litigation fee agreements that enable collective actions such as those involving the postmasters and postmistresses. If we have learned anything from Committee, it is that Ministers should live in dread of the experience of the former Lord Chief Justice, at all times. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, offered us some wise words on that occasion and I am glad—delighted, actually—to see the Government finally acting with some speed to bring forward a Bill from the Ministry of Justice that covers a wider range of cases than the current Clause 127 achieves. If the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, had not quoted Alan Bates, I would have done, because I thought it was a ringing endorsement of what was necessary.
Perhaps I could task the Minister and tire him a little to put a bit more on the record about the detail, nature and extent of the short Bill when he sums up. Can he give us a clue about its introduction date?