Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill

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Committee stage & Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard) & Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 9th February 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB) [V]]

My Lords, I have just a little to add to what has already been said about Clause 40.

The current requirement that a residence condition be “overnight” has acted as a limitation on the maximum length of the nightly period of house arrest that may be imposed under a TPIM; the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, referred to some of the case law on this subject. Confinement to the home during substantial parts of the day may sound almost familiar in times of Covid but it would represent a major reversal of past practice. I see that my own 2012 report, to which the Minister was kind enough to refer, confirms that even control orders featured curfews of only up to 16 hours.

In that context, I have three questions. First, if Clause 40 is passed into law, for how many hours a day will it be permissible to confine TPIM subjects to their designated residences if that is considered, in the Minister’s words, “necessary and proportionate”? Is there any reason why it should not be for 23 or, indeed, 24 hours?

Secondly, what are the specific circumstances that make it necessary for public safety to extend these already formidable powers in this way? If they are to be credible after 15 years of real-world experience, please may we have actual examples, even if they must be anonymised, rather than hypothetical ones?

Thirdly, and more generally, my sense from the last few debates is that the Government will have to work quite hard if they are to persuade noble Lords of the operational case for some of these changes—particularly as they appear not to have persuaded their own independent reviewer, with all his privileged access to classified material. What proposals does the Minister have in that regard?

[Lord Bach (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, I declare my interest as the elected and serving police and crime commissioner for Leicester, Leicestershire and Rutland. I have been in that post for nearly five years now but in three months’ time, if the 6 May elections take place as the Government propose, I will no longer have this interest to declare. I look forward to once again playing a greater role in your Lordships’ House.

However, when, as in this Bill, issues of delicate constitutional importance arise—issues that affect the relationship between the state, in the guise of the Home Secretary and the police, and the individual, in the guise here of the reasonably suspected person—surely it is important to examine with great care, as this House always does and clearly has done today, the implications for the rule of law and individual liberty. That is why I put my name to my noble friend Lord Hunt of Kings Heath’s Amendment 31, which, strangely, is in this group.

Amendment 31 suggests a practical and sensible way forward—one that balances the interests of all involved, I would argue. It suggests a role for police and crime commissioners that seems entirely appropriate and consistent with the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011. When the coalition Government proposed the setting up of what I will call PCCs, they deliberately gave them considerable responsibilities and powers. Not only were they described as the “local policing body”; the Policing Protocol Order 2011 insisted that police and crime commissioners had a role in the “totality of policing”. Sometimes, it seems as though the then Government’s intentions, as contained in the Act passed by Parliament, have not always been fulfilled by succeeding Governments, who, although keen to support the legislation, seem to draw back from some of its consequences. I very much hope that the way in which the Minister deals with this amendment will show that I am wrong.

Of course, we all agree that strong powers are needed to protect society from those who would use, aid or support terrorism to get their own way. In this Bill, there is an obvious intention to strengthen the power of the state against the individual, pointed out repeatedly by noble Lords from all sides. This involves the removal of basic safeguards, as we have heard today: first, the need for there merely to be reasonable suspicion, rather than proof of a balance of probabilities, and, secondly, the open-ended nature of a TPIM. The dangers of that last approach were referred to by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, in the context of recent public prevention legislation. Immense executive power attaches to the Home Secretary and the police, who are tasked with TPIM powers.

Third Parties (Rights against Insurers) Regulations 2016

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Tuesday 22nd March 2016 Grand Committee

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

I am grateful to the Minister for his explanation and also for bringing this set of regulations forward for our consideration and for the House’s approval in due course. It is an extremely important area which I think anybody practising in the common-law field values very much. I have only one question and that is to ask for reassurance in relation to part of Regulation 3, which deals with the relevant bodies in insolvency or administration under sectoral legislation. This is an extremely sophisticated area of law and I join in the Minister’s congratulations to all those who have played a part in putting all this together.

A feature of the list of enactments set out in Schedule A1 is that all except the last deal with areas of regulation which are common to the United Kingdom, with the special provisions made in the case of Northern Ireland which are set out in the schedule. Aviation, energy, financial services, postal services and railways apply equally to Scotland as they do to England and Wales. But the question of water and sewerage has occurred to me, because Scotland, I believe, has its own legislation relating to sewers and water: there is the Water (Scotland) Act, the date of which escapes me, and I believe that there is a sewerage Act for Scotland as well.

I fear that without detailed research, which is beyond my resources at the moment, I am not sure whether the Scottish legislation provides for administration under a legislative scheme. I am fairly confident that the Water Industry Act 1991, referred to here, does not extend to Scotland. It may well be that those who have been looking at this in detail have reassured themselves that there is no need for a mention of the Scottish legislation, perhaps because it does not actually provide for this kind of administration. If that is right, of course I understand why there is no mention of those statutes, but it might be as well to be absolutely sure that there is not a gap here that ought to be plugged before the regulations are brought into force.

That aside, I regard this as a very fine piece of fine-tuning which I am sure will be greatly welcomed in order to avoid any further gaps in the valuable legislation.

[Lord Bach (Lab)]

My Lords, I, too, thank the Minister for his explanation of this statutory instrument. I confirm that it is not controversial in the slightest. We are happy to support it, as we supported, of course, the 2010 Bill as it went through Parliament. Indeed, I hope I may be forgiven for reminding the Grand Committee—it was some time ago now—that I was the Minister who took that Law Commission Bill through this House, using the special procedure. I was assisted then by an excellent team from the Ministry of Justice and I suspect—indeed, I am sure—that the Minister has been so assisted today.

The Minister will know that we on this side have many criticisms of much that the Ministry of Justice does these days, but in this area of complex but important law-making and law revision, we have nothing but praise. I have a couple of questions and comments for the Minister’s consideration, but they are brief.

The first point is about paragraph 8 of the Explanatory Memorandum, which deals with the consultation outcome. It says that the APIL and the ABI—the Association of Personal Injury Lawyers and the Association of British Insurers—have been consulted and are broadly content. The memorandum states:

“Both organisations expressed general approval of the Regulations”.

Is there a particular meaning to the word “general” in that particular context? I am pretty reassured that there is not, because I have a letter here from APIL itself, which suggests that it is happy with the regulations, but I wonder what the expression means in that context—probably nothing.

Armed Services: War Crimes

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Tuesday 1st March 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Bach (Lab)]

My Lords, when can we look forward to the draft Bill of Rights and will its timing be affected by the EU referendum?

[Lord Faulks]

My Lords, we are in the hands of the Prime Minister, who has a number of elections to consider —local elections, elections of the devolved assemblies, and the small matter of the European referendum. Noble Lords may have to wait a little longer, but it will of course be well worth waiting for.

Public Advocate Bill [HL]

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Friday 29th January 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Bach (Lab)]

My Lords, on behalf of Her Majesty’s Opposition, we welcome the Bill and congratulate my noble friend Lord Wills on introducing it. I have some personal reasons for welcoming it: I was a ministerial colleague of my noble friend and my honourable friend Maria Eagle MP at the Ministry of Justice at the crucial time when, after a shamefully long period, the Hillsborough tragedy began to be properly investigated. Great credit is due to both my noble friend and Maria Eagle for the work they did when jointly Ministers of State at the Ministry of Justice.

All this, of course, is in no small measure due to the work of many, many people. However, I want to mention, as my noble friend Lord Wills did, the previous Bishop of Liverpool, our erstwhile colleague in this House, and, if I may, the now shadow Home Secretary, the right honourable Andy Burnham MP, who played an enormous part in what has happened. However, as my noble friend said, it is the bereaved who deserve more credit than anyone.

This Bill is timely, in the sense that the inquest is moving now towards a conclusion, but 27 years after a national tragedy such as Hillsborough is, as other speakers have said, far too long to wait for a definitive judgment on what happened and why. I am very conscious, as I know the House is, that the inquest is not yet finished, so I will avoid, as will others I am sure, any comment on any conclusions it may or may not reach. What is clear is that this sort of delay must never be allowed to happen again. In our judgment, this Bill is a serious attempt at ensuring that it never does. In a civilised country, the agony of relatives of those who die in a tragedy such as this should never be added to by their having to wait an appalling length of time to find out the truth.

I can be brief today. There are strong rumours that the Government are sympathetic to this Bill and the idea behind it, and I hope that those are true. I am sure my noble friend will agree that there are probably some drafting changes that need to be made at a later stage. However, it is important that the Government, in as much as it is within their power, allow time for this Bill to progress in this House and, most importantly, reach the other place with a real chance of going through its various stages and becoming law—unless, of course, they have some other intention in relation to the Bill. We look forward to hearing what the Minister has to say on that point.

Today, at Second Reading, we are debating the principles behind the Bill. However, I hope my noble friend will forgive me if I raise two possible issues for the future. The first is whether the independence of the public advocate—a very important concept and a crucial principle—should not perhaps be set out in the Bill itself, perhaps as part of Clause 1(1). Secondly, is there an argument for saying that the public advocate should always be the chair of an advocates’ panel rather than just a member? Might this enhance the confidence of the bereaved and ensure more transparency? I pose these questions for further consideration. In short, today, I hope the House will celebrate the introduction and Second Reading of this Bill. It is an important step forward and we on this side of the House are delighted to support its Second Reading.

Criminal Legal Aid Services

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Friday 29th January 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Bach (Lab)]

My Lords, I start by thanking the Minister for repeating the Answer given in another place. I hope the Minister will acknowledge that, although the announcement made by the Lord Chancellor yesterday is of course welcome to criminal law practitioners and others, it represents something of a disaster for his department. It was not only Her Majesty’s Opposition who opposed the two-tier contracting scheme when it was first mooted, way back in 2013 by the coalition Government, but practitioners, experts and many others. We all pointed out that it could not work, that it would mean the closure of too many solicitors’ firms and that it would result, seriously, in legal deserts where those facing criminal charges would not always be able to find advice and representation. That is why we welcome the U-turn.

However, now the scheme has been abandoned, it leaves behind it enormous costs for the Government, for many solicitors’ firms—whether successful or unsuccessful in their tenders—and, of course, for those involved in the litigation. Just think of all those wasted hours worked by civil servants, solicitors’ firms and others—and all for what? What do Her Majesty’s Government intend should happen next? Sometimes in government it is right to say sorry. Does the Minister agree that this is one of those times?

[Lord Faulks]

A Government should always say sorry when they make a mistake. This is a response to a difficult situation which confronted the Government. As I indicated, contractions were taking place within the market. There has also, fortunately, been a drop in the crime rate generally, and the need for consolidation was overtly acknowledged by the Law Society. So these changes were not, as was suggested by the noble Lord, going wholly against the grain, true though it was that many objected to those changes.

It is easy to say that this was a disaster for the department, but the noble Lord is not himself unfamiliar with changes in policy. In 2009, as he may well remember, the Labour Government altered their approach to criminal legal aid. Governments of all colours will, from time to time, in reviewing these difficult situations and in trying to balance the need for access to justice and the need to control public expenditure, adjust their plans.

What we have done has been welcomed by the profession. We have considerable regard and respect for the profession, particularly those criminal legal aid solicitors who go to the police station at highly inconvenient hours and provide valuable assistance to their clients. The profession has welcomed the abandonment of dual contracting, the suspension of the second fee cut and the Government’s intention to work with the professions, as we have indicated, to try to ensure that changes that will have to be made in due course are made with maximum co-operation from both solicitors and barristers.

Although we have not yet calculated the overall cost, this will certainly have been expensive, which is of course a matter of regret. However, if it results in stabilisation of the legal profession and continued maintenance of high standards, then that is not a matter of regret. We will of course have to accept the characterisation of this as a U-turn. I am not sure that U-turns are always quite the disasters they are depicted as in the newspapers. If a responsible government department thinks again, that may be characterised as a U-turn or it may be considered an appropriate response to changed circumstances.

Age of Criminal Responsibility Bill [HL]

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Friday 29th January 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Bach (Lab)]

My Lords, I congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Dholakia, on bringing his Bill back before the House and on his persistence in a cause that he believes in passionately. I value my personal friendship with the noble Lord and admire him for his great knowledge and expertise in this vital area.

We very much support the Bill having a Second Reading today and that this debate—and it is a debate—should continue in a proper manner. Today, I cannot give my party’s full support to the noble Lord’s proposal, but I hope that he bears my words very carefully in mind. We are obviously considering policy on a whole range of issues—that happens after a general election defeat—and it applies here as it applies elsewhere. Although I cannot promise him full support on principle, I want him to watch this space closely.

A very strong and powerful case for reform has been made around the House. Sometimes in debates of this kind in the House I have been on the side of all those who have supported a particular project. It is a very comforting and enjoyable position to be in. I have also been in the position that the Minister might be in today—I am looking forward to hearing what he has to say—of being the only person to resist what seems a very powerful argument made in different ways around the House. I am not as enthusiastic or sure about my own position as practically all those who have spoken. I do not think it is cowardice for people who make laws to bear in mind that issues of this kind raise very powerful and genuine emotions and feelings, often from victims and their relatives. Frankly, it is not the duty of Parliament to ignore those feelings, saying that they can just be dismissed and that we know better. I wanted to get that off my chest. I had to say that in government and I say it in opposition, too. There is a real need for a continuous public debate on this far-from-straightforward issue.

Many who took part in the last debate will remember the contribution of the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, who referred to the Bulger case. What he had to say was as powerful then as it is today. All I can say is that my party will play its full part in the discussion that follows. For me, an equally, if not more, important issue than the age of criminal responsibility is how the system deals with these children, whether they are prosecuted or not.

I was fortunate enough to be asked by the noble Lord, Lord Carlile of Berriew, to sit on an all-party unofficial committee of both Houses which produced, I believe, a very valuable and serious report on youth offending. It asked what society should do with those who commit offences at a young age, whether or not you call them criminals. The elephant in the room during those discussions and the argument that we did not take on was the age of criminal responsibility. We said, “No, that’s not relevant to what we’re looking at. We’re looking at what happens to those who have clearly committed wrong—and criminal wrong—in those circumstances”. It seemed to us from the powerful evidence that we had that the whole mood had altered from the situation when, for example, I was a very young lawyer doing criminal cases to looking at solutions that were welfare-based rather than punishment-based. That is true whether or not someone is taken to the youth court. Just because criminal responsibility exists for 10 year-olds, that does not mean that a welfare conclusion is not reached, and today it seems that it invariably is. Whether there is then a mismatch as far as the age of responsibility is concerned, I know not. However, I see the power of the arguments that have been made today from around the House suggesting that there may not be enough logic in taking someone to a youth court at a very young age and then coming up with a welfare conclusion.

What we do to prevent children committing offences and making victims’ lives hell—let us not forget that the effect on a victim of an offence committed by an 11 year-old can be every bit as painful for that victim as an offence committed by an adult—is a hugely important part of public policy. It is that issue that the noble Lord, Lord Dholakia, quite rightly keeps raising with us. It is, I think, coming to a time when a conclusion must finally be made.

The point made about international comparisons is very powerful and has to be accepted by the Government, the Opposition and Parliament as a whole.

We do not deny the important principle behind the noble Lord’s Bill. We are delighted to support its Second Reading and hope that it encourages the national debate that we need on such an important and difficult subject. I do not think this is an easy subject, but it is one that the Government and the Opposition are now going to have to grasp.

British Bill of Rights

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Thursday 10th December 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Faulks]

I have, of course, read what the Secretary of State said to the Constitution Committee, of which the noble Lord is a distinguished member. I do not think anything I have said is divergent from the evidence he gave and we certainly have no intention of legislating specifically as the Russian Duma did yesterday.

[Lord Bach (Lab)]

My Lords, given the extremely difficult situation the world community faces, is this really the right moment to repeal the Human Rights Act? Do the Government really believe they are setting a good example to other countries, some of which may not have the same respect for the rule of law as we traditionally have, by repealing the Human Rights Act and inevitably coming into conflict with the ECHR?

[Lord Faulks]

The repeal of the Human Rights Act is part of a manifesto commitment; it does not in any way diminish our respect for the importance of protecting human rights. What we are concerned with is the overreach of the Strasbourg court and the relationship between this Parliament, the Supreme Court and the Strasbourg court. This does not mean that there is any diminishing of our respect for the protection of human rights.

Legal Aid

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Thursday 10th December 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Bach (Lab)]

My Lords, I start by thanking all noble Lords who have taken part in this debate. It has been an excellent debate, which is hardly surprising given the stellar cast list. I am particularly grateful to my noble friend Lord Howarth of Newport for agreeing to open the debate. My Front Bench responsibilities mean I have to wind up for the Opposition. I am sure the House will agree that the noble Lord, Lord Howarth, did a superb job.

Rather unusually, I thank someone who has not taken part: the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. He, as the noble Lord, Lord Lester, reminded us, devoted his column in today’s Times to this debate. What he has to say about the Government’s conduct over the past few years and—as importantly—his suggestions about the future of legal aid are, as the House would expect, extremely clear and telling. If I have one regret about the debate it is that, apart from the excellent Minister, the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, there will be no one speaking from the government Benches today. It makes us regret even more than normal the absence of the late Lord Newton of Braintree, who used to be such an important part of these debates.

The subject of today’s debate is the future of legal aid. In instigating the debate, I thought it well past time for this House, with its obvious expertise in this field, to discuss once again this vital issue. I confess I also had another purpose. Noble Lords will know now that the new leader of the Labour Party, Jeremy Corbyn, has asked me to lead a review into the future of legal aid under the auspices of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, the shadow Lord Chancellor. Mr Corbyn is, I believe, the first leader of a political party in this country really to understand legal aid and its importance, not just in our legal system but for the type of country we want to be. In my view, it is well past time that a major political party undertook such a review. This is not because there has been a lack of excellent work done in this field. I have only to mention the three reports from the Low commission—and it was very good to hear the noble Lord, Lord Low, today—the Legal Aid Practitioners Group, Justice and many more. A political party that hopes to win power needs a robust, thought-through policy that is credible, practical and principled. What better way to ensure the review’s success than to canvass the views of this House and listen to its analysis of where legal aid is now and what should be done in the future to ensure it plays its proper role? We are in the process of asking people to sit on a commission that will advise on the way legal aid should go. When the make-up of the commission is announced—shortly, I hope—it will be clear that its members have been chosen not for their political views but for their expertise in a wide variety of law, lawyers and non-lawyers alike.

What approach will we adopt? We hope to be inclusive; we will collaborate with the considerable and well-evidenced work and ideas that have already been developed; and we will not be afraid of innovation. We all have to look for new approaches—as has been said, many may involve the new technology—to meet the huge unmet needs that exist. Finally, we will do our best to try to stem the decline which there clearly has been and which exists in our justice system at the moment. It is a critical time, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, reminded us. Poorly thought-out reforms, many of them not evidence-based, have begun to affect the reputation that our legal system enjoys. If access to justice becomes no more than a theoretical right but is in fact denied to many, then, as has been pointed out by the senior judiciary, the rule of law itself is put at risk.

It sometimes seems that everyone in the world except the Ministry of Justice knows that LASPO has had a profound and debilitating effect on access to justice. Having removed, in such an unthinking way, so much from the scope of legal aid—so much family law and nearly all social welfare law—it is hardly surprising that litigants in person flood the family courts. In the area of social welfare law, many people—very largely the poor and the vulnerable—are no longer able to receive even advice.

It is perhaps just worth repeating the shocking statistic that, whereas in 2009-10 there were 471,000 advice and assistance new matter starts, by 2013-14—just four years later at the end of the first year of LASPO’s implementation—that figure had fallen to 52,000, a drop of nearly 90%. To put that in human terms, it represents hundreds of thousands of our fellow citizens who only a few years ago could get legal advice and now are not able to. It is almost beyond belief but the figures show it to be true.

In the field of criminal legal aid, which I will not have time to go into today, we have heard some passionate and very well-made speeches from all sides of this Chamber. I thank the noble Lords who have spoken about the real crisis that there undoubtedly is in the criminal system.

There were many decades when a broad consensus between the political parties helped to develop legal aid as an essential part of the social security system that every citizen was entitled to in a civilised country such as the United Kingdom. Sadly, that consensus has broken down to some extent, particularly in the last few years. I argue that the reason for that is largely, although not completely, the administrative and legislative action of the coalition Government. I was very grateful for what the noble Lord, Lord Marks, said a few minutes ago about that.

If there is one thing that I would like to see arise from the review that I am undertaking, it is the possibility of a return to that consensus. One hopes that it would be about the principles set out so well by the Young Legal Aid Lawyers—a very impressive group—in its briefing note:

“Equal access to justice for all irrespective of wealth should be the absolute core principle of our legal aid system. We believe that the cost of legal aid should be met by the state through general taxation. We believe that access to justice is a public good”—

I emphasise the words “a public good”—

“that should be classed by government in the same category as the rights to healthcare and education”.

These are principles that should unite us all, and I believe in principle that they do. However, if I may say so to the Minister, whose remarks I look forward to hearing, a good start would be for Her Majesty’s Government to think urgently about undoing some of the damage they have caused.

Legal Aid

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Tuesday 24th November 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Faulks]

The noble Lord is right that this has been the subject of legal challenges, just as the bidding process itself was subject to an unsuccessful judicial review. There have been individual legal claims under public procurement regulations and a judicial review in relation to the process. It is inappropriate for me to comment in detail about matters which are the subject of litigation. However, I can say that about 19% of the staff were temporary. The Government are satisfied that these staff were thoroughly adequately trained and that what they were asked to do was reasonable in the time afforded to them.

[Lord Bach (Lab)]

My Lords, can the Minister confirm that the criminal duty tender policy, which seems to have gone so wrong, was agreed by both parties in the coalition in 2013? Can he tell the House the current estimate of the eventual cost of the litigation now under way and when he expects that litigation to conclude? Finally, is it not well past time to scrap this ridiculous policy and begin negotiations again with the Law Society and the criminal law solicitors’ groups on a more sensible and sustainable way forward?

Civil Legal Aid (Merits Criteria) (Amendment) (No. 2) Regulations 2015

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Monday 23rd November 2015 Grand Committee

[The Minister of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord Faulks) (Con)]

My Lords, the statutory instrument before the Committee today amends the Civil Legal Aid (Merits Criteria) Regulations 2013, known as the “merits criteria regulations”, so that legal aid funding can be provided in some cases where the prospects of succeeding are below 50% but where legal aid funding is required under the European Convention on Human Rights or EU law. These changes have been made to reflect the findings on the legal aid merits test made by the High Court in the recent case of IS.

While this judgment is under appeal—I have had an indication that an appeal will be heard on 25 or 26 April next year—the Government consider it important that these amendments are brought into force without delay to provide a means by which the Legal Aid Agency is able to comply with the judgment in the interim. Failure to make such a change promptly would have resulted in an extended period in which the Legal Aid Agency might in some cases either have taken an unlawful decision or indeed have been unable to take any decision. For these reasons, and owing to limited parliamentary time, the statutory instrument before us was made and brought into force using the urgency procedure provided for under the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012.

The merits criteria regulations set out the merits criteria that must be applied by the Director of Legal Aid Casework at the Legal Aid Agency when determining whether an applicant qualifies for civil legal services under Part 1 of Schedule 1 to LASPO. Broadly speaking, these criteria provide the basis for deciding whether it is justified to provide, or to continue to provide, public funds in an individual case. The factors to be considered are similar to those that would influence a privately paying client of moderate means when considering whether to become involved in proceedings.

Why are the Government taking this action? The merits criteria regulations include a number of different requirements, including a prospects of success test for an application for full representation. When the prospects of success test applies, the regulations generally prevent the Legal Aid Agency funding any case where the prospects of success are below 50%. Had the merits criteria regulations remained unamended, the director would therefore have been placed in something of a bind. Refusing legal aid in some cases would have been an unlawful decision as, on the High Court’s findings, it might have resulted in a convention breach. While the Legal Aid Agency could have sought to delay non-urgent decisions, we did not think it would be reasonable to await the outcome of the Government’s appeal in this matter, which may not be known for some time. Even though the hearings are in April, there may well of course be some delay in producing a judgment.

The amendments made by this instrument mean that, in cases where an application for full representation is subject to an assessment of its prospects of success, legal aid may now be provided for some cases assessed as having “borderline” or “poor” prospects of success. The director will need to be satisfied that it is necessary to determine or, in the case of a risk of a breach, appropriate to determine that the prospects of success test is met in order to prevent a breach, or the risk of a breach, of the legal aid applicant’s rights under the convention or enforceable EU rights.

A discrete point arises. The Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments, or JCSI, has expressed its views on the clarity—or, more accurately, the lack of clarity—in respect of the transitional provisions in the SI. I apologise to the Committee for any confusion that may have been engendered; the department intends to develop a revised drafting approach—resulting, I hope, in greater clarity—to be used in future that is more closely targeted at solely those cases that begin before commencement. However, we consider that the transitional provisions in this instrument still operate to achieve the policy intention.

This instrument makes important and necessary amendments to the merits criteria regulations to ensure that legal aid will continue to be provided in any case where refusal to grant would be unlawful. It does so while maintaining the underlying purpose of the civil legal aid eligibility criteria and the legal aid scheme—that is, to make sure that the limited legal aid budget is directed at the cases which most justify public funding. I therefore commend this statutory instrument to the Committee, and I beg to move.

[Lord Bach (Lab)]

My Lords, I shall be extremely brief. I thank the Minister for his very clear outlining of these regulations. I can tell him and the Committee at once that the Opposition do not oppose it—indeed, we support it. I thank him for his generous apology regarding the points made by the JCSI. The regulations are clearly a sensible step for Her Majesty’s Government to have taken following the High Court judgment. The Government are appealing that decision, and we are grateful to the Minister for telling us the date. I gather that it was a fixed date for the hearing. The Minister and I know that those dates can change, however fixed they may or may not be. If the appeal is unsuccessful, will it be the Government’s intention to change the criteria by legislation? Our advice, for what it is worth—and if the Government are interested in any way—is not to do so. We welcome the regulations.

[Lord Faulks]

I am grateful to the noble Lord for his observations and for the advice that he so generously offered on behalf of Her Majesty’s Opposition. Of course, depending on the outcome of the case, one side or another might consider it necessary to pursue the matter further to the Supreme Court, were permission to be obtained, but in due course a decision will follow that judgment and we will decide whether or not to proceed with the matter.

I have been given an amended date, I am afraid to say. I wrongly informed the Committee that it was April, but the better news is that it has been brought forward: the date is now 21 or 22 March 2016, but of course that will be subject to the provisos so accurately identified by the noble Lord, Lord Bach.

[Lord Bach]

If we allow this to carry on for a bit longer, do you think that the date may get closer and closer?

[Lord Faulks]

I am grateful for that interruption. Who knows? But we are at least moving in the right direction, I am glad to say.

I am grateful for the general acknowledgement of the sense of these regulations, and I thank the noble Lord for that. I believe this to be an appropriate instrument that makes the necessary amendments to the merits criteria regulations in order to comply with the judgment pending the appeal.