Foreign Affairs Committee

Debate between Lord Austin of Dudley and Mark Pritchard

Tuesday 19th March 2019 Commons Chamber

[Ian Austin]

That is as may be, but I am not a member of the Independent Group; I am the independent MP for Dudley, standing up for the people of Dudley, and representing the whole of the House on the Foreign Affairs Committee, which is what members of Select Committees are elected to do.

As the Chair of the Liaison Committee pointed out in an article just this week,

“Select Committees have been strengthened”

since recent reforms

“which allowed their members to be elected by their fellow MPs—and Chairs by the whole House of Commons—rather than appointed by the patronage of party whips. As a result, members are more likely to have relevant experience and genuine interest in the work of their Committees”.

Of no one could that be said more truly than the hon. Member for Ilford South. As far as I am aware, there is no criticism of the way in which he or I have discharged our responsibilities on the Foreign Affairs Committee. He is a distinguished former Chair of the Committee, and before that he was the Labour party’s foreign policy expert. As I have seen in my short time on the Committee, and as Members in all parts of the House would agree, he has a more detailed knowledge of foreign policy issues, and greater contacts around the world, than anybody else in the House of Commons. Booting off the Committee somebody like that, who holds the Government to account, is a ridiculous decision. It flies in the face of how Select Committees are supposed to operate.

As for me, I was one of the people who instigated the Committee’s inquiries on Kurdistan. I was one of the MPs in this House who campaigned for years for the Magnitsky Act.

[Mark Pritchard (The Wrekin) (Con)]

The hon. Gentleman and I may disagree on many domestic policy issues, but for years we have worked together on many foreign policy issues, some of which he is touching on. He mentioned that the Leader of the Opposition is behind this move. Is that because the hon. Gentleman is now an independent Member of Parliament, or because of his views on antisemitism and some of the other foreign policy issues that he has just raised?

[Ian Austin]

I will come on to that, but I will say this: I have been very clear about why I left the Labour party. I left after 35 years because I had become absolutely ashamed of the way in which the leader of the Labour party had allowed a culture of extremism, antisemitism and intolerance to develop—and for no other reason. Members have a choice to make this afternoon. They can choose to stand with someone who has campaigned against racism all their life, or stand with the leader of the Labour party in his vindictive attempt to boot people off a Committee simply because they stood up to racism. Frankly, I think it is outrageous.

I make one more point on my work on the Foreign Affairs Committee. I was one of the MPs who were a driving force behind the Magnitsky Act—legislation to take tough action against people responsible for gross abuses of human rights and large-scale corruption. I was one of the Committee members who instigated its current inquiry on UK sanctions policy.

As I mentioned, this debate is happening because the Labour party has decided that it wants to kick me off the Committee in retaliation for my decision to leave the Labour party. I want to set out the background to that and explain why I took that decision. I want Members to think about this and consider it when deciding how to vote.

The main reason why I decided to join the Labour party, 35 years ago as a teenager in Dudley, was to fight racism. I really cannot believe that after all this time, I have ended up leaving the Labour party because of racism. It was a difficult decision for me to take, but I have to be honest with people, and the truth is that I have become ashamed of the Labour party under its current leadership. I am appalled by the offence and distress that the leader of the Labour party has caused to Jewish people. It is terrible that a culture of extremism, antisemitism and intolerance is driving out not just Members of Parliament, but other members, too—decent people who have dedicated their whole lives to mainstream politics.

It is a matter of great shame that someone such as the hon. Member for Liverpool, Wavertree (Luciana Berger) has been bullied out of the Labour party by antisemites. It was wrong of the Labour party to threaten the right hon. Member for Barking (Dame Margaret Hodge) and me with disciplinary action when we spoke out on antisemitism. It had to drop that, because we had done nothing wrong. The hard truth is that the Labour party under its current leadership is tougher on the people who complain about racism than on the racists.

The current leader and the people around him have turned what was a mainstream political party into something very different. He has spent his entire career working with, defending and supporting all sorts of extremists, and in some cases antisemites and terrorists. I thought from the very beginning—since before he was elected in 2015—that he would be utterly unfit to lead the Labour party, and he is completely unfit to be our country’s Prime Minister. He has said and done things that are clearly antisemitic, including defending that grotesque racist mural on a wall in east London. We need to ask ourselves what he would be saying if a senior member of the Conservative party had defended a grotesque mural that was racist against any other group of people. He called Jewish people Zionist, and said that they did not understand English irony—as if, somehow, they were different from the rest of us. He also calls Hamas and Hezbollah his friends.

--- Later in debate ---

[Ian Austin]

I completely understand, Mr Deputy Speaker. I have made some of the points that I wanted to make about the Leader of the Opposition and the position that he has taken the Labour party to under his leadership.

I will draw my remarks to a close. I want to stay on the Committee because I want to speak up for freedom, democracy, human rights and the rule of law. I want to carry on campaigning against totalitarian dictatorships such as Venezuela, which are supported by the leader of the Labour party and the people around him at the moment. I want to carry on speaking out against the Kremlin and against Vladimir Putin and his brutal regime of corruption and abuse: he murders people on the streets of Russia and kills them here in Britain, too. I think every Member will recall the appalling response that the Leader of the Opposition gave to the attacks in Salisbury. I will continue to campaign on these issues, which is why I want to stay on the Foreign Affairs Committee.

[Mark Pritchard]

The hon. Gentleman is being very generous, and I am grateful to him for giving way. I will need to decide which way to vote today. Will he also include in that litany of why he should stay on the Committee the potential dismantling of our intelligence agencies, which protect us and our allies, day in, day out—another policy espoused by the Leader of the Opposition?

[Mr Deputy Speaker]

Absolutely, totally irrelevant!

Iranian Nuclear Programme

Debate between Lord Austin of Dudley and Mark Pritchard

Thursday 2nd July 2015 Westminster Hall

[Ian Austin (Dudley North) (Lab)]

I beg to move,

That this House has considered the Iranian nuclear programme.

It is a pleasure, as always, to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Amess; it is great to see you in the Chair this afternoon. I am grateful to the Chairman of Ways and Means for giving us this opportunity. I have been raising concerns about Iran’s nuclear ambitions ever since I became a Member of Parliament: I have raised this issue with four Foreign Secretaries over the past 10 years. I applied for the debate in the hope of getting it this week because of the negotiations currently taking place in Vienna.

It is worth recalling how we got here and why Iran’s claims that it does not want a bomb have no credibility whatever. Iran has been caught lying time and again. In 2002, Iranian opposition groups disclosed details of major secret nuclear sites that Iran had kept hidden. Those sites included a large underground uranium enrichment facility at Natanz and a heavy water production plant and reactor at Arak that could produce weapons-grade plutonium, neither of which are necessary for civilian power. In 2009, Britain, France and the US exposed another secret enrichment facility under a mountain at Fordow that is too small for civilian fuel but big enough to produce weapons-grade uranium.

The International Atomic Energy Agency issued a report in November 2011 with detailed evidence of Iran’s nuclear weapons programme, which included a structured programme until 2003 and suspected activities since. In defiance of binding UN Security Council resolutions, Iran has expanded its enrichment capacity over recent years, reducing the time needed to reach one bomb’s worth of enriched uranium to two to three months. Iran has repeatedly refused the IAEA access to the Parchin military base, which is suspected to have been working on nuclear triggers, and has been working to cleanse the site of all evidence. Iran already has missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads, and our Prime Minister warned in 2012 that Iran is developing intercontinental ballistic missiles.

The Iranians say that they are enriching uranium for nuclear energy, despite not having the capacity to make nuclear fuel rods and not having a nuclear power station that can use the fuel. Iran has only one nuclear power plant, which was built by the Russians, and it is contractually bound to use only Russian fuel rods in that plant. Experts have likened the situation to someone buying a gallon of petrol from a petrol station every day for 12 years despite not having a car. All those activities have been in direct breach of Iran’s non-proliferation treaty commitments and numerous binding UN Security Council resolutions.

I will talk a little about the nature of the current proposed deal and the concerns that it raises. The framework announced in Lausanne in April 2015 has created much concern. Henry Kissinger and George Shultz put it well in their article for The Wall Street Journal:

“Nuclear talks with Iran began as an international effort, buttressed by six U.N. resolutions, to deny Iran the capability to develop a military nuclear option. They are now an essentially bilateral negotiation over the scope of that capability… The impact of this approach will be to move from preventing proliferation to managing it.”

It was welcome to hear President Obama say earlier this week that he will

“walk away…if it’s a bad deal”.

At times we have heard from the US that the only alternative to the deal would be war. The impression has therefore been given that the US is more concerned than the Iranians about the consequences of not reaching a deal. Yet it is surely the case in any negotiation that, unless we are willing to walk away and unless we have an alternative to an agreement, we are negotiating from a point of weakness, which will be exploited by the other side. Even at this late stage, and given what the P5+1 have already conceded, we need to get a deal on the best terms possible to meet our basic concerns. That means not accepting a deal at any price.

The red lines tweeted by Supreme Leader Khamenei last week are clearly not consistent with an acceptable deal for the UK and our P5+1 partners. What is our plan B if the Iranians do not budge from those red lines? Will our Government press our P5+1 partners to keep negotiating for an acceptable deal? Will the UK consider calling for a further extension of the current joint plan of action to allow more time, if needed? Meanwhile, this week the Iranian President threatened that, if there is no deal, Iran

“will go back to the old path, stronger than what they can imagine.”

Will the Minister confirm that we will not be moved by such threats? If Iran does not agree to our minimum terms, walks out on the talks and carries out its threat to resume its stockpiling of enriched uranium and centrifuges, will there be a robust and effective response to dissuade it from that path?

I will now turn to the details of the deal under discussion. I am waiting to see exactly what emerges from Vienna. If an agreement is reached, we already know from the framework that it will allow Iran to become a nuclear threshold state. The framework says that Iran will scale back its enrichment capabilities for 10 to 15 years, but most of the restrictions on the enrichment and stockpiling of uranium will then expire. President Obama has said that the

“fear would be that in Year 13, 14, 15, they have advanced centrifuges that enrich uranium fairly rapidly, and at that point, the breakout times would have shrunk almost down to zero.”

As the framework will ultimately allow Iran to be within touching distance of nuclear weapons, and as Iran cannot be trusted, there are two critical concerns. The first is about knowing exactly what is going on inside Iran’s nuclear programme, and I have some specific questions about that.

First, is it a condition of the deal, and of the lifting of sanctions, that Iran answers all the IAEA’s questions about its suspected nuclear weapons research? Will the Minister confirm that, as his colleague the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, the hon. Member for Bournemouth East (Mr Ellwood), told the House last month, it is essential that the IAEA

“is able to verify all of Iran’s nuclear-related commitments, including through access to relevant locations”?

How will the Government ensure that the IAEA can conduct intrusive and robust short-notice inspections of any site, including military locations, when Khamenei declared just a few days ago, while negotiations were taking place in Vienna, that such inspections will be limited? On research and development, will he confirm that the development of advanced centrifuges will be strictly limited to prevent the rapid technical upgrade and expansion of enrichment after the initial 10 years? Can he confirm that the remaining enriched uranium in Iran that is above the limits agreed in the framework will be irreversibly converted into a harmless form?

My second concern is that real and credible deterrents are needed in case Iran attempts to break out for a bomb either in the next 10 to 15 years or beyond that. Again, I have some specific questions. First, what discussions have the Government had with our American and European allies about how we would respond to Iranian violations? What planning will take place with our allies to deter Iran from making a dash to a bomb when its breakout time is, in the words of President Obama, “almost down to zero”?

How can the Government prevent Iran from acquiring the capability to produce nuclear weapons when the agreement is over? How will they ensure that the breakout time does not reduce to zero? How will the Government ensure that Iran does not continue to develop military aspects of its nuclear programme given that it has not come clean on past activities, has violated protocols signed in the past and has failed to comply with its commitments to the IAEA to answer questions posed by the nuclear watchdog?

How will the Government and our international partners deal with violations of the agreement? Does the Minister believe that a joint committee mechanism of which Iran is a member will be reliable for dealing with such violations? What mechanisms will be in place to quickly reimpose, or snap back, biting sanctions if necessary? What would be the threshold for snapping back EU sanctions? Is there a threshold, or would one follow political negotiation? Will the Government reaffirm that all options ultimately remain on the table to prevent Iran from getting nuclear weapons, should it try to do so in the future? Finally on the deal itself, every nuclear arms control agreement has included measures to control the means of delivery, so why does the current proposal lack a clause that deals with the issue?

I now want to raise some points about what will happen after the deal. We appear set to enter an agreement that, within 10 to 15 years, will allow Iran to reduce its breakout time to almost zero, according to President Obama. As the sanctions fall away, Iran will receive a huge economic and political boost, greatly empowering it in its ambitions to dominate the region. It is not surprising that that has united Israel and some Arab states in deep concern.

[Mark Pritchard (The Wrekin) (Con)]

I congratulate the hon. Gentleman on securing the debate. Of course the question has to be seen in the American, as well as the Israeli, geopolitical context. Does he agree, however, that the supreme leader, along with President Rouhani, would be better served by looking at Iran’s history? Great leaders from Persian history, such as King Darius and King Cyrus, supported the return of Jews from Persia to Jerusalem and helped to pay for the building of the Temple. That is real leadership, and it shows how to live in peace with Israel, rather than threaten it.

[Ian Austin]

I think Iran’s leaders would be better served by doing lots of things differently. I hesitate to use the words “wishful thinking”, but I am not sure how much confidence we can have that Iran’s present leadership will embark on the course of action that the hon. Gentleman has set out.

There is real concern right across the region that others—first and foremost, Saudi Arabia—will use the next 10 to 15 years to catch up with Iran’s nuclear capabilities. Former Saudi intelligence chief Turki al-Faisal said recently:

“Whatever the Iranians have, we will have, too.”

What will the UK and its allies do to reassure states in the region that they will deter Iran from breaking out to a bomb and, therefore, dissuade others from trying to match Iranian capabilities, creating a cascade of proliferation across the region?

There is also real concern that Iran will use its strengthened economic and political position to expand its existing destabilising activities. The country is shipping rockets to Palestinian armed groups in the Gaza strip and paying them to fire those rockets at Israel. It is also shipping rockets to Hezbollah in Lebanon, which now has 100,000 rockets aimed at Israel. In addition, it is shipping weapons to Houthi rebels in Yemen, propping up Assad in Syria and expanding its attempt to dominate a Shi’a-controlled Iraq. It is worth recalling that Hezbollah, which answers to the Iranian regime, is also guilty of murderous attacks on European soil. Just this week, a Hezbollah operative was convicted in Cyprus and sentenced to six years’ imprisonment for planning an attack against Israeli targets there.

Will the Minister tell us what discussions the Government are having with our US and EU allies and with friends in the region, including the Gulf states, Egypt, Jordan and Israel, about how to contain an Iran that will be unbound by this deal? How does the UK plan to work with its allies to deter Iran from pursuing more destabilising behaviour? In the short term, the deal is likely to grant Iran an immediate bonus, which could amount to up to $50 billion, as a result of the lifting of sanctions. How will the Government ensure that that money is not used to increase Iranian insurgent activities in Syria, Iraq and Yemen or to continue supporting and arming Hezbollah and Hamas? What conditions will the agreement place on the use of those assets?

It is particularly disgraceful that Iranian leaders have repeated open calls for the destruction of Israel. That includes the supreme leader, in November last year, tweeting a nine-point plan for Israel’s elimination. Will the Minister assure us that the tone of relations between this country and Iran will reflect the deep distaste we have for such rhetoric and for Iran’s general approach to the region? Finally, will he give a commitment that the UK will continue to enhance its strategic co-operation with Israel against shared threats, including Iranian behaviour?

I have put lots of questions to the Minister, and I appreciate that the debate taking place in the main Chamber means that he is having to deal with a policy area for which he is not personally and directly responsible, but I would be grateful if he could answer my questions either in the debate or, subsequently, in writing. If he would prefer, I would also be happy to table them as written questions.