Brexit: Stability of the Union

Lord Armstrong of Ilminster Excerpts

Thursday 17th January 2019 Lords Chamber

[Lord Armstrong of Ilminster (CB)]

My Lords, I should like to add my voice to those of others to congratulate and thank the noble lord, Lord Lisvane, for giving the House the opportunity to debate this Motion. The subject is an important one. In all the discussions and debates about Brexit, we have perhaps not sufficiently addressed the consequences of Brexit for the integrity of the United Kingdom.

The problem of retaining an open border between Northern Ireland and the Irish Republic when that becomes the only land border between the United Kingdom and the European Union has of course received a great deal of attention. The Prime Minister has been resolute in the pursuit of arrangements to ensure that the status of Northern Ireland as part of the United Kingdom should be preserved and ensured. But the arrangements are complex and to some extent artificial, as well as controversial, and of course they are part of an agreement which has now been overwhelmingly rejected by the House of Commons.

I follow the noble Baroness, Lady O’Neill, in reminding the House that Northern Ireland is different from the rest of the country in that the Good Friday agreement, like the Anglo-Irish agreement of November 1985, in which I played a part, guarantees that there will be no change in the status of Northern Ireland as part of the United Kingdom unless and until a majority of the people of Northern Ireland want it and decide to vote for it. Whether that time will ever come, none of us can say, but it seems that it is likely to come sooner than it otherwise might when the United Kingdom is going to leave or has left the European Union.

Then it has to be remembered that in Scotland there was a majority for remaining in the European Union in the referendum of June 2016. That was not just an echo of the “auld alliance” between Scotland and France. It could become a significant factor in any future referendum on Scottish independence, although like other speakers I should be a little surprised if that took the number of supporters for independence over the threshold of 50%. Scotland would find it a cold place to be outside the UK and the European Union.

I am not at all sure that I wish to enshrine these matters in a written constitution, which is like a great statute. Such a statute would become like a large building which cannot be changed when the conditions outside it or the requirements being made of it change. We need to go rather carefully when trying to freeze or fossilise the existing constitutional arrangement because it then becomes in a sense a dead thing and unable to adapt to changes in life, changes in requirements and changes in circumstances outside. I approach that with a certain amount of scepticism.

The union that is the United Kingdom was created and developed by successive changes made over centuries. It was not set out in advance in a written constitution, but has developed in response to the needs of the day. The United Kingdom has been a source of strength and benefit to all its constituent parts, as one can see from the number of Scottish people who have made such a large contribution to our public and political life. It has achieved a strength, standing and an influence in our relations with other countries which none of the constituent countries would have had on their own. It has also remained a steady beacon of freedom and democracy and of political stability and maturity—living together, as it were—to which other countries have looked with respect and envy. We take it for granted because it has always been there for us. However, there are times, and the present is one of them, when while looking at our constitutional arrangements, we should be counting our blessings and actively seeking to protect and preserve them.

Brexit: Civil Service Impartiality

Lord Armstrong of Ilminster Excerpts

Wednesday 24th October 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Young of Cookham]

I am grateful to my noble friend. Like him, I worked with Sir Jeremy. I sat round the Cabinet table for a number of years with him and worked with him when I was Chief Whip and Leader of the House. One of his successes was building on the work of his predecessors and creating a more open, diverse, plural Civil Service that was also more professional but never lost sight of the basic principles of the Civil Service: honesty, openness, impartiality and integrity.

[Lord Armstrong of Ilminster (CB)]

My Lords, speaking for all his predecessors as Cabinet Secretary, I share and express our regret that Sir Jeremy Heywood has felt obliged to retire on health grounds. Sir Jeremy served many Prime Ministers and, as we have just heard, many Chancellors of the Exchequer. He served with great skill, unremitting hard work, distinction, impartiality and integrity. He has given the state some service and is well deserving of the gratitude and approval of the Government, Ministers, his colleagues in the Civil Service and both Houses of Parliament.

[Lord Young of Cookham]

I agree with the noble Lord’s every word and gently suggest that there will now be so many former Cabinet Secretaries in this House that perhaps they should form their own group.

Historical Allegations:Operation Conifer

Lord Armstrong of Ilminster Excerpts

Thursday 18th October 2018 Lords Chamber

Asked by

[Lord Armstrong of Ilminster]

To ask Her Majesty’s Government, further to the replies by Baroness Williams of Trafford on 11 October (HL Deb, cols 177–9), what steps they are taking to ensure that investigations into historical allegations do not damage the reputations of the people against whom the allegations are made in cases where such investigations are not resolved conclusively.

[Lord Young of Cookham (Con)]

My Lords, decisions on how to conduct investigations are the responsibility of the force concerned following guidance issued by the College of Policing. The college’s recently updated guidance makes it clear that the names of suspects, including those who are deceased, should be released only where there is a legitimate policing purpose. Operational advice to senior officers investigating allegations of more recent child sexual abuse involving institutions or people of public prominence is also being updated.

[Lord Armstrong of Ilminster (CB)]

My Lords, as the Government persist in refusing to commission an independent review of Operation Conifer, perhaps they will muster the courage to express a considered view themselves. Operation Conifer produced not a single shred of credible evidence that Sir Edward Heath might have been guilty of child abuse, and a lot of credible evidence to show that he was not. Of the 42 allegations investigated by Wiltshire Police, 35 were dismissed. Of the remaining seven unresolved allegations, four can be shown to be without foundation. The other three are probably equally baseless, the product of a conspiracy to create and disseminate false allegations of child abuse by national figures such as Lord Bramall, Lord Brittan and Sir Edward Heath. Does the Minister agree that Operation Conifer’s report falls far short of the standards of probability required to justify the institution of a criminal prosecution, if Sir Edward Heath had still been alive to be prosecuted? Does justice not require us to accept that Sir Edward Heath was not a child abuser and to consign Operation Conifer to the dustbin of history?

[Lord Young of Cookham]

No one could have done more to safeguard and defend the integrity and reputation of Sir Edward Heath than the noble Lord. On the Government’s role, the noble Lord, together with my noble friends Lord Hunt and Lord MacGregor, went to see the Home Secretary on 10 September. Their meeting lasted 40 minutes and they deployed, with all the force and eloquence at their disposal, their concerns and proposals for the Government to intervene. The Home Secretary said that he would reflect on it; he has previously overturned the decisions of his predecessors where he felt that the case was made. In this case, a month after that meeting and having taken advice, he wrote to the noble Lord on 10 October. He said: “I do not think there are grounds to justify review or intervention by Government”. He then set out his reasons. Unless something has happened in the past month, I do not believe that the Home Secretary will change his decision.

On the broader issues, I find it compelling that those who knew Sir Edward personally do not believe that there is one scintilla of truth in the accusations that were made. The noble Lord asked me to state from the Dispatch Box that in my view, had Sir Edward lived, the case would not have reached the level at which the CPS would institute a case. I hope that he, as a former Cabinet Secretary, will understand that it would not be right for a Minister to make such a pronouncement.

House of Lords: Labour Peers’ Working Group Report

Lord Armstrong of Ilminster Excerpts

Thursday 19th June 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Armstrong of Ilminster (CB)]

My Lords, I welcome the Labour Party report, which is full of interesting and well thought-out ideas and I congratulate the noble Baroness, Lady Taylor, and Lord Grenfell on chairing that working group. As it turns out that I shall not be able to stay until the end of the debate, I shall spare your Lordships the benefit of my observations on this occasion, confident that another occasion will arise before the House of Lords is actually reformed.

The Future of the Civil Service

Lord Armstrong of Ilminster Excerpts

Thursday 16th January 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Armstrong of Ilminster (CB)]

My Lords, my noble friend Lord Hennessy of Nympsfield has been taking a keen interest in the Civil Service, its activities and personnel, for nearly 50 years. That interest has become steadily more benign and supportive over the years. We all mellow with age. At least we can be grateful to him for raising the subject and giving us an opportunity to debate it. With time being very short, I shall confine myself to the main point that I wish to make, although I would have liked to comment on many other matters.

Clearly, the Civil Service has to be nimble and versatile enough to keep pace with the implications of the social and technological changes and challenges that occur and will continue to occur. Its role has always been, and will continue to be, not so much to advise about what policies should be pursued—that is a matter for political and ministerial judgment and decision—as to advise on how the policies chosen by Ministers can be put optimally into effect, and then to put them into effect.

Civil servants are expected to discharge their duties with honesty, integrity, impartiality and objectivity. These have been the guiding values of the Civil Service, as my noble friend Lord Hennessy reminded us, for a century and a half. In 2010, they were given statutory expression and force. Like motherhood and apple pie, no one seriously contests them. However, we seem to feel a need constantly to parade and reassert them, and to write statutes, codes and regulations to try to ensure that they continue to be applied in every aspect of management. That seems to reflect a lack of confidence in their being properly observed.

The development of elaborate statements of principle, codes and regulations makes me uneasy. There have to be arrangements for disciplining those who transgress, but I should prefer a world in which, as a general rule, the civil servant is the guardian of his own integrity and relies on his own professional conscience and sense of values. It is better that a civil servant should say to himself, “Ought I to be doing this?”, or, “Ought I to be doing this in this way?”, than that he should say to himself, “Can I fit this within the rules and regulations”—or, worse still, “Can I stretch the rules and regulations to cover what I propose to do?”. He really should be thinking about the issues for himself.

In the end, this is a matter, as noble Lords have already said, of mutual respect and trust between Ministers and civil servants. I have had the privilege of knowing from experience that that relationship can be established and that, given goodwill on both sides, there can be a clear understanding of each other’s roles and responsibilities, and a recognition that they are there to work together in the public interest and not against each other.

The Civil Service needs to be able constantly to adapt to the challenges of changing economic, social and technological conditions. However, the future of the Civil Service would not be best served by a further proliferation of orders and regulations, or a proliferation of expert advisers in extended ministerial offices—which, I fear, would become a device to enable Ministers who are politically unsure of themselves to surround themselves with politically congenial cronies, paid for by the taxpayer, and distance themselves from departmental realities and their departmental advisers.

The prime requirement for a good future for the Civil Service and, indeed, for the good governance of this country is the maintenance of its traditional values in deed as well as in word, and the establishment of mutual respect and trust, based on good will and a clear understanding and acceptance on the part of both Ministers and civil servants of their respective roles and responsibilities.

Transparency of Lobbying, Non-Party Campaigning and Trade Union Administration Bill

Lord Armstrong of Ilminster Excerpts

Tuesday 5th November 2013 Lords Chamber

It would be good to go wide rather than narrow, so my heart is closer to amendments such as that of the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, than it is to the Bill as originally drafted. It is an uneasy mix and it does not quite work.

[Lord Armstrong of Ilminster (CB)]

My Lords, like the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, I was a Permanent Secretary for some 10 years and, unlike him, was a civil servant. I do not remember in that period ever being lobbied as a Permanent Secretary, but of course lobbying went on among the grades immediately below mine. This debate has therefore shown that these matters must be the subject of a new amendment on Report that resolves the various difficulties that have been mentioned.

I was attracted by the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Norton of Louth, which referred to senior civil servants and special advisers. It probably needs to go further. Amendment 33 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Royall, goes wider than it needs to in its references to “Ministers or officials” and then to civil servants; however, that is for her to discuss. I very much hope that this issue will be looked at and that the definition will be widened. It need not go beyond including a senior civil servant, as defined by the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010, because any lobbyist would think that lobbying below that level was a waste of time, and it is therefore not likely to happen.

Profumo Inquiry

Lord Armstrong of Ilminster Excerpts

Thursday 18th July 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire]

My Lords, I am conscious that there are several Members of this House who would love to write the next book on the Profumo affair. If I were asked to advise on the decision on this, I would say that we should hold to the principle not that the content should never be published but that it should not be published while those who gave confidential information on the assurance that it would not be published are still alive—and some of those who gave that evidence are still alive. The decision will have to be approved by the Lord Chancellor and the Minister for the Cabinet Office. The Master of the Rolls—as Lord Denning was then—also plays a role in such decisions as chair of the advisory board on public records.

[Lord Armstrong of Ilminster]

My Lords, I declare an interest as one who formerly had the custodianship of these papers. I can confirm that the evidence was taken by Lord Denning on the specific understanding that it would never be published. I think that one would need to be very bold to go back on that, certainly while people who gave evidence to the Denning inquiry or who were involved in events are still alive, and perhaps during the lifetime of their descendants. Does the Minister agree that it will need something like 100 years before one can consider whether these papers should be published?

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire]

My Lords, I do not wish to take a decision on that, either.

Accountability of Civil Servants: Constitution Committee Report

Lord Armstrong of Ilminster Excerpts

Thursday 7th February 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord Armstrong of Ilminster]

My Lords, I add my voice to those which have congratulated and expressed thanks to the noble Baroness, Lady Jay, and to the Constitution Committee for their measured, balanced and authoritative report which brings the threads together and presents us with some very sensible and well considered conclusions. The committee has done the state some service in robustly and, in my view, correctly reasserting the Haldane convention that civil servants are accountable to Ministers and Ministers are accountable to Parliament—it would put Ministers and civil servants into an unworkable tangle and morass of divided, dual and sometimes conflicting accountability if it were otherwise.

I am not going to join in the discussion of whether there is a distinction between responsibility and accountability. I simply note that there is an important verbal point in the committee’s view that there is no difference. It says that,

“there is no constitutional difference”.

I think that I am prepared to accept that. In other respects there is a difference between responsibility and accountability but I will not waste your Lordships’ time by going into that.

The committee is also right in arguing that the growth in the size and complexity of the state since the Haldane convention was formulated, and the development of Select Committees since 1979, require that the practice in operating the convention should be kept under review. It would clearly be impossible for Ministers to give all the evidence required by parliamentary committees, so the convention must be applied with understanding and flexibility within the framework defined by Lord Haldane—but it must not be violated.

It is particularly in relation to the work and the demands of parliamentary select and other committees that the lines in the sand need to be kept under review and redrawn if need be. The principle must be that the civil servant is accountable to his Minister when he gives evidence on the Minister’s or the department’s behalf to a parliamentary committee, as he is in everything else that he does as a civil servant. Normally there will be no problem about this. The Minister—or the department on his behalf—will select, and the committee concerned will accept, the civil servants who are best qualified to answer the questions likely to be asked. Occasionally, as the Constitution Committee recognises, a parliamentary committee will wish to hear evidence from a particular civil servant. The Minister will consent to allow that civil servant to give evidence if the Minister is content that he should do so; but if the Minister is not content that he should do so, the Minister is entitled to withhold his consent.

I do not think that a Minister can be forced not to withhold consent. If he does withhold consent, then the committee will be within its rights if it summons the Minister himself to go and give evidence, or to make available another civil servant to do so if the committee is prepared to accept that other person. I was involved in one case where a Commons committee wanted to call two named civil servants to give evidence but the Minister, for valid reasons, refused to allow them to go and, with the committee’s grudging acceptance, sent me to give evidence on the Minister’s behalf. I still remember with a touch of pride, though it got me into some trouble at the time, the Guardian’s lobby correspondent’s verdict on that encounter: “Mandarin 3, Select Committee 0”.

There will be other cases where a civil servant called to give evidence will be instructed by his Minister not to answer a particular question or questions, or not to give certain information to the committee concerned, because the information is of especial secrecy or confidentiality. The civil servant must be free to say that the Minister, who is himself accountable to Parliament and on whose behalf he is giving evidence, has instructed him not to answer the question or give that information. In my view, the committee is bound to accept that position and to have recourse to the Minister himself if it wishes to press for an answer. The civil servant concerned should not be put under third-degree pressure by the chairman or members of the committee to answer the question when he has been instructed by his Minister or is bound not to do so.

The Constitution Committee discusses the question of the appointment of Permanent Secretaries. The problem question here is the role of a Minister in selecting a new Permanent Secretary. It was all so much easier in my day. When I was head of the Civil Service, I chaired a senior appointments selection committee whose task was to consider a shortlist of candidates for an appointment and give the guidance on whom I should recommend to the Prime Minister. Before preparing such a shortlist, I took great trouble to consult the Secretary of State concerned to try to make sure that any candidates whom he favoured were on the shortlist and that any candidates with whom he thought he could not work were not on the short list.

The Prime Minister I served was not very happy if I recommended only one name; she liked to have more than one name before her, with a statement of my reasons for the recommendation I made. She would sometimes discuss my recommendation with me, with her customary forensic skill, before approving an appointment. She wanted to make sure that the appointment would not just be Buggins’s turn, but I cannot remember that in the end, after the discussion, she ever approved the appointment of someone whom I had not recommended.

That was a less formal arrangement than the existing system but it did not work badly. It seems to me that the existing system, as described in the Constitution Committee’s report, provides a Secretary of State with sufficient involvement in the process to make sure that his views are known and taken into account and that he will not have thrust upon him a Permanent Secretary with whom he feels unable to work. I do not think it would be right to go further than that and give the Secretary of State or departmental Minister the final choice, for all the reasons set out in the evidence to the Constitution Committee and by the committee itself in its report.

It would clearly be undesirable for the Permanent Secretary to change every time there is a change of Secretary of State or departmental Minister. The turnover of departmental Ministers can be quite rapid. I served for four years in the Home Office: for two as a deputy secretary, then two as Permanent Secretary. During that time I served three Secretaries of State, two Labour and one Conservative, and got on happily and constructively with all three. It would have been intolerable, not only for me but also for the Secretaries of State and the department, if the Permanent Secretary had changed every time there was a new Secretary of State.

The Constitution Committee discusses the question whether Civil Service policy advice should ever be disclosed to parliamentary Select Committees. I agree with those who said in evidence that a civil servant should never be asked to disclose the advice he has given to his Minister; if anyone is to be asked to disclose that advice, it should be the Minister. The general rule should be that advice given by civil servants to Ministers should never be disclosed. If civil servants were to believe that their advice might subsequently be disclosed, there would be a real danger that that advice would be less full, candid and fearless than it should be. Exceptions to the general rule should be extremely rare, if not non-existent.

I could discuss many other points on the report but I agree with very much of it and will not add more, save this in conclusion. In all this, I am reminded once again of the charge that Queen Elizabeth I gave to Sir William Cecil in November 1558, when she appointed him to be her principal Secretary of State—in effect, her Cabinet Secretary and head of the Civil Service. She said:

“This judgment I have of you, that you will not be corrupted by any manner of gift; and that you will be faithful to the State; and that, without respect of my private will, you will give me that counsel you think best; and if you shall know anything … to be declared to me of secrecy, you shall show it to myself only”.

As a lapidary statement of the duties and responsibilities of civil servants in relation to Ministers, it is difficult to improve upon that.

However, it is worth also remembering the advice that Sir William Cecil gave to his son and successor about what happened when he and the Queen disagreed:

“As long as I may be allowed to give advice, I will not change my opinion by affirming the contrary, for that were to offend God, to whom I am sworn first; but as a servant I will obey Her Majesty’s commandment, and no wise contrary the same, presuming that she being God’s … minister here, it shall be God’s will to have her commandments obeyed”.

I might not have put it quite like that; I might have referred not only to her divine mandate, but to her to democratic mandate too. However, I recognised instantly that that was how I felt in my dealings with Mrs Thatcher when she was Prime Minister and I was her Cabinet Secretary. The two quotations taken together seem to quite neatly and pithily encapsulate the duties of civil servants to Ministers.

Queen’s Speech

Lord Armstrong of Ilminster Excerpts

Monday 14th May 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Armstrong of Ilminster]

My Lords, I am not proposing in this debate to rehearse yet again my proposals for the reform of the composition of this House. On two previous occasions in this Chamber I have set out ideas for the composition of a reformed House. Those ideas were also set out in a memorandum of evidence which the right honourable Frank Field MP and I submitted to the Richard committee, the Joint Committee, and which is published in the appendix to that committee's report.

My concern today is with questions of procedure and process. The Government’s draft Bill seems to be founded on a syllogism: parliamentary law-making bodies should be elected by universal suffrage; the House of Lords is a parliamentary law-making body; therefore, the House of Lords should be elected by universal suffrage. That syllogism has a beautiful simplicity, but it does not stand up to the complexities and challenges of real life as it is lived.

What is deficient about that syllogism? First, there are numerous examples in other countries of parliamentary systems which work satisfactorily with second Chambers whose Members are not elected by universal suffrage. Secondly, in our system it is questionable whether the House of Lords is rightly to be regarded as a law-making body for these purposes. In this House we can propose laws and we can propose to revise laws; but under present arrangements at the end of the day we can be overridden by the other place. We cannot by ourselves make laws. We can propose, but the House of Commons has primacy and can dispose. Laws can be made only by and with the consent of the House of Commons, which is of course elected by a process of universal suffrage. As I read somewhere recently: “The Lords isn’t really a legislature, so why don't we cease fretting about its composition?”. I do not go quite as far as that.

Thirdly, even the Government’s draft Bill responds to the widespread view that there is merit in retaining an element of appointed and non-elected independent Members in the second Chamber. Only the Opposition can now claim the purity of calling for 100% directly elected Members.

Mr Tony Blair, who accepted in principle the need for House of Lords reform, was wont to say that it should depend on achieving consensus. There have been statements from government sources in recent days which have stressed that progress depends on consensus. The Prime Minister himself said last Wednesday,

“this is only going to proceed if the political parties will agree to work together and take a responsible attitude towards this reform”.

He then said:

“If we are going to achieve this reform, we will have to work together across the parties to try to deliver what I think will be progress for our constitution”.—[Official Report, Commons, 9/5/12; col. 23-4.]

That could perhaps be described as enthusiasm tempered with statesmanlike moderation and caution.

If discussions in both Houses of Parliament in recent weeks have made anything clear, it is that the prospects of meaningful parliamentary consensus on the proposals in the Government's draft Bill are not 50:50, they are infinitesimally small. The heart sinks at the thought of the hours, days and weeks that will be spent, first in the other place and then, if the Bill survives there, in this House, debating the details of the Bill, as the noble Baroness, Lady Hayman and the noble Lord, Lord Jenkin, said, generating much political sound and fury but getting nowhere in achieving meaningful consensus.

Some of the participants will no doubt enjoy the fun; but the public, whose reaction to the subject of Lords reform can be summed up as an uninterested and uncomprehending yawn, will wonder why their representatives are not using the time for measures which address the problems which matter to them.

As the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, pointed out, the reference in the gracious Speech to this proposed legislation gives the game away. The Bill to be brought forward is,

“to reform the composition of the House of Lords”.

There is nothing there about the role and functions of the House of Lords. And yet, as many other noble Lords have said, how can we hope to achieve consensus on whether the composition is fit for purpose unless we have first achieved consensus on the purpose which the House is to serve?

The assumption behind the Government's Bill is presumably that the role and functions of the House of Lords will remain as they are, but, if the House becomes a wholly or largely elected body, its role and functions will not remain as they are. If Members of this House were to be elected by a process of universal suffrage, they would not for long accept the continued primacy of the House of Commons. If they were elected for geographical constituencies, even if those were not coterminous with existing parliamentary constituencies, Members of Parliament—MPs—would be likely to find themselves in competition in their constituencies with Lords of Parliament—LPs, or whatever they are to be called.

There is also the question of costs. The noble Lord, Lord Lipsey, has produced figures showing that a directly elected and salaried House of Lords would cost the taxpayer a great deal more than the present House does. No doubt any reform will cost some extra money but we should, in thinking about reform, have regard not only to fitness for purpose but also to value for money. We need first to achieve and articulate consensus on what we want the reformed House of Lords to be and to do—in other words, on its role and functions—then, having first done that, to achieve consensus on who we should like to carry out that role and those functions—in other words, on its composition.

When I was a private secretary in 10 Downing Street there was, hanging on the wall of the private office above my desk, a piece of paper, mounted and framed, on which Mr Harold Macmillan had written in his own hand:

“Quiet calm deliberation disentangles every knot”.

I remember looking up at that piece of paper during the last weeks of 1973, at the time of the three-day week, and saying to myself: “Well, Uncle Harold, I hope you’re right”. At that time there was lots of deliberation, but not all of it was either quiet or calm. I believe that House of Lords reform is a knot that should and can be disentangled by quiet calm deliberation.

My proposal today—indeed, my plea to the Government—is that they should defer bringing forward a Bill for the reform of the composition of the House of Lords until there has been a serious attempt to arrive by quiet and calm deliberation at proposals on what should be the purposes, role and functions of the House of Lords and then at proposals on its composition, designed to make it fit for those purposes. This task could be entrusted to a body created and designed for the purpose, which should not be a purely parliamentary committee. It should of course include Members of both Houses, from all the main political parties and from the independent Cross-Benchers in the House of Lords, but not be confined to parliamentarians. It should include non-parliamentarians with suitable qualifications and experience, and be chaired by a non-parliamentarian. It could be a royal commission, a constitutional convention—as the alternative report has suggested—or a committee of privy counsellors. Whatever it is, it should be as small as possible: certainly, smaller than the Joint Committee chaired by the noble Lord, Lord Richard. It should be equipped with a strong but small team of expert advisers, including constitutional experts such as Professor Vernon Bogdanor, Professor Robert Hazell and people with relevant experience such as former Clerks of this House.

[Lord Lloyd of Berwick]

I wonder whether the noble Lord would explain how the group he envisages would differ in any way from the royal commission which sat in 2000. I have a list of the people who were in that royal commission; they exactly comply with what he wants.

[Lord Armstrong of Ilminster]

I do not know that it would differ in essentials but, as other noble Lords have pointed out, since the royal commission chaired by the noble Lord, Lord Wakeham, history and life have moved on. There is a new set of circumstances and new considerations to be taken into account.

The expert team would be responsible for producing papers analysing the issues and making recommendations for consideration by the main body. That body should first consider and make recommendations on the role and functions of a reformed House, and its report on those matters would be published and considered by both Houses of Parliament. It could be laid down as a given that the role and functions of a reformed House of Lords should respect and be compliant with the primacy of the House of Commons. Once there was broad consensus on role and functions, the expert advisers could analyse and make recommendations on the composition of the House of Lords. They could be asked to consider whether, and if so how best, to provide for an element of representativeness—possibly, but not necessarily, by direct election—and an element of independence. They would need to make recommendations on the role and functions of a commission or committee on the appointment of Members of the House of Lords and to consider and make recommendations on the terms of service of those Members, the optimum size of the House—and how to keep its numbers within that—and how to maintain an acceptable balance between the various parties.

The conclusions and recommendations of the expert advisers would once again be considered by the main body, and that body’s conclusions and recommendations would be reported to Parliament and the public. This process could be undertaken with urgency. Even so, it would be bound to take some time but, as the Prime Minister has said,

“reforming the House of Lords is not the most important priority”.—[Official Report, Commons, 9/5/12; col. 22.]

However difficult it may be to justify the House of Lords as it is, it is not working too badly. We can afford to do the job of deciding about reform properly and sensibly, and get it right. It is worth taking the time required for thorough analysis and serious discussion. This would, as I believe, provide the foundation for achieving broad consensus on how best to go forward with reform of the House of Lords and thus for bringing forward a Bill which, unlike the present draft Bill or a revised Bill on similar lines, could command a wide measure of support on all sides in Parliament and would not need to disrupt the flow of more urgent parliamentary business, which bears on the pressing problems of the times in which we live.