Wales Bill

Debate between Lord Anderson of Swansea and Lord Norton of Louth

Tuesday 11th November 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Norton of Louth (Con)]

My Lords, Clause 3 is straightforward. It disqualifies Members of the House of Commons from sitting as Members of the National Assembly for Wales. The provision implements recommendation 40 of the 2009 report of the Committee on Standards in Public Life, MPs’ Expenses and Allowances. The committee’s recommendation derived from consideration of the position in Northern Ireland, where all the parties with representatives at Westminster wanted to bring multiple mandates to an end.

The clause also appears to be supported by the main parties at Westminster. At Second Reading in the other place Owen Smith, speaking for the Opposition, said that the Labour Party welcomed the provision, as the party had,

“always had an internal party position whereby it does not support people having dual mandates”.—[Official Report, Commons, 31/3/14; col. 618.]

What, then, is the basis for outlawing dual mandates? The argument appears to be that one cannot do the job of an MP while also holding another mandate. It was that conceit of the European Parliament that led to the EU prohibiting members of national legislatures from serving as Members of the European Parliament. We had to legislate to exclude Members of this House who were elected as MEPs.

The Committee on Standards in Public Life also contended that a dual mandate did not meet the conditions it prescribed for MPs holding other jobs—namely that it did not interfere with the primary role of the MP, was completely transparent to electors, and did not present a conflict of interest. The committee conceded that the second of these did not apply to a dual mandate. There is obvious transparency.

I am not persuaded that the other two conflict with holding the dual mandate either. I do not see a conflict of interest—not, at least, if one is representing the same constituents. The point about interfering with the primary role of the MP brings us, in essence, back to the practical argument. I am not clear that a case has been made that it interferes with the primary role of the MP. One could argue that it introduces an element of cross-fertilisation of benefit to both bodies.

Last week I had the honour of attending, indeed of chairing, the Speaker’s Lecture, given by Nick Raynsford, a former Minister for Local Government, who drew attention to the decline, which he regretted, in the number of MPs who serve concurrently as local councillors. The numbers have decreased significantly in recent decades, to the point where there are now virtually no MPs who also sit as local councillors. As he pointed out, this is in stark contrast to what happens in a number of our European neighbours.

Supporters of the clause will doubtless argue that it is no longer possible to do justice to the job of an MP while also serving as a local councillor. Some seem to manage—but that is not my point. The argument ignores a fundamental issue of principle. If one is to have a public office filled by election, one should not infringe the freedom of choice of the electors. If electors wish for a particular candidate to serve them in more than one assembly, that is a matter for them. It may be difficult or near impossible to serve in both, but that is not a sufficient basis for prohibiting voters by law from electing whoever they wish to represent them.

The late Lord Bannside was well known for having a triple mandate, never mind a dual mandate. Fulfilling all three roles may have been overly demanding. He may not have served his constituents effectively—although I am not saying he did not. My point is that it was a matter for him, and for those who elected him. His constituents put him in those positions. They knew what to do if they felt he was not representing them effectively.

I have a principled objection to restricting by law the choice of electors. I do not regard it as our role to say who electors should or should not elect. It is for that reason that I supported lowering the age at which one could stand for election to public office. I have no problem with that age being lower than the voting age; it used to be the other way round. If you lower the voting age to 16, you empower 16 year-olds. If you lower the age at which someone can stand for election to 16, you empower electors. My view is that we should be widening the choice of electors, not restricting it.

There are some positions that are incompatible with elected office. Those are generally already provided for, but we should keep them to a minimum. I see that in Amendment 10 my noble friend Lord Thomas of Gresford wishes to exclude any,

“member of the legislature of any country or territory outside the Commonwealth (other than Ireland),

from being eligible to be elected to the National Assembly. I suspect the chances of any member of such a legislature standing are pretty slim, but why should we legislate to prevent that? If political parties wish to have internal rules to limit such dual candidatures, that is a matter for them, but we should not be using the statute book to forbid it. If an AM wants to stand for election to the House of Commons or an MP seeks election to the National Assembly, that should be a matter for them and for the judgment of electors.

As I said, my objection to the clause is one of principle. We should apply stringent standards of scrutiny to measures of constitutional significance, not least those that place a restriction on electors. That is what, in effect, the clause does. It is important to get this on the record. We are in danger of creating a patchwork quilt of restrictions through bans on a dual mandate. We need to be more alert to the implications. If we are to proceed with the clause, we need to have on record a clear, principled justification for it. I invite both Front Benches to address the issue of principle engaged by the provision. There is no need to address the practical implications; we know what those are. We need to have the principle underpinning the ban that trumps the right of electors to elect the candidates of their choice. I beg to move.

[Lord Anderson of Swansea]

My Lords, I hear what the noble Lord, Lord Norton, says. He argues on a point of principle that the choice of the electorate should not be channelled in any way in respect of dual candidacy. He mentioned the position on the continent. He will know that the stream is moving strongly against an accumulation of mandates on the continent—certainly in France, which I know reasonably well. When I represented Swansea, I would have loved to be the Mayor of Swansea at the same time and, perhaps, to have had another mandate. That would have been very useful in cross-fertilisation and no doubt added to my local standing. I work on the simple principle of practicality. People tend to vote for the party, which stands against the principled point which the noble Lord enunciated. Also, no person can serve two masters. My experience in the other place was that, if done properly, it was a full-time job. Equally, as we add to the responsibilities of the Assembly, if an Assembly Member is to do the job properly, that is also a full-time job, and the electorate should not be short-changed by allowing a person to do the two jobs. They will do one well and the other not.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Norton of Louth]

My Lords, it is precisely because there was cross-party agreement that there is a valuable case for raising the issue. I am grateful to those who have spoken. The noble Lord, Lord Howarth, invites me to digress somewhat on to the proposal for a senate of the regions and nations—the words “back of an envelope” come to mind. In terms of the principle that would apply, it would be that which I have enunciated. He talked about caution, but I think that caution should apply to the very proposal for such a senate, rather than the method by which its members should be chosen.

On the points that have been raised, the principal argument deployed from both Front Benches against the amendment is, in essence, that being an MP is a full-time job. There are two problems with that. It was not accepted by the Committee on Standards in Public Life in its report, where the challenge was a conflict with the primary role, not an argument about its being a full-time job. It is also belied by the fact that the House of Commons is not unable to function because MPs are doing other jobs. It is quite possible for an MP to fulfil the functions of a Member of Parliament while being a Minister of the Crown, for example. I really do not see the argument that—

[Lord Anderson of Swansea]

While there is a difference between being a Minister and a Member of Parliament, they are in the same building at the same time. I invite the noble Lord to consider the example of someone who is a Member of the Assembly and yet is called to vote in the House of Commons—as the Prime Minister was yesterday, in full evening dress—and therefore neglects what might also be an important vote in the Assembly. A number of conflicts will arise in that way and a Member of Parliament or a Member of the Assembly will have to choose which he would prefer.

[Lord Norton of Louth]

My Lords, I recall that, particularly pre-devolution, we had Ministers who were responsible for different parts of the United Kingdom and who had to spend an awful lot of time not being in London. If there are challenges from being in both assemblies, that is a matter for the Members. Certainly, at times Members have managed to achieve that. Let us not forget that when we talk about a dual mandate, we are referring only to the House of Commons. There are Members of this Chamber who have a dual mandate, including one who is present at the moment.