Lord Anderson of Swansea
Main Page: Lord Anderson of Swansea (Labour - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Anderson of Swansea's debates with the Wales Office
(9 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberThe noble Lord does not seem to be entirely taking into account the considerable length of time that a convention would take. If it were going to do its job well, it would take a number of years to reach its conclusions and for those conclusions to be implemented. If there were to be an income tax referendum in Wales—I emphasise the word “if” because it is not a foregone conclusion—I hope it would take place before the outcome of any convention were decided.
A constitutional convention or royal commission could take a very long time. However, the referendum on income tax may never happen at all as the First Minister has said that he is not very interested in this concession. Therefore, what appears on the face of it to be a significant step on the part of the Government may in fact not be a step at all because such a referendum in respect of income tax provisions is not likely to take place.
If the noble Lord is telling us here today that the Labour Government in Wales have already decided that under no circumstances would they call an income-tax referendum, I am very disappointed. The line I have heard from the Labour Party up to now is that it is open-minded to it as long as there is progress on other issues connected with devolution. I want to take this opportunity to repeat that the UK Government believe that there should be a referendum on income tax powers in Wales as soon as possible. That is something we would strongly encourage in Wales. We regard this as a significant step in Welsh devolution because we are planning to bring forward an amendment at Third Reading on this with the intention that it should be used.
My Lords, Amendment 4 stands in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Morgan. It states that all matters pertaining to National Assembly for Wales electoral arrangements contained in this Bill must be subject to Assembly agreement before implementation. It has been grouped with Amendment 5, in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Elis-Thomas and Lord Wigley. It is more comprehensive than my amendment in that it extends to its constitution, structure, membership and elections and suggests that they should be decided by a vote of the whole Assembly by a majority of no less than two-thirds of voting Assembly Members.
I make only this comment on the two-thirds supermajority. I know there is apparently precedent for this, but I call on the knowledge of the noble Lord, Lord Norton of Louth, that traditionally in jurisdictions that require a two-thirds supermajority it has been a recipe for inertia. It has led to gridlock and immobilism. In this sort of matter, to impose the necessity for a two-thirds majority suggests that there will be no reform at all as it is very difficult to find an issue on which there is that level of majority, but I defer it. Perhaps the noble Lord will write to me suggesting that it is almost certainly true.
I have been impressed by what the Minister has said thus far in respect of the two amendments which have been before us. She has shown a readiness to listen and, certainly, to respond. On the previous amendment, in particular, she argued that this is a matter that should be left to the Assembly because there is a consensus among the various parties in the Assembly. My submission in respect of this amendment is that it is certainly a matter that should be left to the Assembly. I would have thought that there is no doubt whatever that all parties in the Assembly would agree to this. If the Minister is prepared to say at this stage that she will follow what she said in relation to the previous amendment in relation to this one and that she will move an appropriate amendment at Third Reading to let the Assembly decide its own electoral arrangements, I can save this House a lot of time by sitting down and saying, “Thank you very much”.
I have given the Minister the opportunity to truncate my speech, but perhaps I should set out the terms of the amendment, otherwise I shall be truncating myself. My broad proposition is that we are devolutionists now. We may disagree on the pace of devolution and on the terminus, the end station, of devolution, but there is a broad spirit of agreement, particularly post the Scottish referendum, and a new spirit of seeking to allow the assemblies of the nations and of the parts of the United Kingdom to make their own decisions—or, as they would say in colonial times, to make their own mistakes. In some cases, central government has shown itself reluctant to relax the reins, and this matter has, thus far, been one of them, but I nurture the hope that, consistent with her previous responses, the Minister will make a more positive response to this.
The proposition is simple and clear. It is absurd that in Westminster we should be laying down rules on how the devolved Assembly in Wales should organise its own elections, irrespective of its views. Surely it is the expert in this field. It has the experience of fighting elections on the current rules and we should listen to it with respect. If decisions, at least for the moment, are not left to the Assembly, as is suggested in the other group, at least its agreement should be necessary to any proposals. Even our local authorities have a degree of discretion currently not left to the Assembly.
It is difficult to see how this can be opposed, save on grounds of inertia, as there would surely be no opposition in the Assembly itself. There is a taste otherwise of “Westminster knows best”, from high to low, delivering electoral arrangements like tablets of stone to a grateful Assembly. Surely we should all accept that we are dealing with a mature Assembly? I am sure that my friend, the noble Lord, Lord Elis-Thomas, would be the first to concede that there were some initial teething problems, but now the Assembly has settled down very well indeed, and has gained the support and approval of the overwhelming majority of the people of Wales. They should be allowed to decide for themselves how they wish to be elected. Currently there is not even the statutory obligation to consult them on these arrangements.
Do we really know best? Do we wish to continue to impose our wisdom on the Assembly? Have we no trust in the Assembly on such matters, which should be wholly within its own domain? I leave this question to the Minister and the House: how can it be reasonable not to allow the Assembly to make decisions on such electoral arrangements, not as a matter of generosity, but as a matter of law? I beg to move.
I thank my friend the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, for continuing to move his amendment. I was afraid at one moment that he was seeking to withdraw it before he had actually proposed it, and that would have been entirely disorderly.
I am delighted with the progress of our discussions today. I had a list of three issues that I wished to raise on behalf of myself and my noble friend Lord Wigley, and our colleagues of all parties in the National Assembly. This is the third issue. The response to the previous two has been extremely good, so I am expecting an even better response to this one.
In addition to the points that had already been covered on the reserved powers order and on the recognition for a decision involving tax-raising powers reflecting the agreement of the people of Wales, part of the resolution that was passed unanimously by the National Assembly two weeks ago was a call on the UK Government to give the National Assembly the power to determine its electoral arrangements. The Minister indicated in an earlier response that this might indeed be a matter that would be looked at in the great deliberation before St David’s Day. We are very keen that these arrangements should be agreed before the next Assembly elections so that we are able to benefit from any changes that will take place.
I will call in aid no greater authority than my friend in the Assembly, and a neighbour of my family in the Vale of Glamorgan, the leader of the Opposition. He is not yet the right honourable Andrew RT Davies, but no doubt will be at some stage. He argued strongly on this resolution and said:
“I find it bizarre that we have an institution that has primary legislative competence and that Ministers are appointed by the Crown, but, ultimately, the electoral arrangements for this institution do not reside in this institution. I do believe that that would be a relatively simple Act to undertake”.
I hope the government Front Bench in this House will agree with that analysis.
This issue was also discussed more recently last week, when we had the Constitutional and Legislative Affairs Committee’s report on the inquiry into the disqualification from membership of the Assembly. Both the First Minister and the very distinguished Deputy Presiding Officer, David Melding, agreed entirely with the view that the Assembly should indeed be in charge of its own electoral arrangements.
What we have here are two amendments, appropriately grouped together, but with two different principles. The amendment in my name and that of my noble friend calls for powers on electoral arrangements and constitutional aspects to be devolved to the Assembly through Schedule 7 to the Government of Wales Act 2006. Under the subject National Assembly it becomes an additional action that the Assembly is unable to legislate upon in that area. That is the way that it is phrased in this particular discussion, although we had a different discussion on this principle in Committee.
The principle that my noble friend seeks is statutory consultation—
Yes, agreement with the Assembly on the outcome—a need to negotiate an agreement. So there are two principles there. Indeed, the noble Baroness is right that this has been overtaken by the undertaking given earlier, but I did not even dream that we would have so many undertakings, so I tabled the amendment in expectation rather than in hope—and now my hope is about to be fulfilled.
Then I very much hope that the noble Lord expresses his joy by not moving his amendment.
My Lords, I was hoping for a more positive response. As I may have said earlier, once upon a time I was a civil servant. In Whitehall there is a little book called something like 1,001 Ways of Avoiding a Decision. “Yes Minister” is in that same vein. The argument put forward is that this is not the vehicle; this is not the time. I would argue that it is the vehicle and it is the time. The Minister’s speech could have been made a month or two months ago. My noble friend Lord Elis-Thomas indicated that there have been two recent developments in the Assembly—the resolution and the response to committee recommendations—which suggest that there is all-party agreement in the Assembly.
Does the noble Lord accept that discussions are going on at this time on whether these issues should be devolved to the Assembly? His amendment would simply have the effect of delaying things which have been agreed some considerable time ago as a result of the normal form of public consultation.
The last thing I would argue for is delay. There is surely a case for delay if there are genuine differences between the various parties in discussion, but I understand that there is no lack of consensus, as indicated in the points made by my noble friend Lord Elis-Thomas. If the argument is that I may be seeking to delay, I can say that I am certainly not doing that. If the argument is that my amendment may have the effect of delaying, I would respond: what is the effect of what the noble Baroness is saying?
Will there be some agreement in time for Third Reading on this matter, on which there is substantial agreement and on which we have the precedent of the relationship between the Scottish Parliament and Westminster? Why the difference? If there is agreement why cannot it be done now, as indeed on the concession that the Government made in respect of the voting age? Is the Minister prepared to say, given the consensus, that this can be remedied and changed at Third Reading? If not, I think it is unfortunate but I would certainly not wish to proceed with the amendment, and I beg leave to withdraw it.
Amendment 7 stands in my name and in the name of my noble friend Lady Morgan. My initial submission is that the area covered by the amendment should be a matter for the National Assembly and that it should not be for us to intervene. I note the two-thirds, super-majority suggestion. Given that the current membership of the Assembly is 40 directly-elected Members and 20 elected on the list system, that proposal would mean that the list system—even if it were deemed to be inappropriate—could not be judge because, on the “turkeys not voting for Christmas principle, those on the list system would be unlikely to vote for it to end.
The Government saw in the Bill, quite properly, a way in which to implement Silk 1. Clause 2 stands as an eccentric—something outside Silk 1. These are the only matters that deviate from the Silk recommendations, and one is constrained to ask why this is used as a vehicle for this important change. I shall not cover the same ground that we covered at Second Reading, although we did not consider this matter in Committee. However, I wish to counter the charge of naked partisanship that was used. Your Lordships may recall that I mentioned the significant comments of leading Conservative and Liberal Democrat spokesmen. It is significant that their comments were made freshly after the actual experience of dual candidacy. Perhaps memories are now fading; for example, regarding the experience of the Clwyd West constituency election in 2003. It was won by Labour’s Alun Pugh. However, three of the other candidates—Brynle Williams, Conservative; Janet Ryder, Plaid Cymru; and Eleanor Burnham, Lib Dem—all became Assembly Members as a result of the regional list. It was a certain Alice in Wonderland world in which everyone was a winner; everyone had a prize.
To the suggestion that this is new and that the only country in the world to have had a similar ban on dual candidacy is Ukraine, Professor Roger Scully said in his evidence that a number of Asian countries have a similar ban. I cite Taiwan and South Korea. New Zealand, New Brunswick and Prince Edward Island in Canada have in recent years considered bans on dual candidacy. It is not, as has been suggested, confined to Ukraine. It is best surely that the normal rules should apply. If someone is rejected by the electorate in an election, that same person should remain rejected by the electorate and not come in by the side door and be on a par with other candidates.
The implication in suggesting that there should be dual candidacy is that we have a dearth of suitable candidates in Wales. That is not my experience. I recently watched a selection in my former constituency as an interested observer. I have seen many other candidate selections and there is a very good list of quality candidates who are ready and available for selection. We demean Welsh politics by suggesting that we do not have sufficiently able, competent people available.
I note the submission of the Electoral Reform Society Cymru, which is, if I have interpreted it correctly, that it wishes to rescind the ban on dual candidacy but impose a supermajority. Obviously we must respect its view, but equally recognise that this is not an ex cathedra statement. Yes, we respect it, but we in this case are the cathedra: it is we who dispose. The arguments against dual candidacy arising from the experience prior to 2003—I cited in the past not just Clwyd West, but the position of Llanelli—are sufficiently cogent for us to say that this matter should remain as it is. We should continue the ban on dual candidacy. It is, after all, in the interests of democracy that if someone is rejected by the electorate they should remain rejected by the electorate.
My Lords, I want to say a word or two in support of my noble friend Lord Anderson. The principle that party-political candidates stand as individuals should not be ignored. People are not simply representatives of their parties: they are individuals and characters. Electors form judgments about their individual suitability to represent them in the Assembly. That is why I think that the permission to offer dual candidacy is wrong in principle.
Happily, the National Assembly for Wales has not been subject to the same pressure of scandal and disgrace as the House of Commons in respect of expenses, but there can be no doubt at all that when electors voted in the 2010 general election they formed their judgment, in the case of certain candidates, on the basis of those candidates’ personal records. That is the background to the introduction of the recall legislation. It is against that spirit to say that a candidate is no more than the representative of a party and that if that candidate does not win the first past the post part of the election that same individual candidate can acceptably come back on the list.
Even if it was not for that consideration, voters feel that it offends against an instinctive sense of political propriety that people should run as candidates under first past the post, lose the election and then turn up an hour or two later elected on the list system. That was offensive, and it was absolutely right that the previous Labour Government remedied the error that they had made in the original devolution legislation. The Government of Wales Act 2006 removed the possibility of people standing as candidates twice in the same election. It is regrettable that the coalition—here it is a coalition not just of Conservatives and Liberal Democrats, but also of Plaid Cymru—is seeking to restore a system that is designed by them to be advantageous to minority parties. It is entirely acceptable that under the electoral system we have for elections to the National Assembly for Wales extra provision is made to ensure that minority parties are represented there. However, we must avoid what was generally taken in Wales to be an abuse, whereby defeated candidates come back and reappear, contrary to the clearly expressed wishes of electors.
There may or may not be validity in what the noble Lord is saying. Some people may vote positively for a candidate while others, knowing certain candidates, will vote against. It is not a question of either/or.
This comes back to the amendment put forward by my noble friend Lord German where the candidates’ names are on the list. I should like to see the evidence that people are voting against candidates; none has been brought forward that I have seen.
When the last Labour Government introduced the ban on dual candidacy in the Government of Wales Act 2006, Ministers claimed to have done so as a result of the general public’s “considerable dissatisfaction” with dual candidacy. I have heard it suggested again today that an overwhelming majority of people are against it. Let us look at the two surveys referred to by the noble Baroness, Lady Gale. I turn first to the Government’s Green Paper. It was suggested by the shadow Secretary of State in another place that an overwhelming majority of respondents to the consultation were opposed, but in fact the summary of responses published by the Wales Office in 2012 notes only a small majority—in fact, it was a majority of one.
Let us look at those who actually submitted to the consultation. The majority in favour of removing the ban were Labour AMs with responses written in remarkably similar language. I would ask noble Lords to look a little more closely at the evidence before they assert, as was done in another place, that an overwhelming majority of respondents thought that it was right to have the ban. Frankly, that is not the case. It is true that the 2006 paper produced by the Bevan Foundation found that a small majority did consider it to be unfair, but the foundation went on to say that any change should be “based on sound evidence”.
Perhaps I may take noble Lords with me to look at some of the evidence. Independent bodies such as the Electoral Commission have disputed the change. They have suggested in evidence to the Welsh Affairs Committee that the view is clear that prohibiting dual candidacy in Wales is not something that they are in favour of and is not supported by evidence as necessary. It seems to me that no evidence has been brought forward since then that suggests that such a change is necessary.
An acknowledged expert on this issue is Professor Roger Scully—who has already been mentioned—from Cardiff University’s Wales Governance Centre. I do not know his politics, but I know that he does not vote for the Conservative Party. He said:
“No substantial independent evidence was produced at the time of the GOWA”—
the Government of Wales Act 2006—
“(or, to my knowledge, has been produced subsequently) of significant public concern about dual candidacy. The claims made about dual candidacy ‘devaluing the integrity of the electoral system’, and ‘acting as a disincentive to vote’ therefore remain wholly unsupported by solid evidence”.
It is a fact, and one recognised by the Arbuthnott commission established by the last Labour Government, that dual candidacy is a feature of mixed-member proportional electoral systems the world over; yet of all the countries that use this system, it is only Wales that has such a ban.
That brings me to the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson. Taiwan, which I believe he mentioned, Thailand and Ukraine all have a different system where they have two completely separate lists that do not interact; so it does not apply in the same way. In New Zealand, whose system he also recommended, the Electoral Commission has urged against introducing such a ban, so there is very little evidence elsewhere out there that this ban is desirable.
I come to a point that has not been touched on—rather significantly—that, apparently, at the same time as we were saying that this ban was so necessary for Wales when it was introduced for Wales at Westminster, for some strange reason it was not introduced in relation to the Greater London Assembly or to Scotland. At the time, of course, both bodies had regional members who represented the Labour Party, whereas in Wales there were no regional members for the Labour Party. Cynics might suggest that there is something to read into that, but we have not heard any mention of why the ban is only something that is right for Wales, but not right for Scotland or Greater London.
My Lords, first, I welcome the noble Lord, Lord Bourne, to the Front Bench for the first time on a Bill. Let us warmly welcome him. He has made a major contribution, not least to constitutional matters in Wales.
On what the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, said on STV, this is certainly worth debating. It would get around the dangers of dual candidacy. Of course, the problem is that people can identify with a constituency but are less able to identify with a region, but it certainly would be more democratic and would remove the dangers of this particular proposal from the Government.
On the evidence, I concede that it is not overwhelming, but the surveys that have been mentioned all point one way. There is no popular demand for this and there is a slight majority in the relevant two surveys showing that there is opposition to the dual candidacy—for good reason.
What puzzles me is that the Bill is broadly non-controversial and has been made even more palatable by the concessions made today by the Government. Yet, the Bill essentially puts into practice the recommendations of the Silk commission except for this provision. If you were a geologist you would call that eccentric and something outside that. One wonders why the Government have added this to what is essentially a non-controversial Bill.
This is not a partisan amendment in any way on my part. I have mentioned before that the leading spokespeople of both the Conservative and Liberal Democrat parties earlier opposed dual candidacy—for good reason. They had seen it in practice during the first Assembly. I gave quotations at Second Reading to show that, since this had been introduced by a Labour Government, the amendment could hardly be deemed partisan. As the rejection was supported by these two leading spokespeople, it again could hardly be deemed partisan. In my judgment, this is an unwise inclusion in what would otherwise be a non-controversial Bill. The Labour Party has pledged to reverse this when we get into government. Having made my point and looking forward to that reversal—
My main concern about this whole issue is the constitutional situation where the electoral system for the Assembly is to be changed whenever there is a change of United Kingdom Government. Quite frankly, I find that reprehensible. We require stability in an electoral system. Would my noble friend agree that it is better that this matter is devolved to the Assembly, so that we can create an electoral system that would be responsive to the people of Wales and would be established by only a two-thirds majority?
I have argued in the past that all the electoral arrangements, including this one, should be devolved to the Assembly, but I am less inclined to accept the latter part of my noble friend’s submission that there should be a two-thirds majority. It would not be a two-thirds majority but a one-third blocking minority, so it would be minority rule. Given the fact that under the current system a third of the seats are on the list, I suspect that nobody on the list will vote for any change. On the whole, we should let the Assembly makes its own decision on this. I therefore wholly accept the view of my noble friend. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, Clause 3 is straightforward. It disqualifies Members of the House of Commons from sitting as Members of the National Assembly for Wales. The provision implements recommendation 40 of the 2009 report of the Committee on Standards in Public Life, MPs’ Expenses and Allowances. The committee’s recommendation derived from consideration of the position in Northern Ireland, where all the parties with representatives at Westminster wanted to bring multiple mandates to an end.
The clause also appears to be supported by the main parties at Westminster. At Second Reading in the other place Owen Smith, speaking for the Opposition, said that the Labour Party welcomed the provision, as the party had,
“always had an internal party position whereby it does not support people having dual mandates”.—[Official Report, Commons, 31/3/14; col. 618.]
What, then, is the basis for outlawing dual mandates? The argument appears to be that one cannot do the job of an MP while also holding another mandate. It was that conceit of the European Parliament that led to the EU prohibiting members of national legislatures from serving as Members of the European Parliament. We had to legislate to exclude Members of this House who were elected as MEPs.
The Committee on Standards in Public Life also contended that a dual mandate did not meet the conditions it prescribed for MPs holding other jobs—namely that it did not interfere with the primary role of the MP, was completely transparent to electors, and did not present a conflict of interest. The committee conceded that the second of these did not apply to a dual mandate. There is obvious transparency.
I am not persuaded that the other two conflict with holding the dual mandate either. I do not see a conflict of interest—not, at least, if one is representing the same constituents. The point about interfering with the primary role of the MP brings us, in essence, back to the practical argument. I am not clear that a case has been made that it interferes with the primary role of the MP. One could argue that it introduces an element of cross-fertilisation of benefit to both bodies.
Last week I had the honour of attending, indeed of chairing, the Speaker’s Lecture, given by Nick Raynsford, a former Minister for Local Government, who drew attention to the decline, which he regretted, in the number of MPs who serve concurrently as local councillors. The numbers have decreased significantly in recent decades, to the point where there are now virtually no MPs who also sit as local councillors. As he pointed out, this is in stark contrast to what happens in a number of our European neighbours.
Supporters of the clause will doubtless argue that it is no longer possible to do justice to the job of an MP while also serving as a local councillor. Some seem to manage—but that is not my point. The argument ignores a fundamental issue of principle. If one is to have a public office filled by election, one should not infringe the freedom of choice of the electors. If electors wish for a particular candidate to serve them in more than one assembly, that is a matter for them. It may be difficult or near impossible to serve in both, but that is not a sufficient basis for prohibiting voters by law from electing whoever they wish to represent them.
The late Lord Bannside was well known for having a triple mandate, never mind a dual mandate. Fulfilling all three roles may have been overly demanding. He may not have served his constituents effectively—although I am not saying he did not. My point is that it was a matter for him, and for those who elected him. His constituents put him in those positions. They knew what to do if they felt he was not representing them effectively.
I have a principled objection to restricting by law the choice of electors. I do not regard it as our role to say who electors should or should not elect. It is for that reason that I supported lowering the age at which one could stand for election to public office. I have no problem with that age being lower than the voting age; it used to be the other way round. If you lower the voting age to 16, you empower 16 year-olds. If you lower the age at which someone can stand for election to 16, you empower electors. My view is that we should be widening the choice of electors, not restricting it.
There are some positions that are incompatible with elected office. Those are generally already provided for, but we should keep them to a minimum. I see that in Amendment 10 my noble friend Lord Thomas of Gresford wishes to exclude any,
“member of the legislature of any country or territory outside the Commonwealth (other than Ireland),
from being eligible to be elected to the National Assembly. I suspect the chances of any member of such a legislature standing are pretty slim, but why should we legislate to prevent that? If political parties wish to have internal rules to limit such dual candidatures, that is a matter for them, but we should not be using the statute book to forbid it. If an AM wants to stand for election to the House of Commons or an MP seeks election to the National Assembly, that should be a matter for them and for the judgment of electors.
As I said, my objection to the clause is one of principle. We should apply stringent standards of scrutiny to measures of constitutional significance, not least those that place a restriction on electors. That is what, in effect, the clause does. It is important to get this on the record. We are in danger of creating a patchwork quilt of restrictions through bans on a dual mandate. We need to be more alert to the implications. If we are to proceed with the clause, we need to have on record a clear, principled justification for it. I invite both Front Benches to address the issue of principle engaged by the provision. There is no need to address the practical implications; we know what those are. We need to have the principle underpinning the ban that trumps the right of electors to elect the candidates of their choice. I beg to move.
My Lords, I hear what the noble Lord, Lord Norton, says. He argues on a point of principle that the choice of the electorate should not be channelled in any way in respect of dual candidacy. He mentioned the position on the continent. He will know that the stream is moving strongly against an accumulation of mandates on the continent—certainly in France, which I know reasonably well. When I represented Swansea, I would have loved to be the Mayor of Swansea at the same time and, perhaps, to have had another mandate. That would have been very useful in cross-fertilisation and no doubt added to my local standing. I work on the simple principle of practicality. People tend to vote for the party, which stands against the principled point which the noble Lord enunciated. Also, no person can serve two masters. My experience in the other place was that, if done properly, it was a full-time job. Equally, as we add to the responsibilities of the Assembly, if an Assembly Member is to do the job properly, that is also a full-time job, and the electorate should not be short-changed by allowing a person to do the two jobs. They will do one well and the other not.
My Lords, we should be grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Norton of Louth, for inviting us to reflect on the principle involved here. When he comes to respond to the debate, perhaps he would give us the benefit of his thoughts on how his principle would apply if, as has been proposed, there should be a senate of the nations and regions of the United Kingdom. Admittedly, I understand that the proposition is that members of the senate should be indirectly elected: they should be sent from the Assemblies and Parliaments of the nations and regions of the United Kingdom. However, I should be grateful for the noble Lord’s guidance as to what principle ought to apply there: whether he considers that a dual mandate in those circumstances should be permitted by law, discouraged or something that the rules of the political parties should embrace—or would he advise a degree of caution in the matter?
My Lords, it is precisely because there was cross-party agreement that there is a valuable case for raising the issue. I am grateful to those who have spoken. The noble Lord, Lord Howarth, invites me to digress somewhat on to the proposal for a senate of the regions and nations—the words “back of an envelope” come to mind. In terms of the principle that would apply, it would be that which I have enunciated. He talked about caution, but I think that caution should apply to the very proposal for such a senate, rather than the method by which its members should be chosen.
On the points that have been raised, the principal argument deployed from both Front Benches against the amendment is, in essence, that being an MP is a full-time job. There are two problems with that. It was not accepted by the Committee on Standards in Public Life in its report, where the challenge was a conflict with the primary role, not an argument about its being a full-time job. It is also belied by the fact that the House of Commons is not unable to function because MPs are doing other jobs. It is quite possible for an MP to fulfil the functions of a Member of Parliament while being a Minister of the Crown, for example. I really do not see the argument that—
While there is a difference between being a Minister and a Member of Parliament, they are in the same building at the same time. I invite the noble Lord to consider the example of someone who is a Member of the Assembly and yet is called to vote in the House of Commons—as the Prime Minister was yesterday, in full evening dress—and therefore neglects what might also be an important vote in the Assembly. A number of conflicts will arise in that way and a Member of Parliament or a Member of the Assembly will have to choose which he would prefer.
My Lords, I recall that, particularly pre-devolution, we had Ministers who were responsible for different parts of the United Kingdom and who had to spend an awful lot of time not being in London. If there are challenges from being in both assemblies, that is a matter for the Members. Certainly, at times Members have managed to achieve that. Let us not forget that when we talk about a dual mandate, we are referring only to the House of Commons. There are Members of this Chamber who have a dual mandate, including one who is present at the moment.