(2 years, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, having not spoken at Second Reading, but having listened to the debate, I want to contribute one thought which I think follows rather well from what the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, said. This debate on the definition of the word “serious” is really pretty sterile. Talking about the word “serious” is rather like talking about whether a work of art is good or not good. What we are really talking about is judgment, and the judgment of many different groups: of the demonstrators, of the police, and of the courts and within the courts—juries, magistrates and all the rest of it. All we are striving to do is to get what the people as a whole—who are demanding something better than what is happening at the moment—want: better solutions when things happen. I do not believe that we can be precise in laying down in law what is serious or not serious, but that does not mean that we cannot use the word “serious” as shorthand for the collective judgment of all those interests involved.
My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Hain, with his proud record of disruption, cautioned us against forensic critiques. I am afraid that he is in for another one, but in my defence, I will make it very short.
The Minister hinted at the end of Second Reading that he would give thought to a definition of “serious disruption”, which I think would be useful. That is certainly what police witnesses suggested in another place, and what some of us, including my noble friend Lord Hogan-Howe, suggested at Second Reading. I am grateful to the Minister for the opportunity to discuss it yesterday.
I put my name to Amendment 17, recommended by the Joint Committee on Human Rights, which is based on part of the definitions in Sections 73 and 74 of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022. Having now had a chance to review Amendments 6, 27, and 38, in the name of my noble and learned friend Lord Hope, I am minded to jump ship—I hope that does not make me a rat—because I think his amendments may be better adapted to the purposes of the Bill.
The particular merit of my noble and learned friend Lord Hope’s approach is to recognise that the offences in Clause 1 on the one hand and Clauses 3 and 4 on the other are very different in nature. Disruption consequent on locking on is liable to be caused to any individuals or organisation based or carrying on business in the locality, and it is right that the definition should acknowledge this. Equally, it seems right that the threshold should be a very high one: “prolonged disruption of access” to homes, workplaces or other places to which there is an urgent need to travel, or
“significant delay in the delivery of time sensitive products or essential goods and services.”
That latter condition about significant delay appears in Sections 73 and 74 of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 but has, for some reason, been omitted from the JCHR definition.
The tunnelling offences are of a different nature. The serious disruption that they seek to address is to “construction or maintenance works” or related activities. Amendments 27 and 38 appropriately reflect that narrower scope.
If the Government are going to come back with a definition, or definitions, of “serious disruption”, I hope they will see the force of doing it in this way. My noble and learned friend Lord Hope modestly suggested that they might be able to manage something more proportionate and carefully phrased than he did—all I can say is, good luck with that.