Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateLord Anderson of Ipswich
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(6 months, 3 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I briefly want to follow my noble friend Lord Hailsham in his remarks. Had he been the presider in a three-person court, I would have been very happy to say that, having heard his speech, I had nothing else to add. However, since we are here, your Lordships have the disadvantage of hearing what I have to say. Like my noble friend Lord Howard of Lympne and my noble friend Lady Helic, I regret not being present at Second Reading and apologise, but I have read the Hansard of the debate.
I am always reluctant to disagree with my noble friend Lord Howard, but he took too narrow an approach to the questions before us. I use Clause 1(2)(b), which is the subject my noble friend Lord Hailsham attacks, as a hanger on which to make a few remarks. I think, if I understood him correctly, that my noble friend Lord Howard said that Parliament can essentially do what it likes, and of course he is perfectly right. Parliament can be as foolish as it likes. It can pass a law saying that all dogs are cats, but that does not make all dogs cats. It can pass a law saying that Rwanda is a safe country, but that does not make it a safe country. In addition—this is where I agree with my noble friend Lord Hailsham—it is for the Executive to advance their policy, whether it is a good policy or a bad one. It is for the Government to say that it is their policy that Rwanda is a safe country to which to send failed asylum seekers. If the Government then wish to have their view tested by Parliament, again, they can go ahead and do it.
Therefore, what the Government are proposing as a matter of policy is not a constitutional outrage, but the way in which they are writing it down in Clause 1(2)(b) is, if I may respectfully say so, just plain silly. It is worse to be silly than it is to be guilty of a constitutional outrage, and this is not a constitutional outrage but just plain silly.
Ridicule is a more powerful weapon than the constitutional and legal arguments of any number of lawyers. As the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, advances in one of her amendments, it would be helpful to have a UNHCR opinion on the safety or otherwise of Rwanda. However, I have a feeling that exporting government policy to the UNHCR is not a good idea. It would be helpful to have that opinion, but it is not essential. The Government must stand on their own feet, bring their policy to Parliament and have it tested. It will survive or not on the merits of the facts. The assessment of whether Rwanda is a safe country must be for the Government to consider and for Parliament to agree; we as a bicameral parliamentary body are not equipped to reach those sorts of conclusions. We can agree or disagree with the Government, but we are not equipped in a presidium to reach a conclusion on whether the Republic of Rwanda is a safe country as a matter of fact.
I do not wish to undermine or underestimate the hugely difficult political problem that the Government face with illegal immigration and the making of unsound asylum applications. Nor do I wish to undermine their genuine and very proper decision and policy to stop the boats. However, if we are to stop the boats, and if we are to reduce the amount of illegal immigration and bogus asylum applications, the Government would go a long way if they had the confidence of their own convictions and allowed Clause 1(2)(b) to say that that the Bill gives effect to the politically expedient policy of the Government that the Republic of Rwanda is safe, rather than trying to shift the responsibility for that opinion on to Parliament. Parliament may come to agree with it, but the initial policy is one for government. To that extent I wholly agree with my noble friend Lord Hailsham.
I am another supporter of Amendment 3. Clause 1 is an example of the current vogue for starting Bills not with operative provisions but with preambular statements of the obvious, a custom which is always irritating but normally harmless. However, there is harm, not just silliness, in Clause 1(2)(b) with its rather grand invocation of
“the judgement of Parliament that the Republic of Rwanda is a safe country”,
a judgment for all time, apparently, that there is no provision to revisit or change. That invocation is unnecessary and contrary to principle. It is unnecessary because there are other ways for Rwanda to be declared or deemed safe. The Secretary of State could be entrusted with the decision or, if it really is necessary for Parliament to take it, there could at least be a power for the Secretary of State to amend it in the light of changed conditions, as was the case with Section 75 of the Illegal Migration Act 2023.
It is contrary to principle because it requires us to come to a judgment on a fact-specific life-and-death matter on which, frankly, we are ill equipped to adjudicate. Of course, this is not the first time that such a thing has happen. It was tried in the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act 2004, when the countries of the European Economic Area—all signatories to the ECHR—were deemed, beyond rebuttal, to be safe. That experiment, a requirement of European Union law, was not a successful one. Its unwieldiness was demonstrated in the case of Nasseri. The Judicial Committee of the House of Lords dismissed a challenge to the safety of Greece but, through the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hoffmann, whom I am delighted to see in his place, indicated that the courts might have to issue a declaration of incompatibility if the deeming provision was contradicted by the evidence. The issue was sensibly addressed in the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 by transforming the irrebuttable presumption into a rebuttable one.
My Lords, I cannot of course surpass the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, in quality but I can at least claim the advantage in quantity: I have seven amendments in this group to his four.
We discussed in the first group of amendments why Parliament is ill equipped to make the fact-specific and time-specific judgment asked of it by the Bill—that Rwanda is a safe country. I suppose that on Wednesday we will look at how this difficulty is compounded by restrictions on access to the courts, which is the most troublesome aspect of the Bill.
The amendments in this group do not provide answers to either of those concerns of constitutional principle. Instead, and very much as a second-best option, at least as far as I am concerned, they accept the proposition that Parliament should be the decision-maker and seek to make something workable out of it. The past few hours have surely served as a warning, following the similar warning delivered by the International Agreements Committee at the end of last year, that this House could not, as the noble and learned Lord put it, in all conscience sign off now or in the near future on the proposition that Rwanda is a safe country. The Minister came very close in the last debate to admitting the obvious—that this is at best a work in progress. If he is as sensible as I think he is, he should be very grateful for the olive branch that is Amendment 6 in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope.
We turn to the question of what Parliament would need in order to make its judgment—the letter promised to the noble Lord, Lord Scriven, will be a welcome start, but it could not of course be enough—and how to ensure that this judgment can be revisited over time. My Amendments 15, 16, 77, 83, 88, 89 and 92 in this group, on which I am grateful for the assistance of the Law Society of England and Wales, are put forward in that spirit of slightly grubby compromise.
Amendment 15 provides for an independent reviewer to review the implementation and operation of the Rwanda treaty and report on it, initially at three-month intervals and thereafter annually. The objective is to produce an impartial report which Parliament can use to come to its own view. I am indebted for that idea to the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, a former independent reviewer himself, who signed the amendment but unfortunately cannot be here today. I accept that there are bodies other than an independent reviewer which could give us the expert advice that we need to make the judgment required of us under Clause 1. It may not be realistic to expect the Government to accept the UNHCR or indeed the Joint Committee on Human Rights for that purpose. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, suggests involving the independent monitoring committee established under the UK-Rwanda agreement. There is a good deal of logic in that and it might be a satisfactory solution, so long as its reports are published in full and without interference by the joint committee—the body made up of officials from the two Governments and hence anything but independent—to which the monitoring committee, under the scheme of the treaty, reports. For that reason I see attraction in the approach of the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, in his Amendments 64 and 65, which cut out the middleman and require the monitoring committee to report directly to Parliament.
My Lords, I will speak against Amendments 9, 10 and possibly 13. I declare that I am a member of the Joint Committee on Human Rights but, personally, I did not agree to the full report. Like the noble Baroness, Jones of Moulsecoomb, who is not in her seat, I have to say that I am not a lawyer, but I am a woman and therefore I am a pragmatic person.
The one thing about this Bill is that everybody criticises it, but nobody gives us an answer on how to deal with what is a huge problem. As a pragmatic person from the outside, I see it as a totally political discussion rather than people getting together to try to find a solution. The problem is that there is no silver bullet solution to regaining control of our borders, dealing with immigration and how to deal with all those people dying coming into the United Kingdom.
As I see it, the Strasbourg court states that members have an obligation to comply with interim measures, but it does not say anywhere that they are compelled to do so. Therefore, the argument that Parliament will undermine the rule of law by authorising Ministers to decide whether to comply with Rule 39 measures, is incorrect.
The other argument advanced by people opposing the Bill is that our reputation across the world will be damaged, but this is not a proven belief. It is unsubstantiated. The reality is that the whole international migration system has got totally out of control. Our Government are taking decisive actions to protect our country’s border, strengthen our national security, stop the appalling trade and, ultimately, avoid many unnecessary deaths.
Is not the primary duty of any Government to keep their citizens safe and the country secure? British citizens generally welcome migrants and value the importance of migration, but they are becoming more and more reticent at the idea of footing the bill, seeing the pressures on our NHS, schools and housing. This Bill is not anti-immigration but a pragmatic response to the urgent crisis. One cannot compare previous waves of immigration, such as those of the Jews and others who were forced to leave their country and were limited in their numbers. Faced with the scale and cost of the current migration into the United Kingdom, doing nothing is not an answer.
I realise that this Bill is not perfect, but it is a first step. If we do nothing, there will be political consequences, as the noble Baroness pointed out earlier, and we can see that in the rise of populism and anti-immigration movements in the rest of Europe. This is why I object to these amendments; they will strip away parliamentary authority to decide not to comply with the Rule 39 interim measures and therefore go against the whole idea of this Bill.
I am prompted to intervene by Amendment 80, so ably introduced by the noble Lord, Lord Dodds. Although I do not support that amendment, I think that he has raised a very significant issue. He referred to Article 2 of the Northern Ireland protocol, as amended by the Windsor Framework, and to the principle of non-diminution of rights. The Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission, as he knows, has a statutory duty under the Northern Ireland Act 1998 to monitor the implementation of Article 2 to ensure that there is no diminution of rights.
As the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission explains in its advice on the Rwanda Bill, referred to in the Constitution Committee’s report last week—and I declare an interest as a member of that committee—the rights not to be diminished include the EU procedures directive. That requires, among other things, by Article 27, that a third country can be considered safe only where the authorities are satisfied that key human rights principles will be respected. The procedures directive cannot be satisfied by a deeming provision; that is not how EU law works. It requires decision-makers to be untrammelled by legal fictions, and it requires convincing evidence that third countries are safe in practice. So there would appear to be a clear mismatch between what the Bill says and what the procedures directive preserved in Northern Ireland says.
My understanding is—although I submit to noble Lords from Northern Ireland on the detail of this—that this by no means a theoretical question. Official statistics do not provide an accurate picture of the extent of human trafficking on the island of Ireland, but the Northern Ireland refugee statistics for December 2023 record that there were 3,220 people receiving asylum support in Northern Ireland, and they were eligible for that because they were destitute on arrival.
To echo the call from the noble Lord, Lord Dodds, for transparency and openness in this matter, my questions to the Minister are as follows. Does he agree with the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission report, and in particular its conclusion that Clauses 1 and 2 of the Bill are contrary to the principle of non-diminution of rights under Article 2 of the Northern Ireland protocol? When he responds to the noble Lord, Lord Dodds, on his Amendment 80, would he also explain how, consistently with the Northern Ireland protocol, this Bill can apply in Northern Ireland at all?
My Lords, I shall speak to Amendments 9 and 13. I obviously have the greatest respect for my noble friend Lord Hailsham and the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, but let us look at the two subsections whose removal they called for at the beginning of the debate. Clause 1(4) says:
“It is recognised that … the Parliament of the United Kingdom is sovereign, and … the validity of an Act is unaffected by international law”,
and Clause 1(6) defines what the term “international law” means. There is nothing at all controversial in either of these clauses: indeed, Clause 1(4) is a classic statement of the legal position. I am afraid that I find it frankly bizarre for speeches to be made in this Committee expressing outrage that the Government have had the temerity to put them into Clause 1, as though they were dark secrets to be discussed only among lawyers in quiet corners of the Inns of Court. It is simply a frank statement and it has every place in Clause 1, where it will help the courts interpret the provisions of the Bill. Indeed, one can see that the interpretation provision at the end of the Bill refers back to Clause 1(6). For those reasons, I oppose the amendments proposed by my noble friend.
I want to be clear. I referred to the provision of the procedures directive which requires a case-by-case decision on whether a third country is safe. I contrasted that with Clause 2(1) of the Bill, which says that:
“Every decision-maker must conclusively treat the Republic of Rwanda as a safe country”.
Is the Minister saying that there is no difference between those provisions, or is he accepting there has been a diminution of rights under the procedures directive and saying that it does not matter? If that is case, can he explain why it does not matter?
My Lords, I do not wish to enter into a matter that lies outwith my department and sphere of responsibility at this hour. With the noble Lord’s permission, we shall write.
Having offered those reassurances to the unionist Benches, I offer this conclusion. We have devised a solution that is innovative and within the framework of international law. It is a long-term solution that addresses the concerns set out in the Supreme Court judgment and ensures that this policy can go ahead, paving the way, as I said earlier, for other countries to look at similar solutions. I invite my noble friend to withdraw his amendment.