(6 years, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberI am not saying that this is right; I am trying to describe what I believe to be the conscientious objection. I am not saying that it is proper. I have not applied for the health service, unfortunately, so I do not need to say what the extent of my conscientious objection would be, but there is no doubt in my mind that that is the nature of the conscientious objection, although people may have slightly different views about how far it extends. That is why the suggestion of the noble Lord, Lord Winston—I acknowledge his wisdom—is the best way forward, subject of course to making sure that it was used not in a discriminatory way but in trying to accommodate the full extent of the objection within the framework of the administration of the health service.
Does the noble and learned Lord accept, though, that the narrow case of Mary Doogan and the midwives in Scotland—she had after all been involved in more than 5,000 live births, bringing children into the world—illustrates what could never have been in the minds of legislators in 1967, as one can see in the Hansard of that period, and how much things have changed in the intervening years? That is not just about changes in attitude and culture; to pick up the point that the noble Baroness just made to the noble and learned Lord, there are those among us who believe that life begins at conception and that the science is right, and therefore that the law is right in saying that, for instance, as he referred to earlier, only for the first 14 days can experiments take place on the human embryo. That must be 14 days after something, and the law states that explicitly. That is not an unreasonable position, although I accept that these are contested positions. How therefore do we find, in a society where we respect difference, that there can be contested positions without discrimination falling on those who carry out those contests?
That is why probably the best solution that I have seen so far is to try to accommodate a contract on which you enter such conscientious objections as you have. I can see that that may limit the opportunities within the health service that a person with a conscientious objection has, but then that may be part of what you have to do.
Does the noble and learned Lord therefore think it is a good situation for us to be in that, for instance, people who have religious views or who are atheists and are opposed to taking the life of an unborn child in the womb are by and large pretty well excluded now from gynaecology and obstetrics? The noble Lord, Lord Winston, says from a sedentary position that that is not true. If he can give an example to me of, for instance, people who hold deeply committed Christian evangelical views or who are committed Roman Catholics or, for instance, Orthodox Jews who would support, for instance, the taking of life up to birth, as the law now allows since 1990 in the case of Down’s syndrome, I would be surprised, but I would be interested to hear those names.
(7 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, the idea of having a review of the effect of legislation strikes me as a very good proposition in general, and in particular in relation to this Bill. Obviously, as the noble Baroness has explained, the precise consequences of the Bill, which I congratulate my noble friend on bringing forward, are not very easy to see, because there are overlapping provisions in the Abortion Act which might deal with some aspects at least of the particular circumstances that the noble Baroness referred to. In my judgment, this is a useful amendment and a similar principle might well apply in other legislation as well.
My Lords, I agree with the noble and learned Lord and welcome the amendment from the noble Baroness. It strikes me that in this 50th anniversary year of the original legislation, which has led to some 8 million abortions, it would be a good thing if something like the amendment moved by the noble Baroness were attached to the original legislation. There is no sunset clause in it and it has never been reviewed, which I find staggering considering that 50 years have passed.
The amendment that the noble Baroness referred to, which was passed in 1990, extended the provisions of the 1967 legislation to enable the abortion of a baby with a disability, right up to and even during birth. As I pointed out at Second Reading in support of the Bill introduced by the noble Lord, Lord Shinkwin, this has led in some cases to abortion on grounds such as cleft palate, club foot and harelip. Indeed, 90% of all babies with Down’s syndrome, which the noble Baroness referred to, are now routinely aborted in this country. This is pretty close to eugenics and we need to consider much more deeply the issues that relate to the legislation governing the amendment that has been moved.
I sometimes think that instead of the tramlines on which we often find ourselves, with deeply held views—I respect the position that the noble Baroness takes; it is different from my own but I respect it—we need to go far more deeply into these questions. I am grateful, therefore, to the noble Lord, Lord Shinkwin, for giving us the opportunity to have this debate in your Lordships’ House.
My Lords, before we leave this group of amendments, I echo something that the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, said a moment or two ago about the importance of protecting workers’ rights. I was involved in the original legislation when it was enacted and spoke in another place about protecting workers who wanted to opt out of having to work on Sundays, and I moved amendments that excluded Christmas Day and Easter Day—two of the very few amendments that were successful at that time.
To some extent, these amendments merely tinker with the protections provided previously. A lot of evidence has been gathered in the years since the enactment of the original legislation which indicates that those protections need strengthening further. I simply refer the Minister to what one of her predecessors —the noble Lord, Lord Sassoon—promised Parliament back in 2012, on 24 April, when he spoke at the Second Reading of the Sunday Trading (London Olympic and Paralympic Games) Bill. He said that Parliament would have the opportunity fully to debate the issue of Sunday trading restrictions if the issue were revisited. I simply ask the Minister why it therefore required the intervention of notable Members of Parliament such as Mr David Burrowes and the redoubtable Fiona Bruce, who worked across the divide to defeat the Government’s proposals, to prevent something being stampeded through without proper parliamentary scrutiny. Why was the promise given to the House in 2012 not honoured? Why did we not have a debate about this when it was in your Lordships’ House in the first instance, before it went to another place? Perhaps the Minister will shed light on that.
The Minister will know that there were some 7,000 responses to the consultation process the Government initiated. It would be a great breach of trust in the future—at a time when trust is not held in very high esteem by many people when looking at Parliament and politics—if we were both to ignore the responses to the consultation process and circumvent the promises Ministers have previously given. If any further changes are intended, will there be the opportunity for full parliamentary scrutiny? Can we please not use such methods, which, in the end, it took members of the Minister’s own party in the House of Commons to prevent the Government from proceeding with in a very high-handed way?
I associate myself with a good deal of what the noble Lord, Lord Alton of Liverpool, has said. In particular, strengthening the rights of those in the retail trade in relation to Sunday trading is very important. I am glad that, however it has come about, it has ultimately been a government proposal which I hope noble Lords will agree to very quickly.
(12 years, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, obviously, the people who fall into this category should have our sincere sympathy. I certainly feel strongly that they deserve that. However, I want to mention one or two matters. First, when this system of contingency fees—or whatever name you want to call it—was introduced, there was no special rule for such cases. I do not know to what extent the noble Lord, Lord Alton, or the noble Lord, Lord Avebury, have looked into the situation as it was when the system as I introduced it was working.
Secondly, it will not have escaped your Lordships that the next amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Alton, concerns industrial disease cases generally. The amendment we are discussing deals with respiratory cases; the next amendment deals with industrial disease cases. I particularly draw to your Lordships’ attention the question of justice as between different claimants. I entirely accept what has been said by those highly medically qualified noble Lords who have spoken about the disease we are discussing. However, other troubles that are the subject of personal injury actions involve lifelong deprivation of practically all one’s faculties. That kind of long-lasting trouble comprises another type of personal injury action. If your Lordships wish to support this amendment, they have to think how they would justify treating the cases we are discussing differently from other terrible cases which those of us who have experience of personal injury actions know exist.
Long ago I was professionally involved in cases that concerned the National Coal Board. Pneumoconiosis cases were brought but other cases were brought involving people who had been injured while working underground. People who suffered those injuries were in terrible distress and eventually died. However, before they died they were in a very distressing situation. Therefore, one has to be careful about how one distinguishes between the different cases. Justice requires that similar cases be similarly dealt with.
If I understood him correctly, the noble Lord, Lord Alton, said that the cases in the group he was asking for should not be required to subsidise other cases. My understanding of this system is that you do not subsidise other cases: the success fee is dependent on the chances of success in your case. It is a factor which is dependent on a probability of success that works into the success fee. It is not dependent on other cases; it is dependent on the precise potential for winning that exists in the case that you have in hand. Therefore, I do not accept that this system in any way subsidises other cases across the board except in the sense that the probability of success in a particular case is what determines the success fee.
If the noble Lord, Lord Alton, wishes to press this amendment, I assume that he will not have the benefit of the 10 per cent uplift for his amendments in this group, which is on the way as a result of the undertakings given by the Government. There is also the question of the one-way shift. That would probably apply if it were done generally in respect of these cases, but the other may not.
This is a very difficult area. The sympathy of the whole House is with these people, and that is very much the case with me and my noble friend in particular, given his experience of this issue. However, justice requires us to do justice as between different claimants. Other claimants also have very difficult conditions. How do we say to X, “Your claim and the conditions to which you have been exposed are so bad, as distinct from the others, that we can justify treating you differently”?
I should perhaps have said that I of course associate myself with the congratulations offered to the noble Lord, Lord Avebury. I did not suffer from the difficulties that my noble friend Lord Newton of Braintree had.
Perhaps I may put two points to the noble and learned Lord before he sits down. The system as it operated under his stewardship did not take funds away from the claimant when they were successful in litigation. That is surely the difference from the matter before your Lordships’ House. When the noble and learned Lord oversaw the system, it was fair and just, and did not raid any of the funds that the claimant was able to receive in compensation. We are merely seeking to maintain the status quo in the way that it operated during his time.
As to exceptional circumstances, surely, if someone is terminally ill, they are exceptional or sui generis, as described by the noble Lord, Lord Newton, and my noble friend Lady Finlay in their interventions. If people in this group are terminally ill, that is surely what makes their cases exceptional.
My Lords, it is possible to describe other types of illness and the basis for claims in very much the same language as that used by the noble Lord, Lord Walton of Detchant, and the noble Baroness. So far as the first point is concerned, in the system as I introduced it the success fee would be payable by the claimant out of his or her damages.