King’s Speech
Lord Alli Excerpts(3 months, 2 weeks ago)
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Lord Alli (Lab)
My Lords, I first welcome the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hermer, to this place. I want to say how pleased I am that he has joined the Government and I congratulate him on an excellent maiden speech.
I have been in your Lordships’ House for 26 years; I know I do not look as if I have, but I have. Twelve of those years have been on the Government Benches and 14 on the Opposition Benches, and I can say without hesitation which I prefer. It is a privilege to return to this side of the House, and it would be remiss of me not to thank the party opposite for all its help in making that possible.
On a more serious note, I want to take a moment to reflect on the many colleagues who are not here today and who would have loved to have witnessed that journey. I am thinking of them all, in particular my noble friend Baroness McDonagh, who I know would have been by my side today.
I have chosen to speak in the constitutional debate because, over the last decade, we have seen an undermining of the fundamental principles that decency and fair play should underpin our elections. At the last election, voter turnout was low—low because voters were fatigued by politicians but also because you do not win elections by maximising voter turnout; you win elections by making sure your votes are distributed in the right seats.
However, in 2014 the Conservative Party started down a road that systematically disenfranchised many voters they believed would not support them. First, there were individual electoral registration forms, where each voter had to register individually rather than relying on the old household forms, thus disenfranchising many young people and ethnic minorities. Then came voter ID, again disproportionately affecting the poor, the disabled and the ethnic minorities. Then there was a type of voter ID that was acceptable—yes to blue badges and older persons’ bus passes but no to student ID cards—and, more recently, sabre-rattling around the widespread use of postal votes.
Democracy requires participation. Depressing participation should not be used as a political strategy. The only winners of that are extremists. So, I welcome the Government’s commitment to modernising the constitution, beyond the reform of this House, to strengthen the integrity of elections and encourage wide participation in the democratic process.
I ask my noble friends on the Front Bench in this place and my honourable friends on the Front Bench in the other place: in addition to extending the franchise to 16 and 17 year-olds, will they look at two other measures? The first, I suspect, given the speech by the noble Lord, Lord Wallace, would be easy, and that is automatic enrolment. There can be very few arguments against it. The second could perhaps be a bit more difficult, and that is mandatory voting. This is not a revolutionary idea. Indeed, some form of mandatory voting exists in over 22 countries, including Australia, Belgium, Luxembourg, Brazil, Argentina, Peru, Ecuador, Singapore and Uruguay. What do we see in those countries? We see increased voter turnout and reduced influence of money in politics.
We do not have to sit back and watch extremism rise in our society—extremism built on the back of fewer people participating in our elections. We can do something about it. I am reminded of that quote, “The only thing necessary for the triumph of evil is for good people to do nothing”. We can do something. This is our opportunity to act, and I hope the Government will do so.
I wish the Government all the best on what is an ambitious King’s Speech. It has been far too long acoming for me, but it is here now. Let us not waste the opportunity to implement change.
Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Bill
Lord Alli Excerpts(11 years, 4 months ago)
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Lord Alli
My Lords, I fear that my response will disappoint the noble Lord, but let me try to explain why. The amendment seeks to create two classes of marriage. It is conceived from the notion, as the noble and learned Lord said, that what same-sex couples want is use of the word “marriage”. It simply misses the point. What same-sex couples want is marriage itself. They want to share with opposite-sex couples the joy of married life, and to be treated equally by the state and by society. They do not want to be “married (same sex couples)”, and I suspect that opposite-sex couples do not want their union bracketed, either.
The noble and learned Lord has gone to a huge amount of trouble to identify and draft amendments to ensure that the brackets are in the right places and the sexual orientation identifiers placed at any and all opportunities. The question that perplexes me is: why is that necessary? Why does the noble and learned Lord want to pick out gay couples in such a public and conspicuous way? I understand that those opposed to same-sex marriage, having lost the vote at Second Reading, now want a second—and, judging by the Marshalled List, a third, fourth, fifth and sixth—bite of the cherry. “Give them marriage”, says the noble and learned Lord, “but not the name. Call it something else: ‘traditional marriage’ and ‘marriage (same sex couples)’—anything but marriage itself”. That is a new battle; in that way we can preserve the inequality between same-sex and opposite-sex marriage.
If we do that, what of international recognition? This amendment would allow other countries to treat same-sex couples differently from opposite-sex couples. Those countries will say, “We recognise only marriage (opposite sex couples)”. We will draw in statute a difference for others to exploit. That is a bad idea. The word “marriage” should be able to be used by couples regardless of their sexual orientation.
I have a great deal of respect and admiration for the noble and learned Lord and agree with much of what he says on many occasions, but I find myself diametrically opposed to his view on this matter. I do not think that the noble and learned Lord or other noble Lords who have spoken in support of this amendment will ever see this Bill as I do. The amendment that the noble and learned Lord has crafted is a means of dividing us, not uniting us. It pours salts on to wounds at a time when we should be healing. It will allow others—not noble Lords in this place—to create mischief where none was intended. It will be argued that Parliament made the distinction so must have had a purpose in doing so. There the discrimination begins.
We have an obligation in this House to make good and to rebuild once this Bill is passed. This amendment would leave a scar on the Bill for another day, and another battle to be fought. For those reasons, and many more, I hope that this amendment will be defeated. Two classes of marriage, however well disguised, is the very opposite of what this Bill is designed to do. Giving us the use of the word “marriage” with one hand and taking back its exclusivity with the other would be a fatal blow to the intentions of the Bill. Just to be clear, I do not find the amendment acceptable in any shape or form. I hope for the reasons that I have tried to express that the noble and learned Lord will understand why I do not share his view.
Lord Skelmersdale
Is the logic of the noble Lord’s position that this Bill should not be called the Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Bill but the Marriage (Amendment) Bill? Would he be interested in putting down an amendment, if it is not too late, to that effect?
Lord Deben
My Lords, it is always with very great care that one clashes with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, particularly when one has to suggest to him that there is an illogicality in the argument that he has put forward. He said, on the one hand, that there is a whole range of differences between same-sex marriage and opposite-sex marriage. In that, he is not only right but obviously right. He then attached to that the reason for making this distinction in the Bill, but it is a distinction that does not need to be in the Bill because, as he says, it is universally recognised. Therefore, making the distinction in the Bill must be for a different purpose.
As we have heard the debate continue, we have moved from the careful language of the noble and learned Lord to expositions which explain the purpose of the amendments. When they are referred to as modest amendments, I think only of the modest proposal which, in Dean Swift’s writing, went rather further than that title suggested. This modest amendment is here for a purpose. It is to say now what has so far not been able to be said more directly, which is, “Wait a moment, it is not quite what you say”. We will have made sure that in the Bill, and therefore in the Act, we make a distinction that can be referred to and used not only internationally, as the noble Lord, Lord Alli, said, but at home.
I think that Christians should be even more strongly opposed to this than others because the Bill is specifically designed to give us an absolute right to maintain our view about marriage. It does so on the basis that it gives the state an absolute right to maintain its view about marriage. That was, after all, something that was started back in the days of Henry VIII, when the state said that it could make its own decisions about what marriage meant, even though that meant disagreeing with the highest powers in the church.
I am not suggesting that the state should go any further in its relationships with the church than Henry VIII did, but I am suggesting that this is an historic decision and one that we should respect. The church, under the quadruple lock, is absolutely able both to perform and to give its teaching about marriage. That is a teaching which I wholly support. As a convert, I have to, otherwise I would not have made that decision and choice. However, I also believe that parliamentarians have a duty to the whole nation, and those in the whole nation who seek marriage do not seek marriage followed by brackets. Indeed, I think that opposite-sex couples ought to object to this. Why should they have marriage so defined?
I turn to the second argument, which is that in the very clear words quoted by the noble Lord, Lord Lester, there is now a different way of looking at marriage from the historic one. That was rapidly picked up by those who want to support the amendment. I hope that we will think carefully about this. Differentiating between same-sex marriage and opposite-sex marriage because you think that the one is about a new view of marriage and the other is about an old view is of course not correct. If you wanted to distinguish between the new view and the old view of marriage, you would have to have more brackets. You would have to have “(traditional) marriage” for opposite-sex marriage and “(new) marriage” for opposite-sex marriage. No one in this House would suggest that as one approaches the registry office or the smart hotel, one should go up with a list of alternatives, asking, “Am I going in for marriage-light or marriage-heavy? Am I taking marriage in this way or that way?”. From much of my experience of some 35 years in surgeries as a Member of Parliament—more, if you take in the period of candidacy—I do not think that anybody would understand having to fill in a form on that basis.
Baroness Richardson of Calow
My Lords, I recognise what the noble Baroness said about how important it is for a marriage to be conducted in a very proper way. Sometimes the presence of a registrar can make a marriage very special, but the registrar is invited to register a marriage, not to make it or to bless it. If he or she does not register it, someone else will have to. It is not going to make a difference to whether that marriage takes place. We need to have concern for smaller registry offices that do not have a huge number of registrars and which would have to make a rota that took into account people’s sensitivities. This is going a step too far.
Lord Alli
My Lords, we debated at Second Reading and in Committee the rights of this group of employees not to conduct same-sex marriages. I understand that it might seem unfair to some that registrars who do not approve of gay marriage should have their jobs put at risk if they refuse to marry same-sex couples. Registration is the core of what those public employees do. It is not an add-on. It is their refusal to do a substantial part of their job that creates the issue, not their religious belief. We divide church and state, and I think it is dangerous to let church bleed into state functions. I believe that every citizen of this country has a right, regardless of colour, creed, background, religion or, indeed, sexual orientation to have equal access to the goods and services offered by the state. We all pay for them.
Lord Deben
That would be a reasonable argument and one that I would support for people in future, but does the noble Lord accept that there ought to be some generosity towards those who have chosen this profession and for whom the matter of registration—and it is that—stretches their beliefs to a degree that means that they cannot do it? It is not for us to decide what is a proper belief; that is one result of a division between church and state. We ought to be able to allow the small number of those for whom this is true to continue in their jobs until they move on.
Baroness Williams of Crosby
Would the noble Lord, Lord Alli, consider looking at other countries and at what has happened in cases where public servants have questioned the conscience of the state in asking them to do things that they believed to be deeply wrong? How much we all feel in debt to those brave people who stood up in countries such as Germany in the 1930s, and elsewhere, because they believed they had a conscientious objection to what the state was ordering them to do.
Lord Alli
I understand the point the noble Baroness, Lady Williams of Crosby, is making, but it undermines her argument when she and the noble Baroness, Lady Cumberlege, seek to rubbish the national panel for registration and the opinions it gave and question the core of what registrars are saying. They are saying that they do not want this.
In Committee, I said that we have to divide church and state, and this is the other side of the coin. If the noble Baroness, Lady Williams of Crosby, wants me to accept what she just said, would she accept that the church has made it very clear that it wants an absolute opt-out? It has insisted, quite rightly, and I am happy that it has done so, that any individual priest or cleric, no matter how strong their belief in same-sex marriage, should not be allowed to opt in until the religious organisation has agreed. There is a blanket exemption, so if I were a priest—the Bishop of Salisbury—and I deeply believed that I should be allowed to marry gay couples, why could I not opt in? There is a blanket ban from the churches. Individual opt-in and opt-out are not on the table. The churches themselves ruled it out at the beginning of this process. No priest can opt in; no registrar can opt out. If we accept the case for religious organisations barring individuals from opting in, we, too, must accept the case for civil registrars not being able to opt out. We have discussed this issue at length; we need to resolve it today.
Lord Lester of Herne Hill
My Lords, I cannot remember whether the Race Relations Act 1976 had already come into force when I got married 41 years ago in the Brixton register office. However, suppose that that Act had not come into force at that time. In Brixton, there are a lot of black people. If I had wanted to marry a black person and we turned up at the Brixton register office, where the registrar looked at us and said, “I’m very sorry, but I have a conscientious objection to mixed marriages. I don’t wish in any way to undermine you, but I just can’t do this”, that would be impermissible. A public servant who is performing statutory duties must not discriminate on any forbidden grounds.
Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Bill
Lord Alli Excerpts(11 years, 4 months ago)
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The Lord Bishop of Leicester
I am grateful to the Minister for that clarification. I understand it and I hope that she will understand the sprit in which I raised this question.
Lord Alli
I understand what the right reverend Prelate is trying to do and completely agree with it. However, I wonder whether he might also take away with him the issue of employees of the Church of England. The church is the only organisation exempt from the employment regulation that would otherwise prevent the church from dismissing somebody for simply being gay. It was an exemption that it argued for and received. When the right reverend Prelate talks about other employers, I say with absolute humility that it would be lovely if the Church of England could revisit that decision about being able to sack gay priests who are not active homosexuals and are not having sex but who simply identify themselves as being gay. I will listen much more sympathetically to the arguments that the right reverend Prelate puts forward when that anomaly is corrected.
The Lord Bishop of Leicester
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Alli, who asks, through me, whether the Church of England would revisit a number of issues and a number of stands that it has taken. I wish that the church would do that and would certainly want to play my part in ensuring that it does. I have taken careful note of speeches made around this House during the passage of this Bill and of what the most reverend Primates the Archbishop of Canterbury and the Archbishop of York have said on this. I take his point and think it is well made.
Tomorrow evening, I will be acting as host to 50 or 60 of the world faith leaders in my garden in Leicester. We work closely together and I know how deeply concerned they are about their freedoms to follow and proclaim the traditional teachings of their faith and how much they look to their bishop, who has the privilege of a seat in this House, to do everything possible to ensure that those freedoms are underwritten by the Bill. It is in that spirit that I brought forward this amendment today. I now beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Baroness O'Loan
I appreciate how late it is, and will be brief, but I do want to move Amendment 56A, which relates to Part 2 of Schedule 7, on the last page of the Bill. As I reflect on tonight’s debate, I would say to the Government that this may not be as simple as it seems. The reality is that, despite the repeated assurances of certain noble Lords, the United Kingdom has repeatedly been found to be in breach of its obligations under the convention and, more recently, under the Human Rights Act.
Along with the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, I would say to the Minister that there is both courage and common sense in considering the Bill again and in bringing it back on Report with amendments. I have heard the Minister’s comments on that and have seen government amendments. I asked the question that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, asked at Second Reading. However, I did not get any response to any of my questions at Second Reading—a matter on which a number of noble Lords commented to me.
More remains to be done and I am pleased to hear the noble Baroness, Lady Northover, say that the door is open. However, I would like to see something rather than just ex post facto post-legislative scrutiny. We need more than that because there is an expectation in this House that the Bill will become law and I want to place on record that I was somewhat concerned at the earlier tenor of the debate. I understood that the process in this House was to raise issues in general at Second Reading, to put amendments in Committee and hear a government response, and to revert to unsolved issues on Report. Otherwise, surely, there would be no point in anything other than Second Reading and wherein would lie our scrutiny function? I would also like to place on record, in response to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace of Tankerness, the fact that I and, I think, several other noble Lords have received a letter signed by a significant number of Members in the other place, saying that although it was broadcast as a free vote, it was not quite as free as it was made out to be.
The Bill as drafted is not limited in its consequences to the issue of conducting same-sex marriages, et cetera. It does not ensure that there can be no detriment to an individual or organisation in their interactions with a public authority, because it does not deal, in this context, with a Section 149 issue and does not deal with the risk of the attribution of discriminatory action against persons with a protected characteristic; namely, sexual orientation. I want therefore to speak very briefly about individuals who, for reasons of conscience, feel unable to promote same-sex marriage in the way that the law, currently, would appear to suggest that they might have to do.
Teaching sex and relationship education tends to be something which is asked of teachers who do not specialise in the topic but may be mathematicians, physicists or historians. SRE has to be taught and some staff must teach it. The risk for a teacher is that, directly or indirectly, something they say may be interpreted as relating to the subject matter of the Bill and may be interpreted as discriminatory by pupils of a homosexual orientation. The noble Lord, Lord Alli, was right when he said earlier that teachers of course have to act as professionals. They can develop rules; for example, that in their classroom no teacher or pupil can be asked a personal question. However, the reality is that a classroom of 30 or more teenagers is not the easiest place to operate. There may be pupils who see an opportunity to embarrass a teacher by asking repeated questions, by making suggestions or by their conduct generally as the teacher tries to ensure that all the children are kept safe, that there is no bullying and that the children actually learn. Teaching is not the easiest occupation.
We even have to take into account that a teacher may have to face what may be a mischievous, but nevertheless damaging, allegation of discriminatory behaviour which is completely unwarranted. We know that there are mischievous and unfounded allegations of sexual abuse of children in schools. I know that that is a difficult issue to introduce in this context but we need to be aware that working in the classroom is not as simple as some noble Lords appear to think it is.
Finally, it is my belief that this amendment, or a similar one, could be introduced to prevent the adverse and unintended consequences to which the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace of Tankerness, referred earlier. It would provide protection against detriment resulting from the operation of Section 149 for any person holding conscientious beliefs that marriage is between a man and a woman. It would not permit homophobic action, but it would provide a balancing between these difficult and sensitive competing rights.
Lord Alli
My Lords, I think we have debated this issue, like a number of others, over and over again, so I do not wish to detain the House for any longer than is necessary. However, I want to say that this is a good Bill and a balanced Bill. As the Minister said, there is some work to do before Report, but this is the last amendment in Committee. I put on record my thanks, and I am sure the thanks of many Back-Benchers, to the Front-Benchers of both parties for the way in which they have conducted this stage of the Bill. It does them credit, and this House too.
Baroness Thornton
My Lords, I shall address my remarks to the actual amendment, which is about the public sector equality duty. This amendment seeks to place an express requirement on public authorities to protect individuals who hold a view that marriage should be between a man and a woman under the public sector equality duty. This amendment misunderstands what the public sector equality duty does, and I am slightly surprised that the noble Baroness would suggest it. It is a duty to:
“have due regard to the need to:
Eliminate unlawful discrimination, harassment and victimisation and other conduct that is prohibited by the Act:
Advance equality of opportunity between people who share a characteristic and those who don’t:
Foster good relations between people who share a characteristic and those who don’t”.
It is not a duty to compel or ensure certain actions by a public body, as Amendment 56A would require. However, that due regard applies to religious belief in the same way that it applies to sexual orientation. No other beliefs or specific issues are singled out for special consideration under the public sector equality duty. Singling out one particular belief above any other risks undermining the equal balancing of protections for religious organisations and other protected characteristics, which is specifically enshrined by this duty. We suggest that this amendment is both unnecessary and potentially damaging to the protections—
Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Bill
Lord Alli Excerpts(11 years, 4 months ago)
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Lord Alli
By adding a new layer to the process the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Morrow, has managed to find another ingenious way to thwart any religious organisation that wishes to opt in. I am not sure what purpose it serves except to give additional strength to those who oppose opting in, even when religious organisations have given consent.
This gives me the opportunity to ask the Minister whether he might look into an issue raised with me regarding shared religious premises. The example given to me is that of a building that is primarily used by a religious organisation, but rented out once a week to another religious organisation. There is a worry that, under the current drafting of the Bill, if the first organisation applies to conduct same-sex marriages in that building then the tenant could object, preventing their being able to register the building. I wonder whether the noble and learned Lord might look at this and let me know whether that is the correct interpretation. I do not need an answer today. I am happy for the noble and learned Lord to write to clarify the situation.
Baroness Cumberlege
No, my Lords, I do not know of any. I have just a little more to say before I finish. Our proposed new clause will promote rather than hinder tolerance, because individuals will be more likely to live in harmony, even if their thoughts and beliefs are entirely contradictory. Harmony, broad-mindedness and tolerance are more likely to be achieved if both those who do and those who do not believe that same-sex marriages should be available feel that their beliefs are equally valued and protected.
In conclusion, our proposed new clause strikes a sensible balance between the rights of those wishing to get married and the rights of those with conscientious objections to conducting same-sex marriages. It will allow individuals conscientiously to object only in certain limited circumstances. It will not allow anyone with a conscientious objection to communicate that objection to anyone wishing to get married at a register office. It will not allow any registrar to make their beliefs publicly known through their work. It will allow registrars quietly to refrain from conducting same-sex marriages only where there are enough other registrars to cover demand. Surely this is a better approach.
Earlier this evening, the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, talked about a middle way. I agree with her. This House encourages tolerance. Our amendment would protect the rights of individuals with conscientious objections, and also allow same-sex couples to get married. To me, that is the middle way. I urge the Minister—
Lord Alli
I have a question for the noble Baroness. If I understand her proposed new clause correctly, at the beginning there is a conscientious objection subsection. There is also an obligation on public authorities to provide registrars. The proposed clause then states that if there are not enough registrars in the area, the conscience exemption is dropped and the registrar will have to perform the marriage regardless. That is the worst of both worlds. There is the illusion of a conscience exemption, but if there are not enough registrars, the poor person about whom the noble Baroness spoke will have to perform the marriage in any case. Perhaps the noble Baroness will tell me if I got that right or whether she has a different interpretation.
Baroness Cumberlege
The noble Lord, Lord Alli, got it absolutely right. I will draw my remarks to a conclusion.
Lord Anderson of Swansea
My Lords, I hope that the Government will listen to the points that have been made and recognise that there is a real problem here. The Government can, after all, be magnanimous. They have had substantial majorities in favour of the Bill, both in the other place and here. Now they can listen to the clear case for the protection of those who will be adversely affected if this Bill, as no doubt it will, becomes law. I hope also that the Opposition will recognise our proud tradition, over the centuries and beyond, of trying to support radicals; those who are against the wind, those who have a legitimate conscientious objection.
I do not agree with my noble friend on the Front Bench who was trying to reduce to absurdity the idea of where we draw the line, of what happens if someone objects to mixed-race marriage. There was not an objection. Even in apartheid South Africa, if one were white one could find a church in which to marry a black woman, or the other way round. It is rather like asking what would happen if a registrar objected to marrying someone with ginger hair. Of course, one can raise an objection of that sort and try to draw a silly distinction, but there must surely be a point where reasonable people accept that there is a substantial body of opinion which is in favour of traditional marriage, and if it is at all possible, as in the terms of the amendment, one should seek to accommodate it.
The noble Baroness, Lady Cumberlege, should be congratulated on the balanced and tolerant way in which she moved her amendment. The good sense of the people should be accommodated because there is not only the problem which the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, mentioned: that the contract of an existing registrar will have been altered by statute to their detriment. This will not have been part of their original terms and contract of employment, so they would stand being faced with the awful choice of either going against their conscience or losing their job. Surely there should at least be some transitional arrangements to allow for this. Furthermore, looking at this in a practical way, one asks how many people are likely to be affected by this. What will the demand be for same-sex marriages? The evidence from other jurisdictions is that demand will be relatively small. I concede that the evidence points to the fact that there was a more substantial demand in the initial stages, because of the pent-up demand from those who wished, for example, to transfer from civil arrangements to a full marriage position; but afterwards, there was a relatively small number.
If it is the case—I think it is very likely to be the case—that only a small number will wish to enter into a same-sex marriage, then that is surely manageable and should be managed by reasonable accommodations and by good will on the part of the Government and those who seek to legislate. I am not even sure of the concession made by the noble Baroness that someone might be compelled to officiate if there is not someone actually available within Islington or wherever. If it is likely to be the case that only a small number are going to be affected, in larger jurisdictions there will be more than one registrar in any event, and it is surely not beyond the wit of an accommodating and understanding local authority to make arrangements with an adjoining local authority. In so many other areas of competence, local authorities co-operate.
I fear that there is a whiff in the Government of “The juggernaut moves on. We shall insist that these people conform, jump to attention, do what we say they will do, or they will properly be dismissed”. There surely must be a more tolerant attitude, as we have had over the years, to people who have an established objection of conscience. Certainly, over the years my party has recognised that the establishment has always railed against those who AJP Taylor called troublemakers, because troublemakers lead to progress. We have always respected those who stand against the wind of public opinion or of legislation of this nature. If we have reasonable good will and magnanimity, we will seek to accommodate that small minority of people rather than say, “You must conform or else”, or otherwise seek to reduce to absurdity their own position.
My own judgment is that we can find the good will that dealt with the sort of problems we faced in the previous century when there was a majoritarian approach. The Liberal Democrat approach was rather to encourage politicians to introduce laws that, yes, were mandated by the majority, but with sensitivity to minorities where there might be negative or unfortunate effects. When it became apparent that a law designed for and supported by the majority—this one is perhaps supported by the majority but it is designed for a minority—might have negative effects, the answer was not to abandon the law or put the minority outside its scope, which could negatively impinge upon it, but to provide different treatment under the law.
One saw the same authoritarian approach with the then Government’s attitude towards the adoption agencies of the Roman Catholic church. With a degree of good will, they could have been accommodated. The Catholic agencies could have referred same-sex couples who wished to adopt to other agencies that would help them, but no, the authoritarian bandwagon rolled on and the effect was negative in respect of children. Many of the agencies were forced to close. People may have felt better inside at that, but the unfortunate losers were the children who had been cared for extremely well by those Roman Catholic agencies.
The truth is that a law designed for a majority, or in this case a minority, can have perverse and unintended consequences for minorities. Similarly, a law designed for one minority can have perverse and unintended consequences for other minorities. In my judgment, with good will, they should and can be provided with appropriate accommodations. The simple effect of this legislation will be that if you are a registrar, you are religious or your identity is such that you cannot in all conscience officiate at a same-sex marriage without acting in violation of that identity, you have an awful choice to make. You can either officiate and act in violation of your identity and your conscience or you can lose your livelihood. Surely that goes against all the traditions of this country when an easy way out can be found.
The fact is that many employed by public authorities have their consciences respected. Examples have been given—I will not go over them again—of atheist teachers. The noble Lord, Lord McColl, cited an example from his own experience of doctors and abortion. If we pass this Bill unamended, the effect of it will be that every registrar with a sincerely held objection to same-sex marriage must either act in violation of their identity and be willing to officiate at such marriages or lose their vocation. That is the blunt choice. I end by saying that it would be a frightening and illiberal Britain which would force them to do such a thing. Just as we make space for atheist teachers and for doctors and nurses, surely we should make space for registrars.
Of course the job of registrars is to officiate at marriages, but I would submit that the number of same-sex marriages is likely to be very small indeed. I recall that during the Committee stage in another place, the Minister was asked the following by Tim Loughton MP:
“Why is that the principle that a surgeon who has strong Catholic views is allowed to pick and choose whether to perform abortions or other surgery, if the same principle cannot be applied to a Catholic registrar with strong views, allowing them to pick and choose whether to perform that other public service? What is so essentially different that we protect one but not the other?—[Official Report, Commons, Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Bill Committee, 26/2/13; col. 234.]
The Minister responded by saying that they are different functions: one is an abortion; the other is a same-sex marriage. That is hardly an adequate answer. Surely there is an inconsistency in the Government’s position—in both cases public servants perform a public function for which the public pay. Merely saying that they are different functions is inadequate. Registrars should have their conscience accepted as well.
Those of us who were brought up just after the Second World War recall the statements attributed to some of the awful chairmen of conscientious objectors tribunals. Imagine them saying to a young man who, on conscientious grounds, did not wish to go to war, “you cannot pick and choose”. I think of Crito and Plato in this context—you cannot pick and choose. This has shades of some of those awful chairmen of tribunals. I hope that this House, consistent with its traditions of individual liberty and freedom of conscience, will support this worthwhile amendment.
Lord Alli
My Lords, I understand that it might seem unfair to the right reverend Prelate, or to the noble Baroness, Lady Cumberlege, that registrars who do not approve of gay marriage should have their jobs put at risk. However, it is their refusal to do their job, not their religious belief, that creates the issue.
However, I was rather taken by the intervention of the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, and I think it does us credit to look at some of those transitional arrangements to see what can be done. I also agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, that this House has at its core the belief that every citizen in this country has a right—regardless of creed, colour, background, religion or sexual orientation—to have equal access to the services that we pay for. It is something that we debated at great length during the passage of the Equality Act (Sexual Orientation) Regulations 2007. As a House, we put beyond doubt that no one should be denied equal access to services simply because of the way they were born. This provision flies in the face of that principle.
To the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Swansea, I say that it cannot be right, equally, for public servants to pick and choose which laws they will and will not implement. That is a recipe for chaos. I think my noble friend on the Front Bench was saying that this would open the door to allow Hindus, for example, to refuse to marry people who marry outside the caste. It would also open the door for Catholic registrars to have the right to refuse to marry divorcees. It would give registrars the delegated powers of this House and of the other place. That is not something that we should permit, no matter how tempting the case.
The other uncomfortable feeling I have is the notion that simply having a strong religious belief against gay marriage entitles you to be exempt from the law, but that having the opposite and equally strong religious conviction does not. The right reverend Prelate knows that the church was very happy to ensure that the provisions of this Bill could come into force only when religious organisations, such as their own, decided they should. There is no conscience clause there: no individual priest or cleric who is a registrar is allowed to opt in, no matter how strong their conscientious belief that same-sex marriage should be allowed to be performed in religious settings. If a conscience clause is so desirable, I make this offer to the right reverend Prelates the Bishop of Hereford and the Bishop of Leicester. If you are prepared to accept a conscience clause on this side, help me to craft a conscience clause for the clerics and priests in the Church of England who wish to opt in to registrar marriages. You have got your lock: attacking ours is not, in my view, a clever move.
The Lord Bishop of Hereford
I do not think that the initiative for the quadruple lock came first from the Churches. Rather, it was an offer made to us because of our concerns about the legislation and appeals to Europe. Those were the concerns that lay behind that.
Lord Alli
I will repeat my offer. I am really happy to work with the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Hereford, or the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Leicester. If a conscientious clause to allow registrars to opt out in civil marriage is so important, I will work with him to craft a similar clause to allow registrars in the Church of England to opt in. Conscience is not a one-way street. It goes both ways. If you want to opt out, we must come back and question why we cannot opt in. It is about more than just one conscience. We all have a conscience and mine tells me that this amendment is wrong in principle.
Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood
My Lords, I, too, confess to having some sympathy with the amendment, particularly as diluted by the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss. However, I hasten to add, I do not have enough sympathy actually to support it. It would represent the thin end of a dangerous wedge and set a troubling precedent. I recognise of course that there are some limited exceptions to the obligations on doctors and certain others but I think that, without exception, they relate to cases where there is some physical relationship between the person being exempted from a public duty and somebody else.
The closer analogy is perhaps with incumbent judges. It has never been suggested that judges should be free on grounds of conscientious objection to refuse to take certain cases. Proposed subsection (3) in the amendment refers to “religious or other belief”. Suppose that a judge strongly objects to indeterminate sentences, whole-life tariffs, automatic sentences, rules such as “two, three strikes and you’re out” or, in days past, to divorcing people. Catholic judges were from time to time, as the noble and learned Baroness will confirm, obliged to pronounce in divorce cases. Indeed, those of us who sat here as Law Lords, and then across the square as Supreme Court judges, routinely as part of our duties sat on Privy Council appeals. From time to time we would be confronted with final appeals, often from the Caribbean, in capital cases. Is it suggested that it would have been open to a member of the court to decline to take such a case on the grounds of a religious or other strongly held belief?
Very simply, public servants should almost without exception—save in these physical relationship cases—serve the public according to the law as democratically enacted. They should not seek to shed what they regard as their less palatable duties on to long-suffering colleagues.