Data Protection and Digital Information Bill

Lord Allan of Hallam Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 24th April 2024 Grand Committee

Secondly, the tech companies have made clear that they follow our proceedings with interest. Across the world, they have gone to court to prevent legislation passing, undermine regulation and frustrate penalties. However, it was in an open court, at the inquest of Molly Russell, that the world saw just how cynical and wilfully careless the sector is. Via her Instagram account, Molly Russell viewed, liked and shared 2,100 pieces of content relating to depression, suicide or self-harm in a period of only six months. It was also in open court that the Chief Coroner came to the view that the material recommended to Molly contributed to her death in more than a minimal way. Of course, both I and the Bereaved Families for Online Safety hope that the provisions in the broader Online Safety Act will make meaningful change to children’s online experience but, when the worst happens, we will, because of this provision, see again in open court the part that any regulated company plays in the death of a child. It is my hope that, as well as giving some succour to the families at the very worst moment of their lives, the court’s access to data will also make companies pause to think about the impact of their service design on children before they roll out products, and that they act more swiftly when the alarm is raised. Tech is 100% engineered and can be anything at once. Until the sector stops seeing harms to children as unfortunate collateral damage to their business model, they and we will have failed.

[Lord Allan of Hallam (LD)]

My Lords, I want briefly to contribute to this debate, which I think is somewhat less contentious than the previous group of amendments. As somebody, again, who was working on the Online Safety Act all the way through, I really just pay tribute to the tenacity of the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, for pursuing this detail—it is a really important detail. We otherwise risk, having passed the legislation, ending up in scenarios where everyone would know that it was correct for the data-gathering powers to be implemented but, just because of the wording of the law, they would not kick in when it was necessary. I therefore really want to thank the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, for being persistent with it, and I congratulate the Government on recognising that, when there is an irresistible force, it is better to be a movable object than an immovable one.

I credit the noble Viscount the Minister for tabling these amendments today. As I say, I think that this is something that can pass more quickly because there is broad agreement around the Committee that this is necessary. It will not take away the pain of families who are in those circumstances, but it will certainly help coroners get to the truth when a tragic incident has occurred, whatever the nature of that tragic incident.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, having been involved in and seen the campaigning of the bereaved families and the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, in particular in the Joint Committee on the Draft Online Safety Bill onwards, I associate myself entirely with the noble Baroness’s statement and with my noble friend Lord Allan’s remarks.

Cancer Research: Funding Gap

Lord Allan of Hallam Excerpts

Monday 29th January 2024 Lords Chamber

[Viscount Camrose (Con)]

I am not familiar with this analysis, but it is very difficult to understand exactly how much is spent on cancer research, for the reason I gave earlier: so much cancer research is in areas adjacent or relevant to cancer without being specifically tagged as “cancer research”. For instance, in October 2023 the Prime Minister announced a new £100 million fund for the AI life sciences accelerator mission, which will have beneficial outcomes on cancer but is not tagged directly to cancer.

[Lord Allan of Hallam (LD)]

My Lords, I am sure the Minister receives regular representations from potential investors in medical research in the UK about what they need from the Department of Health and Social Care. Will he share with the House, and with his neighbour on the Front Bench, their key asks from the UK medical system and how he ensures a cross-government approach to entice in the maximum amount of investment?

[Viscount Camrose (Con)]

Indeed: it is so important to have not only a cross-government approach but a cross-sectoral approach. The Government work closely with academic, industry, charitable and other stakeholders. The crux of this is the healthcare missions of the Office for Life Sciences. The OLS cancer mission aims to show leadership in oncology innovation by developing further the approach first successfully used in the Vaccine Taskforce. Among other things, it has implemented the UK cancer research strategy forum, which brings together bodies of all kinds that are active in cancer research to ensure that they are effectively co-ordinated in today’s research and in future directions.

Data Protection and Digital Information Bill

Lord Allan of Hallam Excerpts

2nd reading
Tuesday 19th December 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Allan of Hallam (LD)]

My Lords, even less than the noble Lord, Lord Knight, can I claim that this is my primary brief, so I want to make a short Back-Bench contribution to the subject, bringing some of my experience from former interests. I declare that I do not have any current financial interests but, if you look at my register entry, you will see that I spent a long time working for a company that was so much at the heart of the data protection debate that the 2016 EU regulation was nicknamed in Brussels “Lex Facebook”.

I do not want speak to the details of the provisions in front of us, and I look forward to hearing some of the arguments, particularly from the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, with whom I worked closely in the context of the Online Safety Act; I think she has some really important points to raise on what is in the Bill. I also look forward to the maiden speech of the noble Lord, Lord de Clifford.

The one thing I really want to spend a short amount of time on today is to flag a concern that I will not attempt to resolve: I would rather leave that to my noble friend Lord Clement-Jones and others who will to be in Committee on the Bill. It is the concern around EU adequacy that I think should really be front and centre of our discussions when we consider this legislation. As I say, I do not intend to be active in later stages of the Bill—unless we fix the NHS between now and Committee, which would be a blessing for more reasons other than enabling me to take part in consideration of data protection legislation.

The flag that I am raising will be in something of a Cassandra-like tone. It is something I think is very likely to happen, but I am not expecting the Government to believe me and necessarily change direction. I have been intimately involved in these discussions over many years. If people have been following this, they will know that the EU had an adequacy agreement with the United States that had full political support within the EU institutions but has successively been struck down in a series of actions in the European Court of Justice. All the politicians wanted data to flow freely between the United States and the EU, but the law has not allowed that to happen. So the alarm bells ring. The noble Lord, Lord Knight of Weymouth, said he thought the Commission had doubts; that worries me even more. Even where the Commission is saying that it is comfortable with the adequacy of the UK regime, the alarm bells still ring for me because it said that repeatedly over the US data transfers and it turned out not to be the case.

There are three main areas where we can predict that the risk will occur. The first is where the core legal regime for data protection in the UK is deemed to be too weak to protect the interests of EU data subjects. The second is where there are aspects of the UK legal regime for security-related surveillance that are seen as creating unacceptable risk if EU data is in the hands of UK entities. The third is where redress mechanisms for EU data subjects, especially in relation to surveillance, are regarded as inaccessible or ineffective. These are all the areas that have been tested thoroughly in the context of the United States, and any or all of them may end up being tested also in the European Court of Justice for the United Kingdom if EU citizens complain in future about the processing of their data in the UK. The first angle will test the complete package of data protection set out in the many pages of this Bill. The second will consider our surveillance practices, including new developments such as the Investigatory Powers (Amendment) Bill, which is before us right now. Any future changes to UK surveillance law, for example, following a terrorist outrage, may end up being tested and queried before the European Court of Justice.

Regarding redress, our relationship with the European Court of Human Rights is critical. Any suggestion that we start to ignore ECHR judgments, even in another area such as immigration policy, may be used to argue that EU citizens cannot rely on their Article 8 right to privacy in the United Kingdom. My advice to the Minister is to properly test all these angles internally on the assumption that we will be arguing them out at the European Court of Justice in the future. This is difficult. I know that the UK authorities, like the US authorities, will not be comfortable sharing details of their surveillance regime in a European court, but that is what will be required to prove we are adequately safe if a complaint in respect of UK surveillance is made. It is really important that we hear the strongest lines of attack, and that we invite privacy activists, in particular, to offer them: the Government should invite in the kinds of people who will be taking those court cases so they can hear their strongest lines of attack now and test all our legislation against them. We certainly should not rely on assurances from the European Commission; I hope the Minister can give us more than that in his response. The key dynamic from the transatlantic experience is that this is between EU privacy activists and the European courts, rather than being something the Commission entirely controls.

The consequences of the loss of EU adequacy, or even significant uncertainty that this is on the horizon, will be that UK businesses that work on a cross-channel basis will be advised by their lawyers to move their data processing capability into the EU. They would feel confident serving the UK from the EU, but not the other way around. This is precisely what has happened in the context of transatlantic data flows and will hardly make Britain the best place in the world to do e-business. I hope the Minister will confirm that it would be a very undesirable outcome, to use parliamentary language, and that we will be taking one step forward but two steps back if that is a consequence of this Bill.

Having planted that flag, it is regrettable I will be unable to help noble Lords as they try and thread the needle of getting the legislation right. I have every sympathy for those seeking to do that; I have less and less sympathy for the Government, because they chose to bring the legislation forward, unlike other important legislation like the mental capacity Bill, which was left off the agenda, as I keep reminding the Government. I hope noble Lords will keep this Cassandra-like warning current in their minds as they consider the Bill; I do not want to be standing here in five years’ time saying, “I told you so” and I do not think noble Lords want me here in five years’ time saying that either. With that in your Lordships’ ears, I hope the Minister and Members who are scrutinising the Bill can really dig into this adequacy point and not hold back, because it is a genuine, serious threat to all kinds of businesses in the United Kingdom, not just digital ones.

Artificial Intelligence: Regulation

Lord Allan of Hallam Excerpts

Tuesday 14th November 2023 Lords Chamber

[Viscount Camrose (Con)]

Indeed. Of course, one of the many issues with regulating AI is that it falls across so many different jurisdictions. It would be very difficult for any one country, including the US, to have a single bit of legislation that acted on the specific example that the noble Lord mentions. That is why it is so important for us to operate on an international basis and why we continue not just with the AI safety summit at Bletchley Park but working closely with the G7 and G20, bodies of the UN, GPAI and others.

[Lord Allan of Hallam (LD)]

My Lords, there is significant public interest in the companies developing artificial intelligence working together on common safety standards, but in doing so they may run the risk of falling foul of competition law. Will the Minister be talking to the Competition and Markets Authority to make sure that one public good, preventing anti-competitive practices, does not impede another public good, the development of common safety standards?

[Viscount Camrose (Con)]

Yes, indeed. It is a really important point that the development of AI as a set of technologies is going to oblige us to work across regulators in a variety of new ways to which we are not yet used. That is indeed one of the functions of the newly formed central AI risk function within DSIT.

Emergency Communications

Lord Allan of Hallam Excerpts

Monday 26th June 2023 Lords Chamber

[Viscount Camrose (Con)]

It will be an area covered by the report. I stress that, from the information that I have so far, BT was able to implement its disaster recovery planning and system and return, albeit at a slightly slower pace, to the ability to answer 999 calls. I very much take the point that the wrong combination of catastrophic failures would indeed create a very serious and broad situation.

[Lord Allan of Hallam (LD)]

My Lords, people dealing with a health crisis may call either 111 or 999 and each of those services will refer people on to the other as appropriate. Can the Minister confirm that there are protocols in place such that the operators of each service are informed as soon as one of them goes down so that they can stop referring people on, and whether there are protocols in place for each service to handle the overload if one has gone down?

[Viscount Camrose (Con)]

It is an excellent question; I am afraid the truth is that I do not know the answer at this point, but I will be happy to write to the noble Lord.

Data Protection

Lord Allan of Hallam Excerpts

Thursday 23rd March 2023 Lords Chamber

[Viscount Camrose (Con)]

The AI regulation White Paper is due for publication next week and my noble friend will see a lot of that detail set out in it. I observe for the time being that the approach is, as far as possible, to maintain sectoral regulation where it is but apply the principles that she mentioned over the top of it. I look forward to working with her on the AI White Paper, which I hope will set her concerns to rest.

[Lord Allan of Hallam (LD)]

My Lords, following up previous questions on adequacy, the Minister will be aware that these are ultimately matters for the European Court of Justice, where any Commission decisions can be challenged—and are often struck down, as the United States has found to its cost. Given the likelihood that any decisions of adequacy in respect of the revised UK law will be challenged, what preparations are the Government making so that they are out there, defending the interests of British business in front of the European Court of Justice in future? That is an easy question for the Minister’s first day out.

[Viscount Camrose (Con)]

I thank the noble Lord and am always very much in favour of easy questions. As the Bill progresses through Parliament, we will indeed be engaging with the EU, as he suggests. I share his view that this is something we have to take extremely seriously and have proper preparation and engagement throughout.