(7 years ago)
Lords ChamberThe Minister said that the reason this is done in regulations is because telling a bank how to do its due diligence is too detailed for primary legislation. But he is rather overstating the case, because Regulation 18 of the 2017 money laundering regulations says that, “A relevant person”—this would be the bank—
“must take appropriate steps to identify and assess the risks of money laundering and terrorist financing to which its business is subject”.
The first requirement there is:
“In carrying out the risk assessment required under paragraph (1), a relevant person must take into account … information made available to them by the supervisory authority”,
under Regulation 17. If you go back, you find that the supervisory authority has to take notice of what the Treasury and the Home Office have said. So this is a cascade that automatically updates. If there is a new risk, the Government identify it, along with mitigating measures, and tell the supervisors, which devise ways to update the information for their sectors. Then the onus is still on the individual businesses to work out how to do this. Yes, there is a list of factors to include, but it is within the power of the Government to say, “This is an extra factor; it does not even need any legislation”. However, it embeds the duties of the Government to have a position and to come out with their reports and then the duties of the supervisors. None of that is definitely retained, because everything to do with this money laundering directive can be rubbed out. So it is not about the excruciating detail that the Minister says it is—the excruciating detail comes from the supervisors.
I understand the point the noble Baroness makes, but it is not about—to use her term—the excruciating detail. Secondary legislation—with parliamentary scrutiny—provides the Government with the ability to react to rapidly changing circumstances. Relying on primary legislation would not allow the Government to do that. We have a difference of opinion in that regard—but, on the point she made, guidance to financial institutions would follow whatever legislation and whatever rules and laws prevail at that given time.
I turn to Amendment 69A. After the EU (Withdrawal) Bill receives Royal Assent, the powers under the Bill as they are drafted will allow changes to the money laundering regulations 2017 and to the funds transfer regulation which are appropriate to prevent deficiencies that arise as a result of the UK ceasing to be a member of the European Union. It will not enable any other changes to be made. I note that the noble Baronesses, Lady Bowles and Lady Kramer, are aware of the need to make such changes to the money laundering regulations 2017, as demonstrated by Amendment 69D, which we will discuss later today. However, the Government’s approach in this area is to ensure continuity for regulated firms, and certainty for businesses as to the nature of the obligations with which they need to comply.
In order to ensure that our anti-money laundering regime makes legal sense on withdrawal from the EU, we anticipate laying brief regulations made under the power in Clause 7 of the EU (Withdrawal) Bill so as to fix a limited number of deficiencies within the money laundering regulations and the funds transfer regulation. Our approach will make amendments such as—for example—removing references to the Government needing to have regard to reports published by the European Commission and to the Government having to file notifications of risk assessments with EU institutions. It would not be appropriate to keep these obligations, as I am sure noble Lords acknowledge, once the UK ceases to be a member of the European Union.
Given the necessity for such changes in order to have functioning UK law, I do not agree with Amendment 69A, which would remove the ability to make these necessary fixes to our existing laws. Being unable to make necessary changes of the type that I describe would not take account of the fact—the basic fact—that the UK will have ceased to be a member of the European Union.
Legislative reform orders that derive from the 2006 Act are designed to reduce the regulatory burden rather than achieve any policy changes. They must meet a number of preconditions before they can be used to reduce regulatory burdens. Most importantly, they are not allowed to remove any necessary protection, and are therefore not a risk to regulatory safeguards within the money laundering regulations 2017.
I do not agree with the proposed exclusion of a useful tool to ensure that the UK’s anti-money laundering regimes can be simpler, easier to understand and easier to comply with, while ensuring—a point well made by the noble Baronesses in speaking to their amendments—that standards are not driven down, which I agree with, and the strength of the system is maintained. That is another point of principle I agree with.
I hope the Committee will also consider how legislative reform orders are used. There is no convention to use them to make controversial changes, and the preconditions in the 2006 Act will always apply. I believe that the preconditions of the 2006 Act are the appropriate way of constraining the use of its powers. Further, disapplying legislative reform orders in a single case might suggest that it would be appropriate to use them in other similar contexts.
I turn now to the proposed new clause contained in Amendment 69E that would limit amendments to the money laundering regulations 2017 to only those which implement standards published by the Financial Action Task Force, or that identify or revoke a designation of a high-risk third country. I should add that I am again grateful that within the clause both noble Baronesses recognise that new powers are required to update the UK’s money laundering regime after we leave the EU.
The Government are committed to playing a leading role in shaping global anti-money laundering standards through our membership of the Financial Action Task Force. Noble Lords will be aware that we led a successful campaign through the FATF to clarify that only some charitable organisations, such as those working in conflict zones, are vulnerable to terrorist financing, and in doing so improved the ability of civil society organisations to function and receive funding. We have also actively worked to clarify the obligations on the private sector to share financial intelligence. In doing so, we are addressing a key priority for the private sector, which consistently delivers the message that we will be better able to manage financial crime risk if it is able to share more information regarding suspicious customers.
It is right that the Government have the power to update the UK regime when such standards change. There are, however, several areas where the UK’s anti-money laundering regime already goes beyond these standards. Our recently established register of trusts generating tax consequences, for example, goes beyond the standards set by the Financial Action Task Force. Similarly, the decision at Budget 2015 to regulate virtual currency exchanges for the purposes of anti-money laundering and counterterrorist financing did not reflect an expectation of the Financial Action Task Force—it went beyond and it was a policy decision to which we expect to give effect through transposing amendments to the fourth EU anti-money laundering directive.
Although we will remain aligned with Financial Action Task Force standards after the UK ceases to be a member of the EU, our anti-money laundering regime already exceeds its standards in certain areas and we will wish to ensure that our defences against misuse of the financial system remain ahead of global standards, rather than solely reflecting them. Ensuring that we can make regulations so as to detect, investigate and prevent money laundering or terrorist financing, as well as to implement the standards of the Financial Action Task Force, is the most certain method of placing future changes to our anti-money laundering system on a sound legal basis. Adopting the amendment would limit our ability to do so in future.
I concede that maybe we should have said “be at least as strict as”, but there is nothing in the Bill that says we are going to maintain and be ahead of global standards. We would all be a great deal happier if there were something in there indicating that standards would be maintained. We know there are good intentions, the Government have been doing good things and the Front Bench opposite would do good things, but it is not there in writing. That is what is fundamental to this: the principles are not fixed.
I thank the noble Baroness for acknowledging the actions that this Government have taken and—I am sure I speak for the Front Benches—for the faith that she has in both Front Benches. I have listened carefully to her point. The point that I am making is that the UK has already shown that through our commitment to the FATF, which we will continue to be part of. Not only are we complying but we are leading, and that role will continue and indeed be strengthened by the UK’s membership of the FATF. The objectives and obligations that it asks member states to adhere to will continue after we leave the EU.
I turn to Amendment 72A. The definition of terrorist financing contained in Clause 41 of the Bill is identical to that which already exists in the 2017 money laundering regulations. This definition provides that “terrorist financing” means an act that constitutes an offence under various legislative provisions, being sections of the Terrorism Act 2000; the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, the ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida (Asset-Freezing) Regulations 2011 and the Terrorist Asset-Freezing etc. Act 2010.
As noble Lords will note, elements of the definition of terrorist financing within Clause 41 cross-refer to secondary legislation that creates a criminal offence; namely regulation 10 of the ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida (Asset-Freezing) Regulations 2011. This provides that any person who contravenes prohibitions contained elsewhere in those regulations commits an offence relating to the financing of terrorism. The offences created through those regulations play an important role in deterring the financing of terrorist organisations. Regulation 14 of those regulations further provides that a person guilty of the relevant offence is liable, on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years’ imprisonment or to a fine or indeed both.
Clause 1 of the Bill provides that an appropriate Minister may make sanctions regulations where doing so would further the prevention of terrorism, whether in the UK or elsewhere. It is possible that such regulations made under the powers conferred by Clause 1 could impose targeted sanctions and penalties similar to those that are established through the ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida (Asset-Freezing) Regulations 2011, and which are already captured within the definition of terrorist financing within the 2017 money laundering regulations. If such regulations are made, they will effectively update the UK’s regime for counterterrorist financing. I am sure noble Lords will also note that the reference in the definition to the Terrorist Asset Freezing Act etc. 2010 will become obsolete when Part 1 of that Act is repealed.
In these circumstances, it is right that the definition of terrorist financing within Clause 41 of this Bill can be updated so that the UK’s counterterrorist financing framework can be applied consistently, working off a single definition of terrorist financing. Clause 45(5) of the Bill provides that any regulations updating this definition would rightly be made through the draft affirmative procedure, providing Parliament with an opportunity for fully scrutinising any such changes. In the absence of such a power, the Government would otherwise be obliged to maintain a definition of terrorist financing within this legislation that could quickly go out of date and so limit the effectiveness of our response to the financing of terrorist groups.
My Lords, there are a lot of regulations going on here that interact with one another. Will they be considered one by one, so that they can be looked at comprehensively, or will they come in a great big wodge—akin to the sort of thing we get on money laundering?
My Lords, I am sure that the noble Baroness will accept that there are times when it makes sense to discuss certain regulations together in a group. At other times, they will be discussed individually. We will certainly look at the context of each regulation and introduce it in the appropriate manner. The key point I would make in all this is that, under the procedure we have adopted, we want to ensure that there is effective scrutiny.
I totally accept the point of principle and have noted our difference of opinion on the point made by both noble Baronesses and others on primary and secondary legislation. However, I have explained why the Government believe their approach is the right one. I also appreciate the patience of Members of the Committee in our detailed discussions setting the context, which I am sure will be reflected in our discussions today. I thank noble Lords for their patience and indulgence, and hope that they are minded to withdraw or not move their amendments.
(7 years ago)
Lords ChamberThe noble Baroness says “everyone”. I know that she and the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, made that point but I do not agree. She has made her point and I have listened; perhaps she should listen to the point that I am making in response.
As the noble Baroness says, Schedule 2 ignores the cascade of information. The power in Clause 41 will enable us to update and amend existing legislation that does this, as we did when the regulations were replaced this year, as I have already mentioned. This should not be viewed in isolation, which I fear is what the noble Baroness is doing. When new categories of risk manifest—the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, talked about virtual currency exchanges—new legislation will be needed, and this power helps to fill that gap.
In sum, Schedule 2 sets out examples of the scope of the anti-money laundering and counterterrorist financing power contained in Clause 41, and it defines the limits of this power in relation to criminal penalties. The noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, ignores proportionality. However, this issue must be looked at in the wider context, not in isolation. Ministers are bound to use these powers proportionately, taking account of people’s human rights, and they are bound by Section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998. I therefore contend that Schedule 2 should stand part of the Bill.
Perhaps I may briefly mention Amendment 71A, which I understand is related to the opposition of the noble Baronesses, Lady Kramer and Lady Bowles, to Schedule 2. To give an example, the reference in paragraph 2 of Schedule 2 to regulations, mentioned by the noble Baroness, being capable of requiring,
“prescribed persons to identify and assess risks relating to money laundering, terrorist financing and other threats to the integrity of the international financial system”,
corresponds with regulations 16 to 18 of the money laundering regulations 2017. These require the Government, supervisors and regulated firms to assess the risks of money laundering and terrorist financing at a national, sectoral and business level as appropriate so as to inform the nature and extent of any due diligence measures applied by regulated firms.
Perhaps I may give a further example. The reference to “prescribed persons” in paragraph 4 of Schedule 2, which again the noble Baroness quoted, corresponds to Part 3 of the money laundering regulations 2017. This establishes a framework giving effect to the standards of the Financial Action Task Force relating to simplified and enhanced customer due diligence, which I am sure we all welcome. Again, this is not about the UK going it alone; it is about how we are part and parcel of the FATF.
Therefore, the amendment would not remove the Government’s ability to designate categories of business as regulated for anti-money laundering purposes, or designate supervisors. These purposes are already permitted under Clause 41 and are referred to in Schedule 2.
There may also be a number of areas where we want to confer functions upon persons to assist with the implementation and enforcement of sanctions. I think that the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, startled the doorkeepers when she quoted various examples. Captains of ships and harbour masters, for example, might need to exercise functions in order to comply with shipping sanctions. We might also need to confer functions to help enforce sanctions on border officials, agents of Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs, or law enforcement agencies, such as the National Crime Agency.
I know the noble Baroness. She is well versed in the money laundering issue, and I respect that. That is why I said at the outset that I will listen again, or read, I should say—listening to Hansard may be stretching it a bit—her contribution very carefully and see if there are aspects that need further amplification and explanation from the Government. I hope that through my practical examples I have addressed some, if not all, of her concerns and that at this point, she will be minded to withdraw her amendment.
I thank the Minister for his reply. I fear that a large part of it merely proved my point that small extracts have been turned into powers. I maintain that without the surrounding framework to give proportionality, you do not need everything that is in there. It is difficult—
I was merely giving a few illustrative examples. Like the noble Baroness mentioned, I think she and I would be the only ones here if we carried on in this respect. What I was doing was merely illustrating, but it is dealt with comprehensively.
That is the point. It is converted into a power very comprehensively but it just takes the first section. For instance the one I quoted does not even point out that they are responsible only for what goes on in their own business. That makes it very difficult. A lot of this could be dealt with by putting in those proportionality statements and a few more things.
The other source from which this list of powers has been obtained—which I think the Minister was referring to—is the FATF recommendations. However, you have to bear in mind that the FATF is an organisation meant to look at risks to the financial system, terrorist financing and those kinds of things. It is not set up with a branch to deal with civil liberties or even human rights. It leaves that to the nation states which are then going to implement. I could probably find it in the FATF but it is too late in the evening to do that. You cannot just put the list of powers or of things that the FATF wants you to do into powers without acknowledging that there has to be a framework.
Yes, there may be human rights elements that we have not abolished, nevertheless there are more things—
To clarify, I said that we need to look at this in the wider context. That is why I referred to the obligations that Ministers are bound by in the Human Rights Act. That is part of our statute, so we are obliged to follow that.
Unfortunately, it seems that that ends up in the courts from time to time, which is very difficult for the sorts of people that might find themselves entangled in this. My plea is really that we just make an effort to get this a little bit more right. In that spirit, I will not be pressing Amendment 71A, which was linked to the creation of supervisory powers, which was why it was in the same group. This issue is one that we will wish to return to in general on Report.