Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Bill [HL] Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateBaroness Bowles of Berkhamsted
Main Page: Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (Liberal Democrat - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted's debates with the Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
(6 years, 11 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, the Opposition are sympathetic to many of the points that have been made, and I single out Amendment 69H. The capacity to carry out UK company formation from outside the UK is a real lacuna in the current money laundering regime. Monitoring within the UK is difficult enough, as is evidenced by the use of, for example, Scottish limited partnerships in Russian and former eastern-bloc bank fraud and money laundering of gigantic proportions. This vulnerability is of course magnified when the company information provider eludes the UK’s money laundering oversight.
Amendment 69J provides, we respectfully suggest, a useful additional hurdle for any prospective money launderer to negotiate. While the provision of the requisite materials for opening a bank account no doubt seems irksome to many, it none the less provides an additional external check on the background of those seeking to operate via a UK company.
The amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Naseby, offers a clear and useful mechanism for combating money laundering and I share his observation that it would be surprising if the Government did not support this measure with considerable force.
My Lords, there are two issues here. The first is to make sure that money laundering checks are carried out somewhere in the chain. There could be various mechanisms to do so, some of which are suggested in the amendments. Then there is the issue of how Companies House itself will get the money to conduct the checks. That is the point of the provision in Amendment 69L for a mechanism to levy a fee. Obviously, there could be other mechanisms. As to Amendment 69J, if there is no bank account, the fee could be levied at that point. Ways in which to tighten up and get the money are the objectives of this family of amendments.
My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, for leading a short but interesting debate on these matters. I shall put some remarks on the record to see whether they satisfy her and my noble friend.
Amendments 69H and 69J would prohibit trust or company service providers, known as TCSPs, that do not carry on business in the UK from incorporating UK companies, unless overseen by a UK anti-money laundering supervisor. The amendments would also require UK companies to establish a UK bank account and evidence this to Companies House. The money laundering regulations 2017 require TCSPs carrying on business in the UK to be fit and proper. We will also shortly formally establish the office for professional body anti-money laundering supervision, or OPBAS, which will work to ensure consistently high standards of anti-money laundering supervision by professional bodies, including TCSPs.
If there are factors that make it unclear whether a trust or company service provider could be regarded as acting by way of business in the UK—in which case it would fall within the jurisdiction of a UK anti-money laundering supervisor—HMRC considers on a case-by-case basis whether registration for supervision is necessary in order to combat attempted evasion of supervisory requirements. I therefore agree with the intention behind the amendment. However, given the pending establishment of the office for professional body anti-money laundering supervision, it is right that we establish this body first and then take proper account of its conclusions around TCSP supervision before taking further action in this space.
Additionally, the problem that the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, and my noble friend Lord Naseby correctly identified ultimately results from trust or company service providers exploiting the comparative weakness of anti-money laundering supervision in certain overseas jurisdictions. In order to comprehensively address this, our emphasis should not be solely on expanding the scope of our anti-money laundering regime, particularly given the practical difficulties that would arise from UK supervisors seeking to exercise effective oversight over trust or company service providers established outside the UK and with no physical presence within the UK.
Such circumstances would present significant challenges for effective supervision, which typically includes measures such as on-site visits to firms that present higher risks of money laundering. The most effective way of addressing the problem which the proposers of the amendment have highlighted is through effective international co-ordination to drive up standards of supervision in jurisdictions with weaker anti-money laundering regimes than we have here in the UK. This is the agenda which we promote with international partners through the Financial Action Task Force, and it is this agenda which will offer a durable, long-term solution to the problem of weak overseas supervision of trust or company service providers.
Amendment 69J would amend the Companies Act 2006 to require UK companies to establish a UK bank account and evidence this to Companies House on an annual basis, or otherwise pay a fee or financial penalty. The wider purpose behind this part of the Companies Act is to provide a simple mechanism for companies to confirm that corporate information registered with Companies House as required under other obligations is accurate and up to date. The amendment would significantly change the purpose of the annual confirmation statement. As drafted, it would additionally require all UK companies to demonstrate annually that they hold a UK bank account; otherwise, they would have to pay a financial penalty. This would mark a significant increase in the reporting burden on the 3.9 million entities registered with Companies House, the majority of which are small, local businesses which would have to provide evidence of a UK bank account every year.
Amendment 69K would require company formation agents—defined for these purposes as including the UK registrar of companies at Companies House—to conduct customer due diligence. I appreciate my noble friend’s remarks about the consultation which has taken place, led by my noble friend Lord Ahmad, with colleagues and officials. I understand and sympathise with my noble friend’s intention; it is quite correct that we should take steps to avoid corporate vehicles being used for money laundering. However, I hope I can convince him that his amendment is not the best way to do that—although he prefaced his remarks by saying that it was a probing amendment. He will probably want to reflect on my remarks in response to it.
The amendment would represent a fundamental change in the principles under which the UK’s company law system has long operated. The UK registrar of companies has a statutory duty to incorporate and dissolve limited companies. This is carried out by Companies House, which registers company information and makes it available to the public. Companies House is not—unlike trust or company service providers, which are already supervised for anti-money laundering purposes under the money laundering regulations—a private-sector profit-making business. The registrar has no discretion in law to refuse or decline a request to incorporate a company. Companies House therefore cannot decline to establish a business relationship in the way that firms regulated for anti-money laundering purposes must when they cannot discharge their customer due diligence obligations. Because of the registrar’s statutory obligations, Companies House is not considered to be a company formation agent. If approved, the amendment would require further substantial revision to UK company law to allow Companies House to operate in the same fashion as company formation agents.
Approximately 600,000 new companies are registered each year at Companies House. The customer due diligence measures required under the money laundering regulations are significant, and are required to be applied by regulated firms on an ongoing, risk-sensitive basis to prevent illicit actors making use of the financial system. They are not intended—either by international standards, EU law or UK law—to be applied by a public body to all companies that are incorporated within the UK. Were these measures to be adopted, they would be a significant, unfunded burden upon Companies House and would fundamentally alter its relationship with the company formation process. They would also unnecessarily delay the process of company formation. The overwhelming majority of UK companies are set up for legitimate commercial purposes. Applying this amendment as drafted would not address or identify higher risks of money laundering or terrorist financing, but would instead impose an across-the-board administrative burden on Companies House and individual companies.
My Lords, my noble friend Lady Kramer and I gave notice that this schedule should not stand part of the Bill. I would like noble Lords to take a few moments in private to give the schedule the “read it out aloud” test. Let us try one bit of it now. Paragraph 4 says:
“Require prescribed persons to take prescribed measures in relation to their customers in prescribed circumstances”.
All the prescribing is yet to be defined. I am sorry to appear light-hearted, but I can imagine that coming out of the mouths of comedians. Truly, I do not know whether the schedule is sinister or whether it just fails to understand how the money laundering regulations 2017 work. It is sinister if you look at the scope of the powers, which gives opportunity for boundless increase in who can be covered and ignores any proportionality or safeguards that are included in the current law.
It is no use pointing to the reference to the current regulations, which appears in paragraph 20, because that is basically there only to give power for them all to be rewritten, amended or revoked—so there are no guarantees for anything. It is worth having a quick look at paragraph 20, which starts:
“Without prejudice to anything in section 41, paragraphs 1 to 19 or section 44(2), regulations under section 41 may”.
We have to remember that Schedule 2 starts:
“Without prejudice to the generality of section 41”.
So we have a paragraph that starts with three mentions of “without prejudice”, reinforcing that a whole lot of other stuff is expected to be going on. Paragraph 20 then says:
“(a) subject to any modifications the appropriate Minister making the regulations considers appropriate, make provision corresponding or similar to any provision of the Money Laundering Regulations 2017, as those Regulations have effect immediately before they are saved by section 2 of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2017; (b) amend or revoke the Money Laundering Regulations 2017”.
It says that you can make provisions corresponding or similar to, or revoke. If that, together with the three references to “without prejudice” is not giving notice that you intend to completely rewrite them, then I really do not know what is. This is, as I have said before, a big part of the problem. It is sinister when looked at that way.
There is also a failure to understand, or at least to commit to, how the money laundering regulations 2017 work. That misunderstanding or failure to acknowledge is there by virtue of the very structure of Schedule 2. It is upside down, starting with the person, moving on to supervisors and leaving out duties of government. It does not seem to appreciate the cascade of risk assessment that drives automatic updating of the nature of risks from the Treasury and Home Office, to supervisors and then on to the persons. The list of powers seems to have been composed by lifting a short part-sentence here and there from individual sub-regulations, ignoring any safeguards including, as I said, the surrounding cascade methodology. The part-sentences are then turned into a list of naked powers that have already received criticism from the Delegated Powers Committee in paragraph 36 of its report. I commend reading that paragraph to noble Lords; it highlights and criticises the unrestricted power over persons, the powers to create supervisors with investigatory powers, the powers to prohibit the carrying on of business and power to impose unlimited fines and criminal offences—all without limit save for the sentencing limits.
It would stretch your Lordships’ patience, especially at this hour, if I went through each paragraph to show its origins and what is missing—although I could do that, if noble Lords wanted. I will just illustrate the pattern with one paragraph but, as I have said, it is a repeating pattern. Paragraph 2(1) requires “prescribed persons”—the yet to be defined prescribed persons—
“to identify and assess risks relating to money laundering, terrorist financing and other threats to the integrity of the international financial system”.
That actually sounds like a pretty good definition of what the Financial Action Task Force was set up to do. The Minister can by regulation make anyone—some small accountant, lawyer or bookkeeper, you, me, the doorkeeper, a schoolteacher—do it all, not forgetting unlimited fines for getting it wrong. Am I being ridiculous? Well, no, because there is no mention of the category of person or it being about their own or a relevant business. Where does this wording come from? Let us look at Regulation 18(1) of the 2017 regulations, entitled:
“Risk assessment by relevant persons”.
It starts:
“A relevant person must take appropriate steps to identify and assess the risks of money laundering and terrorist financing to which its business is subject”.
Spot the missing bits. It has to be “appropriate steps” relating to its own business. The “relevant person” is not open-ended either, because there is a list of relevant persons in Regulation 8.
The noble Baroness says “everyone”. I know that she and the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, made that point but I do not agree. She has made her point and I have listened; perhaps she should listen to the point that I am making in response.
As the noble Baroness says, Schedule 2 ignores the cascade of information. The power in Clause 41 will enable us to update and amend existing legislation that does this, as we did when the regulations were replaced this year, as I have already mentioned. This should not be viewed in isolation, which I fear is what the noble Baroness is doing. When new categories of risk manifest—the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, talked about virtual currency exchanges—new legislation will be needed, and this power helps to fill that gap.
In sum, Schedule 2 sets out examples of the scope of the anti-money laundering and counterterrorist financing power contained in Clause 41, and it defines the limits of this power in relation to criminal penalties. The noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, ignores proportionality. However, this issue must be looked at in the wider context, not in isolation. Ministers are bound to use these powers proportionately, taking account of people’s human rights, and they are bound by Section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998. I therefore contend that Schedule 2 should stand part of the Bill.
Perhaps I may briefly mention Amendment 71A, which I understand is related to the opposition of the noble Baronesses, Lady Kramer and Lady Bowles, to Schedule 2. To give an example, the reference in paragraph 2 of Schedule 2 to regulations, mentioned by the noble Baroness, being capable of requiring,
“prescribed persons to identify and assess risks relating to money laundering, terrorist financing and other threats to the integrity of the international financial system”,
corresponds with regulations 16 to 18 of the money laundering regulations 2017. These require the Government, supervisors and regulated firms to assess the risks of money laundering and terrorist financing at a national, sectoral and business level as appropriate so as to inform the nature and extent of any due diligence measures applied by regulated firms.
Perhaps I may give a further example. The reference to “prescribed persons” in paragraph 4 of Schedule 2, which again the noble Baroness quoted, corresponds to Part 3 of the money laundering regulations 2017. This establishes a framework giving effect to the standards of the Financial Action Task Force relating to simplified and enhanced customer due diligence, which I am sure we all welcome. Again, this is not about the UK going it alone; it is about how we are part and parcel of the FATF.
Therefore, the amendment would not remove the Government’s ability to designate categories of business as regulated for anti-money laundering purposes, or designate supervisors. These purposes are already permitted under Clause 41 and are referred to in Schedule 2.
There may also be a number of areas where we want to confer functions upon persons to assist with the implementation and enforcement of sanctions. I think that the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, startled the doorkeepers when she quoted various examples. Captains of ships and harbour masters, for example, might need to exercise functions in order to comply with shipping sanctions. We might also need to confer functions to help enforce sanctions on border officials, agents of Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs, or law enforcement agencies, such as the National Crime Agency.
I know the noble Baroness. She is well versed in the money laundering issue, and I respect that. That is why I said at the outset that I will listen again, or read, I should say—listening to Hansard may be stretching it a bit—her contribution very carefully and see if there are aspects that need further amplification and explanation from the Government. I hope that through my practical examples I have addressed some, if not all, of her concerns and that at this point, she will be minded to withdraw her amendment.
I thank the Minister for his reply. I fear that a large part of it merely proved my point that small extracts have been turned into powers. I maintain that without the surrounding framework to give proportionality, you do not need everything that is in there. It is difficult—
I was merely giving a few illustrative examples. Like the noble Baroness mentioned, I think she and I would be the only ones here if we carried on in this respect. What I was doing was merely illustrating, but it is dealt with comprehensively.
That is the point. It is converted into a power very comprehensively but it just takes the first section. For instance the one I quoted does not even point out that they are responsible only for what goes on in their own business. That makes it very difficult. A lot of this could be dealt with by putting in those proportionality statements and a few more things.
The other source from which this list of powers has been obtained—which I think the Minister was referring to—is the FATF recommendations. However, you have to bear in mind that the FATF is an organisation meant to look at risks to the financial system, terrorist financing and those kinds of things. It is not set up with a branch to deal with civil liberties or even human rights. It leaves that to the nation states which are then going to implement. I could probably find it in the FATF but it is too late in the evening to do that. You cannot just put the list of powers or of things that the FATF wants you to do into powers without acknowledging that there has to be a framework.
Yes, there may be human rights elements that we have not abolished, nevertheless there are more things—
To clarify, I said that we need to look at this in the wider context. That is why I referred to the obligations that Ministers are bound by in the Human Rights Act. That is part of our statute, so we are obliged to follow that.
Unfortunately, it seems that that ends up in the courts from time to time, which is very difficult for the sorts of people that might find themselves entangled in this. My plea is really that we just make an effort to get this a little bit more right. In that spirit, I will not be pressing Amendment 71A, which was linked to the creation of supervisory powers, which was why it was in the same group. This issue is one that we will wish to return to in general on Report.