Community Infrastructure Levy: Homeowners

Kit Malthouse Excerpts

Wednesday 29th April 2026 Westminster Hall

[Sir Jeremy Hunt]

The hon. Member is absolutely right, and he is foreshadowing what I will propose as one of the solutions to this issue: that homeowners should be excluded from the potential ambit of CIL altogether, because that was not its intention. It is a loophole that is being exploited, and I hope to explain why some councils have been so keen to exploit that loophole. We need to remove the root cause if we are going to deal with this issue.

[Kit Malthouse (North West Hampshire) (Con)]

My right hon. Friend is laying out a compelling illustration of the injustices to individuals that this highly complex charge is causing. As he moves on to his solution, will he also reflect on the macroeconomic impact of this complexity and deterrence? I was Housing Minister for a year. Sadly, in those 12 months, I did not get round to sorting out this mess, but it was obvious to me that the small builder sector, which used to produce over 50% of the homes in this country, had been decimated by the crash and never returned. This disincentive to the kind of work that would encourage a really strong small builder sector, which could then contribute more to our economy, is both a brake on growth and a brake on the wider housing aspirations that both Governments have had over the last few years.

[Sir Jeremy Hunt]

I absolutely agree with my right hon. Friend, who has much more experience of the housing sector than I do. He will know that countries like France—not very far away—that have been much more successful than us in building more houses also have a flourishing small builder sector. In this country, because of the enormous costs involved in the planning process and often the land, it is much harder for small builders to get involved. Of course, one of the other advantages of small builders is that they are more likely to get consent from local communities, because they are often from those local communities. I agree with my right hon. Friend entirely: that is one of the unintended consequences of the problems we have with the community infrastructure levy regime.

CIL was drafted with very strong teeth to ensure that developers actually pay up, but for ordinary members of the public trying to do an extension, these Orwellian processes can be utterly terrifying. Some councils—not my own Waverley borough council, alas—recognise the inflexibility of the regulations and have taken a soft-touch approach to prevent homeowners from being captured. To its credit, West Berkshire, which as it happens is also a Lib Dem council, implemented a discretionary review and refunded £400,000 to affected householders. Others have not. I recognise that the difference in councils’ approaches makes the Minister’s job more difficult.

So how should we fix the issue? First, we need to reform the highly complex CIL legislation to distinguish between commercial developers and householders. The problem with a system that is based entirely on the floor area of a project is that even a small increase in the size of a project—just a couple of extra metres on a patio—can suddenly mean that an ordinary homeowner is required to get planning permission, perhaps retrospectively, and can become liable, and they may not know it at the time. Homeowners should be outright excluded from the reach of the community infrastructure levy.

Secondly, even in the absence of legislation, we need clear guidance from the Government to local councils so that no homeowners anywhere are charged for the community infrastructure levy. Thirdly, we need an effective mechanism for redress and the ability to correct genuine mistakes after a liability notice has been issued. Sadly, zero rating CIL liability does not work because a charge remains on the land, which may render the property unsaleable, so the Government need to find a way not just to avoid injustice but to secure justice for the hundreds of families who have been wronged to date by the problems in the system.

Finally, we need to recognise that the root cause of the problem is that councils such as mine have been collecting the community infrastructure levy not just to build infrastructure but so that they can use the interest from unspent CIL as revenue. An estimated £9 billion is sitting in council accounts from unspent contributions by developers, of which an estimated £2.2 billion is unspent CIL. That means that some councils are effectively funding their core services from the human misery of their council tax payers. At a minimum, rules should specify that interest from unspent CIL should go back into the CIL account to avoid a perverse incentive for councils to do the wrong thing.

British democracy rests on the principle of consent and fairness, both of which demand justice for those caught unfairly by the CIL system, which was never designed to capture them. All those people deserve clarity, and this should be prevented from happening again. I know the Minister and many other hon. Members here today want just that, and I look forward to hearing the Government plans.

Courts and Tribunals Bill

Kit Malthouse Excerpts

2nd reading
Tuesday 10th March 2026 Commons Chamber

[Dr Neil Shastri-Hurst (Solihull West and Shirley) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Bolsover (Natalie Fleet). Although she is on the opposite side of the debate from me, she always speaks with huge passion on these issues. I should start with a couple of declarations. First, my wife is a sitting employment judge, and therefore the tribunal element of the Bill pertains to her. Secondly, like many right hon. and hon. Members in this Chamber, I was a barrister immediately prior to coming into this place, and I maintain my practising certificate. I hope the hon. Lady will indulge me if I pontificate on this issue for a few moments.

While I was not a criminal barrister, I did a significant amount of inquest work, so I had face-to-face, first-hand experience with jurors, and I can say without a shadow of a doubt that they are the most remarkable, ordinary people, who give up their time for civic engagement. They sit there quietly, listening to the evidence; they take their role seriously; and they sit in judgment and make findings of fact. That is a huge constitutional principle. We have talked about rights, and I am not going to pretend that there is an innate right to a trial by jury, but there is a firm constitutional principle of ensuring that justice is not merely done to the public, but that it is done with the public.

We all know about the problem of court backlogs. It would be a farce to pretend that this is not a significant and serious issue—it is a failure of the state that we have got to this place. It is a failure of successive Governments, and we recognise that across the board, but the question we have to ask ourselves is not whether trial by jury should be abandoned; it is whether the reforms that are before this House, with the scrutiny that has been undertaken and the impact assessment that accompanies the Bill, constitute sufficient evidence for making such a reform to this country’s constitution.

What the Bill asks for is very clear, and we have to be honest about it. We are asking for a shift in the balance between the state and its people, and that may lead to inequality before the law. Take the prime example raised by my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Torridge and Tavistock (Sir Geoffrey Cox): that of two individuals who, on a factual matrix, committed precisely the same crime. Those individuals appear before the court, but one has a string of previous convictions. Are we really saying that a person should be denied the opportunity of a jury trial if they have not previously been of bad character? That is a nonsense, and it does not achieve what we should be seeking to achieve.

The further point, of course, is that if we are making such a constitutional change on the basis that it will enable us to deal with the backlog in the criminal courts, why is there no sunset clause in the Bill? Why are we not saying that the purpose of the Bill is to shift the dial and make progress, but that we recognise that it should not be a blank cheque for the state? We should recognise that if this change has to be made—although I do not believe it does—it should be made on a limited basis, because if we are to change a right that is older than most institutions in this country, the least Parliament should do is base its decision on more than just an assumption in the impact assessment.

Let me turn to the modelling, which was also raised by the shadow Justice Secretary, my hon. Friend the Member for West Suffolk (Nick Timothy). In this House on 3 February, I asked the Lord Chancellor a question about the 20% reduction in the time taken by court hearings. He gave me a very clear answer—that he accepted Sir Brian Leveson’s findings, but that the Government would publish their own modelling alongside the Bill. However, page 10 of the impact assessment is very clear that the Government have adopted Sir Brian’s assumption. That is an assumption; it is not modelling. There is a distinct difference. Analysis is helpful, but modelling is critical, and if we are weighing up the evidence base for the Bill, we have to have more than analysis alone.

[Kit Malthouse (North West Hampshire) (Con)]

Can my hon. Friend give us his views as a practitioner on something that has not yet been mentioned in the debate, which is the usefulness of juries in protecting the institution of the judiciary? At the moment, if there is a string of sentencing that the Government or politicians do not like, there is not a lot they can do about it. If it is judges who are handing out those sentences, they will come under direct political attack, as we unfortunately see from time to time. The distance and insulation that a jury gives is not just a protection for the citizen, but a protection for the judiciary and its ongoing integrity.

[Dr Shastri-Hurst]

My right hon. Friend is right. There is a reason that judges wear a wig and barristers wear a wig and gown. It provides a shield between the arm of the law and the citizen. To dilute that would fundamentally upset the settlement that has been reached over hundreds and hundreds of years.

Deprivation of Citizenship Orders (Effect during Appeal) Bill

Kit Malthouse Excerpts

Committee of the whole House & 3rd reading
Monday 14th July 2025 Commons Chamber

[Kit Malthouse (North West Hampshire) (Con)]

I beg to move amendment 1, page 1, line 9, at end insert—

“(2BA) But a judge may determine that an order does not continue to have effect for a person “P” during the appeal period if, on granting leave to appeal at any stage, they are satisfied that—

(a) “P” faces a real and substantial threat of serious harm as a result of the order,

(b) continuation of the order would significantly prejudice their ability to mount an effective defence at a subsequent appeal, or

(c) the duration of the appeal process has been excessive because of an act or omission by a public authority.”

[The Chairman]

With this it will be convenient to consider:

Clauses 1 and 2 stand part.

New clause 1—Independent review—

“(1) The Secretary of State must, within one year of the passing of this Act, commission an independent review of the effects of the changes made to section 40A of the British Nationality Act 1981 by section 1.

(2) The review must be completed within two years of the passing of this Act.

(3) As soon as practicable after a person has carried out the review, the person must—

(a) produce a report of the outcome of the review, and

(b) send a copy of the report to the Secretary of State.

(4) The Secretary of State must lay before each House of Parliament a copy of the report sent under subsection (3)(b) within one month of receiving the report.”

[Kit Malthouse]

I am pleased to be opening this debate, although, given the turnout in the Chamber, it seems to be a minority interest among Members of Parliament, notwithstanding the fact that the legislation affects some of our most basic freedoms and rights. Before I address amendment 1, I hope you will forgive me, Madam Chair, if I briefly indulge in a preamble. There are a couple of issues that I want to impress on the Minister in the hope that he will respond favourably and, if not accept my amendment, agree to consider the principles it raises in the other place. Given the number of senior lawyers there, this legislation will be examined by some pretty stringent legal eyes.

First, Madam Chair, I hope you will agree that we established on Second Reading that this Bill is highly discriminatory. One of the truisms we always utter in this House is that we all stand equal before the law, but I am afraid that where this legislation is concerned, that is just not true. The Minister would be unable to wield against me the powers he is seeking to bring in under this Bill; it would not be countenanced because I have no right to citizenship elsewhere. However, there are Members of this House against whom the Minister could wield that power. Although he could not wield it against me, he could wield it against two of my children, although not against the other one—I have three. He could wield it against the children of the former Prime Minister, my right hon. Friend the Member for Richmond and Northallerton (Rishi Sunak); against the children of the former Chancellor of the Exchequer, my right hon. Friend the Member for Godalming and Ash (Sir Jeremy Hunt); and against the children of the former Deputy Prime Minister, my right hon. Friend the Member for Hertsmere (Sir Oliver Dowden). I am trying to illustrate to the Minister that this legislation is highly discriminatory, and unusually so. He is tampering with some of the basic tenets of British justice through this Bill—a principle has been established in the Supreme Court that he is attempting to reverse—and I want him to have in mind that he is trying to embed that discrimination in law. I hope and believe that that is not his primary motivation, but he must comprehend that before he takes this step.

Secondly, I say to the Minister, who has a distinguished record of service in the defence of this country and now serves as Security Minister, that much of the Bill is, let us face it, focused on those accused of committing terrorism here or overseas. Terrorists win in two ways: first, by the physical injury that they inflict and the fear of that physical injury that they are likely to inflict by exploding bombs, killing people and all the horrors we have seen in our lifetimes over the past 30 or 40 years, if not longer; and secondly, by a long, slow undermining of our way of life and by sowing division within our society. Their long game is to force us to twist ourselves in knots around the freedoms that make us different, which they despise, and slowly to erode our standard of living and the atmosphere in which we live, and we have seen that before in this country.

The Minister is old enough to remember the evolution of the Diplock courts in Northern Ireland, where hearings were held without juries. We dispensed with the basic freedom of the right to a jury trial in Northern Ireland for a while, largely because of accusations of violence towards juries. It was proven later that this was part of a known strategy by the IRA to make the Six Counties ungovernable, other than by military colonial means, so the IRA saw that move as a triumph. What terrorists want in the long term is a twisting of our natural freedoms. They want us to make compromises in our legislation that undermine our sense of belonging in our nation and create a division not just between the governed and the Government, but within society. This legislation, I am afraid, starts to do exactly that.

On Second Reading I pointed out, as I have possibly already done today—I hate to be repetitive—that this legislation and this power create two classes of citizenship in the UK. There are those who can have the order removed and those who never can have it removed. As use of the power has accelerated over the past two decades, and we are using it now more than we ever did, it creates a feeling of unease among those whose citizenship is conditional.

I will explain to the Minister why I tabled amendment 1. As I said on Second Reading, my view is that he is undermining some of the basic tenets of British justice with what he is attempting to do with this legislation. With this amendment, I am attempting to swing the pendulum back a little in the cause of fairness before the law. As he will know, individuals subject to this power have the right to appeal on a number of bases, and courts will decide whether to allow their appeal. Broadly, there are three areas on which they can appeal: the first is whether the decision was proportional; the second is whether it was procedurally fair; and the third is whether the Minister or the Home Secretary has made a mistake over whether the person has a right to citizenship elsewhere and so may in fact be rendered stateless. As he knows, that is not allowed under the legislation.

If I have had my citizenship deprived essentially at the stroke of a pen by the Home Secretary, and I win an appeal, it seems unfair, given that I have won that appeal on the basis of fact, that the Government can continue to deprive me of my citizenship pending a further appeal by them. Ordinarily, I would have got rid of this legislation, but the Minister seems insistent, and he won on principle at Second Reading, and that is fine. I am therefore appealing to his sense of good old British fair play to say, “This individual has won their first appeal on the basis of fact. Unless we have some profound reason to dispute that fact, we will not appeal, in which case they get their citizenship back.” On the basis of the fundamental British value of “innocent until proven guilty”, that person should get their citizenship back, particularly if a judge decides that the three conditions outlined in my amendment are satisfied.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Minister for Security (Dan Jarvis)]

Will the right hon. Gentleman give way?

[Kit Malthouse]

By all means. I know he is a busy man, and I do not mean to be critical.

[Dan Jarvis]

I have huge respect for the right hon. Gentleman, but I think he is being a little unfair. He would have been entirely welcome to discuss his amendment with me. Had he chosen to do so, I would have happily sat down with him to discuss the detail of it.

[Kit Malthouse]

The Minister is a fair man and a fair-minded man. He is quite right, and I am willing to countenance his appeal and give him the benefit of the doubt, and that is exactly what I am asking for the individuals subject to this legislation. He will know that we have certain inalienable constitutional rights as British citizens, which this legislation contravenes. The first is that we have a right to a fair hearing and that any action the Government take must be exercised fairly. That right has been established in the common law again and again, and most recently in 1994, in the case of ex parte Doody, when the court decided that Ministers must exercise their powers fairly.

The second inalienable right, which has been decided in the Supreme Court, is that we all have a right to access to the courts, and that cannot be unfairly restricted. As that has been decided by the Supreme Court, the Government cannot put up artificial barriers to our access, such as raising fees or making sure that we cannot physically get to the court. Indeed, as the Minister will know, I have an absolute right to defend myself in person at every stage of legal action, whether that is at first hearing or at subsequent appeal. All those powers or rights that I have as a citizen are affected by the legislation he is attempting to put through.

My amendment essentially says three things. If the Government failed to win an appeal, but wished to continue to deprive me of my citizenship pending a further appeal, they must, when seeking leave to appeal from the judge, also ask the judge for leave to continue the deprivation of citizenship. The judge basically could say no in three circumstances. First, the judge could say no if there is a real and substantial threat of serious harm to that individual if they were denied access to the United Kingdom. Some of these people will be living or operating from extremely dangerous places. If that person is likely to be killed pending further appeal on the denial of their citizenship, it would seem grossly unfair, their having already won an appeal, to deny them access to the country.

The second ground would be if their exclusion from the UK and the continuing of denial of citizenship would be deeply prejudicial to the conduct of their defence in an appeal that the Government subsequently decided to bring. In such a case, it would be impossible for me to defend myself at appeal in person, which should be my inalienable right as a British citizen. It would be impossible for me to do that remotely in some God-forsaken part of the world where I cannot Zoom in or I do not have the ability to communicate. It would be the same if I am unable to communicate with my legal team. I am sure the Minister can see that it would be unfair to interfere with someone’s ability to mount a proper defence—we should not forget that that person has already won an appeal—through the continuing denial of citizenship.

The third ground, which we covered on Second Reading, is the Government’s taking their time, achieving their objective merely by dragging their heels and playing for time, hoping that something, perhaps something untoward, will turn up. A judge should then make a judgment—the clue is in the name—on whether they are being efficient in their use of the legal system, rather than, as I am afraid happens from time to time, gaming it to their own advantage.

[Simon Hoare (North Dorset) (Con)]

As my right hon. Friend knows, I have a huge amount of respect and affection for him, and he is right to refer to the inalienable rights that a British citizen has in terms of access to justice and so forth, but surely he must accept that individuals facing deprivation of citizenship will have crossed a threshold of behaviour, or allegiance, so alien to our traditions, so alien to all the rights and responsibilities accrued over the decades of British citizenship, that in essence, in the court of public opinion, they will put themselves way beyond the pale when it comes to those issues. It would be an extreme hypocrisy for those who most seek to undermine our way of life to demand all the rights and privileges that they have sought to undermine, and possibly destroy, through their actions or foreign allegiances.

[Kit Malthouse]

I understand my hon. Friend’s point, but I would have more faith, or confidence, in his view if it applied to me as well, which it does not. What we are saying is that we can have two British citizens who commit the same heinous acts but receive two different kinds of treatment. One can have his or her citizenship removed and be expelled from the country, but another—say I were to do that—cannot. My view is that this is highly discriminatory, and tramples over some of the inalienable rights that my hon. Friend has mentioned. We currently have plenty of British citizens in high-security prisons who have committed acts as heinous as those committed by people whom we have deprived of British citizenship, but we have decided to deprive them of British citizenship purely because of their heritage and background—purely because they may be second-generation immigrants.

As I pointed out on Second Reading, this legislation applies to every single Jewish member of the United Kingdom citizenry. They all have an inalienable right to Israeli citizenship, and as a result, in my view, they all have second-class citizenship. I do not think that that is right. I do not think that it is fair. I think that it drives a wedge into our society, and sows a seed of doubt at the back of everyone’s mind.

This is the point that I was trying to make at the start. Those who perpetrate such heinous acts overseas absolutely should be punished. As my hon. Friend will know, over the past 10 years I have been at the forefront of trying to ensure that as many criminals as possible end up behind bars, whatever the criminality might be, but the fact is that there is a principle in British law—we are all supposed to be equal—and the Bill breaches that principle very significantly. Moreover, what the Government are attempting to do not only reinforces that breach, but aims to twist and skew fundamental tenets of British justice that have been our right for centuries.

[Simon Hoare]

Surely the fact that a remedy is not available to all does not mean that it is not a remedy. If we wish to argue for the two-tier approach, we can think of instances in which mental capacity has come into play, particularly in respect of capital offences, when those existed here. In abstract theory, that was a two-tier approach to justice, determined on the grounds of mental capacity or lack thereof. Surely remedies do not have be applicable universally to be applied fairly and within the law.

[Kit Malthouse]

I am not sure that I accept the hon. Gentleman’s logic. The test of mental capacity in the judicial system applies to everyone equally. If I were being prosecuted for an offence, I would be assessed for mental capacity, just as my hon. Friend would. The court would accept that there might be mitigations for his actions, or a requirement for a different disposal if he lacks mental capacity, but that is an external influence on him. It may come about owing to mental illness or some other kind of disability—who knows?

The point is that this comes about through no reason other than birth. My citizenship, or my lack of citizenship, is conferred on me by reason of my birth—my parentage, or my heritage. I cannot do anything about it. I cannot be treated for it, as I can be for mental illness. This is purely because my parents may have come from another country, my skin may be of a different colour, or the country of the origin of my DNA may offer particular rights of citizenship. It is something arbitrary, about which I can do nothing. We might as well have a piece of legislation that says that people with red hair receive different treatment under the law, because there is nothing they can do about that.

[Bell Ribeiro-Addy (Clapham and Brixton Hill) (Lab)]

Does the right hon. Gentleman agree that this whole notion of heritage is not even an exact science? My first black ancestor to be born in this country was born in 1806, in Twyford; I have no idea where that is, but I know it is not that far from here. He was the son of a formerly enslaved person and a white domestic servant living in the house of his former master. I do not know what that particular ancestry is, but it goes quite far back. Just because someone called Thomas Birch-Freeman, who was living in the UK and would be deemed British by this legislation, travelled to Ghana as a missionary and settled there, and that is where my lineage comes from, I am now treated differently under the law, despite, perhaps, having heritage that may be similar to that of the right hon. Gentleman.

[Kit Malthouse]

The hon. Lady has made a very good point. My problem with this legislation is that it places a question mark over certain citizens. I am not suggesting that the legislation is on everyone’s lips every day, but when it is used with increasing frequency, it does place a question mark over people’s status as citizens of the United Kingdom, and that, I think, should be a matter of concern.

[Dan Jarvis]

The right hon. Gentleman is making his points in a very considered way, but he is levelling quite serious charges against the Government. May I say to him, in absolute good faith, that our intentions here have nothing to do with someone’s place of birth and everything to do with their behaviour?

[Kit Malthouse]

I understand what the Minister is saying, and, as I said to him on Second Reading, I am not concerned about this power falling into his hands, but we do not know who will be in his position in the future, and we are never quite sure how the power might develop. As I have said, over the years we have seen an acceleration and an increase in what is a very draconian power that we should be taking extremely seriously. To deprive people of their citizenship is a profoundly serious thing to do, which may well—indeed, will—affect them for the rest of their lives. No doubt it will be done in the face of extremely serious offences on the Minister’s watch, but I am not sure that that will necessarily always be the case.

Given that under the power that is being created people can be expelled on the basis that their presence is not conducive to the public good, we could see its being used in combination with other powers that have been expanded recently. Just last week, in controversial terms, the Minister proscribed a particular organisation operating in this country. I am sure he will be able to explain, but in my experience—I think he referred to this at the time—proscription has been reserved for terrorist organisations. As the Minister has indicated, this power is reserved for those who are terrorists. Could it be used against individuals who are convicted of crimes under that proscription? That is the danger that I am trying to illustrate to him, and this is an area of law where I urge him to tread carefully and to think about the compromises that he is creating against our basic freedoms that we need to maintain, at the same time—I do not dispute his motivation—as protecting the United Kingdom in the best way he possibly can. I am just worried that he is taking a step too far.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lisa Smart]

The hon. Gentleman is right that one of the most serious jobs of any Government is to keep their citizens safe—I completely agree. There is, though, a need for robust scrutiny. The Government must have confidence that the legislation they are putting forward has the support of this House and of the country, including that that legislation does what they say they want it to do and does not accidentally do something else. I think the most confident legislators are those who are open, transparent and welcoming of scrutiny, so I am grateful for the hon. Gentleman’s comments.

The Liberal Democrats support amendment 1, tabled by the right hon. Member for North West Hampshire (Kit Malthouse), which would empower the courts to prevent the Secretary of State from issuing a deprivation order in cases where doing so would place an individual at risk of harm or undermine their ability to mount an effective defence, or in cases where a public authority has caused unreasonable delays in the appeals process. This is a measured and sensible proposal that places essential limits on the excessive powers currently wielded by the Secretary of State in matters of citizenship deprivation, and we will support the amendment if the right hon. Gentleman pushes it to a vote.

[Kit Malthouse]

To refer back to the intervention by the hon. Member for Strangford (Jim Shannon), would the hon. Lady be interested to comment on this point? My understanding is that, under the terms of the Good Friday agreement, every UK citizen resident in Northern Ireland has a right to claim Irish citizenship. This Bill in effect means that every UK citizen resident in Northern Ireland can be deprived of their citizenship—have it removed by the Home Secretary—if that is conducive to the public good. That is another example of a whole group of people who would have a second class of citizenship.

[Lisa Smart]

I have listened very carefully to the right hon. Gentleman’s comments this evening and on Second Reading, and I have a great deal of respect for him and the way he lays out his arguments. I am very much looking forward to the Minister’s comments from the Dispatch Box shortly.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dan Jarvis]

My hon. Friend is right about that specific point, but I will return to the points she has raised once I have responded to amendment 1, tabled by the right hon. Member for North West Hampshire (Kit Malthouse). I am genuinely grateful to him—he is looking a bit cynical as to the extent of my gratitude—for providing an opportunity to address the important issues, and they are important, he raised and for the considered, measured and thoughtful way in which he approached this debate and the Second Reading debate a couple of weeks ago.

The right hon. Gentleman made the case for his amendment in his own typically considered way. I listened very carefully to it, as I am sure did other hon. Members. He made the claim that the Bill will create a two-tier citizenship, and my hon. Friend the Member for Clapham and Brixton Hill (Bell Ribeiro-Addy) reinforced that point. He claimed, I think somewhat unfairly, that the Government, through these measures, are seeking to undermine fairness. I say to him and to other hon. Members that we are not trying to do that. What we are trying to do, very simply, is ensure that the Government have the powers and the tools they need to keep the country safe. I know that he would acknowledge—I have made this point to him quite recently—that these are powers that existed under all 14 years of the previous Government. We are seeking to ensure that we have the same powers to be able to do what we need to do to keep the country safe.

I say to the right hon. Gentleman and my hon. Friend that deprivation on conducive grounds is used very sparingly and against those who would pose a serious threat to the UK. It is essential that our legal framework protects our national security—I hope he would agree with that—but he made an interesting point about some of the fine balances and judgments that have to be made. I hope he would accept that, ultimately, deprivation of citizenship and matters relating to national security are matters for the Home Secretary.

The Supreme Court has been clear that the right to a fair hearing does not trump all other considerations, such as the safety of the public. I understand and respect the motivation behind the right hon. Member’s amendment, but it does not take into account the impact of the Court’s decision on national security. These are judgments and decisions that have to be taken by the Home Secretary. The fact that a court may have allowed an appeal against a deprivation decision does not mean that the person does not pose a threat to the UK, for example where the appeal is upheld on procedural issues. Furthermore, it is not controversial to delay the outcome of a lower court on a civil order while any further appeal is determined. It has nothing to do with being found guilty. As I mentioned earlier, the approach in the Bill is in line with the approach taken on asylum and human rights appeals.

Turning to the specific conditions set out in amendment 1, I can assure the right hon. Gentleman that decisions to deprive are taken in accordance with our international obligations. It is also assessed whether deprivation would expose a person to a real risk of mistreatment, which would constitute a breach of articles 2 and 3 of the European convention on human rights, were those articles to apply. Additionally, an appeal can already be paused until a person is in a position to effectively take part. The timings for appeals are agreed by both parties and the courts can order case management reviews to resolve disagreements between the parties. For the reasons I have outlined, I respectfully ask the right hon. Gentleman that the amendment be withdrawn.

[Kit Malthouse]

I am very grateful to the Minister. I have just a couple of points to make, if I may. He is quite right that timetables are agreed and there can be case management reviews, but there is nothing the court can do to restore someone’s citizenship even if the Government do drag their heels. If he could explain to us, perhaps in a little more detail, what recourse I would have were I somebody who had won an appeal, was awaiting a further appeal by the Government against me and mounting a defence but the Government were dragging their heels and basically ignoring the case management reviews. I do not think it is the case that the judge would just dismiss the appeal out of hand. The Government could effectively take their time.

I have a second question, if I may. Can the Minister tell the House whether, in his view, given that it is a subjective judgment by the Home Secretary, membership of a proscribed organisation would be prima facie grounds for the deprivation of citizenship?

[Dan Jarvis]

The right hon. Gentleman undoubtedly makes some important points, but he makes them from a stance and a point of view that is slightly different from the position of those of us who have to serve in government. He spoke about the Government seeking to drag their heels. This Government and, I am entirely prepared to accept, the previous Government are not seeking to drag our heels; we are seeking to keep the country safe. That is what this is about. It is about ensuring that we have a legal framework that provides the tools we need to make difficult decisions, yes, but also to keep the country safe. He will forgive me if I do not seek to move into a slightly separate debate about proscription, not least because I think I would be in trouble with you, Ms Ghani, but I also want to come back to the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Clapham and Brixton Hill.

My hon. Friend made the point that deprivation raises concern among certain communities. I am grateful to her for making that point and I am grateful for the opportunity to respond directly to it. Let me say to her and to other hon. Members that the power to deprive a person of British citizenship does not target ethnic minorities or people of particular faiths. It is used sparingly where a naturalised person has acquired citizenship fraudulently or where it is conducive to the public good. Deprivation on conducive grounds is used against those who pose a serious threat to the UK or whose conduct involves high harm. It is solely a person’s behaviour that determines if they should be deprived of British citizenship, not their ethnicity or faith. Finally, my hon. Friend asked about an equalities impact assessment. I can say to her that the impact on equalities has been assessed at all stages of the legislation.

Turning now to new clause 1, tabled by the hon. Member for Hazel Grove (Lisa Smart), I appreciate the intention behind the amendment, specifically to ensure accountability in the use of deprivation powers. I recall that she is very consistent in raising her concerns about that. However, I must respectfully submit that the hon. Member’s amendment is not necessary, for two reasons. First, the role of the independent chief inspector of borders and immigration already provides a well-established framework for independent oversight. She may recall that I mentioned that to her previously. The role was created under the UK Borders Act 2007, which sets out its statutory function. That includes the exercise of deprivation powers by the Home Secretary and by any person acting on their behalf. The independent chief inspector has the authority to conduct inspections, publish reports and make recommendations, ensuring that the powers are subject to rigorous external scrutiny.

Secondly, the Secretary of State already publishes annual statistics on the deprivation of citizenship. Those figures are publicly available and provide transparency on how often the powers are used and the grounds for deprivation. That data enables Parliament and the public to monitor trends and assess the proportionality and fairness of the system. Taken together, the statutory oversight by the independent chief inspector and the routine publication of deprivation statistics already provide a comprehensive framework for accountability. The amendment, therefore, duplicates existing oversight and reporting mechanisms. It would introduce unnecessary bureaucracy without adding meaningful value.

I would again like to thank all right hon. and hon. Members for their contributions. I hope for their continued support in ensuring that these important changes can be made.

[The Chairman of Ways and Means (Ms Nusrat Ghani)]

Mr Malthouse, do you wish to withdraw the amendment?

[Kit Malthouse]

In the hope that the Minister will do the right thing, yes. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clauses 1 and 2 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

The Deputy Speaker resumed the Chair.

Bill reported, without amendment.

Third Reading

Points of Order

Kit Malthouse Excerpts

Monday 7th July 2025 Commons Chamber

[Kit Malthouse (North West Hampshire) (Con)]

On a point of order, Madam Deputy Speaker. Along with 6.5 million fellow members, I am a member of the local government pension scheme, through my proud membership of the London Pensions Fund Authority. We are uniquely affected by the Pension Schemes Bill, which we are about to contemplate. I am therefore concerned that it should be a hybrid Bill rather than a public Bill. I seek your guidance, please, as to whether the Bill has been properly certified as a public Bill and whether, in fact, it should be referred to the examiners to decide whether it should go through the hybrid Bill process. If not, and the House decides to proceed today, could the House of Lords independently decide through its examiners whether it is, in fact, a hybrid Bill?

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Ms Nusrat Ghani)]

I am grateful to the right hon. Member for his point of order and for giving notice of it. The Bill was not referred to the examiners at the time of presentation, indicating that the view taken by the relevant House authorities at the time was that the Bill was not prima facie hybrid. He is welcome to refer to any aspect of part 1 of the Bill during today’s proceedings. The Chair cannot be expected to respond substantively today, but I will ensure that he receives a substantive written response this week. His final point was about proceedings in the House of Lords, which are not a matter for the Chair, or indeed for this House. I ask him not to refer to that matter in his speech.

Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill

Kit Malthouse Excerpts

Report stage & 3rd reading
Friday 20th June 2025 Commons Chamber

[Kit Malthouse (North West Hampshire) (Con)]

Those of us who have come here today to support the Bill do not speak lightly of life and death, as some have accused us: we come here to recognise that this House has a responsibility to draw lines where there are none. Many of us have campaigned for many years, as the Mother of the House, the right hon. Member for Hackney North and Stoke Newington (Ms Abbott), said, to give voice to dying people—not because they want to be rescued, but because time and again they are begging us for mercy.

It is worth reiterating that this Bill is about not choosing death but how to face death when it is already at the door. It is about that final chapter of life—that short chapter. As many of our constituents have told us time and again, it is a chapter that they write in pain, fear and desperation.

We are here today to ask a simple question: in essence, is the law, in those final, often agonising moments, to be a barrier? Are we to be a barrier, or are we here to be a companion, to assist those people to fulfil their dying wishes? I believe in autonomy—I believe in dignity—but, more than that, I believe in compassion governed by care, not chaos. That is what the system lacks.

Right now, friends, as the hon. Member for Spen Valley (Kim Leadbeater) said, we live with the cruel illusion that doing nothing is neutral. It is not. Those who have objected to the Bill are conspicuous in not saying that they accept the status quo for however long the Bill may take to reappear if it fails. We have heard, again and again, stories of people forced to travel abroad to die in lonely circumstances. We see loving spouses prosecuted for holding the hand of someone they have loved for 50 years. We see lonely suicides in quiet suburban bedrooms: lives ended not because of terminal illness, but because of a lack of legal options.

The Bill brings order where there is confusion; it brings safeguards where there is silence; and it replaces secrecy with structure and fear with honesty. Notwithstanding the claims made today and elsewhere, it has been built in the right way. This House has taken its duties seriously, in all its forms of legislation. The Bill has gone through detailed scrutiny in Committee and concerns about coercion, training, eligibility and oversight have been met head on and addressed through carefully considered amendments. The panel model that we have now is shaped by those concerns. To ensure the right expertise, legal oversight and continuous consent checks are in place from beginning to end. This is how Parliament should legislate: carefully, collaboratively and with humility in the face of complexity.

To those who worry about coercion, I would say that the greatest risk of coercion is under the status quo. Today there are no checks, no panels, no oversight. We do not know who is choosing freely because there is no system to ask and no conduct to examine. We have heard the argument about a slippery slope, and I would say this. This law is very tightly drawn. There is no constitutional pathway here for expansion by stealth. Any change would require this House—us—to decide again. It cannot drift. It cannot slide. It is anchored in law and in the authority of this place.

To those who talk about misdiagnosis, I say that the Bill requires two independent doctors, clear clinical criteria and a final check at the point of delivery. Even then, the person must still be mentally competent and willing at every step. The answer can be no, but at the last—at last—there will be the possibility of a choice. To those who ask, often movingly, what if the patient lives longer than expected, I would say, “Good—they live.” This law does not force a single death. It simply allows a dying person to decide when enough is enough.

Madam Deputy Speaker, I will finish with this.

I have sat with dying friends. I have watched the slow unwinding of bodies that once held vigour, humour and pride. I have seen families trying to honour the unspoken wishes of someone too far gone to speak. Finally, I will say this. We do not honour life by prolonging suffering. We honour life by giving it meaning and power. The one thing that dying people ask for in their agonising final moments is control over the disease that is destroying them. The status quo, my friends, is completely unacceptable. Whatever you think of the Bill, it is indisputable that it is an improvement on what we have now, and I urge you to support it.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Minister for Care (Stephen Kinnock)]

I stand at the Dispatch Box alongside the Minister of State, Ministry of Justice, my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Finchley and Golders Green (Sarah Sackman), not as the MP for Aberafan Maesteg, representing the views of my constituents—although I thank each and every one of them who took the time to contact me with their considered opinions—but as the Minister responsible for ensuring that the Bill, if passed, is effective, legally robust and workable.

I thank Members across the House, on both sides of the debate, for their consideration of this legislation through its parliamentary stages and for their thoughtful contributions. I particularly thank the members of the Public Bill Committee for their detailed scrutiny over more than 29 sittings and 80 hours. This Bill has received more parliamentary time than most Government and private Members’ Bills, and the debate has been respectful and well considered throughout.

It is worth noting, of course, that the subject has received extensive and detailed consideration over a number of decades, both in this House and the other place, as well as beyond Parliament. Many Members will recall that the Bill before us today follows many years of examination and analysis, including reports such as the inquiry of the Health and Social Care Committee in 2023 and the accumulation of evidence from other jurisdictions. I would like to pay tribute to colleagues and campaigners on both sides of the argument for their contributions to this profoundly important conversation.

I will make some brief comments about the most significant alterations to the Bill since its introduction, from the perspective of their importance to the technical and legal workability of the legislation. The scheme set out in the Bill now includes assisted dying review panels. Multidisciplinary panels would grant a certificate of eligibility if they were satisfied that all the relevant requirements had been met. The panel would have to hear from the person seeking assistance, at least one of the doctors, and any other relevant persons. They would be responsible for monitoring and reporting on the operation of the Act, a role that was previously assigned to the chief medical officer. The commissioner would also appoint a dedicated board to advise on the impact of the Bill on disabled people.

The Bill’s commencement clause has been amended so that any provisions that have not yet come into force will automatically do so four years after the Bill is passed. Specific training requirements for doctors playing a formal assessing role under the Bill have been added. There is now provision for an independent advocate to support qualifying persons to understand their options for end-of-life care and the process under the Bill.

In terms of employment protections, amendments that have been made on Report mean that no one is under any duty to participate in the provision of assistance in accordance with the Bill. There are also now employment protections to protect employees and other workers from being subject to any detriment from opting in or opting out of providing assistance under the Bill, and to protect employees from dismissal.

It just falls to me to thank all hon. Members once again for their extremely valuable contributions to this sensitive debate, and to reiterate that should it be the will of Parliament for this legislation to pass, the Government will ensure the safe and effective implementation of this service.

[Kit Malthouse]

claimed to move the closure (Standing Order No. 36).

Question put forthwith, That the Question be now put.

Question agreed to.

Question put accordingly, That the Bill be now read the Third time.

Points of Order

Kit Malthouse Excerpts

Tuesday 20th May 2025 Commons Chamber

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Ms Nusrat Ghani)]

I think the right hon. Member knows that that point of order is a matter not for the Chair, but for the Government. No doubt the Foreign Secretary and those on the Front Bench will have heard him and will respond in due course.

[Kit Malthouse (North West Hampshire) (Con)]

Further to that point of order, Madam Deputy Speaker. I wonder whether you can remind the House what the processes are for us to obtain an emergency debate under Standing Order No. 24, on the basis that this situation is so dire and so acute that a number of us may wish to apply for such a debate.

[Madam Deputy Speaker]

I and the right hon. Member both came into Parliament together. He knows how to obtain a Standing Order No. 24 debate, so he does not need me to remind him of the process. He will get much advice from the Speaker’s Office. Without doubt, the strength of feeling has been heard repeatedly, in the statement and in those two points of order, by the Foreign Secretary and Ministers on the Front Bench.

Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twenty-eighth sitting)

Kit Malthouse Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 25th March 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Sarah Olney]

The issue is who is commissioning the service. The issue is not the doctors or how they are recompensed for the work that they do, but who is doing the recompensing and what their incentives are. If the process is part of an NHS-provided service where it is agreed that it is a compassionate end of life choice, and where it is properly regulated within the wider NHS service and connects with other NHS services, that is one thing.

If the person commissioning that doctor has any kind of incentive around making a profit—and any profit-making organisation will be incentivised to increase the amount of profits that it makes—then, however carefully regulated, there will be subtle influence, pressure, coercion or persuasion that assisted dying is an option that patients should choose, or possibly not-so-subtle influence, to take the example from the hon. Member for Bexleyheath and Crayford. Under other circumstances, in an NHS model, that may not have been a solution they would have been persuaded to choose. It is that issue of persuasion and of incentives that really troubles me.

[Kit Malthouse (North West Hampshire) (Con)]

I am not clear: is the hon. Lady suggesting that doctors who operate in the private sector are less ethical than doctors who operate in the public sector?

[Sarah Olney]

I think I said very clearly to the hon. Member for Stroud that it is not about the doctors. It is about the people who are commissioning them. I absolutely do not believe that about doctors operating in the private sector, who in my experience are often the same doctors as the ones in the NHS. It is about who is commissioning them and who is asking them to carry out this work, and whether those commissioners are motivated by a profit incentive as opposed to the incentive in the NHS to provide the best possible care.

--- Later in debate ---

[Kit Malthouse]

I am sorry if I have failed to understand what the hon. Lady is saying, but under the Bill as it stands, every single stage is supervised by a doctor, even the final moments. I fail to see how the motivations that she seems to be applying to the private sector, malign or otherwise, might affect the conduct of the doctors, given that she accepts that doctors are equally ethical in the private and public sectors, unless she thinks that those motivations are pressuring doctors to behave unethically.

[Sarah Olney]

It clearly remains to be seen, but that may be an outcome as we do not yet know what model we are proposing for the delivery of assisted dying. Perhaps doctors will feel pressured to deliver an outcome because that is how the model has been set up. If we have a model that incentivises profits, particularly if we do not have a similar service within the NHS itself, it is quite possible that that will happen. It will not necessarily affect the care that doctors give to patients at the end of life, but the point is that we do not know.

We cannot fully explore that matter in Committee, because we do not have the full clarity of exactly how the process will be delivered, so we cannot examine the proposed model and identify its potential risks and pitfalls. That continues to be a real concern. Perhaps doctors will feel that pressure; perhaps the service will be precisely designed to encourage them to, for example, diagnose someone with having fewer than six months to live even when it is a slightly more subjective judgment and a different doctor operating in a different system may come to a different view.

[Kit Malthouse]

That is an extraordinary claim to make against doctors.

[Tom Gordon (Harrogate and Knaresborough) (LD)]

I am just trying to wrap my head around the argument. We already know that integrated care boards and other commissioning bodies have incentives given to them when they commission services, so it would be in their interests to diagnose or produce a demand for a service in a particular area. There is already an analogous situation within the NHS; I do not see how that is any different.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lewis Atkinson]

No, I do not agree with the hon. Member, and I will tell her why. The reality is that the shape of the health provider landscape is different in different parts of the country. For example, in Wolverhampton, there has been a significant amount of vertical integration, such that in many cases GP services are part of the NHS provider trust. Therefore, those amendments that would prohibit any public body from participating would explicitly prohibit GPs in Wolverhampton from that provision. Elsewhere, some hospices—a small number—are provided directly by the NHS. Given the history of the hospice sector in the UK, there is clearly a strong voluntary and charitable element of that provision, which is entirely right, but that varies in different parts of the country.

To return to the point made by the hon. Member for East Wiltshire, there are some hospices and end-of-life providers who have made it known that, if this law passes, they may wish to explore whether they will provide such services. Equally, others will not. This goes back to the conscience debate that we had last week. There will be no obligation, so a hospice in one part of the country may well say, “Yes, we wish to provide this service as an option to our patients,” whereas a hospice in another part of the country might say, “We do not.” We need to get past this metropolitan mindset, whereby ll the providers are within easy travelling distance from each other.

[Kit Malthouse]

The hon. Gentleman is making a strong point. Surely what should be at the heart of the organisation’s disposition is consideration of the condition and circumstances of the patient. Whether on the cancer ward, in the hospice or at home, the health service adapts, and has adapted with all sorts of treatments, to dealing with the different circumstances of the patient that it encounters. We must have a system that is flexible enough to allow it to do so for this.

Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twenty-sixth sitting)

Kit Malthouse Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 19th March 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Lewis Atkinson]

My instinct is that it would not. If the Bill becomes law, it would be a lawful choice. The hon. Gentleman may not characterise it as healthcare, but it would be part of healthcare and end-of-life services. We would not accept such stipulations on other healthcare services. I can see a sketch that some may choose to draw; someone mentioned housing supported by a religious institution. The reality is that people do not go out of their way to offend, and they try to live in harmony with those around them. If people are clear that they might actively explore assisted dying as an option, they will not choose to spend their last days in a community where others are ideologically opposed to their choice; it would be uncomfortable for the individual. They would, however, have the legal right to do so.

[Kit Malthouse (North West Hampshire) (Con)]

Having also thought about this overnight, I think there is a freedom-of-association argument. If it were a Roman Catholic organisation designed just for Roman Catholics to live in, such as a home for retired priests, or if it were a Jewish organisation just for Jewish residents, I could see that, but that is not a service that is generally on offer to the public. My concern is whether we could see a situation in which the board of trustees of Hampshire hospitals foundation trust has a majority of people who have a strong religious conviction, and they vote that the service shall not be provided across the three hospitals that the trust manages. If the provision is drawn tightly and the freedom-of-association argument could be made, I could see it. Having said that, there is no institutional objection power in law for abortion: people just do not offer it because they do not have the staff to offer it. It feels to me as though that is what the hon. Gentleman is pointing to.

[Lewis Atkinson]

That is entirely right. The response of public bodies such as NHS trusts is a slightly different issue. I would not want to speak for the Government or imagine what the Secretary of State might say, but it would be inconceivable to me for a quasi-independent public body to decide, on a vote on principle by some local governors, not to offer citizens choices that have been enshrined in law. That is a slightly different point, but I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman.

The hon. Member for East Wiltshire suggested yesterday that if someone chooses to have an assisted death, everyone in the care home or wherever would be part of it. That fundamentally misunderstands the point; I will go for “misunderstands” rather than doubting his intentions, but some would see it as scaremongering. No one is asking for the right to do it in a communal area, where staff or neighbours are forced to observe or participate in any way. Where people live in their own home, they should have rights and dignity at the end of life, whether that is in a care home or in a private residence. We cannot deny them the choice to access end-of-life options, as set out in the Bill. I therefore cannot support new clause 22.

--- Later in debate ---

Our conversations throughout this debate have been very much about “autonomy, autonomy, autonomy”, but what about those people who want autonomy over how to run their businesses, whether that is from a religious perspective, from an ethical perspective or, for a charity, from a fundraising perspective? It is the month of Ramadan, and one of the obligations on me as a Muslim—one of my five pillars—is giving zakat, which is charity. There is a very clear outline of where zakat can go and what needs it meets, such as educational or other purposes. There are different kinds of charity that I can give for other purposes, but they are specified.

[Kit Malthouse]

This is obviously a difficult and sensitive area, but does the hon. Lady think, for example, that a women’s refuge run by a Catholic foundation should be allowed to evict a woman who wants or has an abortion?

[Naz Shah]

I absolutely do not think that, because her abortion rights are set out in law. However, I also think that when that woman is going into a refuge, that refuge will make it clear that she may choose not to. It is about empowering both sides.

I am grateful for the right hon. Member’s intervention, but let us follow that argument. Let us say that somebody wants to pursue assisted death, and they want to go into a place, but they are informed that that organisation does not want to provide or has not signed up to providing an assisted death. It comes back to the issue that my hon. Friend the Member for Sunderland Central rightly raised, which is that people do not deliberately go out looking to offend people. If we were in that space—I cannot imagine being there, but I am trying to understand it—would we want to access that service, because its religious belief differs from assisted dying as a principle?

--- Later in debate ---

[Danny Kruger]

There is much to get into, and I will try to respond a bit more when I speak again. I do not want to revisit the whole question of palliative care but, on the scenario set out by the hon. Member for Penistone and Stocksbridge, the strong advice that I have received from palliative care professionals is that it is not accurate to say that somebody’s pain cannot be palliated. It might well be that there is a difficulty with particular opioids, but there are other palliative care options available to everybody. No palliative care doctor ever says that there is nothing they can do.

[Kit Malthouse]

She said exactly that.

[Danny Kruger]

Well, we have been over the whole question of palliative care and alternatives to assisted suicide; nevertheless, I wanted to challenge that scenario.

On the suggestion that there is a comparison with an abortion service no one is suggesting that a woman who goes into a refuge, discovers she is pregnant and wants to have a termination is somehow obliged to have it on the premises of the refuge, which does not believe in abortion. That is not a scenario that could happen, because that is not how abortion operates. What we are suggesting is that somebody who arrives in a care home or hospice that does not want to facilitate assisted suicide would not be able to receive such assistance there. There is no objection to their believing in or desiring an assisted suicide; the point is to protect the institution.

I recognise the difficulty with the specific case the hon. Member for Penistone and Stocksbridge raised. Nevertheless, the alternative is to have blanket permission for any resident of any care home or hospice to insist that they can receive an assisted death in that home or hospice, despite what the rest of that community and the management might want. Indeed, the patient might have signed a contract specifying that they will not seek an assisted death in that home or hospice. There is much more to discuss, but I hope that that is helpful for the hon. Lady.

--- Later in debate ---

[Kim Leadbeater]

The hon. Gentleman makes a good point, and I am aware of the Minister’s comments. This will be part of the discussion as we take it forward. That is why this debate is really powerful.

In their written evidence, the trustees at Willow Burn hospice, based in the UK, told us:

“Our Mission is to deliver hospice care of the highest standard to our patients and those important to them...We also believe that we should support and enable people to make the choices that matter to them.”

They said they had not decided their position on assisted dying and remained

“open minded about possible future actions. We believe this stance is in the best interests of patients and their families and reflects the wishes of our community.”

I welcome that open-minded approach and their commitment

“to put care, compassion and dignity at the heart of everything”

they do. Contrary to what the hon. Member East Wiltshire has said, the picture is not black and white. I agree with my hon. Friend the Member for Ipswich in that regard.

Colleagues may remember the evidence given to the Committee by the CEO of Hospice UK, Toby Porter. He clarified for us that institutions do not function in the same way as individuals when it comes to conscience-influencing decisions. He told us:

“There is this idea that your individual opinion guides everything, but with a hospice charity the opposite is true. As many Members will know because of their own work as trustees, the trustees and leadership of a hospice team are required to put personal opinion and interest to one side and always act in the best interest of the charity’s beneficiaries, who are the population.”––[Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 29 January 2025; c. 195, Q255.]

It is also important to remember that international experience shows that up to 30% to 40% of patients who sign up to the assisted dying process ultimately do not access it. Palliative care may meet their needs, or they may simply change their mind. However, we also know that the reassurance and comfort that the choice of an assisted death provides alongside other treatment and care is really important to them, and I do not believe that reassurance should be denied to some people because of the institution they happen to be in.

[Kit Malthouse]

The hon. Lady is outlining the issues very effectively. No one, of course, is saying that anybody who works at the hospice that may object has to participate. It may say, “No one here will assist.” We have talked about the importance of place. To a certain extent, I have a right as a tenant in a place where I am resident. It seems that my hon. Friend the Member for East Wiltshire is proposing actively to prevent someone from being able to access this in a place that they choose. That feels to me the wrong balance. I wonder whether that is broadly where she is heading.

[Kim Leadbeater]

The right hon. Gentleman makes an important point. The word that we have used a lot—maybe not enough in some respects—is choice. That is important for individuals, but it is important for institutions as well. Putting an institutional opt-out in the Bill would risk creating confusion and distress for patients and their loved ones, and indeed for staff and volunteers.

--- Later in debate ---

[Kit Malthouse]

To clarify my remarks, I was not necessarily saying that they should have the right to deny, but by default they would if they were, in effect, a closed community that was discriminating in favour of like-minded individuals—a home for retired Catholic priests, for example. By default it would be someone who was unlikely to offer those services. The other point to ask is: if I am in a hospice, in my bed at the last with visitors coming to see me, and one of those visitors is the doctor who is coming to administer to me, I am not quite sure how that would be prevented, unless people are willing for there to be a wrestling match at the door of my room.

[Danny Kruger]

Under the terms of amendment 441, the owners of the premises would be entitled to deny access to anyone who is seeking to deliver an assisted dying service on their premises. They would be entitled to prevent that from happening, yes. Obviously, that is an extremely unlikely scenario; nevertheless, it is one that I think we need to contemplate.

I thank my right hon. Friend the Member for North West Hampshire for his clarification. I had understood that he had acknowledged that it would be appropriate for the management of a Catholic care home to specify that there shall be no assisted dying on the premises, but he is suggesting that it would be illegal or inappropriate for the management to make that stipulation; it just would not happen organically, because no one would want that in that place. I regret that, because I think it should be appropriate for the management of a place—not in some sort of vindictive mission to deny people a particular right or service—to convey to everyone else who lives there that this is, as it were, a safe space in which there will not be state-assisted suicide. I think that is a reasonable hope and expectation that many residents will want when they live in a certain place.

Once this becomes normalised, once it becomes 5% or 10% of deaths, as happens in parts of Canada—if this becomes a normal and standard way to die—I think many people will not want to live in communities in which that practice takes place. I am afraid that we will find a demarcation, a bifurcation in society, for those who do not want to live in an assisted suicide community. It would be appropriate for them to have the option of going to live in a place where they know that will not be taking place.

I concede, by the way, that for many of the institutions that we are imagining here, these shared communities, it would be perfectly appropriate and understandable for it to be an option for residents. Let us think about the different sorts of places we are talking about. The Duchess of Somerset almshouse in my constituency—the sort of place we have in Wiltshire—is a lovely place, beautiful. It has lots of Liberal Democrat voters in it, which I know because I knocked on all their doors—unfortunately, the wrong sort of Liberal Democrat. I can imagine many of them supporting the right in their home, behind their own front door—which they have there—to have an assisted death, and I am sure that the other residents of that place would concede that that is appropriate.

In other places in my constituency, however, a hospice being the most obvious one, neither the management nor the other residents would be comfortable—in fact, they would be extremely uncomfortable—with the sense that assisted suicide might be practised in the next-door room. Whether it is performed, as it were, by the hospice staff, or merely facilitated by them—it would be extraordinary were it somehow to take place without the facilitation of the staff who managed the facility and look after the patients—for it to take place on some sort of parallel track would be an extreme imposition on that hospice and its management. It would be extremely disquieting for everyone else who lives and works in that place. I therefore think it is an appropriate consideration to give such places the right, at a management level, to opt out.

I also want to express my deep concern about what we heard from the Minister—his suggestion that we should not give either individuals or institutions the absolute right to opt out of the facilitation of assisted suicide because we think the European convention on human rights might challenge that. He suggested that a court in this country or Strasbourg would overrule a decision or would negate this law, or challenge it, if we passed it with these amendments to protect hospices and individuals. We would then have a court citing international law in an attempt to overturn this law. I am very concerned about that in terms of both parliamentary sovereignty and the Government’s position. Surely, if the Government think this is the right thing to do, we should do it even if we fear an ECHR challenge. This is a craven submission to a lawmaking body that is not sovereign in our country and would be only advisory. I regret what the Minister for Care said and hope that the Justice Minister can clarify that the Government would not concede an ECHR challenge if Parliament decides to insist on individuals’ rights to decline to participate in assisted suicide.

In response to my challenges on that point, the hon. Member for Spen Valley suggested that it would be an interesting topic for a future conversation. This is the moment to have that conversation. We are deciding on amendments now that will insist on people’s right to decline to take part in assisted death. There will be no further opportunity to insist that people have that right to opt out except on Report, which will be a limited opportunity.

Yesterday, the hon. Member for Luton South and South Bedfordshire made an interesting point that had not occurred to me—whether a husband living with his wife in their own shared home could legitimately deny her the right to assisted suicide in their home. It is a very good challenge. It is certainly not the policy intention, as I am sure the hon. Lady appreciates, to enable one partner to deny the other the right to assisted suicide in their shared home. I ask her to accept that that is not the intention. The purpose of the amendment is to give an occupier the right to refuse assisted dying.

With the hon. Lady’s permission, given that this clause will be voted on only next week, I propose tabling an amendment that would address her concern. I am happy to work with her or the Government to get to the point where we are satisfied that that concern has been addressed, because she is absolutely right: in someone’s own home, their partner or the person who shares the home with them should not be allowed to deny them.

We have hashed out the question about protected beliefs in relation to amendment 481, so I will move on.

[Kit Malthouse]

I am wondering about the difference between my own home with my partner, and my care home with lots of people that may or may not be strangers, and why I should have the right in one but not in the other.

[Danny Kruger]

I hope my right hon. Friend will understand that there is a difference between occupying one’s own home and living in a community under conditions set by somebody else, which is what happens if someone lives in a care home. There are terms and conditions. People have to comply with the rules of the place and have obligations to their fellow residents. In someone’s own home, whether they are living with a partner or not, they have absolute rights. That is the difference. If someone signs up to live in a care home, they have to follow the rules of the place, just like in a hotel. In someone’s own home, they can do what they like, as I am sure my right hon. Friend does.

Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twenty-seventh sitting)

Kit Malthouse Excerpts

Wednesday 19th March 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Danny Kruger]

I do not know what those might be, but I would be interested to hear. That might well be the case. I am afraid that no hard-and-fast rules can be clearly applied here; or, rather, we have to apply hard-and-fast rules in the knowledge of the grey areas, the exceptions and the situations in which we might feel that the law is unjust in particular cases. We have heard examples of that, such as the evidence about the lady in Australia cited earlier by the hon. Member for Spen Valley. I can well imagine the distress involved if someone suddenly finds themselves in an institution that does not permit an assisted death, but they want one and are in their last days.

The alternative, however, is a different blanket rule. If we were to have a blanket rule that we can do an assisted death anywhere—that is one situation—there would be significant knock-on effects. Serious moral injury would be suffered by other professionals and residents. I recognise that my amendment could lead to someone having to relocate if they want to have an assisted death—I am sorry for that—but I think that we have to draw the line in a way that makes most sense.

[Kit Malthouse (North West Hampshire) (Con)]

It would be interesting, if my hon. Friend’s amendments go through, to see the series of plebiscites taking place in care homes and communal situations across the country as to what the residents do and do not want, presumably by a majority. He asserted that there had been a mass exodus of healthcare workers when VAD came in, but I am struggling to find any evidence to support that claim. In fact, the evidence seems to say that that is not the case. Although there have been some resignations, that has largely been because of pay and conditions, as one might expect.

[Danny Kruger]

My right hon. Friend seems hung up on this suggestion that there needs to be a plebiscite or communal decision making—some kind of citizens’ jury. I am not suggesting that for one moment. In fact, I am sure that I have said explicitly that what I want, and what the amendment would enable, is that the owner or occupier, who would probably be an individual or a board of directors, would decide what happens. If they are a decent, compassionate organisation, they might well consult residents—in fact, I would very much expect that to happen if they are doing their job properly—but I am talking about the importance of communal living; and the fact is that a communal living arrangement has leadership. The residents have signed terms and conditions, in a contract, under which they have agreed to abide by certain rules of the house. My suggestion is that if the charity, company or organisation that is managing a care home wants to stipulate that there shall be no provision of assisted dying in that care home, they should have the right to do so. I hope my right hon. Friend would acknowledge that that is consistent with English property rights.

On my right hon. Friend’s second point, I am grateful to him and he might well be right. I am happy to consult my evidence pack, which I do not have at my fingertips, about the effect on the Australian workforce in consequence of the introduction of assisted dying. My memory is that we heard such evidence, or had it submitted to us in written form—his knowledge of the 500 submissions might be better than mine. Let us check and we will have it out, perhaps on social media; I know how much he enjoys those forums.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

--- Later in debate ---

[Kim Leadbeater]

I will speak briefly on this issue. An important point was made by my hon. Friend the Member for Rother Valley about the protections that clause 25 and these amendments provide for medical practitioners. I think the clause strikes the right balance, but it is important to remove the blanket immunity. My hon. Friend referred to codes of practice and codes of conduct. We have talked a lot about good medical practice from the General Medical Council, and we have a clause in the Bill on codes of practice. I feel confident in the clause, but I am still having regular meetings with officials about the legal implications of the Bill. I will continue those conversations, but I am happy that the clause as it stands serves the correct purpose.

[Kit Malthouse]

Will the hon. Lady respond to the point about injunctions? The Minister might want to respond to this as well. My understanding is that in order to obtain an injunction, someone does not have to establish that there is either a civil wrong or a criminal offence. They have to establish that there is a serious matter to be adjudicated, and that there is a strong likelihood of harm taking place. In those circumstances, a court would consider granting an interim injunction, subject then to a further hearing, ex parte or otherwise. The idea that some kind of civil tort needs to be established is not actually correct in seeking an injunction.

[Kim Leadbeater]

That would be my understanding as well, but I am not a lawyer. Fortunately, a lawyer just tried to intervene on me, so he might want to step in.

Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twenty-seventh sitting)

Kit Malthouse Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 19th March 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Danny Kruger]

I do not know what those might be, but I would be interested to hear. That might well be the case. I am afraid that no hard-and-fast rules can be clearly applied here; or, rather, we have to apply hard-and-fast rules in the knowledge of the grey areas, the exceptions and the situations in which we might feel that the law is unjust in particular cases. We have heard examples of that, such as the evidence about the lady in Australia cited earlier by the hon. Member for Spen Valley. I can well imagine the distress involved if someone suddenly finds themselves in an institution that does not permit an assisted death, but they want one and are in their last days.

The alternative, however, is a different blanket rule. If we were to have a blanket rule that we can do an assisted death anywhere—that is one situation—there would be significant knock-on effects. Serious moral injury would be suffered by other professionals and residents. I recognise that my amendment could lead to someone having to relocate if they want to have an assisted death—I am sorry for that—but I think that we have to draw the line in a way that makes most sense.

[Kit Malthouse (North West Hampshire) (Con)]

It would be interesting, if my hon. Friend’s amendments go through, to see the series of plebiscites taking place in care homes and communal situations across the country as to what the residents do and do not want, presumably by a majority. He asserted that there had been a mass exodus of healthcare workers when VAD came in, but I am struggling to find any evidence to support that claim. In fact, the evidence seems to say that that is not the case. Although there have been some resignations, that has largely been because of pay and conditions, as one might expect.

[Danny Kruger]

My right hon. Friend seems hung up on this suggestion that there needs to be a plebiscite or communal decision making—some kind of citizens’ jury. I am not suggesting that for one moment. In fact, I am sure that I have said explicitly that what I want, and what the amendment would enable, is that the owner or occupier, who would probably be an individual or a board of directors, would decide what happens. If they are a decent, compassionate organisation, they might well consult residents—in fact, I would very much expect that to happen if they are doing their job properly—but I am talking about the importance of communal living; and the fact is that a communal living arrangement has leadership. The residents have signed terms and conditions, in a contract, under which they have agreed to abide by certain rules of the house. My suggestion is that if the charity, company or organisation that is managing a care home wants to stipulate that there shall be no provision of assisted dying in that care home, they should have the right to do so. I hope my right hon. Friend would acknowledge that that is consistent with English property rights.

On my right hon. Friend’s second point, I am grateful to him and he might well be right. I am happy to consult my evidence pack, which I do not have at my fingertips, about the effect on the Australian workforce in consequence of the introduction of assisted dying. My memory is that we heard such evidence, or had it submitted to us in written form—his knowledge of the 500 submissions might be better than mine. Let us check and we will have it out, perhaps on social media; I know how much he enjoys those forums.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

--- Later in debate ---

[Kim Leadbeater]

I will speak briefly on this issue. An important point was made by my hon. Friend the Member for Rother Valley about the protections that clause 25 and these amendments provide for medical practitioners. I think the clause strikes the right balance, but it is important to remove the blanket immunity. My hon. Friend referred to codes of practice and codes of conduct. We have talked a lot about good medical practice from the General Medical Council, and we have a clause in the Bill on codes of practice. I feel confident in the clause, but I am still having regular meetings with officials about the legal implications of the Bill. I will continue those conversations, but I am happy that the clause as it stands serves the correct purpose.

[Kit Malthouse]

Will the hon. Lady respond to the point about injunctions? The Minister might want to respond to this as well. My understanding is that in order to obtain an injunction, someone does not have to establish that there is either a civil wrong or a criminal offence. They have to establish that there is a serious matter to be adjudicated, and that there is a strong likelihood of harm taking place. In those circumstances, a court would consider granting an interim injunction, subject then to a further hearing, ex parte or otherwise. The idea that some kind of civil tort needs to be established is not actually correct in seeking an injunction.

[Kim Leadbeater]

That would be my understanding as well, but I am not a lawyer. Fortunately, a lawyer just tried to intervene on me, so he might want to step in.

--- Later in debate ---

[Sarah Sackman]

I find that highly implausible; the likelihood is that the CPS will apply the appropriate charging decision to fit the facts as they have arisen. If they have arisen within the context of this legal regime, for someone acting nefariously, dishonestly or coercively about assisted dying, the charge under this clause would be the appropriate one. I find it implausible that the other scenario would arise. As I said, the CPS is well versed in applying the appropriate charging decision to the appropriate crime on the facts of the crime. I will not speculate or hypothesise on what that might be.

[Kit Malthouse]

As the Minister said, this is not an unusual exercise for the CPS and operates in lots of other areas. For example, the CPS regularly makes decisions about whether to charge someone with grievous bodily harm under section 18 or section 20 of the relevant legislation—they are both forms of GBH. Which one the CPS chooses depends on the circumstances, the seriousness and the level of intent. As she said, the charge naturally—whether it falls under the same Act or a different Act—comes down to the circumstances.

[Sarah Sackman]

That is a good example. One knows from charging decisions that often, on indictment, one might have multiple offences to capture the totality of the criminal behaviour. Some of those may be made out, some of them may not. What the Government have sought to do here, working with the Bill’s promoter, is to reflect her policy intent: to convey the gravity of the offence in this wholly new legal regime. As the right hon. Gentleman pointed out earlier, we are sanctioning and decriminalising conduct that has previously been criminal, while ensuring that this offence captures what would be criminal under the new legal regime. From the promoter’s point of view, it is important to signal that the Government have worked with her on this, and the Government’s position is that the result, in this amended form of the Bill, gives both some satisfaction to her policy intent and is compatible with how our criminal law routinely works, so it is workable from the point of view of the CPS.

--- Later in debate ---

[Sean Woodcock]

I do not accept that they are not relevant to this clause, I am afraid, but I take on board my hon. Friend’s point. If I may finish my quote, the review continued:

“There is some difficulty in determining which coma inducing mixture has the most evidence, based on the lack of comparative data between each drug regime and different dose trials.”

In their evidence, the pharmacologists wrote:

“Monitoring of drug efficacy and safety should be compulsory in order to assure good clinical care and comply with regulations.”

I agree with that sentiment, and I hope that all hon. Members would too.

The right institutions to approve drugs before use and then monitor their safety during use are those that are named in amendment 443. All substances used for assisted dying must be approved through the Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency and either the National Institute for Clinical Excellence or the All Wales Medicines Strategy Group processes. There are significant risks if this rigorous process is not undertaken. The drugs used for assisted dying must be tested to ensure that they are safe and effective for use in assisted death.

[Kit Malthouse]

I am very sorry to intervene on the same point as the hon. Member for Spen Valley, but clause 28 is not about the formulation of the drugs or their approval; it is about the administration of the issuing of the drugs by a pharmacist or otherwise. I am sorry if I am misconstruing the hon. Gentleman, but I think he might be off on a bit of a tangent, on a debate that, as the hon. Lady said, we had earlier. As I say, this clause is about the bureaucratic process of the issuing the drugs, not about their formulation or approval.

[Sean Woodcock]

I would suggest—

--- Later in debate ---

[Naz Shah]

I was not intending to speak to this group, but I am now trying to find amendment 500.

[Kit Malthouse]

Amendment 500 was to clause 21 and we have agreed it already.

[Naz Shah]

In responding to my hon. Friend the Member for Sunderland Central, I appreciate that we do not want to put too much detail in the Bill, but with some of the commitments that we have made as a Government on collecting data we need to go further. That is for the simple reason that our equality laws are not right when we look at other issues, such as the gender pay gap.

--- Later in debate ---

[Sarah Sackman]

I do not have a lot to add, but I point out that, as the Bill stands, clause 34 requires the chief medical officer to, among other things, submit an annual report to the relevant national authority on the operation of the Act. Amendment 382 tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley would make the voluntary assisted dying commissioner responsible for that function instead. Amendment 274 would require that the report under clause 34 contains an analysis of the additional information to be collected under new clause 10 and amendment 273. I remind the Committee of that because we are discussing what information should be gathered, and at what point in the process. There is then the monitoring, reporting and co-ordinating function performed by the voluntary assisted dying commissioner, should those later amendments be passed.

[Kit Malthouse]

My assumption is that once a commissioner is appointed, and in drawing up the regulations and guidelines for reporting, there will be consultation between the Government and the commissioner about what the commissioner actually wants to report on. From what the Minister is saying, I assume that, unless we collect the data, the commissioner will have nothing to say in their report.

[Sarah Sackman]

I thank the right hon. Gentleman for that intervention, and that is exactly why I made that point. One of the design features of the commissioner model is the monitoring function, through which they will undertake annual reporting and an assessment of patterns in the practice, should the legal regime come into force. That is exactly how I anticipate it working.

The commissioner can also be self-correcting and say, “We need to see more information on this because it is a concern. We have this equalities data”—or whatever data we have collected—“and we need to see more on this aspect, because this pattern is a concern to us or it would help to illuminate how the practice is operating.” That is all I wanted to add, because one has to appreciate the operation of the regime as a whole.

--- Later in debate ---

[Kit Malthouse]

Obviously the hon. Lady is a London MP, but I gently point out that particularly in a London context—and in other urban areas—someone’s postcode is actually a very poor indicator of socioeconomic status. I represented central London as a London Assembly member for eight years and, in large parts of central London, there is social housing in the same postcode as extremely expensive houses running into the many millions.

[Sarah Olney]

I know: the Barnes ward in my constituency is one of the most unequal wards in the country, so I fully appreciate the right hon. Gentleman’s point. As I say, that is the socioeconomic indicator that I have for now, thanks to the failings of our predecessors to include it in the Equality Act, but I am open to amendments on Report if anybody has something more compelling. I do think that it really matters that we look at the socioeconomic status of people who are seeking an assisted death, and I welcome feedback—and, as I say, further amendments—on how that particular part of clause 29 could be improved.

Lastly, I included whether someone has a disability, which obviously has come up many times in the written and oral evidence. That is why I specified those characteristics in response to the evidence that we received, and why I am keen to press amendment 273 to a vote.

Amendment 273 agreed to.