Armed Forces Readiness and Defence Equipment

Debate between Lord Beamish and Julian Lewis

Thursday 21st March 2024 Commons Chamber

[Mr Jones]

It is laughable, as my right hon. Friend says. We need to make sure that we actually invest, because this is about skills and about ensuring that we have the workforce.

We have seen the effects when we just pull out of such work. We cannot look at our skills base as a tap, which we turn on when we want it and turn off again when we do not. We cannot do so, because we have seen the costs of that—for example, on the Astute programme. To be political, it was again the Conservative Government who stopped building submarines, so we had a gap in skills, and it has taken all the effort recently to rebuild that skills base and ensure we get it back. We must have such a skills base continually, and that has to be done by working with our European allies. Whether the zealots of Brexit and the anti-Europeans like it or not, if we are talking about things such as stockpiles, we do have to work with allies and make sure that we can deliver them through the supply chain we have.

[Sir Julian Lewis]

Will the right hon. Gentleman give way?

[Mr Jones]

No. I am sorry, but I do not have the time.

I now come on to what will happen after the next general election. Is there going to be a massive increase in defence expenditure whoever wins the election? No, there is not. We know that, so let us just tell the public that. What we need to ensure is that we get the maximum effect from what we do spend. My right hon. Friend the Member for Wentworth and Dearne (John Healey), who speaks for the Labour party on defence, will—if he gets the job—have a big task facing him if we are successful at the next general election. My heart sinks a little when he talks about reviews. Yes, we need to have a review, but we also need action straightaway.

It is now critical that we take some key decisions, and there are very difficult discussions to be had, not just with the British people about where Britain is realistically in the world today, but with some of the members of the armed forces and the chiefs, in saying, “We’re going to do this, and we’re going to do it well, and we’re going to make sure we are safe as a nation.” Is that defeatism or saying that Britain is finished? No, it is not. I think we have a proud future, and we have some great military and diplomatic assets, including in the way we do things. However, we should not delude ourselves that we will be going back to some pre-Suez or pre-second world war global Britain as an imperialist power. We are just not going to be able to do that, and I think we have to be honest with the British people.

There also now has to be speed. As my right hon. Friend the Member for Warley (John Spellar) said about munition shelling, we cannot have a situation in which it takes a year for munition stocks to be replaced. The tempo has to be increased, so action will have to be taken very quickly. I am all in favour of a review and a study of policy—in the last few years in this country we have lacked any thought-out policy work or strategy, and we need that—but we also need action.

It is a daunting task that will face any Government after the next general election, but let us be proud of the members of our armed forces, who work on our behalf to keep us secure. There is an impression that defence is somehow a Conservative issue; I am sorry, but it is not a Conservative issue. A lot of the men and women in our armed forces come from the poorest and most deprived communities in our country, but they are proud to serve their country, and I think we should be proud of them. We should give them the clear commitment that they have our backing, but be clear with them that we must be realistic about the tasks we ask them to do to keep us safe.

Overseas Operations (Service Personnel and Veterans) Bill

Debate between Lord Beamish and Julian Lewis

Report stage & 3rd reading & 3rd reading: House of Commons & Report stage: House of Commons
Tuesday 3rd November 2020 Commons Chamber

[Mr Jones]

It is better than he did in Committee when he called me a hypocrite, Madam Deputy Speaker, but if he listens to what I am saying, he will know that I am not saying that. I know that his attention span is not very good, and he does not tend to listen. What he tends to do is just stick to what he has in front of him and his view of the world, rather than hearing what people are saying. The issue is—[Interruption.] Well, he can say “brilliant” and chunter as much as he likes, but this is the issue—the delays that are taking place because of the investigations.

I have referred to Judge Blackett, and the Minister was there when the evidence was taken. Judge Blackett is a just-retired senior judge of the service justice system, and he said:

“The Bill is effectively looking at the wrong end of the telescope. It is looking at the prosecution end, and you have got to remember that you do not prosecute until you investigate—and you have got to investigate. This will not stop people being investigated and it will not stop people being re-investigated and investigated again. Lots of investigations do not go anywhere, but the people who are investigated do not see that.”—[Official Report, Overseas Operations (Service Personnel and Veterans) Public Bill Committee, 8 October 2020; c. 120.]

That came up when we took evidence from Major Campbell. I will put it on record again that his case was a disgrace, because it took 17 years, but this Bill will do nothing to speed up such cases or to ensure that reinvestigations do not occur. That is the key problem. The problem is not the prosecutions, because their number is very small.

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Ind)]

I have put in three written questions about this Bill, and yesterday I had answers to them. Two of the answers were helpful, but one, on the point that the right hon. Gentleman is making, was not. I was trying to establish how many investigations had not resulted in prosecutions, and I could not seem to get an answer, yet that is central to the whole problem. The core of the problem is not the small number who get prosecuted but the large number who get investigated.

[Mr Jones]

The right hon. Gentleman is correct. That came out in evidence that we took throughout the Committee. The issue is not the number of prosecutions but the number of investigations and how we can speed up the length of time they take.

The problem is that the Ministry seems to have a deaf ear when it comes to recognising that we need to address the issue around investigations, which is what new clause 1 would do. It would ensure that we had judicial oversight of the investigations. We can see what we have at the moment from the example of Major Campbell’s case, which went on and on. New clause 1 states that after a certain period of time, the evidence should be put before a judge to see whether there was a case to answer. Clearly, if the evidence did not meet the test and the case was going nowhere, it would get thrown out there and then. Alternatively, it could be decided that the case needed further investigation, but at least that would ensure that, after six months, there was some judicial oversight of the investigation. That would be a way of ensuring that these investigations did not go on for a long time.

Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Bill

Debate between Lord Beamish and Julian Lewis

Committee stage & 3rd reading & 3rd reading: House of Commons & Committee: 1st sitting & Committee: 1st sitting: House of Commons & Report stage & Report stage: House of Commons
Thursday 15th October 2020 Commons Chamber

[Dr Lewis]

The hon. Gentleman, with whom I worked so closely on the Defence Committee, as always gets to the heart of the matter. He says that, indeed, we have made reference in the context of Northern Ireland to numbers and scale in precisely the way we are seeking to be able to do here. Whether something is then made public is always a matter for debate and negotiation between the ISC and the agency concerned, but where it cannot be made public, that is where the ISC in a sense comes into its own. We exist to be able to see things that for good reasons cannot be made public, but we can then at least give assurance to Parliament that we have seen what cannot be made public and we are reasonably satisfied with it, and that is what this is all about.

[Mr Kevan Jones]

The reason for not giving that figure is clearly that it would give an advantage to those we are working against—for example, in Northern Ireland—through an indication of the scale of the CHIS. Could the right hon. Gentleman clarify the situation and highlight to the Committee that we would look at the numbers, but that we have powers to look at individual cases, as we have done in the past, if we have concerns about them?

[Dr Lewis]

Yes. What it is important to remember and, it must be said, what has not always been remembered in recent times, are the provisions of the Justice and Security Act 2013. That Act, among other things, said that the Committee would have greater powers to “require” the agencies to give certain information. Prior to that, it could only “request” the agencies to do so. The question is: will we have the power to be assured of getting these figures, or are we going to be able only to ask for them and perhaps not get them? The right hon. Gentleman is absolutely right: if we saw something that we did not like the look of, even if we did not have the power to require that particular piece of information in order to delve further, we could at least request it. For many years, that was the only basis on which the Committee could operate anyway.

National Shipbuilding Strategy

Debate between Lord Beamish and Julian Lewis

Thursday 11th July 2019 Westminster Hall

[Mr Jones]

I am envious of the hon. Lady for going back to Cornwall. I spent my summer holidays there last year, and it is a wonderful part of the world.

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

So is Durham!

[Mr Jones]

But Cornwall is, equally, very nice.

The hon. Lady makes an important point. It is about not just the build, but the through-life support. For a lot of the systems that we procure for the armed forces —certainly in shipbuilding—we look at the initial procurement, but we should also be looking at the through-life support. That is where the jobs are, and where the value is for the original, prime companies. As she rightly says, there is also value for smaller companies and others. If we are to spread prosperity around, we should see the contract as an investment in Britain. As she rightly argues, it is an investment in skills going forward. When looking at whether we can afford to make that investment, we should ask the Treasury, “What is the prosperity agenda?” The right hon. Member for Ludlow (Mr Dunne) did a very good report that tried to explain that the prosperity agenda should be linked to procurement in the Ministry of Defence. One of the GMB trade union’s reports argued that 20% of the value of the fleet solid support contract comes straight back to the Treasury anyway, through taxes and national insurance.

That has to be taken into account, but it is the throughput of work that will ensure that the shipyards and supply chain are maintained. We have a great opportunity to do that with the FSS contract. Unfortunately, for reasons that I am not sure even the Minister understands or privately supports, it has been put out to international competition. We will make the same mistakes that we made in the 1980s if we think this will somehow lower the price or get a better deal. I am sorry, but no other country in Europe does the same thing.

We can dance on the end of a pin over whether EU procurement rules apply to the FSS vessels—I have made it very clear that they do not. The French have just ordered four new Vulcan class support ships. Did they think about putting that out to international competition or asking British yards to tender? No, they did not; they ordered them directly. It is the same for Italian and Spanish ships. That is the difference.

The South Koreans and Daewoo have now pulled out of the competition for the FSS contract, but we are not dealing with a level playing field. Those companies have huge amounts of Government subsidy, which is not open to UK shipbuilders. If we are to procure the ships and build them abroad, it is quite clear that the Exchequer will not get back 20% straightaway in tax and national insurance. We will also lose the ability to support our shipbuilding and ship repair businesses.

Since 2010, the Government’s industrial strategy on defence has been disappointing. When I was a Defence Minister, I had the privilege of working with Lord Drayson, who understood this issue. As part of his wider industrial strategy on defence—I think it ran until 2010—he rightly argued that if we want to build complex warships in this country, we need to put in the investment, get the drumbeat of work going, and ensure there is certainty for industry.

Since 2010, we have been promised various defence strategies, but what we really need is an overarching defence industrial strategy. I know the Minister will say that the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy or other Departments are dealing with these things, but I am sorry: a particular strategy needs to be developed for defence industries, including the maritime sector.

Sir John Parker’s strategy was an attempt but, as I said, I think it misses the point. It tries to reinvent some of the wheels of competition that failed in the 1980s. There is a fixation in the Ministry of Defence—I cannot understand where it comes from—with the idea, “Isn’t it terrible to give the work to BAE Systems?” BAE Systems is the only company in the UK capable of building complex warships. There are ways of incentivising it, but also ensuring that we get value for money and that we have the necessary systems. The hulls are important and the steel is important, but being able to invest in combat systems, engine technology and other things related to shipbuilding is vital, because they are exportable.

The carriers were a good example of Babcock, Thales and BAE Systems coming together in an alliance that worked. I do not understand why that alliance should be broken up on completion of HMS Prince of Wales, which will happen soon. That alliance seems an obvious way forward in terms of skills for the FSS. I understand that the new Secretary of State wants competition to be reviewed, which is welcome. I hope we can get understanding of the points that I and a lot of other Members have made about the importance of shipbuilding in the UK.

Let me conclude where I started. This is a vital sector if we are going to keep sovereign capability for complex warship building in this country. It needs to be invested in. It is not a smokestack industry; properly invested in, it is an industry for the future. Off the back of contracts such as that for the fleet solid support vessels, I would like to see investment in not only technologies but skills. We need urgently to ensure that companies such as BAE Systems, which do a fantastic job of recruiting apprentices, have the certainty to invest in skills. If we do not, we will fall behind: even with the political will to build complex warships in this country, we will not have the skills to do so. As I said, we have only to look at Barrow and the submarine programme to see the problems with trying to regenerate skills from scratch.

I am pleased that we are having this debate and putting shipbuilding on the agenda. I hope that that incentivises the Government to make an early decision to award the FSS contract to British yards or a British consortium.

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

As an old schoolmate of yours, Mr Evans, it is a particular pleasure for me to contribute to this debate under your able chairmanship. I pay tribute to the right hon. Member for North Durham (Mr Jones) for continuing his relentless and entirely justified campaign to ensure that the defence footprint, particularly as regards naval shipbuilding, is not shrunk still further in this country.

Mr Evans, you will know, having been in the House even longer than me, that one of the few benefits of having spent more than two decades here is that we get to see trends over decades. What has happened with our naval shipbuilding does not make for a pretty picture. I remember the 1998 strategic defence review undertaken by the then new Labour Government of Tony Blair. It set out a policy for the Royal Navy that seemed to leave it in quite a winning position. Although the Royal Navy was asked to sacrifice three of its frigates or destroyers, thus reducing its total from 35 to 32, the review put forward the concept of carrier strike and amphibious strike, which meant that the two large aircraft carriers would be built.

Had it remained in that formulation, the Royal Navy would have had every reason to be satisfied. We all know, however, that that was not the case. Successive Governments reduced the total from 32 frigates and destroyers, first to 31, on the basis that these were much more capable ships and therefore 31 would be able to do the work of 32. When that little stratagem succeeded, the 31 were reduced to 25, and the 25 were then reduced to our present pathetic total of 19 destroyers and frigates—six destroyers and 13 frigates, to be precise. Before anybody starts lecturing us about the change in the nature of warfare, it is worth reflecting on the fact that one of those 13 frigates, HMS Montrose, is in the news today, having performed the very important function of protecting British shipping from Iranian attempts to respond to the impounding of a large vessel of theirs that was believed to be carrying contraband oil to Syria.

It is rather hard to have a strategy when we are dealing with only a relatively limited number of vessels, even though those vessels may well be much more potent, powerful and versatile than their predecessors. However powerful, versatile and potent they are, each can be in only one place at any one time, and that means that each can be built in only one place over a particular period. That makes it harder to have a versatile and flexible strategy to match those qualities in the ships that are being built.

One of the encouraging results of the publication of the national shipbuilding strategy was that, in identifying the general purpose frigate, the Type 31e—the cheap and cheerful version of the next generation of frigates—as one that should be designed for export, Sir John Parker, to whom we should again pay tribute for everything he did, also specified that, as a result of those vessels being built in modular fashion, they would be very flexible and adaptable over time to what is sometimes called incremental acquisition. In other words, we get the ship hulls built and get them out to sea, and then, over time, because we have built compartments in the vessels that can be used for a variety of purposes over a period of years, we sow the seeds of their future adaptability and additional potency.

We should remember that this was the first time there was talk of an increase in the total number of vessels. Instead of just being told, “We will be replacing 13 Type 23 frigates on a like-for-like basis,” we were told that there would definitely be eight of the Type 26, specialising in anti-submarine warfare, and at least five—not a limit of five—of the Type 31e general purpose vessels. It will be interesting to hear from the Minister whether there are plans to exceed the figure of five for the Type 31e.

Slightly less than a week away on Tuesday 16 July there will be another debate in this Chamber about defence expenditure. Of course, all these issues, including the important one about the fleet solid support ships raised by the right hon. Gentleman, generally come back to defence expenditure and—it must be said—the inadequacy of defence expenditure.

I regard it as one of the achievements of the Select Committee on Defence that, with members representing no fewer than four different parties, it has consistently come to the view, irrespective of party allegiance, that too little is spent on defence in the United Kingdom—far too little. Our expectations were managed downwards to such an extent that it was believed to be some sort of triumph when we did not dip below NATO’s basic recommended minimum guideline of 2% of GDP. To coincide with next Tuesday’s debate, the Committee will bring out an updated report, following on from our 2016 report in which we laid out the decline in defence expenditure as a proportion of GDP compared with rises in health, education and, above all, pensions and benefits, and how defence had declined in our scale of national priorities to such an extent that the size of the armed forces was becoming unsustainable.

The national shipbuilding strategy gives us an opportunity to reverse that decline, and I would be grateful to hear from the Minister what plans there are to do that. It will be no easy task, given that we will remove the Type 23 frigates from the fleet at the rate of one a year between 2023 and 2035. It will be no small task to replace each of those frigates at that sort of rate with a new, modern, complex warship.

[Mr Kevan Jones]

The right hon. Gentleman is talking about the number of ships. Does he agree that the crisis point in the Navy is also about people and not just in number? I referred to skills in the shipbuilding industry, but there is also a need for particular skills in the Royal Navy.

[Dr Lewis]

That is true, because if we fall below what one might call critical mass, we will not be able to maintain the necessary footprint to support the construction and manning of vessels on a consistent basis. That is why the question of the fleet solid support ships is so important. Those vessels can be classified as warships or, if we choose not to, simply as auxiliaries. We have that choice, and it is a choice that we feel, on a cross-party basis, it is necessary to exercise.

The trouble that the Ministry of Defence runs into is that every time a long-term strategic view suggests to it that we ought to make an investment of this sort, it runs up against the short-term imperative that the defence budget is so small that cuts must be made at every opportunity, even where, as in this case, they are short-sighted and storing up problems for the future.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Lewis]

rose—

[Mr Kevan Jones]

rose—

Ministry of Defence

Debate between Lord Beamish and Julian Lewis

Monday 26th February 2018 Commons Chamber

[Mr Kevan Jones]

I hear what the right hon. Gentleman says about civil servants, but the decision to cut the defence budget by 16% between 2010 and 2015 was not a civil servant’s invention. It was the political decision of the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Government at the time.

[Dr Lewis]

Yes, and I will come to the issue of how we can use the percentage of GDP to track what has been happening to defence in a moment. I hope that the hon. Gentleman—a former Defence Minister in the Labour Government, of course, and a very good one—will try to be non-partisan about this for the simple reason that successive Governments are responsible for what has happened.

What actually took place was, as has already been hinted at, something that has been going on over a very long period. Colleagues on both sides of the House have heard me recite this so often that I am afraid they might do that terrible thing and join in, singing the song with me. But I will just run through it again. In 1963, the falling graph of defence expenditure as a proportion of GDP crossed over with the rising graph of expenditure on welfare at 6%. So we were spending the same on welfare and defence—6%—in 1963. In the mid-1980s, as we have heard, we regularly spent between 4.5% and 5% of GDP on defence, and that was the period when we last had an assertive Russia combined with a major terrorist threat—the threat in Northern Ireland. We were spending at that time roughly the same amount on education and health. Nowadays we spend six times on welfare what we spend on defence, we spend four times on health what we spend on defence, and we spend two and a half times on education what we spend on defence.

We have to ask what we mean when we say that defence is the first duty of Government. If it is the first duty of Government, it is a duty that is more important than any other duty, because if we fail to discharge it everything else is put in jeopardy.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Lewis]

What I am looking for today is agreement across the House that we recognise that we should not be having almost theological debates about whether we are just above or just below the 2% minimum guideline that NATO prescribes to its member states for defence expenditure, but that we have to get back to the level—at the very least—of what we considered appropriate for so long, right up until the mid-1990s, when the Labour Government came in, which was 3% of GDP.

[Mr Kevan Jones]

Will the right hon. Gentleman give way?

[Dr Lewis]

I will give way one more time, but I want to concentrate on the bigger picture, because frankly neither of the parties has much to be proud about on defence expenditure since the mid-1990s.

[Mr Jones]

The facts do not bear out what the right hon. Gentleman is saying. According to the Library, the last time defence expenditure was 3% was 1993-94. After that, there was a 7% decrease in 1995, a 1% decrease in 1996 and a 5.7% increase the following year. The Labour Government came in, following the Treasury rules laid down by the previous Government, and in 1998 increased defence spending by 5.8%. The idea that the last Labour Government were following a trend that had been set is just not the case.

[Dr Lewis]

It depends whether the hon. Gentleman is talking about absolute figures or percentages of GDP spent on defence. In 2016, the Defence Committee produced a unanimous report called “Shifting the Goalposts? Defence expenditure and the 2% pledge”. We had the Committee staff use all available sourcing to draw up a definitive table of what had been spent on defence by Britain as a proportion of GDP over the past 50 years. The figures for the period we are talking about are: 1990-91, 3.8%; 1991-92, 3.8%; 1992-1993, 3.7%; 1993-94, 3.5%; 1994-95, 3.3%; and 1995-96, 3%. It then dips below 3% in 1996-97 to 2.7%, and thereafter it is down and down, with little blips here and there, until it is hovering around 2.5% because the cost of operations were included.

The point about all this is that we should not be arguing about who did the most damage. We should be agreeing about what we need in the future. If we are hearing a chorus of voices from the Labour Benches—it is music to my ears—saying that we have not been spending enough on defence and we need to be spending more, that is what we should be saying loud and clear to those people who seem to be perfectly content to spend the existing inadequate sums.

I do not wish to prolong my contribution, but I do wish to speak briefly about the equipment plan that was alluded to in some detail by my hon. Friend the Member for Gainsborough. The equipment plan of 2016 is for £178 billion over 10 years. That includes a small number—nine, which some would say was too small a number—of new P-8A maritime patrol aircraft, replacing a capability that was quite wrongly dispensed with after 2010. We are also supposed to be replacing 13 Type 23 frigates and supplying mechanised infantry vehicles out of this budget, and we are of course engaged in resurrecting carrier strike capability—another capacity that was temporarily lost after 2010.

The first report of the Defence Committee in the new Parliament was entitled, “Gambling on ‘Efficiency’: Defence Acquisition and Procurement”. The word “efficiency” was in inverted commas because we believe that the affordability of the scheme is predicated on an estimate of £7.3 billion of theoretical efficiency savings that are to be made in addition to some £7.1 billion that was previously announced. As we have heard, the National Audit Office thinks that the equipment programme is at greater risk than at any time since reporting was introduced in 2012. The truth of the matter is that we encounter black holes everywhere we look in defence. This brings me to my concluding point.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Jones]

It was a deliberate strategy, in the Cameron-Osborne Conservative party, to ignore the facts and spin—“If we keep saying it long enough, people will believe it.”

The 2009 NAO report said that if the equipment budget was not increased at all over 10 years, it might be possible to arrive at a figure of £36 billion. How did they then get an extra £2 billion? I think the then Defence Secretary just added some personnel revenue costs to get to the £38 billion figure. What the report actually said, however—this point was completely ignored—was that the scenario it envisaged, of the budget remaining constant in real terms over the 10-year period, would lead to a £6 billion funding gap, which could have been managed over that 10-year period.

My hon. Friend the Member for Bridgend (Mrs Moon) is right. The impression was given to the public, and to everyone else who wanted to hear this spin, that the £38 billion had to be found in year straightaway. That was a clear fabrication. We know that, because when the current Chancellor became Defence Secretary, following the resignation of the right hon. Member for North Somerset after two years, he suddenly announced that the black hole had disappeared. I do not know whether he was auditioning for his current job as Chancellor, but the idea that it is possible to get rid of a £38 billion in-year black hole in the defence budget in just two years is complete nonsense.

The Conservative Government used that as a smokescreen to allow them to cut the defence budget, as part of the Chancellor’s austerity drive, by 16%. The effect of that has been some of the decisions referred to earlier on, including the scrapping of capability such as Nimrod. Making people compulsorily redundant in our armed forces was completely inexcusable. Certainly, if the Government I was a member of had done that when I was a Defence Minister, we would have been rightly decried by the people who are always arguing for defence. Those decisions have had an impact on what is happening today. My hon. Friend the Member for Gedling (Vernon Coaker) referred to the increased expenditure on the Trident programme. The £1.2 billion to £1.4 billion in additional costs happened because that decision was delayed. The deal done by the then Prime Minister David Cameron to get the Liberal Democrats on board in coalition delayed the programme, which built in costs.

[Dr Julian Lewis]

indicated assent.

[Mr Jones]

The right hon. Gentleman is nodding. He and I kept raising that and asking why that decision had not been made. The costs arriving now are because of the decisions taken by the coalition Government. I accept all that has been said about increased defence expenditure, but we cannot get away from the core decisions that have led to the problems we have today.

The 2015 pre-Brexit strategic defence and security review announced an additional £24.4 billion spending on new equipment. Some of that, for example on the P-8, was to fill the gap the Government created in 2010 with a hasty decision to scrap the Nimrod. Reference was made earlier to the civil service making decisions. I am sorry, but it was not civil servants or generals making those decisions; it was Ministers making these decisions, including the right hon. Member for North Somerset and the current Chancellor, when he was Defence Secretary. They decided to reduce the size of the Army to 82,000. I asked a retired senior general, “Who came up with the figure of 82,000 for our armed forces?” He scratched his head and said, “We were just told that that was what the figure was going to be to fit the cash envelope.” We then had the construct of Army 2020, which is a complete political cover, to try to give the impression that we are going to keep the Army at nearly 100,000. As my hon. Friend the Member for Bridgend very eloquently outlined in her contribution to the debate, that is not only not producing the additional personnel required, but is actually costing more than if we had not done that in the first place.

Another point about the 2015 review is that, again, hasty decisions were taken in ordering the P-8. There is a gap, created by this Government, in maritime patrol aircraft. The P-8 was to be bought off the shelf—the Apache contract was announced at the same time—from the United States. That was pre Brexit. The added costs in foreign currency exchange are now creating pressures on the defence budget, and that is before we look at the effect on the economic and industrial base of our country. It may seem an easy option to buy off the shelf from the United States, but that lets our own industrial base decline, and that is what is happening. I have not yet seen any meaningful commitment by the contractors, Boeing, to create real jobs in the UK. What angers me is that if it was the other way around and we were selling equipment to the United States, we would be unable to do so without a clear commitment to jobs and investment in United States industry. That is where the MOD woefully and shamefully let down the British economy.

Coeliac Disease and Prescriptions

Debate between Lord Beamish and Julian Lewis

Tuesday 1st November 2016 Westminster Hall

[Mr Jones]

I will make a bit more progress.

We have a situation where, in places such as east Essex, the needs of patients are being discounted despite a complete lack of any type of research. I am concerned that more CCGs across the country will begin to use inadequate justifications as a precedent and follow a similar path. That leads me back to my earlier point about the big problem of under-diagnosis. I am afraid we will see a bigger problem if gluten-free prescriptions are not made available to those on low incomes.

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

On the specific point of failure to diagnose, until 20 years ago I had never heard of coeliac disease, and then I went out with a young lady who, as a teenager, had repeatedly gone to her GP knowing something was wrong. Coeliac disease was never diagnosed until she suffered something analogous to a stroke, which left her permanently all but unable to read. Although she has bravely developed coping strategies over the years, there is no doubt that her life and career have suffered, and she should never have been put in that situation.

[Mr Jones]

The right hon. Gentleman raises a serious point about the life-changing effects that coeliac disease can have. I was only diagnosed by accident, in my 30s; my mother was not diagnosed until she was over 70. Early diagnosis is important, but it is not uncommon for people to live a long time without one being made.

The Health and Social Care Act 2012 included a duty on CCGs to have regard for National Institute for Health and Care Excellence quality standards, but NICE guidance on prescribing gluten-free food for the management of coeliac disease has only recently been published. It says:

“Gluten-free products are more expensive and are usually only available from larger retailers, making access more difficult for people on low incomes or with limited mobility. As coeliac disease can affect more than one member of a family it can also be an additional burden on the family budget”—

as the hon. Member for Aldershot (Sir Gerald Howarth) said.

“To address this, healthcare professionals should help people who may need support to find suitable gluten-free food products on prescription to enable them to maintain a gluten-free diet.”

Armed Forces (Service Complaints and Financial Assistance) Bill

Debate between Lord Beamish and Julian Lewis

Monday 2nd February 2015 Commons Chamber

[Mr Jones]

I agree with my hon. Friend. We are making progress by changing the attitudes of some of the old and the bold in the Conservative party and changing the culture among the senior management of all three services, who accept as a fact of life that bullying, harassment and sexual discrimination are not acceptable in our armed forces and will not be tolerated. The Minister is right that the present chiefs, as I know them, take a zero-tolerance view of such behaviour, and this will support them in ensuring that it does not happen.

[Dr Lewis]

I pay tribute to the hard work of the hon. Member for Bridgend (Mrs Moon), who has been a champion of the Bill. In order to reassure my hon. Friend the Member for South Dorset (Richard Drax), I would share his concerns if I thought there was any danger of the system becoming clogged up with complaints that were designed to paralyse it. That is why I think that the provision in the Bill to which I referred in my intervention on the Minister is so important. The complaints commissioner has the right to investigate or not to investigate a given complaint, which avoids the danger that I think my hon. Friend would otherwise be rightly concerned about.

[Mr Jones]

All I will say to the hon. Gentleman is that he should read the report of the debate we had when the Service Complaints Commissioner was introduced, because this is not about interfering in the chain of command. The present commissioner has done a very good job of highlighting the delays in the processes, particularly in the Army. Anyone who deals with complaints, whether in industry, local government or anywhere else, knows that it is better to resolve a matter quickly, rather than leaving it for a long period. The present commissioner has certainly been highly critical. When we look at some of the cases set out in the last report, we have to ask ourselves why on earth they took so long. They could have been resolved quite quickly, which would have not only improved the Army’s reputation for dealing with such matters but given the complainants satisfaction.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Jones]

They are. However, the important point about the ombudsman—this is what is great about the service complaints commissioner—is that it is outside the chain of command, independently looking inwards. That is not to say that it would always be critical. On some issues, Susan Atkins has not been critical and has supported changes that have taken place in our armed forces. I give credit to the service chiefs for bringing forward some of those changes. If, in a modern age, we want a system that is going to be robust and seen to be fair, it is very important to have that element of independence. That is especially true for bullying. We know that on occasion bullying is an isolated incident, but there have also been examples of where it is part of the chain of command and responsible for the culture that exists in some areas.

The Bill gives the ombudsman power to investigate where it sees fit, but we must understand what powers it would have and what it could do with what it finds. Yes, it can report to the Defence Council, but without any further powers or the ability to make changes, the onus in terms of the defence budget might be to ignore what the ombudsman says. We must clarify that point in the Bill.

As I have said, some recommendations can be made, but we need a method to ensure that reports and findings do not sit on a shelf, and that the Minister of the day, or the Defence Council, does not reject or simply note them. That would undermine not only the role of the service complaints ombudsman, but its independence. People who go to the ombudsman expect to get a fair hearing and to know that something will be done about their complaint.

It is vital that any new system works to the benefit of those who come to rely on it and that the Bill does not impose any unnecessary barriers on individuals and families making a complaint. The current Service Complaints Commissioner has been highly critical of the Army for the length of time it takes to deal with the complaints. Any system must obviously have robust time limits, but the Bill proposes that the Secretary of State will set time limits within which the individual must lodge a complaint. That time limit must not be less than six weeks after the date on which the individual receives their decision from their internal complaints system. In an ideal world that might be a simple system, but the nature of service life might lead to a situation where those time limits cannot be met. If that was the case, people would be time-bound when bringing forward a complaint. I think we need to consider that issue in Committee, and see whether we can allow some flexibility in the way that complaints are brought forward, so that someone does not miss taking a complaint forward because of the time limit.

The ombudsman service must be independent from the chain of command and the armed forces, and must be trusted by the people it is investigating. It must also be seen by servicemen and women lower down the chain of command as a process that is clearly independent.

This is a bit like déjà-vu, because I remember when the Service Complaints Commissioner was being appointed that the hon. Member for Aldershot (Sir Gerald Howarth) was one of the—well, he could certainly be described as a dinosaur if not even worse—people who said that the end of the earth was going to come if the service ombudsman was not someone with a military background. It is clear that service personnel cannot hold that post, but I would also be reluctant to have anyone with a direct service background. Certainly the criticism levelled at Dr Atkins when she was first appointed was unfair and has—quite rightly—been proved wrong given the effective way that she got to know quickly how the armed forces work, and the way that she got the support and good will of people at all levels. It is important that the ombudsman is not seen as part of the old boys’ network—interestingly, the first two have been women.

On representation, occasionally those who lodge a complaint, or who speak of an injustice but never enter the complaints system, cannot see the complaint through—we have already heard about people who die before their complaint is heard. In these rare cases, it is sometimes important to family members that the complaint continues, and if someone makes a complaint against an individual, that individual will still have an opportunity to put forward a defence, albeit in the absence of the accuser. Also, many complaints relate to matters of service pay. In these cases, no one is required to make a defence, so it seems only fair that they be allowed to continue to conclusion. To stop such a case would be totally unfair. All cases should be pursued as a matter of due diligence to allow the ombudsman to oversee the entire system.

This touches on something else the Service Complaints Commissioner has done. A complaint might throw up inconsistencies in areas of policy that need addressing, and just because someone dies, it does not necessarily mean the wider implications do not need addressing either by the chain of command or more widely.

[Dr Lewis]

As the hon. Gentleman will know, I have only recently rejoined the Defence Select Committee after a long absence, so I am not as well sighted on the Bill as perhaps I ought to be. However, given that so much of the concern that led to this sort of legislation was about deaths, will he comment on the role of the ombudsman in relation to complaints brought by families of people who have died?

[Mr Jones]

That is a very important point. I was a member of the Defence Select Committee when it looked into Deepcut—as, too, was the hon. Member for Portsmouth South (Mr Hancock). We could not help but think that the way the families were dealt with was truly shocking, both in terms of basic human decency and because it meant that, unfortunately, the truth could never be arrived at. That was unfortunate for the families, obviously, and for members of the armed forces who were accused of things they clearly did not do.

We have made progress, however, thanks to the Service Complaints Commissioner and this new Bill. The important thing is independent oversight. Individuals are not going to continue with a course of action if they know it is leading to deaths in the armed forces. We know there will be tragedies in the armed forces, on the battlefield and in training, given the robust and difficult training regime, and when they happen, it is important, for the sake of the families, that we get all the information early on; that the matter be dealt with compassionately; and that things be put right early on, if mistakes were made.

I think there has been a change in this country—certainly in respect of local authorities and health boards, for example—and sometimes there is a culture of arguing why something should stay the same. However, if people say sorry early on and admit to mistakes, while it will always be difficult for families, at least they would know what happened. If so, lessons can be learned and measures put in place to militate against such things happening again, which will at least give some comfort to the families.

Defence Spending

Debate between Lord Beamish and Julian Lewis

Thursday 19th June 2014 Commons Chamber

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

May I begin with a double apology? My first apology is for the fact that, unfortunately, as is so often the case, I have committed to addressing a group of people about the workings of the Intelligence and Security Committee. That is at 4 o’clock, so I will not be able to return in time for the wind-ups, and I apologise to both Front-Bench teams and to the House more widely for that. My second apology is for the fact that, having only yesterday stepped off a transatlantic plane, my contribution today may be slightly more incoherent even than usual. [Hon. Members: “No, no!”] On cue, all my hon. Friends rush in to disagree, and I am very touched by that.

Seldom does a decade go by without one realising how brilliantly foresighted George Orwell’s classic political novel “Nineteen Eighty-Four” was for one reason or another, whether it be on state surveillance, the abuse of linguistics, or—as is relevant to this debate—the constantly shifting conflicts that arise between blocs of countries. Orwell may have had in mind the dilemma of the democracies in the inter-war years, which were torn between confronting Nazism and appeasing it, and between confronting Bolshevism and learning to live with it. Often, the reason why people found that to be such a dilemma was that they felt that they could not do both, and they were not sure which was the greater of the two evils.

These days, one might say that we are in a similar position. The democracies are faced with at least two worrying blocs: the Russia, Iran and Syria axis; and the movement of jihadism on an international scale—this is extremely topical—involving not only the takeover of Muslim countries but the infiltration of non-Muslim countries and the carrying out of terrorist acts there. Whichever side one takes as to which conflict is the more important or which enemy is the greater, the one thing we can all agree on is that we are living in dangerous times indeed. Even the one thing that everybody thought had gone away, namely the traditional cold war threat from the former Soviet Union, has reappeared. Therefore, we have to ask ourselves whether we are spending enough on defence.

I propose to adopt the Speaker Bercow speech essential that has been drummed into me over 30 long years, which is that any speech, in the House of Commons or elsewhere, should preferably have one main point. My one main point is that I want to hear from the Government that as long as this Government and this Prime Minister are in office, this country will never spend less than the recommended NATO 2% minimum.

My mind goes back—that is the trouble; it happens to people when they have been in this place for a long time—to the beginning of 2007, when The Daily Telegraph reported the Conservatives as bemoaning the fact that

“defence spending as a proportion of the UK’s gross domestic product is at its lowest since 1930”.

The article stated:

“Government figures show that 2.5 per cent of the UK’s GDP—or around £32 billion—was likely to be spent on defence in 2005/6 compared with 4.4 per cent in 1987/88.”

Of course, we know what had happened between the late 1980s and the early 21st century. The cold war had come to an end and there had been something called the peace dividend, so obviously defence spending had declined as a proportion of GDP.

In fact, in 2007, when the Conservatives were sitting on the Opposition Benches, we made much of the fact that when the Labour Government of Tony Blair had come into office they had reduced defence spending as a percentage of GDP in successive years. It went from 2.9% to 2.6%, to 2.8%, to 2.7%, to 2.7% again, to 2.5%, to 2.5% again, to 2.6% and so on. The bit we really did not like about that was that within the rough figure of 2.5% at which it settled was included the cost of the two ongoing operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, costs that were officially met from the Treasury reserve but that in reality were effectively met from the core defence budget. If the total figure was 2.5%, it did not really matter which budget was taking the cut, as it were, but effectively the real defence budget was much nearer 2.1% or 2.2%. That is where we stand at the moment, including the costs of our current military operational deployments. I must give immense congratulations to my hon. Friend the Member for Basildon and Billericay (Mr Baron), who has consistently raised that point. As he pointed out, the figures quoted in the Financial Times on 16 June suggested that

“the UK’s military expenditure will hit 1.9% of the size of the country’s economy by 2017,”

which would, of course, be below the NATO target of 2%.

I found it almost incredible that this Government would ever dip below the 2% NATO GDP recommended minimum, so I have been trying to get the Prime Minister to confirm that we would do no such thing. I have not been doing too well. There was an exchange on 26 March in which the Prime Minister said:

“We should encourage other countries to do what Britain is doing in matching our at-least-2% contribution in terms of GDP and defence spending.”

I thought that that was an opportunity for me to be helpful to him, as I like to be when I can, and I intervened and said:

“May I take it from what the Prime Minister has just said that there is then no question of the British defence budget dropping below 2% of GDP?”

His answer was:

“We currently meet the 2% threshold. These things are calculated by different countries in different ways, but I am confident that we will go on meeting our obligations to NATO.”—[Official Report, 26 March 2014; Vol. 578, c. 359.]

That sounded reasonably encouraging, but he did not actually say that we were going to keep on spending the 2%, so I tried again on 7 May. This time, I asked whether he would

“confirm that under his leadership this country will never spend less than the NATO recommended minimum of 2% of GDP on defence”,

to which the answer was:

“We are spending in excess of 2% and we are one of the only countries in Europe to do that. The Greeks, I believe, are spending more than 2% but, if I can put it this way, not all on things that are useful for all of NATO. We should continue to make sure we fulfil all our commitments on defence spending.”—[Official Report, 7 May 2014; Vol. 580, c. 147.]

My final attempt was on 4 June when I again asked the Prime Minister to give that commitment, and he said:

“It is very important to meet such commitments. We will set our detailed plans in our manifesto, but throughout the time for which I have been Prime Minister, we have kept—more than kept—that commitment”.—[Official Report, 4 June 2014; Vol. 582, c. 23-24.]

This is all very encouraging stuff and I like to think that the thing is that we have a NATO summit coming up.

[Mr Kevan Jones (North Durham) (Lab)]

The hon. Gentleman need only to look at the Red Book, where the figures used in the Financial Times are quite clear. There is no need to wait for the manifesto.

[Dr Lewis]

I am talking about trying to get a future commitment. I want to hear that as long as my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister is Prime Minister this country will always spend the NATO recommended minimum of 2% of GDP on defence. We have not quite had that commitment yet. He might be intending to make that commitment at the NATO summit and to encourage other NATO countries to do the same, in which case I will applaud him. I do not wish to spoil his timing.

I will conclude with this point: it is necessary and understandable that this country’s intelligence services have a policy of “neither confirm, nor deny” in certain areas, but I do not think that that policy will do for this country’s Government when it comes to saying how much, as a minimum, we will spend on the defence of the United Kingdom.

Trident Alternatives Review

Debate between Lord Beamish and Julian Lewis

Wednesday 17th July 2013 Commons Chamber

[Mr Jones]

I think that the right hon. and learned Gentleman has had enough time, and the time is limited.

There was another option that was deemed unworthy of examination by what is otherwise a thorough and forensic document: sending two unarmed submarines out on patrol with the intention of stepping up our posture in a time of crisis. That is the policy the Chief Secretary has just proposed.

[Dr Julian Lewis]

I read that report in The Times, and it seems to me that what was being said was that the Labour party is committed to continuous-at-sea deterrence and the only question is whether it can do it with three submarines or whether it would have to do it with four. The one thing that is absolutely certain from the report is that it cannot be done with two, yet the Chief Secretary’s position is that if a crisis arose they would step up their performance. How could we build a third or fourth extra submarine in time to step up our performance if a crisis arose?

[Mr Jones]

I know that the hon. Gentleman has studied this subject thoroughly and is an expert. I totally agree with him. As I said, the Chief Secretary clearly has not read his own report because, as the hon. Gentleman rightly says, it outlines the problem with having only two submarines.

The Liberal Democrats briefed the newspapers earlier this week that the two-boat option would be a way forward, and the Chief Secretary has just re-outlined that ludicrous policy. My right hon. Friend the Member for East Renfrewshire (Mr Murphy) hit the nail on the head yesterday when he said that it was a little like installing a very expensive burglar alarm on one’s house with no batteries and putting up a sign saying, “Burglars, come in.” The only difference is that this would be a multi-billion pound deterrent that would not deter.

Defence Personnel

Debate between Lord Beamish and Julian Lewis

Thursday 6th December 2012 Commons Chamber

[Dr Lewis]

Yes, absolutely. I believe that the Government are working on schemes that will make it possible for ex-service personnel to get their foot on the housing ladder. I look forward to what I hope will be positive recommendations by the Minister on this subject.

[Mr Kevan Jones]

I do not know whether the hon. Gentleman is aware that I started that scheme in the last four months of my time as veterans Minister, and the take-up showed that it was very popular.

[Dr Lewis]

I am delighted that there appears to be consensus across the House. Perhaps if the hon. Gentleman had been in post a little earlier than he was, he would have started the scheme a little earlier in Labour’s long period in office.

On a more positive note, Dr Milroy and his organisation recently had a considerable success when the Government acknowledged and accepted their campaign saying that minor military disciplinary offences should no longer be allowed to count against Commonwealth soldiers who, after their period of service to this country, often in dangerous theatres, were applying for British residency and British citizenship. It was a massive injustice that issues that would normally be regarded in civilian life as minor infractions and not criminal in any way were being used by, I believe, the UK Border Agency, against the applications of individual Commonwealth servicemen or ex-servicemen to become British citizens. I am glad that Hugh Milroy and Veterans Aid mounted a successful, high-profile campaign and that the Government listened to them.

Finally, I hope that the Government will be in similar listening mode with regard to a very high-profile case—I think I was the first MP to raise it on the Floor of the House—namely that of Special Air Service Sergeant Danny Nightingale. I am aware that the case is going to appeal on the question of conviction, so I will not stray into the issue of whether that appeal should succeed. I note with great pleasure that the appeal against sentence was successful and I was privileged to be present in the court. I thought it was absolutely grotesque to see a man of Sergeant Nightingale’s character and record in the barred dock of the court, but it was a great result that his sentence was reduced and suspended. He should never have been in custody in the first place.

The only point I wish to make is that Ministers should bear in mind that if the appeal is successful—I say if—the question will arise of whether there should be a retrial. I hope that, if the appeal against conviction is successful, Ministers will have the good sense to say that enough is enough and to make that opinion clear.

My mind goes back to one of the first service personnel campaigns that I was involved in when I came to this House in the late 1990s, namely the case of the two RAF Chinook pilots who were killed when their helicopter crashed into the Mull of Kintyre. That case dragged on and on, and for no good purpose. Lord Chalfont and others in the House of Lords, the right hon. and learned Member for North East Fife (Sir Menzies Campbell) and my right hon. Friend the Member for Haltemprice and Howden (Mr Davis) in this House, and, I would like to think, many of us—in my case on the Back Benches and later on the then Opposition Front Bench, where I held a role similar to that held today by the hon. Member for North Durham (Mr Jones)—pressed the case continuously. Our argument was that, given that the rules were changed after the crash so that no future pilots who were killed in a crash could ever be blamed in the way that they had been blamed, it was nonsensical and unfair that those whose case had led to the change in the rules should not benefit from it.

The same situation could well arise with Sergeant Nightingale. The Secretary of State for Defence has made it clear that he is considering—I hope that he will continue to consider it and, indeed, go ahead with it—an amnesty for other service personnel who have brought back and are holding on to, as trophies, weapons that should not still be in their possession. It would be absurd for the person whose trial had led to the amnesty—we should also remember that an amnesty has already been held locally, which led to other members of the SAS handing in a lot of unauthorised weapons—not to be given the benefit of the fact that an amnesty was now available for everyone else.

I will close as I began by saying that anything that any of us has to say pales into minor significance compared with what we heard from my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Beckenham. It was a privilege to be here during his speech.