(9 years, 9 months ago)
Commons ChamberOver the past 12 months, we have added more than 800 to the reserves. That followed a long period—a whole generation—of decline. We make no apologies for revising the age requirements for ex-regular soldiers to join the reserves in order to share their knowledge and expertise. We are looking for people with key skills and it is a waste to lose people with specialist skills in areas such as intelligence and medicine. Dare I say that my hon. Friend, with his years of experience, might have something to offer to the reserves?
We have had months of failing IT systems, targets being revised downwards and recruitment to the reserves stalling. In addition, we learned last week that recruitment to the regulars was not meeting its targets. Will the Minister confirm the speculation that is going on within the Ministry of Defence and the Army that an alternative plan to scrap the current target of 30,000 is being drawn up?
There are no plans, and no such planning is going on, to scrap the target. The number I gave earlier, of 1,490 people joining the reserves in just one quarter, indicates that things are now moving sharply in the right direction. That figure relates to the Army Reserve, but the Royal Naval Reserve has been ahead of target all the way through and the Royal Air Force Reserve is also doing well, with 150 joining in a quarter.
(9 years, 11 months ago)
Commons ChamberOn my hon. and gallant Friend’s first question, by looking back 18 months he is looking back past the bottom of the trough. The past six to nine months have been much more encouraging, and the next quarter is expected to be even better.
My hon. and gallant Friend has asked his second question again and again, and we have explained that, although we acknowledge that there are some extra costs, there is no way that we can separate them from the whole picture. Some of them are one-off costs, and some of them are connected with regular recruiting as well—we have to remind people, post-Afghanistan and so on, that we are recruiting.
The original plan to reform the reserve force stated that a force of 30,000 would be required by 2018. That was pushed back to April 2019, and last week in The Times, well informed sources in the MOD suggested that the date may well be pushed back even further. Can the Minister confirm exactly when the 30,000 strength will actually be met?
We are still firmly committed to April 2019 as the target date. As I have mentioned, recruiting has increased substantially. If we look at the latest quarter as opposed to the latest six months, we see that it has roughly doubled. Over the past six months it is up 62%, but over the second half of that period it has gone up even faster, and we expect a further continuation of that positive trend. We are firmly committed to April 2019.
(10 years, 1 month ago)
Commons ChamberUrgent Questions are proposed each morning by backbench MPs, and up to two may be selected each day by the Speaker. Chosen Urgent Questions are announced 30 minutes before Parliament sits each day.
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I am grateful to my hon. and gallant Friend for his thoughts. Let us be clear on the numbers. The Chief of the General Staff, the professional head of the Army, said to the Defence Committee on 5 November:
“Already, at the six-month point, we have got to 2,100”—
he was talking about new recruits to the reserves—
“and it is my sense that we will increase the numbers beyond the target in this year…It is not something that will be solved overnight, because we have had the last 10 or 15 years when we have not invested in the Reserve in the way that we are now investing in the Reserve.”
The point—I have tried to explain this to my hon. and gallant Friend a number of times—is that we had a very long period of decline and neglect. In setting up a new system that for the first time for a decade re-established proper medical checks and proper fitness checks, started to collate the numbers properly and so on, we had some glitches, which have been widely discussed. Most of the improvements we made have happened only in the past few months. In the last quarter, we recruited almost twice as many people as in the equivalent quarter last year. I am grateful to him for his continuing interest in the subject, but may I recommend that he does what almost every single unit I have visited recommends and visits some reserve units to discover the exciting things that are going on?
The Army Reserve has expanded by just 20 troops in the past year—20, not the 30,000 personnel promised by the Prime Minister. Capita is being paid £50 million a year to assist in recruitment, meaning that each new net recruit costs taxpayers £2.5 million. That does not include the millions spent on online and other advertising campaigns. The Minister is failing so badly, two years after the policy was announced, that the upper age limit for recruitment is now to be raised, even though, from his reply to the question, one would not think that anything had changed.
This is a shambles—yet more along the lines of the failed IT systems that wasted millions of pounds of taxpayers’ money and the repeatedly missed and repeatedly readjusted recruitment targets. Now we have the fiasco of the increase in the upper age limit for recruitment, changing the goalposts to meet the targets. Urgent clarity is needed on the level of integration between regular and reserve units following the recent statement by the new Chief of the General Staff. Will the Minister confirm whether it is now Government policy that reservists will not be called on routinely and will instead be used only in times of emergency? When was he consulted on that change in policy?
May I ask the Minister to be honest with the Army and the British people about what size he envisages not only the reserve but the British Army will be at the end of the process? He said that his policy is bold. Yes, it is bold, but it is fundamentally flawed, it has failed to be tested, and the tragic consequence will be that Britain's defence will be vulnerable for years to come.
I think that the hon. Gentleman had drafted his points before he heard my answer to my hon. and gallant Friend, so I will not repeat the same points about the changes in the system that are just coming through now and are evident in the latest quarter.
Let me deal with the hon. Gentleman’s more substantive questions. The message coming from the Chief of the General Staff has been cleared with the Secretary of State and me. We are all at one on this and I am grateful for the opportunity to make that clear. When we talk about integration, there is an important distinction to be made between compulsory call-out, which will occur only in times of public emergency—in the long term, because we suddenly hit an unexpected conflict, or in the short term, because of flooding and so on—and opportunities for intelligent mobilisation for formed bodies or individuals that will be there all the time. Most people join the reserves because they want an opportunity to deploy on operations. It may help the hon. Gentleman, whom I have known for a long time, if I give a few examples of that.
In February, under Operation Toral, the next phase in Afghanistan, a formed platoon from my local battalion, 3rd Battalion the Princess of Wales’s Royal Regiment, will go to Afghanistan with its sister unit, the Royal Anglians. We have 24 people, 19 of whom are medics, going out on the Ebola operation. In 2012, the framework battalion for Cyprus was a reserve battalion. The opportunities are there, but call-out will be compulsory only when there is a real emergency. It is worth noting that 25,000 individuals went through Iraq and Afghanistan, most of them under a Labour Government. All of them went through the intelligent mobilisation process, except for a relatively small number involved in the original Iraq operation.
My understanding throughout this has been that Labour’s policy is to support our plan in principle, while doing what an Opposition always should do: hold the Government to account for delivery. I have heard nothing in what the hon. Gentleman has said to suggest that that has changed, and I am pleased about that.
(10 years, 6 months ago)
Commons ChamberThis is not about a long-term plan; it is about basic competence, which the NAO report has clearly called into question. The report warns that there are “significant risks” to the Army’s operational capability because of the Government’s incompetence in handling these reforms. That is why we have called on the Government not to proceed with their redundancy programme until they have seen evidence that the recruitment of reserves has increased enough to fill the gap.
Defence Ministers have developed a habit of returning to a small number of stock phrases and soundbites, usually when their record is under pressure, and I look forward to the Minister’s trotting out a few of them today. No doubt we shall hear—as this has been their mindset from the start—that the Government had no choice but to make these reductions, because they had inherited a £38 billion “black hole” from their predecessors. Let me, for the umpteenth time, quote from the National Audit Office’s 2009 report. It states:
“The size of the gap is highly sensitive to the budget growth assumptions used. If the Defence budget remained constant in real terms, and using the Department’s forecast for defence inflation of 2.7 per cent, the gap would now be £6 billion over the ten years”—
not the one year that has been cited by some Government Members. No doubt the Government do not want to talk about the fact that the “black hole” has now increased to £74 billion because of the 9% spending reduction in 2010. No one seems to know where they got the £38 billion figure from. I suppose they think that if they repeat it for long enough, people will actually believe in it.
Remarkably, it was the former Secretary of State, the right hon. Member for North Somerset (Dr Fox), who first claimed, in September 2011, that he had eradicated the “black hole” in less than a year. Six months later, the present Secretary of State claimed that he had plugged the gap. Perhaps the Minister will tell us who exactly should be credited with this feat. Those two individuals have clearly missed their vocation: if they can make a £38 billion “black hole” disappear in less than 12 months, they should have gone to the Treasury rather than the Ministry of Defence.
At a time when the Government are sacking highly skilled, experienced and brave servicemen and women and scrapping key elements of defence equipment, Ministers must be honest with our forces and the public about why they underspent their 2012-13 budget by almost £2 billion. They also tell us that the UK still has the fourth largest defence budget in the world. That may be true, but we on the Opposition Benches believe such a statistic has little meaning if the allocated budget is not actually being spent, and it is on this count that the Government have failed spectacularly. They gave us aircraft carriers without aircraft. They scrapped the Nimrod programme when three of the aircraft were almost 90% complete, leaving the MOD reliant on Twitter to counter the maritime surveillance threat. They have also sacked regular soldiers before waiting to see whether increased reserve numbers would be able to meet the shortfall.
As the NAO report summarises, the Government
“did not fully assess the value for money of its decision to reduce the size of the Army.”
If the Minister reads the report, he will see that the fact of the matter is that recruiting reservists will be more expensive than having regulars, and that cost will have to be picked up by the Treasury some time in the future. I refer him to page 8 of the report if he wants to read that later.
It is clear that when deciding the future size of the Army, the Government decided on cost savings as their first principle, rather than any strategic underpinning of their decision. The NAO report makes clear on page 6 that
“The future size of the Army was determined by the need to make financial savings”—
an approach which has characterised the MOD under this Government.
Commentators and the Select Committee agree that, blindsided by the desire to achieve savings above all else, strategic considerations have been sacrificed in favour of reductions in personnel and capability. Unfortunately, some people are having to carry the can for this—unfairly, I would suggest. The current Chief of the Defence Staff offered perhaps the most candid description of Army 2020 when he told the Select Committee on Defence:
“I remember the genesis very clearly. It was a financially driven plan. We had to design a new structure that included the run-down of the 102,000 Regular Army to 82,000, which is pretty well advanced now, to follow a funding line that was driven by the austerity with which everybody is very familiar…It triggered the complete redesign of the Army.”
I have written a reply to that report because I do not agree with it, but all the report says is that there are extra costs associated with recruiting for the next year and a half until the new system is in place, and it also queries some of the figures the MOD has put forward, but it nowhere actually suggests that a man or woman who is employed only for 40 days a year could cost more than a regular soldier. It—
Order. This debate finishes at 5 o’clock on the dot, and we have not yet heard from the Minister.
(11 years, 1 month ago)
Commons ChamberMay I express my thanks to my right hon. Friend? I am delighted by that, and I know that the knowledge that the reserve units out there will once again have a powerful independent voice will make a difference. When I talk about some of the current problems, people will understand just how much that voice matters every bit as much as it did in 1914.
I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for giving way and I pay tribute to the work he has done over the years on the reservists. Can he explain why, when the Opposition tabled an amendment in Committee that asked for figures to be—
I do not think the gathering of individual statistics should be a statutory matter, but the fact is that the Government have made a perfectly clear pledge that they are going to publish them. The crucial thing from the point of view of the ordinary reservist is that this body, which is elected by former reservists and respected by them as a body that effectively looked after their interests for nearly a century, is back with a really crucial position, able to make this report. When it visits the Army Recruiting Group, it will be heard with considerably more authority when it is known that it will be put on a permanent statutory basis and will be able to tell us what is really going on. I would like to say, however, that the hon. Member for North Durham (Mr Jones) has taken a close interest in this matter, which I respect.
The plain fact is that when the Regular Army took over recruiting in 2006, the numbers collapsed. The collecting of statistics collapsed, too, and the structure made no serious effort to address the challenges it was taking on. It simply raided the budget and used it for Regulars. To provide just one example, from 2006 to this day—it is now seven years on—Army recruiting offices are open only from 9 to 5.30 Monday to Friday, so they are not even available for people with civilian jobs.
A number of other things happened at the same time. There was a steady reduction in the flow of equipment to the reserves. There was a huge cut in the training budget. In 2009, we almost lost the whole training budget for the Reserves for six months, and I pay tribute to a small number of colleagues on both sides of the House who supported us in that battle. Worst of all, from 2009, all deployments of formed bodies to Afghanistan stopped—echoing the argument that had taken place at the outset of the first world war—and units were effectively told, “You are just here to act as part-time personnel agencies for the Regular Army”. That really destroyed much of the Territorial Army’s officer corps.
I strongly support what the Government are trying to do with the reserves. The House will know how much I am in favour of a rebalancing. I also commend many things that have taken place: the equipment is improving; there has been a huge increase in the funds available for training, particularly for collective training; and there have been some interesting initiatives at Sandhurst, under the charismatic leadership of the recently appointed Commandant, General Tim Evans. He started a number of improvements in officer training, one of which was the personal brain child of the Chief of the General Staff—taking people through the training in a single eight-week package, timed to coincide with the summer vacation in universities. The pairing of units is another initiative.
The Army Recruiting Group, however, has not got its act together; it is every bit as disorganised as it has always been. I hope the House will forgive me if I give just one example in detail to show just how hopeless it is. When the RFCAs lost their recruiting brief, the requirement for medicals, which had been very efficiently organised, disappeared. Suddenly last year, as part of common selection, it was announced that the Territorials were to do medicals, too. A system was set up, using the NHS as the old one had done, but in a fashion that had not even been cleared by the lawyers in relation to the Data Protection Act 1998. It was completely unworkable. People were told to take a form to their GP and get him to sign it off and send it in. So inefficient was this system that GPs did not know what to do. If units rang up to see what was going on, they were breaching the Data Protection Act. The system was so hopeless that a unit I know well—for obvious reasons, I will not say which—that had had an average of 48 successful enlistees per quarter in the months up to that change, saw a rising trend in applicants turn into just eight enlistees per quarter in the subsequent quarters.
I could go on and on. The software is unworkable; Ministers have already acknowledged that. Unfortunately, that compounds the problems at the recruiting centres. Because it is de facto impossible for somebody to do the form online on their own—if they make one mistake, their application is lost in cyberspace—it has to be done either at recruiting centres or in the units. The recruiting centres, of course, are not available.
(11 years, 9 months ago)
Commons ChamberThis has been a high quality debate, starting with a typically rigorous speech by the Minister without Portfolio. It has been particularly noticeable that, while there have been strong speeches on both sides, all three Members who have had responsibility for this matter—the right hon. Member for Salford and Eccles (Hazel Blears), the right hon. Member for Blackburn (Mr Straw) and my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Kensington (Sir Malcolm Rifkind), who made an outstanding contribution—took the view that we have to have this kind of legislation, and that the amendments would not be helpful. I want to put forward a couple of underlying reasons why I believe firmly that we need the Bill and that the amendments—some of them, anyway—would wreck it, and then delve a little into the historical background. I am concerned that the civil liberties lobby is just a little bit too free in its claims about British judicial traditions.
The one voice that does not seem to have been heard anywhere in the debate is that of the intelligence service. Baroness Manningham-Buller said:
“At the moment there is no justice at all in civil cases where individuals sue the Government for compensation, claiming, say, mistreatment or complicity in torture. Because the secret material held by the authorities cannot be used in court, the Government is forced to settle without a judge examining the merits of the claim. This is immensely damaging”—
immensely damaging—
“to the reputation of the Government and the intelligence and security agencies which cannot defend themselves; to the taxpayer who has increasingly to stump up millions in compensation; and perhaps most importantly of all to the claimants who, while they may receive large cash settlements, do not get their cases heard and judgment reached.”
I have a further concern. A friend of mine, former SAS officer Colonel Richard Williams, who has allowed me to quote his name in the press, has recently been attacked in one of our newspapers with allegations of brutality. The allegations are lies from beginning to end. Bizarrely, they start with the claim that he is being investigated for wrongdoing in Iraq. As he has never been investigated in any shape or form, that is a lie before we even get into the specific allegations. But let us suppose just for a moment that somebody was to turn those allegations into a court case. The circumstances of the operation concerned in the allegations involve some extremely secret material—where the tip-offs came from, modus operandi and so on. Now, it is quite possible that this man, who has been decorated for gallantry and leadership twice and badly wounded—indeed, he had another operation for his wounds only last year—could find himself facing a court case while being extremely reluctant to use certain material in his own defence, because no procedure is available under which he could do so without the risk of breaching secrecy.
Does the hon. Gentleman also agree that this concerns not just the sources of intelligence, but the operating systems of troops on the ground? If anything got into the public domain—for example, about operations in Iraq by special forces—it would limit future operations, if those tactics became known to our opponents.
Of course, the hon. Gentleman is absolutely right. I used the phrase “modus operandi”. This brave officer led our special forces operation for so long in Iraq and did so well at a time when, frankly, other parts of our military operation were failing—the verdict of history is that sadly they did largely fail. The hon. Gentleman is right that this is not only about sources, but about modus operandi, but there is now a further wrinkle. Because the Government have committed to much more of what is generally called “upstream intervention”—putting small numbers of people into areas where they are not in charge or running the show, but simply mentoring, the dodgiest end of which will inevitably go to special forces—this is not only about our modus operandi, but about whether our relationships with host countries, which in almost every case will, I believe, do better in a range of different ways with advice from our special forces, will be possible at all.
I shall move on to the second part of my comments. In Committee, I listened again and again to hon. Gentlemen talking about ancient British traditions of justice. I have listened again and have been reading some of the contributions from the human rights lobby. Although they are perfectly entitled to their points of view and I am willing to listen to them with respect, they cannot claim that the current position of the civil rights lobby, which is reflected in some of these amendments, is in any way rooted in the traditions of British justice.
Let me quote what Lord Denning said in a deportation case some 40 years ago. He was speaking on the Hosenball case, which involved the deportation of, ironically, an American journalist. The case was decided unanimously in favour of the Home Secretary, but nevertheless Lord Denning felt that he ought to put some extra remarks on the record, just to remind people where the balance of British justice lay:
“But this is no ordinary case. It is a case in which national security is involved, and our history shows that, when the state itself is endangered, our cherished freedoms may have to take second place. Even natural justice itself may suffer a set-back. Time after time Parliament has so enacted and the courts have loyally followed.”
Time is brief and others are waiting to speak, so I will not go back to the earlier Liversidge v. Anderson case during the second world war, where by a 4:1 majority the locking up of everybody who happened to be German, with no procedure at all, was upheld. Suffice it to say, however, that this was the continuous view of the courts all the way through until the Belmarsh case. I will give one further quote. Ironically, I would like to quote Lord Hoffmann, one of the judges who found against the Government in the Belmarsh case, on the rather narrow grounds rooted in the then brand-new human rights provisions. In 2001, he commented in a lengthy judgment in the Rehman case:
“I shall deal first with the separation of powers… What is meant by ‘national security’ is a question of construction and therefore a question of law within the jurisdiction of the Commission, subject to appeal. But there is no difficulty about what ‘national security’ means. It is the security of the United Kingdom and its people. On the other hand, the question of whether something is ‘in the interests’ of national security is not a question of law. It is a matter of judgment and policy. Under the constitution of the United Kingdom and most other countries, decisions as to whether something is or is not in the interests of national security are not a matter for judicial decision. They are entrusted to the executive.”
The concessions that the Government have already made, even without going down the route of amendment 30, go much further than any court would have required 10 or more years ago. Whatever the claims of the human rights lobby, the British judicial system always used to understand the vital demands of our national security, and I urge the Government not to give any further ground.
(13 years, 1 month ago)
Commons ChamberThat question is a bit rich—although the hon. Gentleman is a Liberal, and we know we have to accept such things from them. I visited Colchester garrison with him, where we saw the investment that had been made not only in recreation and training facilities, but in housing. He knows as well as I do the problem we all grappled with and that the current Government are still grappling with. I understand, of course, that the hon. Gentleman is hinting at the Annington Homes issue, but to get to the bottom of that, we have to go all the way back to a decision made under the previous Conservative Government. The Chair of the Defence Committee, the right hon. Member for North East Hampshire (Mr Arbuthnot), is present, and his fingerprints are on that decision, which was not a good decision for the taxpayer and limited what we could do to improve armed forces housing. None the less, we made great strides in both married quarters and single-living accommodation in the Navy, the RAF and the Army, and it is now some of the best accommodation of its kind to be found.
Although the Minister hinted at possible future provisions, there is a question whether we should provide housing at all, or whether we should instead move to an allowance system, so that individuals have options in housing, rather than being wedded to a contract, which was also very bad news for the taxpayer.
Will the hon. Gentleman expand on how that proposal would work in places such as Catterick? It is the largest forces base and there is a huge concentration of soldiers out in the countryside with almost no civilian housing anywhere nearby.
What has happened at Catterick and in other places is very interesting. People are speaking with their feet, as it were, by commuting large distances. At Catterick, many people stay in single-living accommodation during the week or commute to Tyneside or even further afield. We have to recognise that the way people organise their lives is changing. The hon. Gentleman talks about examining how we provide housing and allowances, and we need to do that. The piece of work that I kicked off—I do not know whether it is still going on—looks at the options, including paying allowances or working with, for example, housing associations to provide accommodation where people want it. In all three services, many people are choosing to buy or rent accommodation far from their workplace and travel at the weekend. That creates new challenges for the armed forces in providing single-living accommodation, and these are things that we need to examine.
We ask our armed forces to risk all on our behalf. In return, we must make sure that we give them the proper equipment, training and financial support that they deserve. The sacrifices that service personnel make for the country are such that they should not be treated as other public sector workers. They deserve special recognition. In that spirit of recognising the unique nature of military service, I look forward to hearing the contributions to today’s debate. The debate about our armed forces mainly concentrates on equipment, and that is important, but this is an opportunity to recognise the work that our armed forces do. We should not forget that without the input of the men and women of our armed forces, some of the fantastic, dangerous and, in some cases, unique things we ask them to do would not be possible.