Investigatory Powers (Amendment)Bill [Lords]

Debate between Lord Beamish and David Davis

Report stage
Monday 25th March 2024 Commons Chamber

[Mr Kevan Jones]

First, let me put on record the apologies of the right hon. Member for New Forest East (Sir Julian Lewis), who chairs the Intelligence and Security Committee. Unfortunately, he is attending Lord Cormack’s funeral, and I thought it was important to put the reason why he is not here on the record.

First, let me refer to new clause 1, which stands in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Barnsley Central (Dan Jarvis), and say that it is disappointing that we have to have this debate. I am the longest serving member of the ISC, having been on it for nearly eight years. It is a serious Committee; its members take its work seriously and work collegiately. We work on the basis that we support the work of our security services, recognising the difficult job they sometimes have and the dangerous work they do, but that we are also there to provide scrutiny and oversight. If anyone cares to look at our reports over the years, they will see that they are not only thorough, but forensic in their approach. So it is disappointing that the current Government and the previous few have downplayed the Committee’s role.

On Second Reading, I referred to the scrutiny of our intelligence services being a bit like a three-legged stool, as we have the Investigatory Powers Commissioner, the tribunal and the ISC. Together, we should be an effective mechanism to reassure the public that there is oversight of our security services. This is important because the work they do cannot be discussed in open session, and that mechanism gives the confidence that in a parliamentary democracy, where we take freedom of speech and democracy seriously, we have that oversight. The problem with the Government is that, for whatever reason, they have set out their course to undermine our work—I put that on the record.

The new clause will say that the Prime Minister should attend our meetings. It should not be necessary to include such a provision—I believe you served on the ISC at one stage, Madam Deputy Speaker, and so you understand the work we do—but we have a situation where it seems this is seen as not important. The only one in recent times who offered a meeting was the right hon. Member for South West Norfolk (Elizabeth Truss), but that was because she was looking for friends in the last dying days of her Administration, so I do not think it counts. Again, I do not understand the reason behind this. The walls on the way into our office have various photographs of the Committee—you are on one of them, Madam Deputy Speaker—with various Prime Ministers of the day. But this is not about that; it is about the Prime Minister of the day knowing exactly what we are doing and our being able to raise things directly in our secure setting, which we do. That is important, but there is also a wider point to be made about how we scrutinise our security services and give the public that opportunity.

The amendments I have tabled also stand in the names of five other members of the Committee, and we support this Bill. Will we be back in a few years’ time with another Bill? Yes, we will, because, as was said by my hon. Friend the Member for Barnsley Central, technology is changing very fast and we will have to react to it. When the original Bill was taken through by the right hon. Member for South Holland and The Deepings (Sir John Hayes), he recognised that it would not be set in tablets of stone and that this new Bill would be required. The right hon. Member for Haltemprice and Howden (Sir David Davis) is right to say that AI will set some other tests that we have not perhaps thought about yet and those might have to be covered by future legislation. Are we reactive as a Parliament? We always are reactive, but this Bill is important because it will give our security services the abilities to react to the ever-changing world that we face.

I wish to refer to two pairs of amendments that relate to clauses 22 and 23, which go to the issue associated with the triple lock and the authorisations—

[Sir David Davis]

Before the right hon. Gentleman moves on, I wish to pick up on his point about the need for continually keeping up with the changing technology. One thing that was expected when the ISC was created was that it would become, if not quite a grandees Committee, a Committee of people who knew exactly what they were doing and took very seriously the issues before them, including the confidentiality of what they do. At least one of the Chairmen of the ISC has complained in the past about the level of redaction of ISC reports. That matters in the context of keeping up with the times because the only way the House of Commons has of understanding the ISC’s opinions is by reading its reports, and if Members are reading a lot of blank or black lines, they will not learn very much.

[Mr Jones]

I understand the right hon. Gentleman’s frustration, but, as Madam Deputy Speaker knows, there are good reasons for those redactions. The Committee does not just agree to everything being redacted; a thorough process takes place and we have some long arguments with the agencies. I would not want anyone to go away thinking that the members of the ISC are a pushover on redacting information. A lot of attention was given to why certain things were redacted from the Russia report. I am comfortable in the knowledge that the things redacted in that report could not have been put in the public domain. The main reason for this is not to save embarrassment for government or any of the individuals; it is about the ability to protect the tradecraft of our services. If we did put certain things in the public domain, our adversaries who want to do us harm would be able to work certain things out. I assure the House that we push back hard and some redactions that have been put forward over the years have been silly, as other ISC members in the Chamber tonight will recognise.

Let me get back to the issue about the triple lock, which is important. The issue is sensitive because it relates to intrusion into the communications of Members of this House and of devolved Administrations. We are talking about what is commonly known as the Wilson doctrine, but, it is like a lot of things in this age; it was announced in 1966, when it was about telecommunications and picking phones up, but we are in a different world now, as the right hon. Member for Haltemprice and Howden said. We now have smartphones, and God knows what is going to be invented in the next few years in terms of how we communicate. As with a lot of things, the convention was thought to be the way forward, but clearly in 2015 it was found that the devolved Administrations were not covered by it and neither were MEPs. The Investigatory Powers Tribunal found that it had no legal enforcement at all, so it was credit to the right hon. Member for South Holland and The Deepings and the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 that a formal process was put in place for it—that is important.

Currently, the 2016 Act has three layers of safeguards: the Secretary of State who asks for the warrant; a judicial commissioner who examines the communication that is the target of interception and the type of equipment involved, if it relates to a member of a relevant legislature; and, thirdly, the Prime Minister, who, as the final stop, has to agree this.

The Bill will allow the Prime Minister to designate “up to five” Secretaries of State who can approve the warrants in the event that he or she is unable to be available. As has been raised, the obvious example was when Boris Johnson was incapacitated through covid. When we think about the issue, this measure makes sense. The ISC recognised other unique situations when a Prime Minister may not be available, for example if they were abroad and secure communications were not possible. The ISC was keen that the circumstances needed to be exceptional, but we accept that there is a need for the requirement.

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[Mr Jones]

Victory at last—there is such power in changing one word. The Minister has given a solemn undertaking on the Floor of the House that the code of practice will change the word “should” to “will”. A small victory for the ISC, but I am sure my colleagues will take it in the spirit in which it is offered. I say to the Minister gently that we could have agreed that the other day when we met, but no doubt the issue that we will be voting on tonight was concentrating his mind.

With that great victory under my belt and those of the members of the ISC, I turn to other amendments. New clause 3, in the name of the right hon. Member for Haltemprice and Howden, deals with

“cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment”.

I understand why he has proposed the new clause. It is always worthwhile debating the issues, which run through the entire Bill. Am I assured that there are processes in place that protect our civil liberties? Yes, I am. However, there are occasions when things can go wrong or people ignore them. I think they have been strengthened greatly, but the right hon. Gentleman refers to an important point. I was on the Committee in 2017 when we did the inquiry into detention and rendition. That took a long time, but it was a good report given where it got to. It unearthed things that were not pleasant but had been done in our names as a democracy.

One conclusion the Committee came to was that in its view the UK tolerated actions and took others that were regarded as inexcusable. Well, they were inexcusable, because as the report outlined, we passed on information to allies who then used it. I think things have changed, and to give Members an example of how the ISC can improve things, we called for a review of the consolidated guidance surrounding the way that security operatives should operate regarding issues of rendition or torture. That led to the Fulford principles, which I think have moved on and tightened up the rules and guidance for members of our security services. That was a big movement forward.

I do not think the right hon. Member for Haltemprice and Howden will push the new clause to a vote, but it reinforces the point that if we have a situation whereby, again, we get information that is passed to one of our allies, we must ensure that those principles are upheld. Am I confident that they are upheld now? I think I am, but how did we get to that pretty damning report in 2017? We got there because those principles and the guidance in place were not followed. We must be vigilant about that, and over the years the right hon. Gentleman has done not only this House but the country a service through his tenacity on these subjects.

[Sir David Davis]

I will not press new clause 3 to a vote, but I tabled it because in 2010-11 David Cameron, the then Prime Minister, made a promise that there would be a review and that the issue would be investigated properly, but that never happened. The implicit undertaking was that we would not do it again, and we did it again—over and over again. That is why at some point we needed to put our foot down. The problem is that whenever we put our foot down and make an absolute requirement, somebody says, for example “What about the Russians, with the terrorist attack in the last few days?” I am afraid there comes a point where we say, “We are not going to provide information if you torture people.” If we are clear about that, it helps the country and probably also helps the international battle with terrorism.

[Mr Jones]

I agree totally with the right hon. Gentleman, and I think that is where we are as a Government. Certainly those are the Fulford principles—that we do not share information. Again, some of the people who perhaps do not understand what our security services do, and those who want to malign their great work on our behalf sometimes say, “They are doing x, y and z.” Well as I know from seeing some examples, there are occasions where we deliberately do not pass on information to our allies because of the fear that the right hon. Gentleman set out. The detention and rendition report raised that issue, and the Fulford principles now give us strong guidance. Those principles have been put into being and sewn into the DNA of all new officers. As a result of a huge training programme, not just for existing officers but for new entrants into the service, officers now see that as an important part of their work. That is how it must be done, but it is always important to have this debate.

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[Sir David Davis]

Again I do not intend to press the matter, but if the ISC discusses this issue in the future, I point the right hon. Gentleman to the German model. They look at something and do not always release information if it is operationally sensitive.

[Mr Jones]

I agree, but that then places an unnecessary burden on the system. The current process with the Secretary of State, the judicial commissioner and the Prime Minister is robust enough to ensure that people are not doing this to find out what someone ordered on Amazon Prime this weekend or to look at their Tesco account, so I think those assurances are fine.

New clause 4 would

“remove the ability of the Secretary of State to authorise the interception of the communications of, or the obtaining of communications intended for, or private information belonging to, Members of Parliament.”

Again, it is good to have this debate, but I would support such a measure for the reasons I have outlined.

The other change in the Bill concerns bulk data. The right hon. Member for South Holland and The Deepings covered the original investigatory powers in detail, but there are now big data sets held not only by public authorities but by others, and that has made it more important that our security services are able to access them. Whenever we do this, however, it means more intrusion, so let me deal with the issue of oversight in the Bill, and with the broader, more intrusive powers to obtain internet connection records for the discovery of targets.

Again, that is something that I and other ISC members totally support, but the authorisation process is internal. One stance that the ISC has taken throughout all this is that if we are to give more powers to our security services, there must be a balance. There will not be a situation whereby what people have seen can be identified, but this power will drag in a lot of people who, as the right hon. Gentleman said earlier, are completely innocent. As I said, there is a need for such a power, but we thought there should be more oversight from the Investigatory Powers Commissioner. Therefore, the points I made about amendment 15 are important.

The Investigatory Powers Commissioner’s Office does a great job of ensuring public support for what we do, but, again, there is an issue around bulk datasets. Some of the examples that were given to ISC members—thanks must go to the Minister, who arranged a meeting for the Committee to be briefed on this—make sense when it comes to the issue of low or no reasonable expectation of privacy. It is burdensome, for example, to access the electoral register, but today the Government have said that somehow that is a secret document. Well, that is not the case under this Bill, in which case it is important that the security services should be able to use it, rather than having to go through the warrantry process. That goes to the point, which my hon. Friend the Member for Barnsley Central raised earlier on, about the definition of “low expectation”.

Another perfectly legitimate reason that the security services need these measures is related to testing new AI models of learning. They need access to these new big datasets, which are out there and which companies use, and the Bill will allow them to have it without going through the warrantry system. If intelligence is going to be on the front foot when it comes to AI, we will have to have these big datasets that will teach the systems how to do it.

The problem comes back my hon. Friend’s question of what is deemed a low or no reasonable expectation of privacy. That is something we have considered throughout this process. One thing the ISC has considered is adding to the existing categories. One suggestion we put forward was that, when the agencies do this, they should have to email the Investigatory Powers Commissioner to notify them that they have done it.

Post Office (Horizon System) Offences Bill

Debate between Lord Beamish and David Davis

2nd reading
Wednesday 20th March 2024 Commons Chamber

[Mr Jones]

I think it is. In fairness, the Minister wants to get these cases done quickly, as does the advisory board. One controversial thing is that some people will get a little more money than they lost. I am comfortable with that, because I would sooner they get the money than it go to the lawyers or the process be dragged out. If we can get those cases dealt with speedily—some progress has been made on that—we can then get the effort and force put into sorting out the more complex ones.

[Sir David Davis]

The right hon. Gentleman rightly says that some people may get a little more money than perhaps come out of the arithmetic, but would most of us not pay anything to avoid what they have gone through?

[Mr Jones]

Exactly. If somebody gets more money out of this than they have in quantum lost, I am comfortable with that, as I believe is the Minister. It is better putting it into their pockets than into the pockets of lawyers, who will take their time, with this adding to the trauma that these people will have in dealing with these cases over many years.

Let me turn to the Bill’s Horizon pilot scheme provisions, because we have to address not only the Horizon scheme but the pilots that came before it. Condition E for overturning a conviction in the Bill is that the “Horizon system” was being used at the time of the offence. Clause 8 makes provision in respect of

“any version of the computer system known as Horizon (and sometimes referred to as Legacy Horizon, Horizon Online or HNG-X) used by the Post Office”.

We know that there is a difference between those pilot schemes and the actual Horizon scheme that took over—I know that, having been able to recite some of these things in my sleep.

People used a Horizon pilot scheme in the north-east as early as 1996—one went on to be convicted and others lost their livelihoods and were made bankrupt. I recognise that 1996 is the start date in the Bill, but I checked the Post Office’s website again this morning and it says that the roll-out and pilots of the Legacy Horizon system, as referred to in the Bill as part of condition E, started in 1999. So what systems were people piloting in 1996? Were they piloting Legacy Horizon? If they were, that would be at odds with what is on the Post Office’s website. I would like the Minister to refer to that and provide clarification in his wind-up, as a lot of those cases were in the north-east of England, in the area I represent.

Let me turn to another system, one that was pre-Horizon: the Capture system. As I understand it, it was software developed by the Post Office itself. I came across it through a case that had been referred to me. Given all the publicity about the Horizon scheme, it amazed me that the Post Office did not come clean and say, “Oh, by the way, we had Horizon, pre-Horizon and the Capture system beforehand.” If we look at the cases, we see that this was very much because of the attitude of the Post Office towards the prosecutions. We had sub-postmasters who were accused of stealing money and their contracts were terminated. In some cases, they were prosecuted. There was a ridiculous situation in Coventry, where a woman was taken to court and prosecuted. The judge threw out the case on the first day, saying there was no case to answer, but lo and behold, what did the Post Office do? It took a private prosecution against her to recover the £30,000 it claimed she had stolen, which bankrupted her. That shows the mentality of those in the Post Office.

A lot of those cases mirror Horizon cases. I have referred 10 cases to the Minister, five of which relate to individuals who went to prison. As I have done before, I put on record the excellent reporting by Karl Flinders of Computer Weekly and Steve Robson of the i newspaper on those cases. It has been down to me, those two and others to do the detective work, so we need the Post Office to turn up the heat and ensure we get answers. Will the Minister tell the Post Office that it is not a good idea to threaten legal action against journalists? This week, after his latest story, Steve received a phone call threatening him with legal action. That is not very bright, especially as he had all the evidence to back up his story. If that is still the attitude of the Post Office, that shows why the current management need to go.

I understand why the Government cannot include Capture in this legislation, but we need a mechanism to deal with those cases because Capture is important. I have 10 cases, but there are clearly more out there. Clause 7 gives the Secretary of State powers to make “further consequential provision” by regulation. Will that provide a potential way to include Capture cases? The Minister has all the information and he is on top of the brief. I raise the issue today and I will propose an amendment in Committee to see whether we can flesh out the matter, but we need a way to deal with those cases. I have 10 cases, but there are certainly more out there.

[Sir David Davis]

I am delighted that the right hon. Gentleman has raised that point. I referred in my speech to the 2013 BAE study that highlighted Capture, ATM cash management and a variety of other issues associated with audit failure, and basically described a chaotic management system. Earlier postmasters may not have been exonerated by subsequent analysis because people were looking at Horizon and nothing else, but we owe it to them to get this right, even if that is after this Bill has moved through the House.

[Mr Jones]

People might think that because the system is not Horizon, the Bill does not apply to them, but the cases I am dealing with show that there was an injustice. I have spoken to individuals who went to prison. The computer systems were not same, but the Post Office showed the same attitude in the way it went at individuals. It did not believe the postmasters—they were going to be found guilty, come what may.

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[Mr Jones]

I have seen some of those individuals at first hand at the public inquiry. People have said that everyone who is going to make a case has come out of the woodwork already, but that is not true. People are still coming forward. I am hearing about cases on a weekly cases. I thank right hon. and hon. Members from across the House who are keeping me busy by referring cases to me. Please send them to me—I am quite happy to help deal with them. I noticed this morning that there are another three cases in my inbox. The hon. Gentleman makes the key point that we need to look at those individuals to ensure we get some type of justice for them. I have to say that I was surprised by this, but, following the television programme, nearly 1,000 new cases came forward on the Horizon shortfall scheme alone. We may wonder what these people were doing all this time. Well, in some cases, they were not aware of what was happening. In other cases—

[Sir David Davis]

They were hiding.

[Mr Jones]

They were hiding, yes, because of shame and things such as that. It is only now that we realise what a massive miscarriage of justice this was that people have had the confidence to come forward. This Bill will help with that.

I shall come off Capture, because I think the Minister has got my point, but I return to those cases that have already gone to appeal. I do not criticise the Government on this, but we must find a system for dealing with those few cases that have gone through. It is no good the Court of Appeal hiding behind the fact that they have gone through, because, as the hon. Member for Sutton and Cheam has said, new evidence has come out of the inquiry that was not available to the courts at the time. We cannot just leave those people hanging—I cannot remember off the top of my head how many individuals there are, but there are not that many.

Landfill Tax Fraud

Debate between Lord Beamish and David Davis

Thursday 12th January 2023 Commons Chamber

[Mr David Davis (Haltemprice and Howden) (Con)]

As we have come to expect, the right hon. Member for North Durham (Mr Jones) made a wise, insightful and pretty comprehensive speech. He is right to say that we have both struggled, over more than a decade, to get the Government and their agencies to take this issue seriously. He has covered ground thoroughly, but let me see if I can reinforce his points without too much repetition.

The right hon. Gentleman spoke of the Public Accounts Committee’s estimate of the near billion-pound cost to the Exchequer each year—he quite rightly referred to it as a finger-in-the-ear exercise. I have been a PAC Chairman, and I know how that sometimes happens. That is an under-estimate. We have signals all over the place of how big this really is. Last weekend’s Sunday Express said that £200 million in landfill tax had gone uncollected in 2019-20 alone—that is, again, an under-estimate, even in HMRC’s own figures.

The right hon. Gentleman said pretty plainly—and I agree—that HMRC does not want to big up this issue and make a big thing out of it, but it admits that at least £850 million has not been collected in five years. It has gone straight into the pockets of some of our most dangerous criminals. If £1 billion was not collected from, let us say, the bankers, legal people or some other such group, there would be uproar. But here, it is not being collected from criminals, and the matter just goes by.

The right hon. Gentleman made the point about the money being funnelled into criminal enterprises, and he was quite measured in his language. He referred to the type of criminals we are talking about—the Niramax directors and associate directors, one of whom, as he said, was jailed for 15 years for manslaughter. Frankly, I was quite surprised that the charge was not murder, because it was a man behaving in a random way over a personal argument and deciding to kill the other person who was involved. That is the sort of character we are talking about. An associate director went to prison first for a machete attack and then later on for drugs. That reinforces the point that the right hon. Gentleman made about drugs, prostitution and all the nasty underbelly of society—all the nasty criminal activity—being funded and supported by the problem we are talking about. We need to bear in mind more generally when we discuss waste crime that these are not just small-time wheelers and dealers. They are not the Harold Steptoes of today; they are very big wheels, in criminal terms, and very nasty people indeed.

Waste crime has blighted many of our constituencies—it has certainly blighted Haltemprice and Howden—for many years. That is where the concern first came from in my case, as I think it did in most others. Some time ago, in the middle of battles over the Gilberdyke site in my constituency, one of the sites that Niramax has an interest in, someone from south-west England involved in legitimate waste disposal asked to see me. Since it was such a big and recurrent issue, I said, “Yes, okay, come to see me.” He came to my home and, in essence, told me that the north-east of England was rife with waste crime and was known for it. That was what he argued to me. He did not know whether it was an accident of history or whether it was because the Environment Agency was somehow corrupt or involved, or for whatever reason not doing its job.

That was five years or more ago. To be frank, the story was so extraordinary that I thought it was an exaggeration. I am sorry to say that I was wrong. That person was describing pretty accurately what we have discovered in our joint endeavours over time. For too long, the Environment Agency has not been meeting its legal and community obligations, and HMRC has not been enforcing its. I must be clear that not all operators in the waste industry are criminal enterprises—that is anything but the case—but the clear inaction of our agencies has emboldened the dangerous individuals that do run such criminal enterprises.

[Mr Kevan Jones]

I agree with the right hon. Gentleman that not all operators involved in the sector are criminals, but there is evidence that in some cases—that of Niramax and others—contracts were procured by using threats and intimidation after people had signed up to contracts to freeze out legitimate operators and lock in people who were perpetrating waste crime.

[Mr David Davis]

The right hon. Gentleman is right, and I will come back to the incentives—both criminal and legal—that are built in against legal operators.

The right hon. Gentleman also spoke about the powerlessness of communities. Again, I can exemplify that point. We thought we had scored a victory by taking the Niramax associate Transwaste to court over the Gilberdyke site and winning our case that it had breached a whole load of conditions. We won the case, but did my constituents see any improvements? No. Were the problems addressed in court fixed or enforced by the agencies? No. Did the behaviour of the operators improve? No. The courts proved powerless and so the community certainly felt powerless, again because there was no proper enforcement. That goes back to the point that the right hon. Gentleman made in response to the hon. Member for Bristol East (Kerry McCarthy) that this is not primarily about changing the regulations or the law, but about changing the mode of operation of the agencies involved.

Precisely because they cheat and evade payment of landfill tax, criminal companies can undercut other businesses, picking up waste and charging a pittance for it, knowing they will make up for it in illegal returns. In the case of Gilberdyke, locals reported that lorries were flooding the area from Wembley, south Wales, south-west Scotland and Manchester. It is expensive to transport this stuff. Why would it be transported that far unless there were some enormous unfair—not to mention illegal—advantage for the operators? That is what is going on there.

Some of my constituents who are very qualified people monitored that site and estimated that between £50 million and £60 million in landfill tax was being evaded while those lorries were flooding the area. That is at one site alone. This activity involves the destruction of my constituents’ quality of life and the destruction of the local environment, all in pursuit of illegal profits, yet so little action is being taken.

The right hon. Member for North Durham quoted the Public Accounts Committee saying about the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs in October last year that

“the approach to large parts of waste crime is closer to decriminalisation.”

I make the point, as a past Chairman of the PAC, that the PAC is careful about what it says about Government operations. It is careful that it is factually based, and it bases everything on the National Audit Office reports and so on. For the PAC to accuse an agency or Department of effectively decriminalising something as serious as this is in itself an enormously powerful and worrying statement. That quote will strike a chord with those of us who have had to observe the appalling weak record of enforcement of the Environment Agency, even with legal operators, frankly. We are not talking about legal operators today, but even with legal operators, the Environment Agency is weak, let alone those who need to be cracked down on. That fact, again, is reinforced by the data. The number of prosecutions for waste crime generally—not tax evasion, but waste crime generally—have fallen by more than 90% since 2007-08. As the right hon. Gentleman said, there have been no prosecutions whatever for landfill tax fraud.

With Operation Nosedive—like the right hon. Gentleman, I wondered about the name, where it came from, and whether it was making a prediction about its own success—I have to say that its failure was written in from the beginning. It was a failure from the start. HMRC, the Environment Agency and the Crown Prosecution Service were simply not working together properly to investigate and prosecute the gangsters. They simply were not doing the job as a coherent group of people. The NAO told me that HMRC and the CPS admitted as much, and that is why no prosecutions were taken forward. The problem is that this failure and the ongoing increases in the rate of landfill tax mean that illegal profits are only increasing. Given how landfill tax is structured, if evasion is not stopped, then every time landfill tax goes up to improve the environment, the criminal is actually incentivised more by a bigger comparative advantage against the legitimate operators.

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[Mr Davis]

I agree with the aims the hon. Lady describes, but I am not sure whether this is a resource issue for the Environment Agency—I think there is a resource issue in other areas. If the Environment Agency does its job right first time, that is it dealt with. To bring it down to the microcosm of a single waste tip, if it does not enforce the first, second or third complaint, it will have hundreds and thousands of complaints, and its time will be sucked into dealing with them. To some extent there may be a resource issue, but a bigger issue is, straightforwardly, to do with management and the determination to make the industry obey the rules and to spot such things as tax evasion. If tax evasion takes place, the whole structure she describes disappears. The cheap operator who is not paying taxes gets all the business, and therefore nothing is pushed to a better waste outcome. I take her point, but in many ways management is more important.

[Mr Kevan Jones]

On that point, does the right hon. Gentleman agree that the big disconnect is between the policy that everyone wants to support—more recycling—and not only how it is enforced but how it is monitored? The best example is Scotland’s zero waste strategy. It sounds great, but waste is being shipped across the border to the north-east of England and other sites in the UK, and there is no monitoring of that. Exporting waste from Scotland to landfill sites in the rest of the UK will not meet the environmental standards that the policy aims to achieve.

[Mr Davis]

I agree. Exporting from Scotland to England will not help at all, so the right hon. Gentleman is exactly right.

We have a ridiculous co-ordination problem in the midst of all this. The NAO told me that Operation Nosedive failed for a variety of reasons, but ultimately it was felt that defence lawyers for the criminals would be able to exploit all the weaknesses of co-ordination and data in the system. Frankly, it is galling that criminal charges could have been held back by the bureaucracy and box-ticking approach of Government Departments effectively, which were stepping on each other’s toes rather than working together.

Waste crime and landfill tax fraud are cheating the taxpayer out of hundreds of millions of pounds a year, and it is time we got serious about that. Thanks to the NAO, we know that every single year, waste crime in general costs £900 million—the PAC said £1 billion—which is a very, very large number. We should not lose track of the fact that that is an annual cost. And that is without, as it turns out, the costs in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. We do not have the hon. Member for Strangford (Jim Shannon) in his place to raise a point about Northern Ireland, but there are costs there, too. In the current climate, I can only imagine the uproar if that occurred in any other situation.

The right hon. Member for North Durham touched on the importance of HMRC’s joint unit for waste crime. The Government would like to claim it has been a success—indeed, after the first year they said it was a success—but I have to tell Members that I cannot see a single sign of success. It is shameful, frankly. This is where I agree with the hon. Member for Bristol East (Kerry McCarthy) that this is a resource issue. We absolutely need to ensure that, unlike at HMRC before, there is the right legal advice at every stage, the right data at every stage and the right investigative capability at every stage, so that, rather than saving £10,000 here and £10,000 there only to lose £3.5 million on a failed case or £1 billion a year on the system as it is, we actually deal with the issue. The current strategy is penny wise and pound foolish, and in that respect she and I agree.

National Security Bill

Debate between Lord Beamish and David Davis

2nd reading
Monday 6th June 2022 Commons Chamber

[Mr Jones]

I would not want to go anywhere near what is in the hon. Gentleman’s imagination. All I can say is: yes, we are talking about information that will have an impact not only on our general security, but on the security of individual agents and others. That is why I support the Law Commission’s recommendations to introduce a public interest defence and to create an independent statutory commissioner to investigate wrongdoing or criminality where disclosure would otherwise constitute an offence under the 1989 Act.

The absence of reform means that if we pass the Bill as it is now, there will be nothing in it to guard against large, mass disclosures of sensitive information; we will still rely on the 1989 Act. Even if somebody indirectly helped foreign powers, I cannot see how we could bring them to book under this Bill. We should support the introduction of a public interest defence, because it would make it easier to bring prosecutions. I have heard some people say, “This would really give journalists and others an opportunity to throw secrets out there.” No, it would not; it would put the onus on them to argue in court that it is in the public interest that the information is disclosed. It would be welcome, as it would ensure that people thought about what they did.

[Mr David Davis]

Does the right hon. Gentleman agree that the Katharine Gun case is a good demonstration? The prosecution was dropped at the point of trial, probably because the Government could not predict how a jury would interpret her public interest defence rights without any codification.

[Mr Jones]

The right hon. Gentleman raises an interesting point. Without reform, the courts will define public interest anyway. I would sooner have this place define it than leave it to the courts or allow an ad hoc system to build up over time. I do not understand why the Bill does not take that opportunity, because it would help. Some journalists think that it would be a way of stymieing them, but I think it would clarify the position on the information that can be put in the public domain and would actually help to make that defence. I would rather have this House than a court of law setting those parameters.

The Law Commission made another recommendation that I think worthy of consideration, although we need to work out how it would work in practice:

“an independent commissioner to receive and investigate complaints of serious wrongdoing where disclosure of the matters referred to may otherwise constitute an offence under the Official Secrets Act 1989. That commissioner would also be responsible for determining appropriate disclosure of the results of that investigation.”

That would provide another valve in the pressure cooker of the system when people think that wrongdoing needs to be highlighted.

I would love to know why the Government have missed the opportunity to bring all these things forward in the Bill. I hope that as it passes we can insert some of them: that would not only strengthen the Bill, but give our security services the toolkit that they need.

The foreign influence registration scheme, which we called for in the 2020 Russia report and which is supported by the agencies, would make it unlawful to be an undeclared intelligence officer. I accept that there are issues with definition, but the consultation on the Bill described it as a key component of the new regime, yet for some reason it is not in the Bill. I hear the Home Secretary’s promises, but—call me old-fashioned—I think we should have it before us today to debate on Second Reading.

Overseas Operations (Service Personnel and Veterans) Bill

Debate between Lord Beamish and David Davis

Wednesday 21st April 2021 Commons Chamber

[Mr Jones]

I am grateful for the Minister’s offer to do that, but the problem, which I will address later, with the Bill is that it is being done ad hoc. The Minister’s predecessor promised that investigation would be in the Armed Forces Bill. Lo and behold, it is not and has been kicked into the review. If we are really to address the issue of veterans being reinvestigated, the problem is the length of the investigations, not whether there should be prosecutions at the end. That is a judicial test. That is the mess that the Government have got into with the entire process.

[Mr Davis]

rose—

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Davis]

The bishops often vote against the Government. This is something where the military securitat—as it were—do not vote against the Government. They are people whose patriotism is unquestionable and whose knowledge is unparalleled in this area, so the Minister should pay great attention to them and take notice.

The aim of the Bill, as we have heard several times, is to shield our military personnel from being pursued by vexatious claims—I was going to say something rude about lawyers. It is a proper and worthwhile ambition and one that we should fully support. The Government have rightly made it clear—and this is the point on which I support them—that torture and genocide can never be acceptable and have excluded them from a five-year presumption against prosecution.

However, even with these concessions, there remains a fundamental problem. The Government have failed to exclude war crimes from the list of offences, as has been made clear by the Opposition spokesman. I asked the Minister whether he would clarify for me how he distinguishes between war crimes, torture, and genocide as subjects properly excluded from the Bill. Although he made a very skilful response he could not do it and I do not think anybody could do it. As my right hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Beckenham (Bob Stewart) made plain, war crimes include wilful killing: in the case he raised, the wilful killing of prisoners; the wilful killing of innocent civilians; and wilfully putting people through miserable pain or suffering. All those things are, quite properly, war crimes. They are, quite properly, things we would be held to account for by the rest of the world, let alone our soldiers being held to account by our courts and our judicial procedure.

I firmly believe that we cannot protect our own soldiers without correcting that exclusion. That is not just my opinion; it is the opinion of many of our experienced military leaders. Take Lord Robertson, the former Labour Minister—he was both Defence Secretary and NATO Secretary-General—who authored the amendment. He argued that the Bill would create

“a two-tier justice system in which troops acting for us abroad would be treated differently from other civilians in society.”—[Official Report, House of Lords, 13 April 2021; Vol. 811, c. 1190.]

That cannot be right and that cannot be just. Indeed, it is not what our troops stand up for. It is not what they fight for. When they go abroad to fight, they do so because they stand up for our civilised values, and this is one of them. There is a certain quirk to that.

The Bill must give confidence to military personnel, complainants and other countries that the United Kingdom remains a stalwart upholder of the rule of law. There can be no greater test of our national character and no more important measure of our moral fibre than maintaining the highest of standards in this most difficult of tasks. We must get this right. If we get it wrong, we will be in the shameful position—this was made clear several times by the Labour party spokesman, the right hon. Member for Wentworth and Dearne—of putting our troops at risk of being summoned before the International Criminal Court. The chief prosecutor of that court wrote to the Secretary of State for Defence. When I saw the account of that, I wrote to the chief prosecutor and received a clarification. War crimes are plainly in the court’s sights. If somebody is alleged to have been guilty of a war crime and we exercise the presumption against prosecution as stated in the Bill, they will end up in front of the ICC. That is quite clear to me. That is not a risk, but a certainty.

[Mr Kevan Jones]

In Committee, we spoke at lot about the famous case of Marine A. Under this measure, that individual would not have been prosecuted after five years, but it is clear that he would have ended up in the International Criminal Court for what he did. He would not have been given the hearing he had in this country, not just in terms of the fairness of our judicial system but also on appeal, taking into account the specific nature of the reasons why that incident occurred. To me, it would be absolutely awful if such individuals were found before an international court, rather than a court in this country.

[Mr Davis]

For people watching who will not remember Marine A, he is a marine who effectively executed a wounded prisoner and went to prison for it.

Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Bill

Debate between Lord Beamish and David Davis

Consideration of Lords amendments & Ping Pong & Ping Pong: House of Commons
Wednesday 27th January 2021 Commons Chamber

[Mr Jones]

It is, and there is another thing of which I would like to reassure the House, from a security point of view and from my position on the ISC. As I think I said on Second Reading, such decisions are not taken lightly by the security services. Senior officers authorise and control CHISs for good reasons. Do they have some difficult calls to make? Certainly, from one of the transcripts that I read, they do. Do they, on occasions, withdraw authorisation? Yes, if they think that the individual is doing something that is not justifiable or proportionate.

The other point is that we, and a lot of the Bill’s opponents, have concentrated on the security services, but remember that it will be used by the police and others.

[Mr David Davis]

As I was listening to the right hon. Gentleman’s very thoughtful speech, it occurred to me that it might be a mistake to have the same Bill cover the security services and everything up to and including the Food Safety Agency.

[Mr Jones]

I have to agree. One thing I do not agree with about the Bill is the scope in terms of some of the organisations that it covers; I raised my concerns about that on Second Reading.

Use of CHISs disrupts child exploitation, county lines, organised crime and—increasingly, when it comes to the security services—right-wing extremism, for which human intelligence is part of the suite of intelligence gathering that those services need to use. I do not agree with Lords amendment 2.

Lords amendment 4 is about juveniles. I pay tribute to my hon. Friend the Member for Walthamstow (Stella Creasy), who has raised what is clearly an emotive issue. I think that covert human intelligence sources should be authorised for the investigation of juvenile criminality only in very exceptional circumstances. But as the Solicitor General said, the impression being given again is that somehow the Bill for the first time gives our security services or police the ability to authorise juvenile covert human intelligence sources. It does not: the ability is there already.

When I intervened on the Solicitor General, I referred to the CHIS code of practice. The Regulation of Investigatory Powers (Juveniles) Order 2000 sets out the additional safeguards relating to junior CHISs. The Government need to find some way of incorporating that in the Bill. The Solicitor General said that it was rather long, but something needs to be there, to answer the issues being raised. I accept—I have seen evidence of this—that there are occasions when junior CHISs are needed: work around county lines gangs is just one example. But the provisions need strengthening, and I ask the Solicitor General to look at that when the Bill goes back to the other place.

Lords amendment 5, on judicial oversight, is important. It is important that the Investigatory Powers Commissioner looks at these issues. Personally, I am not in favour of pre-authorisation because, having spoken to MI5 and seen the transcripts of at least one of the interviews in one terrorist case, I see that these situations are dynamic. It would be very difficult if authorisation had to be obtained every time.

However, I am very much in favour of the Investigatory Powers Commissioner having scrutiny over the authorisations afterwards; that would allow an extra tier of judicial oversight, which would certainly knock on the head some of the nonsense we have heard about the Government or the security services being given the powers to murder people. I asked the Solicitor General about the annual report because it is important for public transparency and scrutiny of this place. I welcome what the Solicitor General said about bringing back an amendment on the issue. That would also allow us on the Intelligence and Security Committee to have some scrutiny.

Like my hon. Friend the Member for St Helens North, I am a little disappointed that Scotland has not agreed to this; to protect the public, it is vital that it does. However, I am reassured by what the Minister said in the House of Lords about that not in any way limiting MI5 operations in Scotland in the national security interests of the whole UK.

Finally, I turn to the issue just raised by the right hon. Member for Haltemprice and Howden (Mr Davis). If I have one big concern about the Bill, it is the Christmas tree of other agencies that are to have these powers; I have not yet personally been given a good explanation of why the Food Standards Agency needs them, for example. I am quite comfortable and satisfied not only that the security services, police and other agencies are able to run CHISs, but that they do it. They know what to do, they do it on a regular basis, and they have officers with huge experience. That gives me some reassurance that the operation of the Bill, when it becomes law, will be done properly. I would like some convincing that the Food Standards Agency and others that use these powers on a less regular basis will necessarily have that thoroughness.

Let me conclude by again thanking the Solicitor General and the right hon. Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup, who have interacted on the Bill with Members across the House, and by once again thanking the men and women of our security services.

Overseas Operations (Service Personnel and Veterans) Bill

Debate between Lord Beamish and David Davis

Report stage & 3rd reading & 3rd reading: House of Commons & Report stage: House of Commons
Tuesday 3rd November 2020 Commons Chamber

[Mr Jones]

But it really does not matter, because if my hon. Friend wants to see the attitude of the Minister to the Royal British Legion, he has only to read the evidence that came before the Committee.

New clause 2 would provide a way of ensuring that minor offences were dealt with speedily. As Judge Blackett said, this could be done in a magistrates court, where, after a period of time had passed, the cases could be looked at judicially and ticked off and dismissed on the basis that the there was no evidence to go forward. That would deal with a lot of the smaller issues. People ask why that is important, but if we look at the Iraq Historic Allegations Team—IHAT—and Northmoor, some of those cases involved assault and other things that in normal circumstances could be dealt with very quickly in a magistrates court. At least if we had a judge looking at them, he or she could make a decision as to whether or not those cases had any merit. It is amazing that the Government fail to recognise that the problem is not prosecutions but actually the investigatory process.

Then, halfway through the Bill Committee, the MOD announced it was coming forward with a review of investigations, to feed into next year’s Armed Forces Act, when the obvious place to have put that would have been in this Bill. The reason for doing that was given away by the Minister in the evidence session: this Bill has nothing to do with making sure of these matters. There is no reason why what I am suggesting and other issues around investigations could not be put in the Bill now and improve it, yet for reasons of tidiness the MOD wants to do it next year.

I have some sympathy with the MOD on that, because perhaps the best way to do this is in those five-yearly reviews of the Armed Forces Acts—and I think I have been on the Committee for every single one for the past nearly 20 years as either a Minister or Back Bencher. But the reason this Bill is before us has nothing to do with that; the Minister let the cat out of the bag in Committee when he said he had to get this through now, because one of his general election pledges was to do it within 100 days. I am sorry, but that is not a good way of bringing in legislation—just trying to press it forward irrespective of whether or not it is flawed.

[Mr David Davis (Haltemprice and Howden) (Con)]

I have a lot of sympathy with what the right hon. Gentleman is saying, but may I drag him away from his politics for a second? Would it not be very simple to incorporate the recommendation in a 1960s magistrates Act of a judge advocate general, as that would deal with exactly what he is talking about?

[Mr Jones]

It would. That and judicial oversight would improve the Bill tremendously. It would then actually do what it is supposed to do, which is stop reinvestigation and stop the worry that these individuals have, but it does not do that; that is the big hole in the Bill.

It is not as though the Minister has not had a chance to look at this. I have raised it with him—I tabled amendments in Committee, which he pushed aside, and we are going to go ahead with what we have now, which will be a flawed Bill. Once it has passed, it will lead to a situation whereby a lot of people think that as a result they have protections when, frankly, it will do nothing of the sort, because it will not stop investigations and reinvestigations. One of the worst things we can do in politics is promise people things and give them the impression that we have done something when actually we have not, because once the penny drops and they see it is not actually the case, they rightly feel very bitter.

As the right hon. Member for Haltemprice and Howden (Mr Davis) has just said, there is time to put this in the Bill. If Ministers are not going to do it in this place, they should do it in the other place, because it will improve the situation.

There is another dishonesty with this process. From, again, using the MOD website, which I do not think is appropriate for political reasons, we see there is a promise about Northern Ireland. The Minister is on record as saying that similar legislation will be brought in to cover historical cases in Northern Ireland. Well, I am sorry, but it will not do so if it is like this Bill; if it is like this Bill then, frankly, it will do nothing at all on investigations. If it is a mirror image of this Bill, all those people who think that somehow they are going to get protection will find that they do not, and that is just not fair.