Armed Forces Commissioner Bill

Lord Beamish Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 19th March 2025 Grand Committee

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

I know it will change in September, but engagement is covered. Trying to overly constrain this definition may risk suggesting that family is more of a traditional nuclear family, and it may not reflect differing circumstances, such as the bereaved or non-traditional family set ups. We have tried to reflect that in the draft regulations; again, I apologise for their being late to the Committee.

[Lord Beamish (Lab)]

I read the regulations very closely, but I am not sure how it includes engaged couples unless they are covered by an interdependence in terms of finances. If an engaged couple were not living together or did not have a joint bank account, for example, would they be covered? It used to be the fact that, in terms of considering casualties, there had to be a connection of financial dependency between the two.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

I am advised that Regulation 2(3)(a),

“a person whose relationship with A is akin to a relationship between spouses or civil partners”

includes engaged people. If that is wrong, I will come back to it, but that is the whole point of having the draft regulations before us. As I said, these regulations are draft and will come back as secondary legislation in due course.

[Lord Beamish (Lab)]

I am afraid I have to say to the Minister that I think that is very woolly. As a Minister who dealt with casualties—I am sure other Members who have served in the Ministry of Defence will be aware of this—I can say that the Armed Forces family is very complicated. At a sudden death or tragic event, various emotions come together and, unless that is defined, you will have difficulty.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

That is a really helpful comment from my noble friend. These are draft regulations; we are not going to legislate them now. The Bill will give us the power to create secondary legislation, and those draft regulations can be changed when people make various comments, including the ones my noble friend has made. Those can be taken into account and, if there needs to be change, there can be.

The whole point of the draft is that it gives the opportunity for noble Lords to make various comments on them. The noble Baroness, Lady Smith, may reflect that kinship is not covered in the way she would expect, and therefore could make that point in response to the remarks I have made and will make. That is the whole point of what we are discussing. If this draft is not drawn tightly enough, of course it will have to be changed.

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Moved by

[Lord Beamish]

3: Schedule 1, page 8, line 16, at end insert—
“3A The Secretary of State must not make a recommendation to His Majesty under paragraph 3 until the recommendation has been laid before, and approved by a resolution of, each House of Parliament.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would mean the Secretary of State could not recommend a candidate to be appointed Armed Forces Commissioner to His Majesty until both Houses of Parliament have approved that candidate.

[Lord Beamish (Lab)]

My Lords, Amendment 3— I will refer to Amendment 5 later—is like Amendment 4 in the sense that it covers parliamentary oversight of the appointment of the Armed Forces commissioner. It does so in different ways, but Amendment 3, standing in my name and that of the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, puts forward one way of achieving this.

In the Second Reading debate on the Armed Forces Commissioner Bill in the House of Commons, much play was made of the fact that the Armed Forces commissioner will be akin to the German armed forces commissioner. My right honourable friend John Healey, the Secretary of State, said:

“The role is inspired by the long-established German parliamentary commissioner for the armed forces, which enjoys cross-party support in the Bundestag and support across the military”.—[Official Report, Commons, 18/11/24; col. 75.]


He then went on to quote the present commissioner for Germany’s armed forces, who welcomes and looks forward to the new Armed Forces commissioner being installed in the UK.

Here, my noble friend the Minister also referred to the inspiration from Germany for the Armed Forces commissioner when he said this at Second Reading:

“The Bill was inspired by the long-established and successful German parliamentary commissioner for the armed forces, who has been championing and providing a voice to Germany’s armed forces for almost 70 years … Our proposed Armed Forces commissioner, like the German commissioner, will have the power to consider the full breadth of general welfare issues that may impact service life”.—[Official Report, 5/3/25; col. 302.]


So, really, the spark that has done this is the German system.

I have to say, that is where it departs a little. The German system looks at the thematic issues that will be the remit of the new commissioner and she can also look at general service complaints, but the way in which the German commissioner is appointed is very interesting and very different from what is being proposed in this Bill. At the moment, this is what is proposed in paragraph 3 of the new schedule to be inserted by Schedule 1:

“The Commissioner is to be appointed by His Majesty on the recommendation of the Secretary of State”.


So the Secretary of State will be the person who appoints this person and decides who they should be, but the German system is very different. The German armed forces parliamentary commissioner is established under the German Basic Law, which was framed in 1949 and, I think, clarified in 1956. The Bundestag parliamentary commissioner has some of the same remit as the proposed commissioner in the UK but there is the force of federal law behind him or her.

Then, we come on to how the German commissioner is appointed. They are elected by the Bundestag, whose website says:

“The Bundestag shall elect the Commissioner by secret ballot with a majority of its Members”.


It goes on to say that candidates may be put forward

“by the Defence Committee, the parliamentary groups”

or groups of members of the Bundestag for this purpose. It says that there should be no debate and that there is a simple vote. It also states:

“Every German who is entitled to be elected to the Bundestag and has attained the age of 35 shall be eligible for the office of Commissioner”.


Although my noble friend and the Secretary of State have argued that this would be akin to the German system, I am not sure that it is, given the powers, process and parliamentary scrutiny that it has. Am I surprised that, in drafting this, they have ignored the bit about Parliament? No, I am not, because the Executive are never keen on giving up power or ceding it to Parliament. I have no doubt that, following this debate, the Minister’s civil servants will come up with umpteen reasons why this cannot be done and, if it was, that somehow the earth would stop spinning and the sun would stop rising.

I have known my noble friend for many years and, as I always like to be helpful, I point out that there is a precedent already in the UK in the appointment of the Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman. I was not aware how he or she was appointed until I looked it up, but it is very much Parliament’s responsibility to appoint that individual. It is an open competition, and there is then an interview panel and final selection, which is done by the chair of the PACAC—the Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee —an experienced ombudsman, and an independent panel. In that case, Parliament, via the role of those two individuals, has a direct say in selecting that person, so I am sure that we could come up with some system whereby Parliament could have a more direct say in who this person will be. It is a new role, and if the Government are arguing that they want to mimic or mirror the German system, Parliament needs to have a role in it. As the Bill stands, it has no role at all.

I know that, in Amendment 4, the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, puts forward an alternative method of involving Parliament. We need to look at ways in which this could be achieved because, without it, the question of who the individual is—I will come on to this later regarding finance—could be at the behest of the Government of the day. If we are trying to give the impression that this person will be independent and accountable to not only the Armed Forces but the general public, and have an oversight role, having Parliament in that process is important. The noble Lord, Lord Russell, and I suggest that, before the nomination is sent to the King, it should go through both Houses of Parliament. That would give at least some oversight of the mechanism.

Amendment 5, which is also in my name and that of the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, is about the tenure of office, where again the Bill tries to mimic the German system but does not quite do it. Under the Bill as currently outlined, the tenure is a five-year term that can be extended but only for another two years. I wonder where they got the extra two years from. I think that was a suggestion in an annual report from one of the existing ombudsmen, but why two years? Amendment 5 proposes that the tenure should be up to two five-year terms. That would be in line with the German system, which is a five-year term that can then be repeated for another five years.

I accept that, with public appointments, it is important to get a turnover of people, but with this role, first, it is a new role. Secondly, the individual is not going to be a member of the Armed Forces or a civil servant, so he or she might have to take a long time to get themselves up to speed with the way in which our Armed Forces are structured and operate. That is before, as the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Stirrup, said, they get their head around the complex nature of the Armed Forces family.

The option of having an extra five years would be better. You only have to look at the workload in the present ombudsman’s report, which has seen something like a 25% increase in complaints. If this person is going to be hit with that from day one, they are going to be very busy. Added to that role—remember that this is a new and extended role—they will do thematic reviews. An obvious one would be on initial recruitment, for example. However, we have looked at this in the past in terms of the Nicholas Blake report into the sad deaths around Deepcut. The House of Commons Select Committee also did quite a major report on that back in 2006. It is sad that some of those things have not changed.

It would be in order to extend that person’s tenure. It would also allow the individual to get a quicker under- standing and be able to follow through on reports. I think some of these thematic reports will take a long time to go through. If they are going to make a change and have weight, they are going to have to be done thoroughly without a time limit that means it will be passed to a new commissioner or, somehow, they will run out of time.

All I will say to my noble friend is that I have looked at the German system; this is not the German system. It can be nearer to the German system if we make some amendments to it. I beg to move.

[Baroness Smith of Newnham (LD)]

My Lords, I will speak to Amendments 4 and 21, which are in my name. As the noble Lord, Lord Beamish, pointed out, in some ways Amendments 3 and 4 are trying to bring a parliamentary dimension to the appointment of the Armed Forces commissioner. I fully agree with everything the noble Lord said on Amendment 3.

There is no objection from these Benches to Amendment 3; it seems a very reasonable amendment. Indeed, I hope the noble Lord, Lord Beamish, is wrong, and the Box—although there is not officially a Box in Grand Committee—officials are not going to be able to give the Minister a bit of paper to tell him that there is no way on earth there can be a parliamentary vote. Some sort of statutory instrument and a negative or positive approval in both Houses seems to be de minimis. I would hope that His Majesty’s Government will think seriously about allowing some parliamentary involvement in the appointment of the Armed Forces commissioner.

One of the problems I envisage with the straightforward negative or even a positive assent is that normally in Grand Committee, when we have a statutory instrument, it feels a little bit like the Scottish play:

“When shall we three meet again?”


Very often, it is the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, for the Labour Benches—now the Government Benches —and either the noble Earl, Lord Minto, or the noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, and me. Very often, there is nobody else other than officials who are required to be here looking at statutory instruments. If we are talking about a serious role for Parliament looking at the appointment of the Armed Forces commissioner, I would like to advocate for a stronger role, which may include a committee as outlined by Amendment 4.

Amendments 3 and 4 are almost different models of how to make an amendment. The one from the Liberal Democrat Benches almost looks as if my colleagues, in drafting it, came up with something from the European Parliament, which is extremely detailed about what is happening. The noble Lord, Lord Beamish, has done something that is nice, skeleton legislation in the true Westminster style. However, I suggest that including a committee’s involvement—most logically the House of Commons Defence Committee, and maybe also the opportunity to speak to the House of Lords International Relations and Defence Committee—could be an important way of ensuring that the commissioner is a robust appointment.

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[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, I again thank my noble friend Lord Beamish for bringing his experience and knowledge of many years. As he says, we have known each other for a long time, and I appreciate the contributions that he has made in the past and will make in the future—on not only Armed Forces and defence matters but many other things.

All the points made by my noble friends Lord Beamish and Lord Stansgate, the noble Lords, Lord Russell, Lord Lancaster and Lord Wrottesley, the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, the noble Earl, Lord Minto, and the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Craig, were really interesting. Before I come to my formal remarks, as I said at the outset, I can say that we will meet between Committee and Report to consider the involvement of Parliament. At the moment, the House of Commons Defence Select Committee is how we see the involvement of Parliament, and I can tell my noble friend—this answers other noble Lords’ questions—that we will discuss the length of time and whether the Government still consider that the most appropriate period.

I say that without any promise that we will therefore change or alter it. I have heard what noble Lords have said and the points and contributions they have made. It is certainly my intention to meet to discuss their points to see whether we may move or if the Government are not persuaded. We will meet to discuss all of that.

I will just reply to some different points before I come to the formal remarks. My noble friend Lord Beamish will be happy that his amendments have at least caused the Government to say that we will have to reflect on the points he has made. He knows me well enough to know that I do not say that as a way of assuaging his views but as a genuine engagement that we can have to see whether we can take forward his points. I say that to the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, and the noble Lord, Lord Russell, with respect to the support they have given to those amendments and the various comments noble Lords have made.

I take the point that the German system is not exactly the same. As my noble friend pointed out, in the Secretary of State’s speech he spoke about our system being inspired by what happened in Germany. That is the point. It is not an exact replica but it has been inspired by it. In discussions with the German commissioner we have taken that forward.

As the noble Lord, Lord Russell, helpfully pointed out, the German commissioner sits in the Bundestag. The German model allows for their commissioner to be there and join in and that is not the role we will have for the commissioner, so again, it is different in that sense. There are differences, but the fundamental question goes back to the point the noble Lord, Lord Russell, made and that the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Stirrup, made earlier; we are setting up the commissioner to answer the “So what?” question.

In answer to the question on how the military feel about it, they are very supportive of this commissioner being set up, so that is really important. The noble Lord, Lord Russell, is right to challenge us; this is a difficult balance between independence and accountability. We are attempting to say that the commissioner has to be independent to command the respect of all of us and to do the job we need them to do: to act without fear or favour to deal with some of the very real issues we face. But we want them to be accountable as well.

My noble friend Lord Beamish has said that accountability should be done through confirmatory votes of both Houses of Parliament. The Government’s view, as it stands, is that that accountability should be done through the Defence Select Committee, with the pre-appointment scrutiny process there and its ability, once the appointment is made, to consider that further and report to the Secretary of State on its view of the suitability of that particular candidate. The noble Baroness, Lady Smith, has added another possible dimension to it. All of us are wrestling with independence versus accountability. That is a very real dilemma for all of us, but it is a balance we seek to achieve.

I will say a little about the Armed Forces commissioner and the process as we see it. I want to answer my noble friend’s question as it shows a difficulty. My noble friend asked why the appointment is on the recommendation of the Secretary of State and not a parliamentary appointment. He noted the fact that it was pointed out at Second Reading that the Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman was a precedent for the sort of process he wants. However, there are several examples of similar roles where appointments are made on the recommendation of Ministers and not subject to the same process as the Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman.

[Lord Beamish (Lab)]

There are, but there is also a very good example in the Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman, where Parliament has a clear role in appointing that person. The problem with the pre-hearings by the Select Committees that my noble friend suggests is that they can make a recommendation but it does not have to be followed.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

It is absolutely correct that the Defence Committee can make a recommendation but the Secretary of State does not have to follow it. I suggest to the Committee that, if the Defence Committee of the House of Commons said that the person who had been recommended or offered the post of commissioner was totally unacceptable and inappropriate—not somebody who should be given that position—the Secretary of State would find it difficult in those circumstances not to accept that advice, although of course they could.

[Lord Beamish (Lab)]

I accept my noble friend’s point, but is it actually in the Bill, or would it be under guidance afterwards? If he is setting great store by its role, it should be in the Bill.

[Lord Coaker]

I think my noble friend knows the answer to his own question, which is: no, it is not in the Bill—that is what he wants me to say. From his own experience, he knows that the Secretary of State said in the other place, and read into the record, the importance of the role of the Defence Committee and the importance of its recommendations. Of course, the Secretary of State is accountable to Parliament for that. In my view, if the Defence Committee was so exercised about a particular appointment and had concerns about it, the Secretary of State could of course still go ahead but it is difficult to believe that they would not consider that very deeply before confirming that appointment.

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[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

It is very tempting to say what I think about this, but I am not going to. I think the Committee will share my view that the noble Lord, Lord Lancaster, has raised a very important point and that we need to properly understand what the law is at the moment and look at his reference to what happened or did not happen in the past. I cannot, therefore, stand here and give a view, because I do not know—that is the honest, open and frank answer. But either in Committee next week or, certainly, on Report, I will be able to tell noble Lords what the situation is. At that point, I will tell the noble Lord, Lord Lancaster, what my personal view is, but for the moment I thank him for a very important question about whether there should be a gap when someone leaves the Armed Forces before they can become the Armed Forces commissioner. It is an important point of principle, on which we will get the proper legal answer.

I will now read into the record the formal pages of my brief, which is necessary. I thank my noble friend Lord Beamish, the noble Lord, Lord Russell, and the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, for their views on the Bill. I acknowledge their concern about the scrutiny of the commissioner’s appointment and their views on the length of the term. I reassure noble Lords that we are confident in the existing pre-appointment scrutiny processes giving rigorous and independent scrutiny by Parliament, with the House of Commons Defence Committee testing that the preferred candidate has the right skills and experience and giving its views before a recommendation is made to His Majesty, and a timely appointment process.

As I have said, noble Lords have made good and fair points—I have not mentioned my noble friend Lord Stansgate, but he also did—and we are happy to consider further how we can take all this forward. I hope that, with that reassurance, my noble friend will not press his amendment. I am also happy to consider further not just the scrutiny but the right length of tenure to balance the commissioner being able to effect meaningful change with bringing a fresh perspective to the role.

On Amendment 21, we wanted to say a little bit more on the implementation timeframe, just to clarify. I share the noble Baroness’s eagerness to see the commissioner’s role established and their office operational as soon as practicably possible. We have not included that level of detail in the Bill, as she points out, as that would be an unusual legislative step. However, I am happy to provide further details on the intended timeframe for employing the commissioner and establishing their office as soon as possible. The noble Earl, Lord Minto, also mentioned the timeframe.

As the Committee will be aware, several factors affect the commissioner’s appointment. Notwithstanding the role of the Defence Committee pre-appointment scrutiny, the commissioner will be appointed following completion of the Bill, and the role will be subject to a full public appointment process, regulated and overseen by the Office of the Commissioner for Public Appointments. In addition, the intended timeframe will need to factor in the passing of the necessary secondary legislation, drafts of which have been provided to noble Lords. We expect that the process will continue in 2025 and, in parallel, we will undertake the necessary implementation work to ensure a smooth set-up and a transition from the current Service Complaints Ombudsman position. Therefore, I can now confirm that we anticipate that the commissioner’s office will be stood up in 2026.

I hope that provides the necessary reassurance to the noble Baroness. With the comments that I have made on considering the points of my noble friend Lord Beamish and others, I hope that he feels able to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Beamish (Lab)]

I thank noble Lords for what has been a very good debate around these two amendments. I hear what the Minister said about this person being on a statutory footing—I think this was stressed in the Second Reading debate. When we get to my Amendment 6, I will explain to noble Lords that that does not necessarily give the protection that this individual requires.

My noble friend says that the Government wish the pre-hearing process to be done by the Defence Committee. I have no problem with that; I have tremendous respect for members of that committee and, having served on it for many years, I know the good work that it does. But what is to stop a future Secretary of State just ignoring that? That is why it needs to be in the Bill. I am not suggesting for one minute that either my noble friend or the current Secretary of State would do that, but we have to future-proof the legislation. We only have to look at the period of Boris Johnson as Prime Minister, when a lot of conventions that had been agreed were just thrown up in the air, including what the noble Lord, Lord Russell, referred to: appointments that had gone through and been agreed through the process, which were then ignored at the end.

This is something that we need to come back to. I hear what the Minister said—that the Bill is not a duplicate of the German system—but that has been the unique selling point that both he and Ministers have made about why this is needed. I welcome further discussions on the time limits and term limits of the individual, and I hope that we can consider this again. With that, I withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 3 withdrawn.

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Moved by

[Lord Beamish]

6: Schedule 1, page 10, line 32, leave out “may” and insert “must”
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would require the Secretary of State to provide financial assistance to the Commissioner.

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[Lord Beamish (Lab)]

Again, this goes to the heart of the issue of independence. I accept that the Government wish to ensure that this individual and the office are independent and cannot be influenced, or have their work affected, by the Ministry of Defence. But at the moment the Bill says:

“The Secretary of State may make payments and provide other financial assistance to the Commissioner”.


I am sure my noble friend will turn around and say, “Well, it would be unheard of for a Secretary of State to withhold money”—in a minute I shall come on to an example of where this actually happened. But I learned a long time ago in local government that, if you control the purse strings, you control a lot of influence in terms of how you can affect the actions of any public body or any activity.

Again, referring to the German system, I accept, as my noble friend said—that this is not a direct copy of the German system. But there are safeguards in the German system because it says in the federal law there that the necessary staff equipment is made available to the commissioner for the performance of his or her functions, and it is a separate piece in the Bundestag’s budget. This is the budget that is drawn up by the Bundestag. It is a draft budget that is done by the Council of Elders and is then agreed to by the Bundestag. So, again, Parliament has a direct say. It has not been down to a Minister to decide that the Armed Forces commissioner will or will not get the finance, which is very different to what we are proposing here.

My noble friend said in the Second Reading debate and again today that the difference is that this will be put on a statutory footing and, therefore, that will make all the difference. It will not. The Intelligence and Security Committee is on a statutory footing under the Justice and Security Act 2013. I presently chair the committee, and it has not had its budget raised for the last 10 years. It has now got to a point where crisis talks are taking place over whether we can carry out our functions as a committee. That is because the previous Government took a clear decision not to increase the budget, even though we asked for moneys to be brought forward. So, again, just because things are on a statutory footing that does not mean that somehow they will be insulated from a future Secretary of State or Government —I am not suggesting that my noble friend or the Secretary of State would do this—who may not like what the commission is doing and may say, “We’re not going to give you another increase in your budget”. That is the death by a thousand cuts that has happened to the Intelligence and Security Committee.

Likewise, I presume that the budget is within the remit of the MoD. I have not been a Minister in the Ministry of Defence, but I know the battles royal that there are over different priorities in the defence budget. That makes you wonder who would be arguing for this within the defence budget if it is coming across other things. Trying to be helpful, I am looking for other examples for the Minister of where we could perhaps have a different system. A different system would be, again, my old friend the Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman, whose money comes from the Treasury and is part of the Consolidated Fund, so it is not in a departmental budget. That at least gives some protection for that money. But this is a serious point, and how this can be remedied needs to be looked at.

This is a simple amendment, changing “may” to “must”, but, without it, the individual in the role would, as I say, be very vulnerable. Who in the MoD is actually arguing for the Armed Forces commissioner in terms of budget? Are they arguing for this rather than for some piece of shiny new kit in a procurement round, for example?

If we cannot have this amendment, some thought needs to be given before Report on, first, how the budget will be provided and guaranteed; and, secondly, how this will somehow be ring-fenced. Without that, it will be easy to kill this off, either by not giving it any finance at all or by cutting its budget over a number of years. Those are my points and that is the reason for this amendment. With that, I beg to move Amendment 6.

[Baroness Smith of Newnham (LD)]

My Lords, this group of amendments seems quite similar in form to the previous one. The noble Lord, Lord Beamish, has presented a modest amendment that would change “may” to “must”. The amendment I am speaking to is a little fuller; it would take more lines in statute. Although the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Craig of Radley, is no longer in his place, I stand with some caution because I realise that my amendment runs to three lines.

Its purpose is very similar to that outlined by the noble Lord, Lord Beamish. In many ways, his amendment does the job, and does so very neatly. Nevertheless, I will clarify a bit more why we feel that it is necessary to put in the Bill that funding and resources will be made available to the Armed Forces commissioner. It is precisely because, if there is no clarity and certainty on that, all the ambitions in the Bill are in danger. The idea is that the Armed Forces commissioner will be more than a glorified ombudsperson and that they will promote the welfare of the Armed Forces’ serving personnel and relevant family members, as well as promoting the Armed Forces more generally. How will the commissioner do that if they are not adequately resourced?

The noble Lord, Lord Beamish, is absolutely right: this is a time of financial pressures. There is a real danger that the sort of role that can be cut is the role of the Armed Forces commissioner. Although I know that we have guarantees that defence expenditure will be increased and that we keep talking about the size of the defence budget, it is still very small, relatively speaking. If this post is being funded out of MoD funding, there is a danger that it will not be a priority. Maybe it is the role of the Minister for the Armed Forces to argue for this post and, at each budget round, to make sure that there are no cuts—death by a thousand cuts—but I would not be so sanguine.

I would like the Grand Committee at least to think about the issues that the noble Lord, Lord Beamish, and I are raising in our similar but different amendments; and to consider ways of ensuring that, if the Armed Forces commissioner is to be brought into place, they are able to do the job that His Majesty’s Government and this Committee want them to do and which the Armed Forces need them to do.

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[Lord Lancaster of Kimbolton (Con)]

My Lords, I will be equally brief. I come at this from a slightly different angle. I confess that I equally support the principle that, whatever happens, this post must be funded; indeed, I asked some Parliamentary Questions about this before commencement. An Answer to a Question on 14 February with the reference number HL4758 said that, in 2023, the post of the ombudsman cost £1.8 million. It is anticipated that, after the changes, the annual cost will increase to between £4.5 million and £5.5 million—a tripling of the cost. Those costs are modest and, I think, reasonable, although I am concerned about inflation—as in, inflation of the number of complaints and costs. There will be a tripling in the cost of this post as a direct result of the Bill.

As I have mentioned before, the role of the ombudsman is just the tip of the iceberg. The unseen cost of service complaints at the bottom of the iceberg within the single services—we have already had an amendment suggesting that we would potentially increase eligibility, through the recruitment process, by at least 100,000—is enormous. There are no official figures on costs—well, there are such figures, but they are not in the public domain and I am certainly not going to put them there; the Minister may or may not wish to put them in the public domain in due course—but they are enormous. I am quite confident in saying that, over a 10-year period, they will exceed £100 million. That is a lot of money.

There is competition in defence for money. All I am saying at this point is that we need to find a balance here. It is absolutely right that this system is in place, that our service personnel have the ability to go through this process, and that it is fair and properly funded, but I put a plea in: at a time when there is enormous pressure on defence, we must find that balance when it comes to scarce resource.

[Lord Beamish (Lab)]

If this role works and changes the culture in the Armed Forces, should that not drive down the number of complaints coming forward? That is a benchmark for what it is going to do. The noble Lord knows as well as I do that the way in which different services deal with complaints is, frankly, ridiculous. If it were a business, it would have gone out of business a long time ago with the length of time it takes. It is not good for the victim or the service either.

[Lord Lancaster of Kimbolton (Con)]

I entirely accept the point made by the noble Lord. All I am trying to do is to put in a dose of reality as to just how expensive this process could be if we are not careful. There is enormous value in it, but can we please be mindful of balance of investment and of finding the right, efficient process that delivers value for money for our service personnel?

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[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

I thank the noble Earl, Lord Minto, for his remarks and the points that he made. I also thank other noble Lords.

Again, let me say something about the general point around the reason for the Armed Forces commissioner; this was alluded to by the noble Baroness, Lady Newlove, and referred to by my noble friend Lord Beamish. I have made my point. The noble Baroness and my noble friend were at Second Reading, so they know that I made the point about the statutory footing for the post then.

This is my personal view, as well as a ministerial view: it is of huge significance when the British Parliament, because of its concerns about some issues happening in the Armed Forces, establishes a statutory person or body—I forget the legal term—to undertake investigations into issues of general welfare concerns that can be raised by a wide cohort of regulars, reserves and their families. It has been given a statutory footing, rather than being a single response to a particular horrific event, although of course it is important to have an inquiry if something happens. To have a standing statutory office responsible for dealing with some of the issues that we have talked about and are all appalled about, with a statutory legislative basis, is significant.

I can take off the ministerial hat and become a citizen—and it means something for the vast majority of the people in this country to say that the legislative will of Parliament is that a statutory body has been set up to do something. The noble Lord, Lord Russell, raised the issue of culture. The statutory body or office of the Armed Forces commissioner will make a significant difference to individual investigations. As well intentioned and important as they are, although they can shine a light, they cannot get to an overall pattern of dealing with issues that arise and are brought to their concern. My noble friend raised the issue of it being statutory. I realise and agree that, on its own, that does not matter and will not make a difference, but it is of huge significance as a starting point for setting up the office.

I will deal with the particular points as I go through, and I want to take up a point that the noble Baroness, Lady Newlove, made. Part of what we have in the Bill is the ability to have transition arrangements, moving from the end of the term of the Service Complaints Ombudsman at the end of 2025 to the new arrangements —the transition to the office that we want to set up in early 2026 to try to overcome any particular problems that occur. I take her point about trying to ensure that we get that office up and running as quickly as possible, notwithstanding the fact that, when you set something up new, there are inevitably things that come up. But I thank her for raising that point. I shall come to the point on resources when I have made some general points, and come back to other points that noble Lords have made.

Amendments 6 and 7 relate to the financial resources available to the commissioner. Both amendments aim to ensure that the commissioner has sufficient funding. The noble Baroness’s amendment would also ensure that they have practical assistance now and in the future to undertake their functions.

I reassure my noble friend Lord Beamish and the noble Baroness that I fully support and share their intentions. It is crucial that the commissioner has the tools that they need, and the Bill has been designed to ensure that that is the case. Therefore, the intent behind this amendment is critical and acutely observed.

I want to point something out to noble Lords and try to answer the points that they are raising. The Secretary of State has an obligation in Clause 4, under new Section 340IA(7), to

“co-operate with the Commissioner so far as is reasonable”.

It says that the Secretary of State

“must, in connection with an investigation … give the Commissioner such reasonable assistance as the Commissioner requests”.

That ensures that they have the necessary assistance from the Secretary of State to conduct their work effectively. In that instance, in dealing with investigations, the word “must” is included.

[Lord Beamish (Lab)]

If it is already in part of the Bill, I cannot see any reason why the Minister should not include the amendment. He may wish to do what the department has already done in the briefing note that it gave us at the Ministry of Defence, in which it used “will”. I would settle for “will”.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

We are trying to say that we certainly wish to see the investigative work of the commissioner funded. Therefore, “must” is appropriate in that particular instance, so we have included it there.

Should the commissioner feel that their funding was insufficient to carry out their functions effectively, they will have the opportunity to raise this in their annual reports, which are presented to Parliament. As I have said, the Secretary of State is accountable to Parliament, and this mechanism would give the ability to scrutinise and challenge any funding decisions. I suggest that a Secretary of State would find it quite difficult to defend themselves against the charge that an Armed Forces commissioner reported to Parliament in their annual report that they had been insufficiently funded to undertake the requirements expected of them.

As the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, and other noble Lords highlighted, the Explanatory Notes estimate that the running costs of the commissioner may be in the region of £4.5 million to £5.5 million. This represents a significant increase in the funding for the ombudsman, which was £1.8 million in 2023—a point that the noble Earl, Lord Minto, noted. While wholly independent of the MoD in their role, the commissioner will still be required to abide by the financial rules, regulations and procedures laid down by both His Majesty’s Treasury and the MoD in the commitment of their financial resources.

I hope that this provides some reassurance to my noble friend, the noble Baroness and other noble Lords on the Committee. As I say, we intend to ensure that the commissioner has adequate funding and practical support, both now and in future. With that, I ask my noble friend to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Beamish (Lab)]

I am very grateful to my noble friend, but the quick answer is: no, it does not. There is a point that I think he is missing. I say this with no disrespect to him or the current Secretary of State but, as Robin Day famously said, he, like all of us, is a here today, gone tomorrow politician. We have to ensure in legislation that this continues on into the future.

The Minister gives an optimistic view that, somehow, having a statutory basis for this gives it some type of protection. Well, I am sorry, but I gave the example of the ISC—it does not, and I assure him of that. He said that the commissioner could raise this in an annual report, but I suggest that he reads at least the last eight years of the annual reports and statements—one is coming out next week—of the Intelligence and Security Committee, where this point has been made constantly and ignored by the last Government. That is a body that is on a statutory footing. Not wanting to get in the hierarchy of scrutiny, I note that you could argue that that is a little different to what we suggest here—but, obviously, for the victims, it is not. So, without that, the Minister may be fine, but I am looking to the future.

We perhaps have to have discussions about this. If the Minister has already given us a briefing note saying “will”—the noble Lord, Lord Russell, argued that—I would be happy with “will”, because that at least defines it compared to “may”. Discussion needs to be had about where it is within the MoD budget because, as the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, said, you suspect that the Min AF or Veterans Minister will argue for this department, but they are the only voice in there doing that.